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A B S T R A C T 
 
This work examines the change-of-position (loss of enrichment) defence comparatively 
in five jurisdictions, namely South Africa, Brazil, England Canada and USA. It advances 
a three-part argument which contends, first, that when a legal system opts for a general 
enrichment principle, it must equally limit it with defences. Secondly, that once the 
limiting mechanisms are chosen, the system must demarcate their contours and establish 
the inevitable exceptions. Thirdly, that legal system, as a consequence, must also decide 
whether to require a symmetric ‘gain-loss’ situation, i.e., whether to insist that the 
measure of recovery be limited by the plaintiff’s loss. If it chooses a symmetry ‘gain-
loss’, that system might face difficulties avoiding a passing on defence, as the reverse 
face of change-of-position on the plaintiff’s side, thereby p tentially undermining 
indirectly the principle of legality. If it departs from that symmetry, the passing on 
defence may ‘normatively’ be ignored, unless for policy reasons it opts to have it.  
The study concludes that South Africa is bound to adopt explicitly a general principle of 
unjustified enrichment with change of position as the general defence applicable to all 
unjustified enrichment claims, save to claims arising from failed bilateral agreements. 
The study recommends that South Africa may give limited recognition to the passing on 
defence in its private law of unjustified enrichment where policy considerations do not 
militate against its application.  
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R  E  S  U  M  O. 
Esta obra aborda comparativamente a defesa da perda do enriquecimento (mudança de 
circunstâncias) no direito do enriquecimento injustificado em cinco paises. Se argumenta de 
forma tripartida que: primeiro, quando um ordenamento jurídico optar pelo princípio geral contra 
o enriquecimento injustificado, deve também limitá-lo com defesas. Em segundo lugar, uma vez 
que os meios de limitação forem escolhidos, tal ordenamento deve igualmente estabelecer os
parâmetros de tais limitações e indicar as inevitáveis excepções. Em terceiro lugar, como
consequência de tais escolhas, deve-se também decidir se no instituto do enriquecimento 
injustificado há uma necessidade da simetria ‘ganho-perda’, isto, se é mesmo indispensável que 
a medida do enriquemento seja sempre igual ao (ou limitada pelo) valor que o queixoso perdeu. 
Se a simetria ‘ganho-perda’ for escolhida como condição necessária, a consequência será que o
ordenamento jurídico enfrentará impasse em evitar a defesa de ‘passing on’ [“transferência do
encargo”], como a outra face da medalha da defesa da perda do enriquecimento do lado do
queixoso (or seja, não pode pedir que lhe seja restituido o que você não perdeu por ter 
‘transferido o encargo’ a outros, por exemplo os consumidores), e como efeito collateral o 
princípio de legalidade será indiretamente violado. Se, ao contrário, se dispensar a simetria
‘ganho-perda’, a defesa de ‘passing on’ pode ser normativamente ignorada, a não ser que se
decida tê-la por razão de política legal interna.  
O estudo conclui que o direito sul-africano inspirando-se nos direitos dos paises que serviram de 
comparação está destinado a optar explicitamente pelo princípio geral contra o enriquecimento 
injustificado e que a defesa da mudança de circunstância deverá ser sua defesa geral para
limitar tal instituto, excepto em acções que são consequências de contratos bilaterias falidos. O
estudo recomenda que o direito sul africano pode aceitar no seu ordenamento jurídico de forma 
limitada a defesa de ‘passing on’ desde que não haja razões de política interna que impeçam
sual aplicação.  
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viii
Citation Method used in the Thesis. 
The following approach is used in citation throughout this thesis: 
1 – Journals:  The title of the article is not cited in the footnotes. Full 
citation appears in the Bibliography at the end of the thesis. In the 
footnotes only the author’s name, the year of publication, the volume and
the page in which the article appears are cited. 
2 – Books: The author’s name, the title of the book in italic, edition if any, 
publication year and the page are cited. The Publisher and local of 
publication appear in the Bibliography. 
3 – Chapters in Books:  The author of the chapter (article), the title of the 
chapter (or article) in single inverted comas, followed by the book editor(s), 
the title of the book, year of publication, and the page in which the chapter 
appears are cited. Full citation is provided in the Bibliography. 
4 – Encyclopaedia: The title of the Encyclopaedia, volume, year of
publication (if available) and paragraph (par. or §) in which the text appear 
are cited. If the Encyclopaedia has an editor or reviser, the reviser’s name, it 
is also cited. 
5 – Online material: The materials are cited as they appear online, and the 
URL given, and the last time the article was retrieved is also given. 
6 – Codes:  Are cited as they are cited in their respective jurisdiction.  
7 – Cases: Court Judgments (known in Portuguese as “acordões”, or 
“arrêt” in French) are cited as in their respective jurisdiction.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
‘Jure naturae aequum est, neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem’.’*
 
A.  General Considerations. 
 
This thesis examines the change-of-position (loss of enrichment) defence comparatively 
in five jurisdictions, namely: England, Canada, United States of America, Brazil and 
South Africa. It puts forward a three-part argument which contends, first, that when a 
legal system opts for a general enrichment principle, it will be forced to curb that wide 
principle with general defences to avoid the potential pitfalls of a principle intrinsically 
intertwined with equitable traits. Secondly, that once the limiting mechanisms are chosen, 
the system will be forced to explore the contours of the limiting techniques and establish 
the inevitable exceptions. Thirdly, that legal system, as a consequence, will also be forced 
to decide whether to require in all and any enrichment claims a symmetric ‘gain-loss’ 
situation, i.e. whether to insist that the measure of recovery be limited by the plaintiff’s 
loss and thereby recognizing a loss of enrichment or a ‘change-of-position’ defence. 
 
If it chooses a symmetry ‘gain-loss’, the sequel might be that that system will find it 
difficult to avoid a passing on defence, as the reverse face of change of position on the 
plaintiff’s side, thereby potentially undermining the principle of legality indirectly. If it 
departs from the symmetry ‘gain-loss’, then the passing-on defence may normatively be 
ignored altogether, unless for policy reasons it opts to have it.  
 
What, then, is a change-of-position defence? As it will be shown in detail throughout the 
thesis, change-of-position or loss of enrichment1 is a ‘positive defence’2 in terms of 
                                                 
*  D.  50. 17. 206. 
1  ‘Change of position’ and ‘loss of enrichment’ will interchangeably be used, though the concepts have 
subtle differences, which are explained in chapter one. The same applies to ‘unjust’ and ‘unjustified 
enrichment’ whose differences are also explained in chapter one. It is not the objective of this thesis to 
concentrate on those differences, though in some specific instances they may be relevant to the theme of 
the thesis. When that occurs, the subtle differences will be highlighted in loco. 
2 Throughout the thesis I will prefer the labels ‘positive defence’ / ‘negative defence’ to that used in 
American jurisprudence ‘affirmative defence’ to describe the same phenomenon, though the conceptions 
will not substantially differ. The choice is simply to avoid a possible cliché with the notion of ‘affirmative 
action’ in public law, even if it might appear distant from the field under discussion. 
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which the defendant ‘acknowledges’ the validity of the plaintiff’s claim, but he 
nevertheless pleads to be exonerated from the liability to restore in full or in part the said 
enrichment due to changed circumstances that would render it ‘inequitable’ for him to 
account to the plaintiff. However, as will be demonstrated, the defence is not uniformly 
understood in all legal systems.  
It is hardly contestable today that common law and civil-law jurisdictions ultimately trace
their law of unjust or unjustified enrichment to the same idea, albeit that the vicissitudes
of history have caused each to develop along differing lines. This common origin is 
reflected in the objection that most legal systems show to those who would benefit at 
others’ expense without justifiable reasons.3 However, when it comes to the defences 
available to those who might have reasons not to restore all or part of a ‘benefit’ that has
fallen into their hands because some subsequent event might have happened, there is less 
common ground.4 It appears that these differences are, inter alia, related to the way the 
whole law of unjustified enrichment is conceived5 in these jurisdictions, the process
through which it developed and other externalities.6 The differences include the 
definition of what should be returned, that is to say, whether it is the object itself or its 
value; and if it is the value, when that value is to be assessed; and if the object no longer 
exists, what should be done and how it is to be done. 
These differences in how unjustified enrichment is understood obviously have a bearing 
on the defences that are available to resist an unjust/unjustified enrichment claim, 
3  See Section 1, of the American Restatement of the Law of Restitution: Quasi-contracts and Constructive 
Trusts (1937) (hereinafter to be cited as ‘Restatement of Restitution’ (1937)): ‘A person who has been 
unjustly enrichment at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other’; Art 884 of the 
Brazilian Civil Code 2002 (infra note 606 [item 4.2.2.3(A) and 4.2.2.3(B)]) and contrast this to its 1916 
Civil Code, art. 964. 
4 Compare Art. 885 Brazil Civil Code 2002, and Section 142 of the American Restatement of Restitution (1937). 
5  See e.g. A. Burrows (1983) 99 LQR 217; Woolwich v IRC (1992) 3 All ER 737 at 752g and 759h (per 
Lord Goff). In this case, Lord Goff refers constantly to the ‘structure’ of the law of restitution, thereby 
implying that the subject has a distinct existence and its own framework. See also P. Watt (1991) LRQ 521. 
For Canada, see A. Drassinower (1998) Univ. Toronto LJ 459-488;  L.D. Smith ‘Property, Subsidiarity and 
Unjust Enrichment (2000) Oxford University Comparative Law Forum 6 at www.ouclf.iuscomp.org/‘; For 
South Africa see D. P. Visser 1992 Acta Juridica 203, 209-210. 
6 See P. B. H. Birks, ‘The Foundations of Unjust Enrichment: Six Centennial Lectures (2002) p. 2 why the 
Reporters of the 1937 Restatement of Restitution changed the name of the document at the last moment. 
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especially those termed as ‘positive’ (affirmative) defences.7 For instance, if the law of 
unjustified enrichment is seen as a gap-filling or a residual subject, as some legal systems 
do,8 it may not recognise certain remedies or provide protection in some cases meriting 
it. Furthermore, if the subject matter does not have ‘its own structure’ and its own 
framework9 which is different from the other areas of obligations, the effect that that 
view will have on the defences will differ greatly from a system that recognises its 
autonomous existence.   
Thus far South Africa neither explicitly recognises a general enrichment claim,10 nor 
does it delineate the scope of its loss of enrichment defence, and its jurisprudence is 
almost entirely silent on where it stands as to the availability or otherwise of a passing-on 
defence in enrichment claims. In the writer’s view, if these gaps in the structure of South 
African law are filled in, the effect might be the emergence of a more dynamic 
enrichment law that would put South Africa on a par with other developed legal systems, 
revolutionizing the field as an independent branch of the law of obligations and giving 
the courts a wider basis to develop the common-law. 
                                                 
7  A. Kull (1995) 83 California LR 1191, 1232. They are so called ‘affirmative defences’ because in their 
operation they invite a balance of equities between the parties, in that the defendant concedes (or ‘affirms’) 
that he received a benefit of a kind for which the plaintiff might ordinarily recover in unjust enrichment; 
nevertheless he pleads that the circumstances make it inequitable to hold him liable. 
8  Restatement of Restitution (1937) § 142; For South Africa see again  D. P. Visser 1992 Acta Juridica 
175. For Canada see Rural Municipality of Storthoaks v Mobil Oil Canada Ltd (1976) 2 SCR 147; For 
England Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale (1991) 2 AC 548 (HL). The Brazilian CC of 2002 in art. 238 also 
sanctions ‘loss of enrichment’ as a defence where the defendant is unable to perform due to an 
impossibility ‘mostly’ arising from a ‘casus fortuitous’. But see chapter 4 below on the limitations of this 
approach where I discuss its shortcomings on the understanding of § 818(III) BGB.  
9  This situation is being slowly changed, and more and more countries in both common law systems and 
civil-law system are now converging again.  ‘Without juristic reason’ is still where the main differences 
remain. The Canadian, as we shall see later have advanced to ‘without juristic reason’; England, Australia 
and New Zealand and most States in the USA retain the ‘unjust factor’ approach, although the 
interpretation given to the ‘unjust factors’ may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (exception in USA 
include Louisiana, North Dakota, Arizona and Delaware, states that embrace the ‘absence of basis’ 
approach). In England the situation is currently somewhat ambivalent as the ‘without legal basis’ approach 
seems to be coexisting with the ‘unjust factor’ approach. (See P. B. H. Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2005) 
116-117; T. A. Baloch (2007) 123 LQR 636). 
 
10 On the need of such general enrichment action, see among others P. O’Brien (2000) TSAR 752-760 and 
other sources cited there; D. P. Visser Unjustified Enrichment (2008) discusses the issue extensively in the 
various chapters of the book and what manifestation the principle may have in the law.  
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B.  Structure and Organization of the Thesis.  
This thesis examines the change-of-position defence in the various jurisdictions under 
consideration on the basis of the following structure: 
Chapter one presents in detail what the defence is and examines its historical 
development in both common-law and civil-law systems. It also offers a brief historical 
overview of the development of the enrichment doctrine in both legal families, as well as 
a brief contrast of the ‘unjust factor’ approach (and describes its current situation) against 
the ‘negative approach’ (the sine causa approach) of the civil-law systems. 
Chapter two explores the relationship of change of position with other enrichment 
defences, and seeks to establish the scope and ambit of change of position within all 
enrichment defences, before the thesis proceeds to analyse the availability of the defence, 
or otherwise, where public bodies are concerned.  
Chapter three explores the difficulties of enrichment liability arising from ineffective 
bilateral agreements. It analyses the synallagmatic return of benefits received and the 
allocation of risk in instances where performance has become impossible. Where 
performance became impossible, and no risk allocation was agreed between the parties, 
the thesis contends that the risk of loss should be allocated to the party who has/had 
control at the time of the loss and could reasonably have insured against the loss. The 
thesis, however, also contends that before the courts allocate the risk to such a party, due 
consideration must be given to the nature of the risk, whether it was endogenous or 
exogenous, as well as to clearly establishing the superior risk bearer. This chapter 
concludes that, in bilateral agreements, the defence of change of position (loss of 
enrichment) is not to be made available to the plaintiff, thereby establishing an important 
exception to the general defence that is noted throughout the thesis. 
Although change-of-position is conceived as a general limiting mechanism to the action, 
it is not the only limiting defence and, if a jurisdiction does not directly recognise change-
of-position, it will still limit the general enrichment action in other ways. Therefore 
chapter four looks at a specific jurisdiction (Brazil) that has recognised a general 
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enrichment action without recognizing a general defence of change of position explicitly. 
The examination proceeds by first making a structural analysis of this jurisdiction’s 
enrichment law as a whole, its nomenclature and underlying issues and conceptions; 
secondly, it explores certain other defences, and draws a tentative inference as to a 
possible subtle change-of-position application. The chapter ends by exploring the 
implications of attaching the expression ‘updating monetary value’ to the general 
enrichment action and how to measure the sum of interest payable (if claimable) in an 
enrichment claim where the principal sum has been adjusted.   
 
Chapter five replicates the structure followed in chapters two and three above and 
essentially analyses the application of enrichment principles in the public-law sphere, 
with particular emphasis on the situation where taxes have been collected by public 
authorities, which are subsequently declared as ‘inappropriately charged’. Its main focus 
is the defence of passing on, the merits and demerits of such defence, and the contention 
that it is a specific manifestation of the defence of change of position. The underlying 
principles of this defence and, obviously, its relationship to change-of-position and the 
desirability or otherwise of their coexistence in the enrichment law are explored. It is 
contended that passing on should not be accepted, not because it is in principle 
undesirable, but rather on account of the near impossibility of establishing the necessary 
proof that its requirements have been satisfied, although the thesis concludes that such 
complexities may be overstated. It therefore argues that the rejection of the defence  
should be qualified and due consideration given to the availability of the defence if the 
imposts at issue were not meant to be passed on, but were nevertheless passed on in 
circumstances where the claimant used ‘mark-up pricing’ in the operation of its business.  
 
Chapter six concludes the thesis. By virtue of the thesis using a ‘built-in’ 
recommendation approach which appears at the end of each chapter, each chapter’s 
conclusion, therefore, presents the main finding in respect of that particular aspect of the 
doctrine of change of position. Consequently, chapter six, as a general conclusion, is 
essentially, the summation of these findings and recommendations plus any other 
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pertinent issues11 and suggestions that may not have been extensively summed up in the 
main body, and which were deemed necessary or useful to highlight at this stage. 
 
C.  Methodology.   
 
 
As a comparative study, the dissertation focuses on the landmark decisions and 
enactments on the issues in each jurisdiction, whenever they are available. In the case of 
Brazil, where neither court decisions nor legislation relating to this topic expressly exists, 
the focus is on the academic approach to the issue (‘a doctrina’ for Brazilians). Thus, for 
Brazilian law, the spotlight is on its new Civil Code provisions on ‘enriquemento sem 
causa’ or related provisions.  For England, Canada, United States, and South Africa the 
decisions of the highest courts, coupled with Law Commission’s Reports or Restatements 
of the Law, where available, and the common-law answers are scrutinised. The thesis 
therefore applies a combination of deductive and inductive research methodology in 
assessing each substantive aspect, depending on the aspect being analysed and/or the 
jurisdiction under consideration. 
 
A recurring problem in the development of the thesis was the question whether an 
institution or a particular aspect of the law in one legal system had an equivalent in the 
other legal systems under analysis, which could enable a proper comparison. If it did not 
have any, one had to find ways to discover how such a system deals with similar factual 
scenarios. In other words, the issue that the thesis confronted from the outset was the 
comparability of the laws themselves. As legal systems rest on different philosophical 
principles and different modes of societal organization, it was important to be alert to the 
danger of value judgment12 and the temptation of ascribing one’s own perception of 
reality to a foreign legal system based on a different culture and a different way of life, or 
perhaps being in a process of transformation. This aspect became extremely relevant 
when dealing with Brazilian law, as this legal system does not even mention loss of 
enrichment/change-of-position as a defence. Hence, in order to proceed, the analysis had 
                                                 
11  Examples that fall within this aspect are ‘inflation’ and ‘revalorization’ of a currency. 
12 On dangers of value judgment in comparative law see G. Canivet (2006) 80 Tulane LR 1377, 1396-97. 
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to consider the different philosophical principles and guiding norms and values that 
inform this legal system. The same was true of the American legal system, the guiding 
philosophy of which, at least in so far as the unjust enrichment doctrine is concerned, is 
founded on principles abhorring non-consensual transfers and forced exchanges,13 or as 
Henry Matter14 puts it, on the goal of protecting autonomy (or liberty), the principle of 
minimal coercion and the ‘non-harm’ rule unless justified by a higher-priority interest. 
 
D.  Nomenclature and Terminology. 
 
Dealing with five diverse jurisdictions spread over three continents and whose laws have 
different historical roots, it is, of course, to be expected that there will be, on the one 
hand, different nomenclature for the same institutes or doctrines and, on the other hand, 
completely different meanings or with no equivalents. The thesis does not dwell on the 
terminological differences, although it does mention them briefly when encountered and 
explains the basic difference in loco whenever necessary. Nevertheless, for the purposes 
of this study as a whole, some terminological differences are ignored and the terms from 
both civilian and common law jurisdictions are used interchangeably. Thus change of 
position, disenrichment, change of circumstances, and loss of enrichment mean the same 
thing in the thesis unless the context shows otherwise; the same applies to unjust 
enrichment and unjustified enrichment as they refer to the subject as a whole. Other 
minor differences are explained in loco whenever they are used. The thesis uses only ‘he’ 
and ‘him’ for elegance’s sake instead of the ‘he/she’ and ‘him/her’ binary. The female 
gender is implied whenever ‘he’ and ‘him’ is used unless the context indicates otherwise.  
 
                                                 
13 M. P. Gergen (2005) 13 RLR 224, 225. For example, though the principle against forced exchange runs 
throughout the whole unjust enrichment doctrine, under the proposed § 34 of the new Restatement (Third) 
of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (Tentative Draft 3, illustration 3, 4, and 5), the principle against 
forced exchange is ‘violated’. In this section the Drafters of the new Restatement concede that the court 
must be allowed to ‘impose a forced exchange on the defendant in cases where it is required to put a 
reasonable value on the performance’. Such possibility arises mainly in situations of partial performances 
of failed agreements in which the performance cannot be returned in species, and the defendant must be 
paid to claim for non-conforming performance, and where the defendant’s obligation cannot be derived 
from his agreement.  
14 (1982) 92 Yale LJ 14, 42. 
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CHAPTER I. 
 
A HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS OF THE CHANGE-OF-POSITION DOCTRINE.  
 
 
1.0. Introduction. 
 
When X (the plaintiff) claims that Y (the defendant) has something which he is not 
entitled to keep as his, there are instances in which Y, though acknowledging the validity 
of the claim, i.e, that he has been enriched at the plaintiff’s expense and in all probability 
without ‘justification’15and that the retention of such enrichment in the circumstance 
would be inequitable, he may nevertheless still be able to plead that he is no longer 
enriched. This is the change-of-position defence. Generally, this defence balances the 
plaintiff’s interest in recovering the wealth transferred against the defendant’s interest in 
being able to deal with what he honestly believes to be his. The balancing of the 
plaintiff’s and defendant’s interests are a clear manifestation of the equitable principles in 
which an enrichment claim itself is rooted, and such balancing is only possible because of 
the underlying idea that, where the equities are held to be equal, the loss should lie where 
it falls. Obviously, if the equities favour the defendant, he should also be able to prevail 
because the claim itself asserts that the plaintiff is to recover when it is equitable to do so.  
 
The need of comparison overwhelmingly (though not exclusively) arises in regard to 
mistaken payments of money, where the likelihood of ‘inevitable loss’ to any one of the 
litigants figures prominently. As will be seen later in this chapter, some early 
interpretations of the defence have indeed held that if the right to recover money paid 
under mistake, for example, is to be measured by an ‘equitable’ principle, it is logical that 
an ‘equitable’ defence should also adhere to this principle16 and change-of-position is 
                                                 
15 This element is one of the aspects that divide common law from civil-law in unjustified enrichment 
claims. ‘Sine causa’ is the position in civil-law jurisdictions, while common law jurisdictions adhere to the 
‘unjust factor’ approach. Canadian common law now expresses it as ‘absence of juristic reason’. These 
issues will be alluded to in more detail later in this work. 
16  Vinnius, for example, discussing the question whether the condictio indebiti would lie for error of law as 
well as error of fact, says: ‘Movet me premium haec ratio, quod condictio indebiti exbono et aequo datur, 
qui omnino consequens est, eam non nisi exceptione aequitatis ex adverso excluidi posse’ [The first 
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exactly such defence. However, the notion of an ‘equitable’ defence has always been a 
concern since ‘equity’ has tendency to introduce uncertainty in the law. 
 
Although the defence is rooted in the Roman law itself, many civilian systems based on 
Roman law do not have such a defence as a limiting device to a claim in unjust (or 
unjustified) enrichment. France does not expressly have this defence. The same is true of 
Brazil and Italy. It is, however, available in Germany (BGB § 818(3) and in the 
Netherlands.17 England is a common-law country which has recently fully embraced 
change-of-position as a general defence to claims in restitution.18  The recognition of this 
principle was, as one assumes, inspired by the developments in other jurisdictions such as 
Canada,19 New Zealand,20 some Australian States21 and South Africa22 In some instances 
the defence has been introduced by statute or by codification while in other occasions, 
following in the footsteps of the development of the law of unjust or unjustified 
enrichment itself, it was introduced by court decisions. The method by which the defence 
entered each legal system also affects its ambits and scope. 
 
It is vital to note that not all jurisdictions that have such defence agree exactly on what is 
meant by change-of-position. Some speak of it as disenrichment or loss of enrichment, 
                                                                                                                                                 
consideration which moves me is that the condictio indebiti is given on the basis of what is decent and fair, 
from which the main consequence is that, from the other side, it can only be cut off by a defence based on 
fairness].(A. Vinius, In Quatuor libros Institutionem Imperialum Commetarius (1642) § 3.27.6; see also P. 
B. H. Birks 1984 Current Legal Problems 1, 21). Obviously, it is not suggested with this that the condictio 
indebiti according to its own wording was an action that rested on bona fides or aequuum et bonum. It 
surely directed the judge to ask whether there was a plain and strict legal rule. However the explanation of 
the restitutionary grounds of the condictio is that the strict debt was then itself attributable to aequitas 
(fairness, reasonableness).  
17 Article 6.212.2-3 BW. The relevant parts of the art. 6:212:2 read as follows: ‘If there is a loss of 
enrichment as a result of a circumstance for which the party is not to blame, it is disregarded to that extent:. 
6:212:3 - The duty to compensate for damages may also be limited if the loss of the enrichment can indeed 
be attributed to the enriched party, but such a loss of enrichment took place in a period in which the 
enriched party did not reasonably have to bear in mind the duty to compensate’ (translations as cited in J. 
Beatson & E. Schrage, case. Materials & Texts in the Law of Unjust Enrichment (2003) 459). 
18  Lipkin  Gorman v Karpnale Ltd (1991) 2 AC 548. 
19  Rural Municipality of Storkhoaks v Mobil Oil Canada Ltd (1975) 55 DLR (3d) 1. 
20 New Zealand Judicature Act 1908, s 94B as amended; National Bank of New Zealand v Waitaki 
International Processing Ltd (1997) 1 NZLR 724. 
21  Australia, like New Zealand, introduced the defence at common law latter in 1992 in David Securities v 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353; (1992) 66 ALJR 768, but some States had  that 
defence in Statutory form long before the High Court decided this case. Western Australia Act 1962, s 
65(8) and Property law Act 1969, s. 125.  
22   African Diamond Exporter (Pty) Ltd Barclays Bank International Ltd  1978 (3) SA 699 (A). 
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others as change of circumstances or change of position.23 Although these notions may 
ultimately produce to the same result in most cases, they do embody subtle differences 
that will be discussed shortly. Nonetheless, it appears that the essence of the defence is 
that it foregrounds the dilution or dissipation of an economic advantage received by the 
bona fide actions of a defendant. Each ‘reliant’24 action which pro tanto reduces the 
economic advantage, or annuls it altogether, gives rise to a change-of-position defence to 
that extent. That part of the economic advantage received is consequently not returnable. 
 
From the aforesaid it is obvious that at least the defence cuts back the measure of 
enrichment liability from the enrichment initially received to that which survives in the 
defendant’s hands when the claim is made. However, the conception of the defence 
differs between those who base it on disenrichment and those wh  emphasise the change 
of circumstances in general: when the focus is put on disenrichment, the defence operates  
solely or primarily by reference to the defendant’s loss of enrichment, but when the 
emphasis is put on change of circumstances in general, the defence operates, not only by 
neutralizing the injustice of the defendant’s retention of that part of the initial receipt 
which has been lost or dissipated prior to the plaintiff’s claim, but also includes what has 
been given up in return and all encumbrances resting on what has been received.25  The 
former view of the defence is clearly narrower than the latter. In essence, the wider view 
supports the approach that the defendant must never be worse off than he was before he 
received the enrichment, save in exceptional circumstances.26 Given that claims in 
unjustified enrichment arise ex aequo et bono, it is understandable that the defendant 
should ordinarily not be prejudiced by the claim over and above the amount of his 
surviving enrichment.  
 
Whatever line of reasoning one follows, it is virtually certain that the defence of change 
of position, when available and quantifiable in ‘monetary terms’, always requires the 
                                                 
23  The defence is known as loss of enrichment in South Africa, change of circumstances in USA, change of 
position in England, Canada and Australia and disenrichment in Germany. 
24  Later in the dissertation the issue of whether the defence is solely concerned with ‘reliance’ or also 
includes ‘anticipatory’ loss will be alluded to.  
25   See M. Chen-Wishart (2000) 20 Oxford JLS 563; See also Staudinger/Lorenz § 818 No. 50 (as cited in 
T.  Krebs, in E. J. H.  Schrage (Ed.) Unjust Enrichment (2001) 311). 
26  M.  Jewell (2000) RLR 12. 
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assessment of how much of the initial receipt survived in the defendant’s hands, although 
it also frequently addresses the question of the equities in the case.27 It is, however, not so 
certain to what extent the parties’ equities per se ultimately determine the availability of 
the defence. Reading historical material and case law, it is evident that there are 
considerable variations in the equity standing in favour of each party from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction in the determination and the applicability of the defence. 
 
Meanwhile, before considering the history of the defence proper, it is worth first 
discussing, in a snapshot, the history of unjust or unjustified enrichment itself, because 
that is the context in which the defence developed.  
  
 
1.1.0. Brief Outline of the Evolution of Unjustified Enrichment Doctrine. 
 
1.1.1. Evolution of Enrichment Law in the Civilian Systems Based on Roman Law. 
 
It is common cause that early Roman law knew no general remedy for unjustified 
enrichment, but offered three specific legal conceptions which can be seen as kindred to, 
or a specific manifestation of, the general notion of unjust enrichment: (i) – the condictio; 
(ii) the extended action of negotiorum gestio (mainly the action negotiorum gestiorum 
contraria); and (iii) the actio de in rem verso.28 One form of the ancient condictio, which 
─ by the time of Justinian had become known as the condictio indebiti ─ enabled 
someone who had had money or delivered goods in error to reclaim the money or the 
goods. This condictio enabled restitution of what had been performed on the basis of a 
                                                 
27  M.  Chen-Wishart (2000) 20 Oxford JLS 564-566.  
28 P. Gallo (1992) 40 American J Comp Law 431, 438; The Law of South Africa (LAWSA), Vol. 9 2nd 
Edition (2005) (per J. G. Lotz, revised by F. D. J. Brand) §§ 207 - 244; D. H. van Zyl 1992 Acta Juridica 
115. J. Hallebeek, The Concept of Unjust Enrichment in Late Scholasticism (1996) 36. Various 
circumstances in which the actio de in rem verso would normally apply are mainly subsumed in the 
discussion of the ‘condictio sine causa specialis in South African law, still adhering to the old condictiones; 
F. Giglio (2003) 23 Oxford JLS  455, 458-460. 
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void contract, as well as where no contract had been concluded between the parties,29 and 
where the performance was the consequence of mistake.  
 
 
Negotiorum gestio developed in close relation with agency (mandatum) and enabled one 
who acted in an emergency in the interest of another, without previous authority to be 
compensated for his altruistic behaviour - but, as such, it was not an enrichment action. 
Essentially, the actio negotiorum gestiorum contraria was only available if the plaintiff 
had acted with the intention to bind the principal to himself. In some situations, however, 
the action against the principal (actio negotiorum gestorium contraria) could have the 
character of an enrichment action (see, for example, D. 3.5.5.5). This manifestation of 
negotiorum gestio is often referred to as the ‘extended’ action. Because this ‘extended’ 
action dates back to the Roman times, various legal systems inspired by the Roman 
tradition in their earlier codification opted, for example, to classify the treatment of  
negotiorum gestio alongside the enrichment claims under the general rubric of ‘quasi-
contracts’.30 The common denominator under this scheme of classification is the fact that 
both kinds of legal concepts give rise to liability (reciprocal rights and obligations in a 
manner somewhat similar to contractual liability), but without the essential element of a 
contract, namely consensus between the parties, being present.31 In its ‘extended’ form 
the actio negotiorum gestio in fact fulfilled the function of an enrichment action, although 
there was a degree of uncertainty and confusion among certain authors32 as to the true 
nature of the ‘ordinary’ or ‘normal’ form of action. Some of the authors created the 
impression that all actions arising from negotiorum gestio were enrichment actions, but in 
fact they were not so considered. The main instances in which the gestor’s claim would 
ordinarily be limited to the extent of the actual enrichment of the dominus appear to have 
                                                 
29  On the meaning of the term ‘condictio’ and a brief history of the expression see LAWSA Vol. 9, 2nd 
Edition  (2005) (per J. G. Lotz, revised by F. D. J. Brand) § 210; J. Helebeek, The Concept of Unjustified 
Enrichment in Late Scholasticism (1996) chap. 1.  
30  For modern examples see chapter four below dealing with Brazilian law and other Codes cited there. 
31 See D. H. Van Zyl, Negotiorum Gestio in South African Law (1985) 65.  
32  For details of these authors see generally among others  D. H. Van Zyl, Negotiorum Gestio in South 
African Law  (1985) 86, who refers to Cujacius, Ad Africanum Tractatus II,  Van der Kessel, Dictata ad 
Insitutiones 3.28.5.  
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been the following: (i) where the gestor had administered the affairs of a minor;33 (ii) 
where he had mala fides administered the affairs of another for his own behalf;34 (iii) 
where he had administered the affairs of another in the bona fide belief that they were his 
own;35 and (vi) where he had administered the affairs of another contrary to the express 
wishes of the dominus36 (domino prohibendo), though some of these four aspects have 
controversial nature.37 Some modern legal systems may not necessarily refer to these 
aspects, but they embody subtle ideas reflecting some or all of these manifestations.  
 
Finally, the actio de in rem verso, was introduced in order to compel the father (pater 
familias) or the master to give back what he had obtained as a consequence of a contract 
executed by the son or a slave.38 This action was developed because the ancient Romans 
did not recognise direct agency. The condictiones, which required a direct conveyance by 
the claimant to the defendant, and the absence of a causa (basis) which could justify the 
retention of the thing by the defendant, were of no avail to an impoverished person where 
the transfer of wealth did not take place directly between the parties to the claim, but the 
defendant had benefited. To address this imbalance, the action de in rem verso was 
introduced and through it the claimant could seize what the defendant had turned to his 
benefit (in rem versus). This action was indeed equitable and to succeed in term of it, it 
                                                 
33  D. 26.8.1 (per Ulpian). 
34  This aspect is based in D. 3.5.5.5 (per Ulpian). 
35 D. 3.5.48 (per Africanus) read with D. 12.1.23 (also per Africanus). While the first text [D. 3.5. 48] 
reads: ‘Si rem, quam servus venditus subripuisset a me vendirore, emptor vendiderit eaque in rerum natura 
esse desierit, de pretio negotiorum actio mihi danda sit, ut dari deberet, se negotium quod tuum esse 
existimares, cum esset meum, gessisses: sicut ex contrario in me tibi daretur, si, cum hereditatem, quae ad 
me pertinet tuam putares, res tuas proprias legatas solvisses, quandoque de ea solutione liberarer’; the 
second text (D. 12.1.23) clearly reads as follows: ‘Si eum servum qui tibi legatus sit, quasi mihi legatum 
possederim et vendiderim, mortuo eo posse te mihi pretium condicere Iulanus ait, quasi ex re tua 
locupletior factus sim’. 
36  See generally the dissentions surrounding C. 2.18.24 and D. 17.1.40. Among the glossators who refer to 
this are Accursius, Corp Iur Civil glossat, gloss non consentio ad D. 17.1.40; Placentimus, Summa cod. 
2.19. Contrary views are, amongst others, in Accursius, Liber Iuris Florentinus 4.4.11 and V. Scialoja, 
‘Della Negotiorum Gestio Prohibente Domino ed in ispecie dell’a Azione di Regresso del Terzo che Paghi 
un Debito altrui contro la Volontà del Debitore’ in Studi Scialoja 3 (1932) 389-403. 
37 See generally J. E. Scholtens (1951) 68 SALJ 134-147; D. H. van Zyl, Negotiorum Gestio in South 
African Law (1985) 65-93; Pothier, Appendice 190-193. For a current treatment of Negotiorum Gestio in 
other jurisdictions see Christian von Bar (ed) Benevolent Intervention in Another’s Affairs (2006). This last 
publication deals with the treatment of negotiorum gestio in all European Union member States as well as 
the position the DCFR (Draft Common Frame of Reference) is assuming on the matter. It explains the 
position of DCFR in relation to the existing laws of the member States. 
38  P. Gallo (1992) 40 American J Comp. Law  438;  J. Hallebeek, The Concept of Unjust Enrichment in 
Late Scholasticism (1996) 36. 
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did not matter whether the claimant was impoverished and the defendant enriched, but it 
looked for an equitable solution, i.e, a solution according to justice, which took the 
general situation of both parties into consideration.39  The main features of this new 
action were: (i) a three-party situation; (ii) the limitation of the extent of liability to the 
enrichment of the defendant; and (iii) an economic loss by the plaintiff.40 Hence, the 
defendant could not be made liable in unjustified enrichment beyond the concrete benefit 
which he obtained from the transfer of wealth and was still present in his assets. 
Furthermore, this action was not triggered by the invalidity of the basis of the transfer, as 
was the case for the condictio. In fact, an actio de in rem verso might be granted despite 
the existence of a valid cause. 41  
 
Although classical Roman law was too rigid and permitted only specific remedies under 
specific actions, and the sources do not acknowledge a general enrichment action,42 in the 
later Roman law, mainly in the Middle Age, the situation tended to be more flexible and 
progressively a positive attitude developed toward generalization,43 principally in the 
context of ‘restitution’.44 The last title of the Digest (De diversis regulis iuris antiqui) 
contains (in D. 50.17.206) a general prohibition of unjust enrichment (albeit without 
having the status of an enforceable rule of law) and in D. 12.6.14 the principle is 
identified as being equitable according to nature; in D. 2.15.8.22 it is described as 
                                                 
39  F. Giglio (2003) 23 Oxford JLS   459. 
40  For the condictiones and history of this action see generally R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, 
(1990) 834-857. 
41  F. Giglio (2003) 23 Oxford JLS  459. 
42 See for example J. E. Du Plessis ((2005) SALJ 141, 143-144 and authorities cited there) who synthesises 
that view when, inter alia, he says: ‘Although Roman lawyers at times stated that a condition could be used 
to reclaim a specific thing or sum of money because it is in the hands of another without a causa, it 
unfortunately is rather difficult to establish clearly what this was supposed to mean (…) and if one takes 
into account that Roman law in any event did not recognise unjustified enrichment as a source of 
obligation, it should be apparent that, from modern perspective, it is difficult to obtain strong guidance 
from Roman law sources on what the notion of the absence of legal ground is supposed to mean’. 
43   Cf. however the view expressed in LAWSA par. 207 (vol. 9, 2nd. Edition) that ‘although there are some 
texts in the Corpus Juris Civilis which appear to indicate the contrary’, Roman Law did not manifest 
clearly any such positive attitude towards generalisation, and what in Grotius Indeilinge 3.30.18 appears to 
be a formulation of a general enrichment action with reference to Roman law, is no more than a discussion 
of the condictio sine causa specialis. For a more detailed historical discussion of the issue, in Germany, 
France, The Netherlands and eventually  South Africa see  D. H. Van Zyl  1992 Acta Juridica 115. 
44 The interaction between the theological schools and the ius commune is mostly noticeable in this area. 
Although in the Roman law the approach to unjust enrichment instances was conceived differently from the 
theological concept represented by the doctrine of restitution, the underlying idea in both notions is the 
same: no one is permitted to enrich himself at another’s expense without justification.  
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equitable and D. 14.3.17.4 and 5; D. 23.3.6.2 and D. 23.3.16 reflect the same disposition. 
In a general way, the civilian system of unjustified enrichment can be said to have 
emerged from Pomponius’ maxim ‘Jure naturae aequum est, neminem cum alterius 
detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem’.45 Since the 12th century the remedies 
mentioned above were progressively reinterpreted. 
 
Negotiorum gestio was developed to include an actio reach the negotiorum gestiorum 
utilis,46 which, unlike the classical conception of the negotiorum gestio, no longer 
required – in certain circumstances - the intention to act in the interest of another (animus 
                                                 
45  D. 12.6.14 and D. 50.17.206; P. Gallo (1992) 40 American J Comp Law 438; D. H. Van Zyl 1992 Acta 
Juridica 115-118. 
46 For example the early glossator Martinus Gosia and his followers tried to adopt as the general enrichment 
action a particular variant of the action for unauthorised administration – namely the actio negotiorum 
gestorum utilis. The difference from the normal remedy for management of another’s affairs consist in the 
fact that it no longer requires the plaintiff to have acted with the intention of obligating another to himself. 
Martinus deduced this from the text in D. 3.5.5.5., that there is room for such an action within the Roman 
system. For example, in D. 3.5.5.5 the manager interferes with another’s affairs simply in order to make a 
profit for himself. In spite of this malicious intention he is nevertheless allowed  to sue the principal, albeit 
not in order to obtain compensation, but merely in order to obtain the amount of the enrichment, if any, 
which has accrued to the principal as a result of the manager’s operation. Even if the required intention to 
bind the principal is lacking, there are two other reasons which, according to Martinus, can justify granting 
the remedy: the principal himself could have been compelled to perform the same (management of 
another’s affairs re ipsa) or the operation appeared eventually to be beneficial for the principal 
(management of another’s affairs ipso gestu). (See J.  Hallebeek, The Concept of Unjust Enrichment in Late 
Scholasticism (1996) 41). 
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aliena negotia gerendi); and the actio de in rem verso47 as well as the condictio48  were 
extended far beyond their original field of application.49  
 
In the context of generalizing the law relating to unjustified enrichment, the medieval 
lawyers concentrated their attention on three main problems: (i) a good faith 
improvement of the property of another; (ii) appropriation of value by using or disposing 
of the goods of another; (iii) indirect enrichment.50 This tendency to extend the original 
remedies opened the way to the development of a general remedy of unjust enrichment,51 
but its achievement took until the very end of the nineteenth century.52  The general 
                                                 
47   The first impetus to ‘stretch’ the applicability of the actio de in rem verso dates back to the periods of 
the early glossators. We find for example that in C. 4.26.7.3 an action is granted against a third party who is 
enriched by means of a contract entered into by an intermediary. Although this intermediary is a free 
person and not a slave or a son in potestate of the third party, some glossators consider the action granted to 
be an actio utilis de in rem verso. (J. Hallebeek, The Concept of Unjust Enrichment in Late Scholasticism 
(1996) 42). 
48 Like in the case of de in rem verso already some early glossators read for example in D.12.1.32 a special 
use of the condictio, which no longer required a negotium (dealing, transaction) between plaintiff and 
defendant. The text grants an action for the mere reason that my money has come into your hands and that 
it is right and equitable (bonun et aequum) that you should refund it. Despite that early flexibility, however, 
it only in the fourteenth century that this special condictio ex D.12.1.32 is adopted as a general enrichment 
action. We find by this time, for example Baldus who speaks about a general equity (aequitas generalis) in 
the following terms: ‘haec est etiam aequitas generalis, quocumque casu representata parit actionem 
generalem, scilicet certi condictionem, quod est notandum’ and later commentators follow him. It is, 
however, acknowledged that this action is not by this time termed an enrichment action, but it is qualified 
as condictio sine causa, condctio certi generalis, condictio ex aequitate or as an actio in factum ex 
aequitate. (see generally J. Hallebeek, The Concept of Unjust Enrichment in Late Scholasticism (1996) 43-
44. For the general teaching of Baldus on unjust enrichment, see J. Gordley, The Philosophical Origins of 
Modern Contract Doctrine  (1991) 55-57. 
49   P. Gallo (1992) 40 American J Comp Law 439; D. H. Van Zyl 1992 Acta Juridica 115 et seq.  
50  P. Gallo (1992) 40 American J Comp Law 439. One should note for example the jurists from the French 
School at Orleans that started soon after the period of the Ordinary Gloss granting enrichment remedies, 
which no longer clearly connected with a specific Roman-quasi contract. Following the example of 
Martinus, these jurists among which there is Pierre de Belleperche, base for example the condictio incerti 
or condictio possesionis on equity and speak, for instance, about the actio in factum ex aequitate, which he 
is willing to grant for cases of necessary management of another’s affairs, when on the ground of C.2.18.28 
it is not possible to bring the actio negotiorum gestorum because the manager acted against the principal’s 
explicit prohibition (See generally J. Hallebeek, The Concept of Unjust Enrichment in Late Scholasticism 
(1996) 42); D. H. Van Zyl, Negotiorum Gestio in South African Law (1978) 24-48). 
51 Amongst those that advocated the general enrichment action either explicitly or implicitly in The 
Netherlands and/or France are:  Grotius, Indeilinge 3. 30.18; Voet, Commentarius 12.7.2; R. J. Pothier, 
Appendice sur la gestion d’affaires (an Appendices to his Treatise on the Contract of Mandate) 193. where 
Pothier says: ‘Dans notre jurisprudence française, qui n’admet pas les subtilités de droit romain, et qui 
regarde la seule equité comme suffisante pour produire une obligation civile et pour donner une action, il 
ne doit pas être douteux que …celui qui a fait des impenses dont je profit doit avoir action contre moi, 
jusqu'à concurrence de ce que j’en profite’.  
52  P. Gallo (1992) 40 American J Comp Law  439. 
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action developed either from the actio de in rem verso,53 or through the condictio sine 
causa specialis or the extending of the actio negotiorum gestio.  
 
Thus, today, many countries in Continental Europe (as well as other countries inspired by 
the civil law) have adopted a general enrichment action either by means of incorporating 
it into their codes or through jurisprudence. The essence of the civilian approach to 
unjustified enrichment is to be found in the notion of sine causa transfer.54  Sine causa is 
understood as the ‘absence of a legal ground’ which implies that either the ground 
(causa) did not exist when the transaction occurred to sustain the validity of the ‘transfer 
of the benefit’, or, if it ever existed, it has since ceased to exist55 (an actio ob causam 
finitam). It is common knowledge that civil law jurisdictions are not homogenous in their 
approach to unjustified enrichment. It is nonetheless true that all of them share the 
negative approach56 to found a claim in unjustified enrichment. By negative approach is 
meant that it must be proved that there is no ‘causa’ (hence the terminology ‘sine causa’ 
and ‘unjustified’ used in the civilian systems), i.e., a legally recognised ground for the 
defendant to retain the enrichment ‘transferred’ to him. Put differently, all civilian 
systems begin from the proposition that every enrichment at another’s expense either has 
an explanation known to the law (a causa) or has not.57 Enrichments are ordinarily 
transferred with the purpose of discharging an obligation or, if there is no such obligation, 
at least to achieve some other objective as, for example, making a gift, the satisfaction of 
                                                 
53 Dawson, for example says that the actio de in rem verso, in the course of the eighteenth century, escaped 
all the limitations adhering to the condictio and actio negotiorum gestorum and became a ‘universal remedy 
for the prevention of unjust enrichment’ (J. Dawson, Unjust Enrichment: A Comparative Analysis (1951) 
84-92 especially at 89-90). 
54 ‘Transfer’ here is used in a very loose sense, to include both an active and passive ‘transfer’. It 
encompasses not only an actual ‘transfer of the benefit from one person to another’ but also an acquisition 
by ‘omission’, i.e. the saving of expenses which would have been incurred in the absence of the act 
complained about. It also includes an increase of liabilities on the part of the plaintiff while the defendant 
decreases his liabilities due to the fact complained about. 
55  See further detail on the notion of sine causa in chapter 4 when dealing with the concept under Brazilian 
law.  
56 The opposite of the ‘negative approach’ is the common-law approach based on the ‘unjust factor’ which 
is discussed further below at 1.1.2.1 and elsewhere throughout the thesis. 
57 Lots & Brand ‘Enrichment’ in LAWSA Vol. 9, 2nd Edition (2005) § 209(d); R. Zimmermann, The Law of 
Obligations (1990) 834, and (1995) 15 Oxford JLS 403, 411, P. B. H. Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2005) 
102-103; D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 171ff; J. E. Du Plessis (2005) SALJ 142, 155-59.  Du 
Plessis observes that though there is unanimity about the absence of legal ground (causa) in civil law in 
general, the meaning and content of that legal ground (causa) varies considerably within the civil law 
family. See special at p. 157 of the above Article where Du Plessis gives French and Dutch examples.  
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a condition, or the coming into being of a new contract.58 If these outcomes succeed, then 
the enrichment is sufficiently explained, i.e. it is obtained cum causa. If the enrichment 
turns out to have no such explanation it is inexplicable; therefore it cannot be retained.59 
The recipient is not entitled to it. It must be disgorged. The retention of it would be ‘sine 
causa’. The consensus, however, ends here.  When it comes to defining what the measure 
of enrichment is, viz, whether it is the object received itself or its value which should be 
returned, and, if the enrichment ceased to exist, what should be done, civil-law countries 
start drifting apart again. Differences also exist as to the moment of assessment of the 
enrichment measure, whether it is the moment the object was received or at litis 
contestatio.  At the risk of oversimplification, I would say that what we actually find in 
civil-law jurisdictions today is, for convenience sake, what I broadly call as the ‘Pothier’ 
and the ‘Glück-Windscheid’ schools. The issue sometimes goes down to the structure of 
enrichment law itself. To the Pothier school belong those who sustain the idea that 
enrichment law should emphasise ‘value received’ as the ‘sole’ measure of enrichment 
(thereby denying implicitly or partially a change of position defence). The Glück-
Windscheid’60 school covers all those who defend the idea that enrichment law should 
concentrate on value surviving, rather than value received, save exceptions.61 Obviously, 
there are intermediate positions between these two camps. The other school, adopting 
Pothier’s perspective of the field as a whole, tends to deal extensively with ‘paiement de 
l’indue’ (undue payment) apart from negotiorum gestio. Though there is diversity of 
thought in the Pothier’s school as to the place of all other enrichment situations62 and the 
requirement of error, the general trend is that the nature of the enrichment claim does not 
                                                 
58 Current Canadian law call all these situations and others as ‘juristic reasons’ (See Garland v Consumer 
Gas Co. [2004] SCC 25; (2004) 237 DLR (4th) 385. 
59 In South African law Visser (Unjustified Enrichment (2008)173-174) poses a question whether one 
should only consider the ‘causa retinendi’ or also the ‘causa dandi’ and how to categorise the notion of 
‘causa’ in the face of the recognition that an invasion of rights can give rise to enrichment claims as well in 
cases of contracts discharged by supervening impossibility. 
60 Current adherents of the Glück-Windscheid school align with what was concluded back in time by Glück 
Ausführliche Erläuterung der Pandekten ad D 12.6 (§ 835) and Windscheid Lehrbuch vol. 2 § 424, that 
loss of enrichment applies both to a genus and to a species, and, therefore, loss of enrichment can be 
pleaded in all cases. 
61 Among the limitations generally advocated one would be that a mala fide recipient is always liable for 
value received, and where the enrichment claim arose as part of an (invalid) reciprocal contract, value 
received is also the right measure.  
62 See for example the discussion of the Brazilian law in this thesis, mostly appearing in chapter 4, which 
presents an enrichment law with dual structure: ‘Undue payment’ and ‘enrichment sine causa’.  See also 
the Dutch Civil Code (BW) using similar structure. 
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depend on the type of benefit conferred. In other words, civil-law countries do not have 
different restitutionary remedies arising from payment of money, the receipt of services 
and the delivery of goods.63
 
 
1.1.2. Evolution of Unjust Enrichment in Common law Systems based on the 
English Tradition. 
 
Common law countries trace the foundations of their law of restitution (unjust 
enrichment) to the initial English extensions of indebitatus assumpsit64 into the quasi-
contractual remedies of quantum valebat, quantum meruit and the ‘action for money had 
and received’. The recognition of indebitatus assumpsit itself as an action occurred 
sometimes earlier65 but it was firmly endorsed in the Slade’s case.66
                                                 
63  R. Zimmermann (1995) 15 Oxford JLS 403, 411. 
64  ‘Indebitatus Assumpsit’ in English legal literature means ‘having become indebted he promised’ (Birks 
Unjust Enrichment 2nd ed. (2005) 131). ‘Assumpsit’ itself as a concept developed from the English ‘action 
on the case’ which was an English mimic of the Roman ‘actio in factum’.  In Roman law itself the ‘actio in 
factum’ was mostly a form of words without specific content. Nevertheless its pattern could, in principle, 
be adapted to any grievances. In the English version it took the form of the ‘whereas’ and the ‘yet’ clauses. 
The ‘action on the case’ could then be named in the various species. One of such nameable species, when 
the name was taken from the ‘whereas’ clause became the action on the promise (assumpsit super se = ‘he 
undertook’), which was ordinarily expressed as: ‘Whereas  (…) the defendant undertook (assumpsit) ….yet 
he wickedly (…) did not pay to the plaintiff’s loss’. Here we have the idea of promise. The sub-form of 
assumpsit in the ‘debt-promise’ format is the ‘indebitatus assumpsit’ (in Latin). ‘Indebitatus assumpsit had, 
in turn, its sub-forms according to the cause of the indebtedness. One of such sub-forms was ‘money had 
and received to the use of the plaintiff’.  (See generally D. Ibbetson ‘Origins’ (1982) 41 CLJ 142; See also 
P. B. H. Birks (1984) Current Legal Problems 1, 25 notes 10-12 for other historical sources); R. M. 
Jackson, The History of Quasi-Contract in English Law (1936) reprinted in (1986). (All citations on this 
work are from the reprinted version (Florida, 1986)); P. B. H. Birks, Unjust Enrichment 2nd ed. (2005) 284-
290.; W. D. Evans, Essays on the Action for Money Had and Received, on the Law of Insurance, and on the 
Law of Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes (Liverpool 1802), reprinted in (1998) Restitution LR  1-33. 
65  At least the year 1520 is the earliest date legal historians have indicated the action on assumpsit was 
used the first time. See J.B. Ames, Lectures on Legal History and Miscellaneous Legal Essays (1913) 142. 
For a detailed historical account of the action, see R. M. Jackson, The History of Quasi-Contract in English 
Law (1936) reprinted in (1986) 4ff and again at 40 and following pages. 
66 (1602) 76 ER 1072. The development of indebitatus assumpsit, according to English legal historians, 
passed through the following phases: (i) a consideration that the defendant must be indebted and must make 
a subsequent promise to pay; (ii) in the Queen’s Bench the fact that the defendant was indebted on a simple 
contract was sufficient for the courts to imply a subsequent promise, specially from the time of Edward v 
Burre, (1573) Dal. 104, l.45) but often the Court of Exchequer Chamber reversed such judgements; (iii) 
Slade’s case ((1602) 76 ER 1072) endorsed the practice of the Queen’s Bench; (iv) soon afterwards, the 
action was extended to cases where the defendant was not technically indebted, but where there was a 
genuine contract. The action was not concurrent with debt immediately after Slade’s case, since the action 
rested on a promise implied in fact, the implication being made from the acts of the parties; the idea of 
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These quasi-contractual remedies offered some sort of solution to restitutionary problems 
resembling unjust enrichment, but they contained no organizing principle and, in any 
event, when available, they were subordinate and always subject to contractual 
principles.67 These remedies were generally aimed at assisting a litigant in the situations 
where he had performed a contract which was void because of, say a necessary element 
was lacking such as full agreement on the consideration or the exact price.68 In brief, 
while on the one hand quantum meruit came to the assistance of, for example, an 
innkeeper entitling him to be paid for services actually rendered, despite the lack of a 
previous agreement on the price to be paid, on the other hand, quantum valebat entitled, 
for instance, payment for their goods those who had delivered them in execution of a 
contract considered unenforceable, due to the lack of determinati n of the amount of the 
consideration, or for certain other reasons.69  
  
The ‘action for money had and received’ developed mostly in symbiosis with the doctrine 
of waiver of tort.70 This development happened before Lord Mansfield came to the 
Bench in 1750,71  although he is sometimes wrongly credited with its invention.72 By that 
                                                                                                                                                 
consent was whittled away slowly, so that the duties imposed primarily by law, could only thus be enforced 
towards the end of the seventeenth century. (See generally R. M. Jackson, The History of Quasi-Contract in 
English Law (1986) 40ff). 
67  J. Beatson, The Use and Abuse of Unjust Enrichment (1991) 2-3. 
68 D. Ames (1888) 2 Harvard LR 58: ‘Services would be rendered, for example, by a tailor or other 
workman, an innkeeper or common carrier, without any agreement as to the amount of compensation. Such 
cases present no difficulty at present day, but for centuries there was no common law action by which 
compensation could be recovered’.  English writers and legal historians trace the origins of assumpsit to 
1520, but its full endorsement occurred in 1602 in the Slade’s case (1602) 76 ER 1072 and that of quantum 
meruit and quantum valebat to 1609 and 1610 respectively in the cases of Warbrooke v Griffin (1609) 2 
Brownl 254 and Six Carpenters (1610) Rep. 147a.  (See C. H. Fifoot, History and Sources of the common-
law (1949) 393ff; P. B. H. Birks (1984) Current Legal Problems 1, 4. 
69  P. Gallo (1992) 40 American J Comp Law, 435; R.M. Jackson, The History of Quasi-Contract in English 
Law (1986) 27, 88 and 105. 
70  ‘Waiver of tort’ is a mechanism by which a claimant ‘ratifies’ the behaviour of the wrongdoer and asks 
for the money made by the wrongdoer as consequence of the tort (delict), instead of claiming damages.  W. 
A. Keener (A Treatise on The Law of Quasi-Contract (1893) 159) expressed such notion in the following 
words: ‘If any one in the commission of a tort enriches himself by taking or using the property of another, 
the later may, in some cases, instead of suing in tort to recover damages for the injury done, sue in 
assumpsit to recover the value of that which has been tortiously taken or used. The remedies in tort and 
assumpsit not being concurrent, a plaintiff is compelled to elect which remedy he will pursue; if he elects to 
sue in assumpsit, he is said to waive the tort’. 
71  For authorities before Lord Mansfield see H. Cohen (1932) 45 Harvard LR 1333, 1334 footnote 3, citing 
among others Hussey v Fiddall, 12 Mod. 324 (1770); Lamine v Dorell, 2 Ld. Raym. 1216 (1706) (waiver of 
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time it had been held that a plaintiff might waive a tort and sue in assumpsit; he could sue 
for money had and received to his use, for money paid on consideration which had failed, 
and for money paid under mutual mistake.73 The doctrine of waiver of tort was 
introduced in order to escape the rigidity and formalism of tort74 as well as that of 
contract law.  
 
This system of waiver of tort introduced a more flexible mechanism into the common-
law. The evolution of the common law of restitution in the twin context of contract and 
tort gave rise to a system of restitutionary remedies resembling more contractual and 
tortious configurations, rather than a truly autonomous system of unjust enrichment 
remedies. That is so because for a quasi-contractual obligation in the old English law to 
exist, it did not require proof of an unjust enrichment, but the ‘proof’75 of a request or 
acceptance of the wares or services performed (acceptio).76  This notion of request and 
acceptance still prevails in current common law. Its survival is made clearer if one looks 
at the scenario of services rendered in the form of un-requested improvements in today’s 
common law. The standpoint of the common-law is that a person who improves the 
property he knows belongs to another is viewed as a volunteer who is making a gift.77 
                                                                                                                                                 
tort); Hasser v Wallis, 1 Salk. 28 (1708) (money had and received); Holmes v Hall, Holt 36 (1695) (failing 
consideration); Tomkins v Bernett, 1 Slk. 22 (1693) (mistake). 
72 Several common law writers hold that a remedy was developed in this sense by the possibility of waiving 
the tort, as acknowledged for the first time by Lord Mansfield. The same holding is also acknowledged by  
P. Gallo and he also thought that Lord Mansfield was the first one to elevate the waiver of tort to the 
podium (P. Gallo (1992) 40 American J Comp Law  435-37). 
73  H. Cohen (1932) 45 Harvard LR 1333, 1334. 
74  In origin tort liability came to an end as a consequence of the death of the wrongdoer (actio personalis 
moritur cum persona). In order to escape this rule, the waiver of tort was introduced enabling the 
ratification of the behaviour of the wrongdoer and asking for money obtained as a consequence of the tort 
instead of seeking damages. For example, in case of conversion, if someone sells the goods of another, the 
owner by waiving the tort, it was possible to be compensated even after the death of the wrongdoer; it is 
still possible to waive the tort. In this way it is possible to choose between claiming damages or asking for 
the money obtained as a consequence of the wrong committed. 
75  The ‘proof of request and acceptance’ in this context was a mere allegation, an authentic fiction which 
did not require an actual proof. Moses v MacFarlan 2 Burr 1005, 1012 (1760) exemplifies this fiction. 
Gerhard McMeel, for example, acknowledges that ‘in quasi-contractual cases the plea of the promise was 
entirely fictional and could not be denied by the defendant’ (G. McMeel, The Modern Law of Restitution 
(2000) 30. 
76  P. Gallo (1992) 40 American J Comp Law 433. 
77 This view in my opinion seems to echo a modified form of D. 50.17.53 which says: ‘Cuius per errorem 
dati repetitio est, eius consulto dati donatio est’ (repetition lies for what is given in error but what is given 
knowing (that is not due) is a gift). It is enough here to twist the requirement of ‘knowledge’ assimilated to 
the idea of gift to come to such an approach.    
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The improver’s expectation of remuneration, if any expected, merely indicates that in 
bestowing this gift, the improver is also taking the risk that the owner will pay for it.78 
The common law usually sees no reason to reverse the gift or reallocate the risk through 
an award of restitution.79 Because the improver knows that only owners have the right to 
determine the condition of what they own, the improver is taken to know that the 
improvement cannot oblige the owner to pay for it. Hence the improvement counts as 
nothing more than a donative act. In other words, as Hanoch Dagan80 puts it, ‘without a 
legal guarantee, a potential benefactor – who needs to decide whether to intervene before 
he is able to receive the beneficiary’s binding commitment that he will indeed reimburse 
him – must take into account that his well-intentioned intervention could be abused’. 
 
This common-law approach to improvements is premised on a liberal value system for it 
regards negative liberty, or ‘freedom from’ forcible human interference, as the essential 
(although it is not necessarily the ultimate value) ingredient to personal development and 
autonomy. Because each individual is distinct and unique, the common-law thinks that 
each such an individual should also be able to choose his goals voluntarily (as well as the 
means of achieving such goals) and should be held responsible for such choices. Any 
trespassing on that sphere of liberty should always be viewed with suspicion, and 
preferably, deterred.81 On that basis, therefore, according to the common-law, individuals 
                                                 
78 See for example Greenwood v Bennett (1973) 1 QB 195 (CA); and for unrequested improvement 
generally see P. Matthews (1981) 40 CLJ 340. 
79  G. Virgo,  The Principle of Law of Restitution (2006) 55-58. 
80  H. Dagan (1999) 97 Michigan LR 1152, 1164. 
81 The extreme anti-interventionist rules currently prevalent in most common law jurisdictions knows some 
exceptions, namely, the doctrine does not apply in maritime salvage cases for which the law has a separate 
elaborate regime applying to those cases, and whenever what is at stake is the preservation of life or health. 
Whenever rescuing life or preserving health is at stake, common law generally has traditionally treated 
somewhat more liberally the benefactors in such cases than those who preserved only a proprietary or 
financial interest of another. Fundamentally the difference lies in the nature of the ‘resource’ involved. 
Between civil-law and common law there is a fundamental difference not only between the nature of the 
resource involved, but especially as regard to the significance of the intervention. Such difference 
encompasses the ‘ultimate success’ test for one legal family and the ‘reasonable diligence’ test for the other 
family.  While it is a prerequisite of Anglo-American law for allowing  ‘good Samaritan’ claims - except in 
cases of life and limb – that the claimant’s effort  to protect or preserve the defendant’s interest meet with 
actual success, as a fruitless intervention, even if reasonable, cannot be said to produce any net value for the 
defendant (i.e; an enrichment), and the reasonable person could, in any event, say that he would only have 
been willing to pay for a result, not an attempt, if one were to apply the ‘bystander’ test; in contrast, under 
civil-law jurisdictions, the ‘good Samaritan’ is not required to demonstrate ‘ultimate success’, as long as he 
can show that he acted with ‘reasonable diligence’. (For further details on the issues see: S. Eiselen & G. 
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should be entitled to control of their resources, at least in so far as they do not actively 
harm others in exercising such control. As a corollary to such control, their actual consent 
– express or implied, but, in all events, actual and not legally imposed – should be the 
prerequisite to any legitimate transfer of, or interference with, any of their resources.82  
 
As instances of unsolicited improvements and the benefits conferred thereby threaten 
potential beneficiaries’ control over their resources, thereby interfering ultimately with 
their free will, a legal system that takes seriously peoples’ negative liberty must equally 
adopt the potential beneficiary’s viewpoint. In so doing, such legal system must require 
that these potential beneficiaries be the gatekeepers of their own affairs, and whoever 
officiously confers unrequested benefits upon them is at the best to be viewed as a 
volunteer bestowing a gift or, at worst, as simply a risk taker.  
 
Since the end of the 19th century, however, Anglo-American lawyers begun to reconsider 
the whole field of restitution starting with the pioneering historical research on 
assumpsit83 and other quasi-contractual analyses especially in America.84  They tried to 
unify all quasi-contractual remedies described above. The process continued and 
accelerated throughout the last century with the landmark issue of the American 
Restatement of Restitution in 1937, followed by other invaluable works both in America 
and other common law jurisdictions, amongst which John Dawson, Unjust Enrichment 
(1951); Robert Goff and Gareth Jones, Law of Restitution (1966);85 George Palmer, Law 
of Restitution (1978); Peter Birks, Introduction to the Unjust Enrichment (1985). All 
these works in one way or another have emphasised the need for a unified principle for 
the whole law of restitution. Such unifying principle has largely been found in the general 
                                                                                                                                                 
Pienaar, Unjustified Enrichment (1999); J. Dawson (1961) 74 Harvard LR 817, 823; P. Gallo  ‘Remedies 
for Unjust Enrichment in the History of Italian Law and in the Codice Civile’ in E. Schrage (Ed) Unjust 
Enrichment: The Comparative Legal History of the Law of Restitution (1995) 275, 279.  
82  H. Dagan (1999) 97 Michigan LR 1161-1162. 
83  D. Ames (1888) 2 Harvard. LR 58.   
84 See H. Cohen (1932) Harvard LR 1333 for several works on Quasi-Contracts preceding the Restatement 
of Restitution 1937. Amongst the most salient the author cites W. A. Keener, A Treatise on the Law of 
Quasi-Contracts (1893) and  F. C. Woodward, The Law of Quasi-Contracts (1913).  
85 R. Goff and G. Jones, The Law of Restitution 1st Ed. (1966) and all subsequent editions up to the 7th 
Edition (2007) reaffirm the same position that ‘unjust enrichment’ is at the foundation of the ‘law of 
restitution’.  
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principle that no one should be enriched without reason at the expense of another,86 a 
principle whose origin can be traced back to Roman law.87  
 
The clear recognition of the general enrichment principle in English law came in a 
unanimous judgment of the House of Lord in 1991, Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale88 case. 
This case recognised simultaneously the general principle against unjust enrichment as 
well as the general defence of change of position. The facts of the case are well known: 
Cass, a solicitor and partner at a law firm, was a gambling addict, and a thief. He took 
₤323 222.14 from his firm’s client account and used this money to finance his gambling 
addiction at the defendant’s club, the ‘Playboy Club’. It is thought he may have intended 
to return the money, but in the end he was only able to replace ₤100 313.16. The balance 
of ₤222 908.48 could not be recovered from Cass. In total, he staked ₤561 014.06 at the 
club, and won ₤378 294.06. The overall loss suffered by Cass over the period of his 
activities were calculated to be ₤174 745.00, of which it was agreed that ₤20 050.00 
represented his own funds.  Having the court accepted that the club was liable to the 
solicitors in unjust enrichment, thereby recognising that this principle formed part of 
English law, the question was whether they should be liable for ₤200 000.00 or for the 
amount of ₤150 000.00. It was held that they were liable for the latter sum. This 
conclusion was based on the defence of change of position. 
 
                                                 
86 Restatement of Restitution § 1 (1937); P. B. H. Birks, Introduction to the Law of Restitution (1985) and 
P. B. H. Birks, Unjust Enrichment 1st Edition (2003) and 2nd Edition (2005) [the two last books of Peter 
Birks differ substantially from his first book published on the subject in 1985 and reprinted in 1989]; R. 
Goff & G. Jones, The Law of Restitution (2007), chapter 1. But see among others,  the following authors 
resisting the generalisation of such a principle to the whole law of restitution:  M. P. Gergen (2001) 79 
Texas L.R. 1927; S. Stoljar (1987) 50 MLR 653; S. Hedley (1985) 5 Legal Studies 56; S Hedley, 
Restitution: Its Ordering and Division (2001); Atiyah is clearly opposed to the centrality of the notion of 
unjust enrichment, for despite recognising the importance of such principle against unjust enrichment, he 
believes that it should not be elevated to a separate legal subject but viewed instead as a principle running 
through several existing subjects such as property  law, tort law and most importantly, contract law (Atiyah, 
The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979) 767-768). 
87  Pomponius D 12.6.14; D 50.17.206. 
88 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale (1991) 2 AC 548 especially at 558 (per Lord Bridge), at 559 (per Lord 
Templaman) and at 568 (per Lord Ackner), and 578 (per Lord Goff). Lord Grittifs concurred with Lord 
Templeman and Lord Goff. The case was again endorsed in Banque Financière de la Cité v Parc 
(Bettersea) Ltd [1999] 1 AC 221 (HL). 
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Lord Goff, whose judgment has become more influential than that of Lord Templeman, 
as far as the defence of change of position is concerned, succinctly put the matter this 
way: 
‘At the moment I do not wish to state the principle any less broadly than this: the defence (of change 
of position) is available to a person whose position has so changed that it would be inequitable in all 
the circumstances to require him to make restitution, or alternatively to make restitution in full’.89  
 
Since the House of Lords decision in the Lipkin Gorman case, the English law of 
restitution in particular (and that of the whole common law, in general) has developed 
exponentially. Both the extent of the enrichment principle and its basis and the scope of 
the change of position defence have been scrutinized in subsequent cases and academic 
writings. Judicially, subsequent cases to Lipkin Gorman such as South Tyneside 
Metropolitan Borough Council v Svenska International Ltd,90 Philip Collins v Davis, 91 
Scottish Equitable v Derby,92 Dextra Bank & Trust Co Ltd v Bank of Jamaica,93 National 
Bank of New Zealand ltd v Waitaki International Processing (NI) Ltd,94 among others, 
sought in one way or another to delineate the scope and operation of change of position 
defence. As regard the enrichment principle itself, cases such as Hazell v Hammersmith 
& Fulham BC,95 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC and Kleinwort 
                                                 
89 Ibid. at 580. 
90 South Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council v Svenska International plc [1995] 1 All ER 545. 
91 Philip Collins Ltd v Davis [2000] 3 All ER 808.  
92 Scottish Equitable plc v Derby [2000] 3 All ER 793. 
93  (2002) 1 All ER (comm.) 192. (This is a Privy Council case, appealed from the Caribbean Dominions). 
94 National Bank of New Zealand ltd v Waitaki International Processing (NI) Ltd (1999) 2 NZLR 211 (a 
New Zealand case of general interest on the defence of change of position with its approach to negligence). 
95 Hazell v Hammersmith & Fulham BC [1992] 2 AC 1 (HL). This case is said to have been the real 
‘trigger’ of the full change in English law, because in this case the House of Lords let it be known that 
billions of pounds had changed hands under void contracts (in both the closed swaps and the interrupted 
swaps).  The House of Lords decided that the contracts of interest swaps made by the local authorities were 
not within the authorities’ money management powers and were consequently void. As such and with no 
exception it required mutual restitution, with the effect that the winner, the party who had received the 
greater sum, has had to repay the winning difference (See generally P. B. H. Birks, Unjust Enrichment 
(2005) 109).  The effects triggered by this case are described as follows by Goff & Jones: ‘The House of 
Lords held that the transactions were ultra vires the local authorities that had entered into them. Legitimate 
commercial transactions were thereby undermined. Predictably there followed a spate of litigation. Two 
cases were selected as test cases: Westdeutsche v Islington and Kleinwort Benson v Sandwell. Important 
questions of restitution were raised before the judge and the Court of Appeal.  But before the House of 
Lords the appellant (Islington) conceded that it was liable to make restitution. Therefore the appeal was 
confined to the question of interest’ (R. Goff & G. Jones, The Raw of Restitution, 6th ed. (2002) § 25-014). 
The chain of reaction was, however, released by its conclusion that the transactions were ultra vires and 
therefore void. The basis upon which the transactions took place had failed to sustain itself and the 
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Benson Ltd v Sandwell BC,96 Guinness Mahon & Co Ltd v Kensington & Chelsea Royal 
London BC97 (commonly known as the ‘swaps’ cases’) sowed the seeds for a 
rapprochement of the common-law with civil-law. As the mistake of law rule has also 
been abrogated98 and the ‘unjust factor’ mistake (and possibly all other recognised unjust 
factors until then) failed squarely to explain the case of restitution of illegally charged 
taxes in the Woolwich99 case, it created the opportunity to introduce the ‘absence of 
basis’ thinking into the English law of unjustified enrichment. The swaps cases and 
others100 gave much needed ammunition to Peter Birks101 (and probably others) to argue 
for the abandonment of the unjust factor102 approach as the basis of enrichment claims in 
English law103 and replacing it with the ‘absence of basis’ at the top of his pyramidal 
structure104 (albeit a pyramid whose base can theoretically still encompass some of the 
traditional ‘unjust factors’).105  
                                                                                                                                                 
defendant could not retain the benefit received because the ground for retention that apparently initially 
existed, in fact did not exist. This is another was of saying the retention would be ‘without legal ground’. 
96 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC; Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Sandwell BC [1994] 3 
All ER 890 (CA); [1996] AC 699 (HL).  
97  [1999] QB 215 (CA).  
98 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349. 
99 Woolwich Equitable Building Society v IRC [1993] 1 AC 70 (HL).  The implications of the Woolwich 
principle are explored in detail in chapter five bel w, when dealing with the passing-on defence. 
100 Woolwich Equitable Building Society v IRC [1993] 1 AC 70 (HL). 
101  P. B. H. Birks, Unjust Enrichment 2nd Ed. (2005) 115-116.  
102  I discuss the unjust factor reasoning in the next heading (1.1.2.1 ‘Unjust Factor: Yesterday and Today’). 
Further discussion of the unjust factor approach will appears elsewhere when discussing the Canadian 
adoption of the ‘absence of juristic reason’ approach and the rationale why the Americans show no interest 
in the debate of ‘unjust factor’ versus ‘absence of basis’ (chapters 2 and 3 below). 
103 Although he cautions that the new approach will be different from the civilian interpretation, Birks 
himself describes the ‘demise’ of the unjust factor approach in this way: ‘The assertion of Englishness is 
not an outburst of chauvinism. It is merely a warning that, although the no basis approach is very civilian 
and although there is now guidance to be obtained from civilian jurisdictions, what has happened is not a 
passive reception of German and French law to fill a vacuum. Lord Mansfield did indeed do some 
borrowing of that kind from the ius commune. By contrast, the modern English judges have simply been 
drawn to an approach to “unjust”  which, with hindsight, is both incompatible with the list of unjust factors 
with which they were previously managing and reflects the method which, in different sub-forms, is 
already familiar in civilian jurisdictions. This time there is no evidence in the cases of deliberate 
borrowing’ (Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2005) 128). Thereafter Birks devotes the whole chapter 6 (pp 129-
160) to the absence of basis analysis. It is also instructive to read his own Preface to the Second Edition 
dated 14 March 2004. 
104 P. B. H. Birks, Unjust Enrichment 2nd Ed. (2005) 115-116. 
105 At this moment, some theorists are of the view that the ‘unjust factor approach’ has been completely 
discarded, with the only task remaining that of re-aligning the interpretation of the precedents in which the 
whole system was based; but many others are still adamant that ‘unjust factors’ have still a vital role to play 
and that the English law of unjust enrichment is still firmly based on the positive approach. T. Krebs, a 
vehement defendant of the positive approach, notes, for example, that in light of the Kleinwort Benson v 
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Thus far the development after Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale (The Firm)106 is an ongoing 
process. Some milestones have already been achieved, while others are awaiting the 
opportunity to arise, as is typical of the common law.  In the conceptualisation of the 
change of position defence, the Philip Collins107 case, for example, pointed out that the 
courts will not be unnecessarily demanding in respect of defendants who have 
insurmountable problems in proving reliance. This case, therefore, implies an 
interpretation of the defence which is more generous to the defendant. The Svenska case, 
on the other hand, is a test of the defence in anticipatory reliance situations. The merits 
and demerits of anticipatory reliance are discussed elsewhere in this work, but for the 
time being it suffices to note that anticipatory reliance was firmly rejected in Dextra Bank 
& Trust Co Ltd v Bank of Jamaica.108 The Scottish Equitable v Derby case represents the 
scenario where it is asked whether a general hardship can found the change of position 
defence. The answer is clearly no. What is required to found the defence is a causal link 
between the original enrichment and the change of position. The New Zealand case 
Waitaki109 is an example of an attempt of a legal system trying to balance the role of fault 
within the law unjustified enrichment. It introduces the notion of comparative fault, but 
most academics and decisions in other common law jurisdictions have already rejected 
the Waitaki approach as undesirable and theoretically unsound. Many other landmarks 
have already been attained and will be noted throughout this work especially if they bear 
any relationship with the topic of the thesis. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lincoln City Council (1999) 2 AC 349 (HL) case, the argument in defence of the unjust factor approach 
might be too late. 
106 For a good summary of developments after Lipkin Gorman case, see T. Krebs, Restitution at the 
Crossroads (2001), chapter 15 (pp 271-306); the same chapter is reproduced as chapter in another 
compilation-book edited by E. J. H. Schrage, Unjust Enrichment and the Law of Contract (2001) 295-336. 
As regard the general principle against unjust enrichment Krebs is in favour of maintaining the English 
‘unjust factor’ approach. The same applies to M. McInnes that in the context of Canadian law is 
uncomfortable with the ‘juristic reason’ approach adopted in that jurisdiction.  
107  Philip Collins Ltd v Davis [2000] 3 All ER 808.  
108  (2002) 1 All ER (Comm.) 192. 
109 National Bank of New Zealand ltd v Waitaki International Processing (NI) Ltd (1999) 2 NZLR 211 
especially at 229. 
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1.1.2. 1. ‘Unjust Factors’ - Yesterday and Today. 
 
The proving of an ‘unjust factor’ has been, until now, the hallmark of the common-law of 
unjust enrichment distinguishing it clearly from the civil-law ‘sine causa’ approach. At 
this moment in time, the situation (at least in English law) seems confusing, or, at a 
crossroad, as Waller LJ describes it in the Guinness Mahon110 case. In my view, English 
law, (among common law countries) is currently a hybrid system uneasily allowing the 
coexistence of the ‘unjust factor’ approach with the ‘absence of basis’ approach in its 
enrichment law. Though not many theorists will readily agree with this proposition, the 
‘unjust factor’ approach is, in my opinion, in a subtle process of being phased out 
completely from the English law of unjust enrichment. Thus far, however, the approach is 
still part of English law, at least in theory, and its signature marks are essentially the 
following: A claimant asking for restitution on the basis that the defendant has been 
enriched at his expense will have to show not only that the defendant was enriched and 
that the enrichment was at his expense, but also prove a ‘positive element’ (an ‘unjust 
factor’) which demonstrates that the enrichment was unjust.111  The various unjust factors 
(or ‘grounds for restitution’ as Graham Virgo112 calls them) sometimes are classified into 
several categories either on account of taxonomy, practical reasons or for tidier 
exposition.113 Obviously there is no unanimity yet amongst English theorists on how to 
finally categorise the unjust factors and their list is open ended. In essence the field is still 
developing. Be that as it may, one commonly found approach is to group them into non-
voluntary transfers (with the subcategories of ‘no intent, impaired intent, and qualified 
intent),114 and a miscellaneous group commonly referred to as ‘policy-motivations’.115 
                                                 
110 Guinness Mahon & Co Ltd v Kensington & Chelsea Royal London BC [1999] QB 215, 233. 
111   Allusion has already been made elsewhere about the Canadian break away with its ‘juristic reason’ to 
which I shall return again at a later stage in this work. For fresh challenges on the ‘unjust factor’ in England 
see S. Worthington (2004) 12 RLR 267; and P. B. H. Birks himself in Unjust Enrichment 2nd ed. (2005). 
112  G. Virgo, Restitution (1999) 119-127. Virgo groups the grounds for restitution in three categories: (i) 
‘plaintiff-oriented grounds for restitution’ (which includes (a) ‘absence of intention’, (b) ‘vitiated 
intention’, and (c) qualified intention); (ii) ‘defendant-oriented grounds for restitution’ (which include (a) 
exploitation, (b) free acceptance); and (iii) ‘policy-oriented ground of restitution’ (in this category falls the 
example of ‘necessity’ and the recovery of ultra vires payment from public authorities). 
113  One of the practical reasons is the attempt to reign on the untidiness of the subject inherited from the 
way the whole field developed in common-law jurisdictions.    
114 In his last book Peter Birks described the traditional English unjust factors from the 
Mansfield/Blackstone presentation (which included mistake, failure of consideration, shades of fraud or 
pressure, and taking advantage of vulnerable people) to the modern tripartite controversial approach 
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The non-consensual transfer group commonly comprises the following ‘unjust factors’: 
mistake, undue influence, ‘illegality’,116 illegitimate pressure, ignorance,117 personal 
handicap (such as minority, dementia, and illiteracy (in certain cases)), failure of 
consideration’. The sub-category of impaired intent (sometimes termed 
‘unconscientiousness in receiving’) traditionally included ‘knowing receipt’, and the 
controversial ‘free acceptance’.118 All other cases not fitting these two groupings may 
only qualify in unjust enrichment for policy grounds.119  
                                                                                                                                                 
(‘intent based unjust factors’, ‘defendant-sided unjust factors’ and ‘policy-based unjust factors’).  -  Birks 
himself referring already to Burrows (‘Free Acceptance and the Laws of Restitution’ (1988) 104 LQR 576 
and A Burrows The Law of Restitution 2nd Ed. (2002) 402-407) refers to the elimination of the defendant-
sided category which was sometimes called ‘unconscientious of receipt’ or ‘free acceptance’ because such 
category proved to be the result of muddled thinking. Thus, this left only the field for two main categories: 
‘Intent-based unjust factors’ and ‘policy-based unjust factors’ (Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2005) 41-43). 
115  P. B. H. Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2005) 107; R Goff & G Jones, The Law of Restitution (2007); M. 
Chen-Wishart (2000) 20 Oxford JLS 557, 559-560. Some writers such a G. Virgo do not follow this 
classification strictly; but in essence they adhere to the same principle that an unjust factor must be proved. 
Thus, Virgo discussing the ‘Role of Unjust Enrichment Principle in Practice’ states that ‘since the unjust 
enrichment principle will be applicable only where the plaintiff’s claim falls within one of the recognised 
grounds for restitution, such as mistake, duress or total failure of consideration (emphasis added), the 
better view that it should be sufficient for the plaintiff to plead that the defendant had been unjustly 
enriched at the plaintiff’s expense on the ground of mistake, or duress, for example, without needing to 
assert that the plaintiff’s claim falls within one of the forms of action’. (G. Virgo, Restitution (1999) 56. 
(NB. The 2006 edition does not depart from this proposition).  
116 Illegality mainly belongs to the policy motivations group. But it is also classified as a defence. Its final 
classification therefore may vary. In some cases its classification may depends on whether it is thought of 
as a ‘protective illegality’ or in other forms of illegalities. Illegally itself does not necessarily mean 
‘contrary to public policy’ though in most cases it is contrary to public policy.  The illegality of, say a 
contract, can be relevant to enrichment liability in at least two ways.  First, it may act as a bar to restitution 
that would otherwise be available in connection with the contract: to this extent, Tottenborn, for example, 
argues that people enter into illegal agreements at their own risk (A. Tottenborn, The Law of Restitution in 
England and Ireland 3rd Ed. (2002) 168).  Secondly, in another sense, illegality may actually create a right 
to restitution, namely where a contract is made illegal in order to protect one party. This last feature is often 
called ‘protective illegality’. One particular feature of the ‘protective illegality’ cases is that there appears 
to be no requirement of total failure even where it would normally apply to the claim in question. For 
further debates and contours of ‘illegality’ in English law see R. Goff & G Jones, The Law of Restitution 6th 
Ed.  (2002) chapter 24 and literature cited there (There are no relevant changes on the issue in the 7th 
Edition (2007) of Goff & Jones’ Law of Restitution for our purpose). William Swadling, however, argues 
that ‘illegality is never a cause of action and that the decisions which appear so to hold can be explained on 
other grounds’ (Swadling, ‘The Role of Illegality in the English Law of contract’ in W. J. Swadling (ed.) 
Unjust Enrichment 289; R. Goff & G. Jones, The Law of Restitution (2002) § 24-003 footnote 37a. 
117  Some writers classify ignorance as a subset of personal handicap. Many others disagree with such 
classification. In any event, if ignorance is seen from the perspective of being ‘vulnerable to be taken 
advantage of’ for not knowing, then it might be analogous to ‘frailty of mind’ and may resemble 
‘handicap’. But that might be pushing the envelope too far.  Objectively it is not a handicap.   
118 The term ‘free acceptance’ was coined by Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitution (1966) 30.  Peter 
Birks alongside Goff and Jones became the most ardent advocates of the concept, but Jack Beatson and 
Andrew Burrows, among others rejected it. The controversy is of no consequence for our purpose. For 
details of the controversies surrounding the concept, especially the Birks-Burrows’ debate see a useful 
summary in G. McMeel, The Modern Law of Restitution (2000) 217-223 and literature cited there. See 
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The angle of the enrichment claims at common law is also different from that of civil 
law. In the common law the enrichment will be retained unless an ‘unjust factor’ (a 
positive element) is proved why it should not stand where it currently lies; in contrast, in 
civil law the approach is that the enrichment shall not remain where it currently lies sine 
causa (a negative element). It shall only remain there if it was acquired under a valid 
legal ground (a disposition of law, a contract, under delictual (tort or ‘civil 
responsibility’) action, etc, or as gift120). For the common-law the unjust factors describe 
a pragmatic manner when an enrichment claim is available. It is only when precedents 
run out that the courts may resort to higher-level principles in order cautiously to extend 
the categories of recognised unjust factors.121 According to some English theorists the list 
of unjust factors is not closed, and the courts will always be able to formulate new unjust 
factors which support an enrichment claim in appropriate case.122   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
further G. Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (1999) 79-86; R. Goff & G. Jones, The Law of 
Restitution 6th Ed (2002) § 20-051; § 1-021; §§ 1-019-022; §§ 1-034-037. 
119  Illegality and necessity cases (encouraging useful interventions) belonged to this policy motivations 
group.  All these three groupings were mostly the birth-children of Peter Birks before he changed his mind 
in his last book and supported the idea that ‘there is only one  unjust factor’ and says: ‘Heavy-weight cases 
have adopted the ‘no basis’ approach. The ‘general doctrine’ is that enrichment at another’s expense has to 
be given up if it lacks any explanatory basis’ (P. B. H. Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2005) 108). 
120 It is to be remembered that under most civil law systems a gift is ‘a contract’, differently from the 
common-law approach. This issue is particularly important in the conceptualization of negotiorum gestio 
where common law in general considers unauthorized administrators (gestors) as ‘intermeddlers’ in other 
people’s affairs and therefore gift-makers who should not be compensated, save in special circumstances. 
(For a good summary see among others, H. Dagan (1999) 97 Michigan LR 1152) referred to earlier in this 
work. For other Civil law systems see for example the French approach in John Bell, S. Boyron & S. 
Whittaker, Principles of French Law 2nd Ed. (2008) 423-426.   
121 For some theorists the modern example of English courts recognizing a new unjust factor is Woolwich 
case ((1993) 1 AC 70 (HL)). (See T. Krebs, Restitution at the Crossroad (2001) 307; S. Hedley, 
Restitution: Its Division and Ordering  (2001); but contrast this view with that of P. B. H. Birks, Unjust 
Enrichment (2005) 133, who clearly says that ‘in England, in Woolwich case  a similar scenario (reference 
to the Australian case Mason v New South Wales (1959) 102 CLR 108 (HCA)) played out on facts which 
did not admit of reliance on duress or any other impairment of intent, so that the outcome had to be made to 
turn on an unjust factor from the other family, namely ‘policy motivations’. Birks concludes, as everyone 
now accepts, that the payment in Woolwich case ‘was simply a payment made to discharge a non-existent 
debt’, viz, an ‘undue payment’, or a payment ‘without basis’. With P. B. H. Birks agrees also A. Burrows, 
The Law of Restitution (2002) 509; See equally Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln CC [1999] 2 AC 349 (HL) 
and Nurdin & Peacock plc v DB Ramsden & Co Ltd [1999] 1 All ER 941.  
122  See T. Krebs above and many authorities cited there.  
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In short, while the common law with its ‘unjust factors’ looks mainly to discover a 
defective or an incomplete intent to undo the transaction, civil-law systems mainly 
emphasise disentitlement. 
 
1.1.3. Concluding Remarks. 
 
It is undeniable that if one looks comparatively at the history of the law of 
unjust/unjustified enrichment in the common-law and civil-law, some clear differences 
are noticeable. In spite of those developmental differences, and some persistent voices to 
the contrary,123 there is now a growing consensus which both families recognise, 
regardless of whether it is directly or indirectly acknowledged, that ‘iure naturae aequum 
est neminem cum alterius detrimento et iniuria fieri locupletiorem’.124 It is acknowledged 
that this ‘principle’ is akin to representing an ideal rather than a practical rule of law and 
                                                 
123 As pointed out elsewhere in this chapter, not everyone in the common-law world agrees with the need of 
a general principle against unjustified enrichment as the foundation of the whole law of restitution. The 
resistance is especially prominent in Australia where the influence of writers such as S. Stoljar, I. M. 
Jackman, R. Gratham and C. Rickett among others is heavily felt. See for example the approach in I. M. 
Jackman, The Varieties of Restitution (1998).  A decade ago Brice Dickson ((1995) 54 CLJ 101, 126) 
equally noted that any direct comparison of the structure of unjust enrichment claims in common law and 
civil-law systems is bound to be misleading because, he also thought, that the principle against unjust 
enrichment serves different purposes in the two sets of systems. Despite these dissonant voices, it is my 
view that the convergence is to a certain degree inevitable.  This assertion gains greater force if one also 
considers, as already alluded to elsewhere in this work, that the unqualified sustainability of the ‘unjust 
factor’ approach is almost doomed. See allusion made elsewhere in this work about the Canadian break 
away with the ‘juristic reason’ to which I shall return again at a later stage in this work. For fresh 
challenges to the ‘unjust factor’ approach in England see among others S. Worthington ‘The New Birksian 
Approach to Unjust Enrichment’ (2004) 12 RLR 267; and Peter Birks himself in Unjust Enrichment 2nd Ed. 
(Oxford, OUP 2005). 
124  Pomponius D 50.17.206 or D. 12.6.14 ‘Jure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento fieri 
locupletorum’. For incarnation of the ‘adage’ in the civil-law systems see for example the development in 
French Law of the action described by Molinaeus as ‘actio in factum ex aequitate’ which Pothier in 
Appendice sur la gestion d’affaires (Appendice to his Treatise on the Contract of Mandate) 191ff 
comments upon and referring to such gestion d’affaires by saying: ‘dans notre jurisprudence française, … 
qui regarde la seule équité comme suffisante pour produire une obligation civile e pour donner une action, 
il ne doit pas être douté (douteux) que … celui qui a fait des impenses dont je profite doit avoir action 
contre moi, jusqu'à concurrence de ce que j’en profite’. For similar approach in German law the early use of 
the actio de in rem verso the provision in § 230 of the Prussian Code ‘Allgemeines Landrecht ‘ of 1794  and 
§ 233 on negotiorum gestio which are said to have been used nearly interchangeably and their application 
that virtually became a general enrichment action. (see generally D. L. de Campos, A Subsidiariedade da 
Obrigação de Restituir o Enriquecimento (Lisbon, 2003) 55-108; D.H. Van Zyl 1992 Acta Juridica 120 
footnote 36; See equally B. Nicholas (1962) 66 Tulane L R  605, 618-623). 
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if mechanically adopted it may carry a legal system too far afield.125 Consequently, 
because both legal families now recognise the principle as the foundation of unjust or 
unjustified enrichment claims, whether implicitly or explicitly, both systems are also now 
equally faced with the reality that it would, inter alia, be inequitable if an innocent and 
unsuspecting transferee were to be regarded in all circumstances as the plaintiff’s insurer 
against every possible peril. How both systems have historically dealt with possible 
inequity will now be addressed.  
 
 
1.2. History of change of position Defence Proper. 
1.2.1. Civil-Law Systems. 
 
In civil-law systems the defence of change of position is ordinarily known either as 
disenrichment or as loss of enrichment. Although some commentators contend that it is a 
novelty invented by the Pandectists,126 its embryonic origin seems to go back to the 
ancient times in the interplay between the notions of distributive justice, commutative 
justice and corrective justice according to the Aristotelian Nicomachean Ethics.127 
Academics are not exactly sure, though, when it first surfaced in its modern form and 
they offer different accounts of its origin, though such accounts are not necessarily 
mutually irreconcilable. Some offer a more historical-philosophical approach to its origin, 
                                                 
125 J. Dawson, Unjust Enrichment (1999 Reprint) 7-8. 
126  For example R. Zimmermann and J.E. Du Plessis ((1994) RLR 38-39 and R. Zimmermann, The Law of 
Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1996) 899ff) implicitly support this view when 
they, inter alia, say of BGB § 818 (III): ‘Such a general rule limiting the defendant’s liability to the actual 
enrichment at the time of litispendente was unknown in Roman law and the ius commune. It was only in the 
course of the nineteenth century, and in the work of tendencies to facilitate enrichment actions, that the 
reasonable reliance of the recipient to be able to keep what he has received appeared to require protection, 
and eventually it was not only regarded as manifestly equitable, but as inherent in the very nature of 
‘enrichment’ liability, that a duty to make restitution existed only insofar as the recipient was (still) 
enriched’. 
127 Nicomachean Ethics, v 9, 1130b-1131a. According to Aristotle, while distributive justice gives each 
citizen a fair share of whatever resources a community has to divide, commutative justice preserves each 
person’s share. In involuntary transactions, one who took or destroyed another’s resources has to give back 
an equivalent amount. In voluntary transactions, the parties have to exchange resources of equivalent value. 
This distinction between involuntary and voluntary transactions which resembles the one drawn today 
between delict and contract, seems also to have been the linear ancestor of such distinction, that goes back 
to Gaius (Gaius 3.88), who according to many legal historians and scholars took it from Aristotle. See R. 
Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1996) 10-11. 
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while others see to it as the necessary culmination of the assertion of a general principle 
of unjustified enrichment. If the effort of the late scholastics gave rise to the modern idea 
of unjustified enrichment as a separate body of law at the same level with contract and 
tort,128 such an idea needed to be supplemented with a strong defence of change of 
position / loss of enrichment as a logical consequence. Although some jurisdictions, as 
we shall see throughout the thesis (and more specifically in chapter four), have opted to 
limit the ambit of such general principle by making the whole law of unjustified 
enrichment subsidiary to the other fields of obligations, the defence of change of position 
certainly plays a major limiting role in many systems. In any event, the concept of 
disenrichment (or change-of-position) appears prominently in the German BGB and 
several German authors129 have devoted efforts to its clarification.  Gordley,130 analysing 
comparatively such notion in the BGB, expresses the view that the drafters of the BGB 
took it from the nineteenth-century Pandectists, especially Windscheid and Savigny, both 
of whom seem, in turn, to have taken it from members of the seventeenth-century and 
eighteenth-century natural-law school such as Grotius and Pufendorf. They, again, took it 
from a group centred in Spain in the sixteenth century and known to the historians as the 
late scholastics. The late scholastics came to the notion of loss of enrichment as a defence 
while discussing the implications of Aristotle’s concept of commutative justice as it had 
been interpreted by Saint Thomas Aquinas. The latter was of the view that ‘if the 
transaction was purely for the benefit of the person who received the property – for 
example a gratuitous loan - then compensation is due even if the property has been lost; if 
it was purely for the benefit of the owner - for example, a deposit, - then compensation is 
                                                 
128  R. Feenstra, ‘Grotius’ Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment as a Source of Obligation: Its Influence in 
Roman-Dutch Law’ in E. Schrage (ed.) Unjust Enrichment (1997) 197; and see especially Hugo Grotius, 
Indeilinge tot de Hollandse rechts-geleerheid 3.30.13. Some authors doubt that Grotius in this paragraph is 
discussing a formulation of a general principle, and hold that he was merely discussing the condictio sine 
causa specialis. There are however many other studies that seem to confirm that he was indeed discussing 
such a general principle, as did other authors elsewhere in the European ius commune on the same text, and 
other passages of the Digest. For a comprehensive studies of the concept of unjust enrichment in late 
scholasticism and the influence of that school of though on Grotius see J. Hallebeek, The Concept of Unjust 
Enrichment in Late Scholasticism (1996) 87-103. 
129 For a summary of old authorities on whether non-enrichment is a defence to the condictio indebiti, 
especially in German law, see King v Cohen, Benjamin and Co. (1953) 4 SA 641 (W), by Steyn, J (as then 
he was). Staudinger-Lorenz § 818 No. 12; R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations 
of the Civilian Tradition (1990) 887-890. For the condictio in general see also F. R. Malan 1992 Acta 
Juridica 131-147.  
130 J. Godley, ‘Restitution Without Enrichment? Change of Position and Wegfall der Bereicherung’  in D. 
Johnston & R. Zimmermann (eds.) Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues (2002) 229-228. 
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not due except if the loss was caused by grave fault’.131 Secondly, the recipient might be 
liable merely because he had another’s property, regardless of how he had come by it 
(ipsa res accepta). According to Aquinas, commutative justice required that he gives it 
back.132 In this last case, according to the late scholastics, and then Grotius133 and 
Pufendorf,134 a person who no longer has another’s property should still be liable if he 
has become richer by having once had it. Such a person is liable only to the extent he is 
still enriched. Thus he is not liable if he consumed another’s property or gave it away, 
except to the extent that he saved money he would otherwise have spent. He is also not 
liable if he bought and then resold another’s property except if he made a profit.135 
Finally, James Gordley thinks that the late scholastics as well as Grotius and Puffendorf 
reached their conclusions by an exercise of setting some reasons aside. They first started 
by setting aside every other reason that the plaintiff might recover until all that is left is 
the defendant’s enrichment by means of the plaintiff’s resources. It is then a defence that 
the defendant is no longer enriched, but only if he no longer had the plaintiff’s property 
and is not liable because of the way he had initially acquired it, whether wrongfully or 
with the plaintiff’s consent.136  
 
Daniel Visser,137 reaffirms that the orientation of ‘Roman law was towards the recovery 
of that which had been given and not towards restoring the balance of enrichment 
remaining with the enrichment debtor’, but points out that a discrepancy developed in the 
substantive law, ‘because the loss of a species was considered a good defence in an 
enrichment action, but not the loss of a quantitas, of a class’.138 Although some of the 
medieval jurists apparently realised the logical fallacy of allowing loss of enrichment to 
be pleaded where a slave was killed by accident, but not where the mice ate a sack of 
                                                 
131  Summa Theologiae II-II, Quaest. LXII, art.6. (1974   G. Walsh Translation). 
132  Ibid. 
133  De Iure Belli ac Pacis, Libro tres (1646), II, X, 2.1 (1909 edition by P.C. Molhuysen). 
134  De Jure Naturae ac Gentium Libri Octo (1688), IV, XIII, 6. (1909 edition by  P.C. Molhuysen). 
135 J. Gordley in D. Johnston & R. Zimmermann (ed.) Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues (2002) 229. 
136  Ibid. 229. 
137 D. P. Visser 1992 Acta Juridica 175; D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 703ff. Observation: 
Unless otherwise indicated, references and translations in this ‘mini-section’ (the history of change of 
position in civil-law systems referent to Visser’s view) are as they appear in both Visser’s publications 
cited in this note.  
138  D. P. Visser 1992 Acta Juridica 175, 180-186. 
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corn, they nevertheless never summonsed the intellectual courage to develop this 
understanding into a rational solution. It was only with the Pandectists, argues Visser 
following Flume, that it became generally to be accepted that loss of enrichment could be 
pleaded both in the case of a species and of quantitas.139
 
Visser arrived at such a conclusion after a detailed examination and interpretation of 
selected passages of the Corpus Iuris Civilis (specifically in the Digest) in the European 
ius commune culminating with Flume’s140 analysis of D 12.6.26.12.141 From the analysis 
of D 12.6.26.12, among other texts, Flume had concluded that the ‘loss of enrichment 
could ward off the condictio in all cases’.  The Digest’s passage states the following:  
 
‘[H]e also points out that it does happen on occasion that we can bring a condictio for something 
different from what we handed over. For instance, I give land not owed and bring a condictio for its 
fruits; or I give a slave not owed, and you sell him honestly for a small sum [‘modico’] in which 
case you certainly need only give back what you have left from the price [‘quod ex pretio haves’]; or 
again, if I have made the slave more valuable by expenditure upon him, must not this too be 
valued?’. 142
 
The gist of the matter, according to Visser, is what is meant by ‘quod ex pretio habes’ for 
some translate it as meaning ‘what you have left from the price’143 while others as 
meaning ‘what you have received as price’.144 Noting that both translations are 
                                                 
139  Ibid. 186. 
140  W. Flume ‘Der Wegfall der Bereicherung in der Entwicklung vom römischen sum geltenden Recht’ in 
Festschrift für Hans Niedermeyer (1953) 103ff as cited respectively in D. P. Visser 1992 Acta Juridica 175,  
and Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 706. 
141  ‘…et interdum licet aliud praestamus, inquit, aliud condicimus: ut puta fundum indebitum dedi et 
fructus condico: vel hominem indebitum, et hunc sine fraude modico distraxisti, nempe hoc solum 
refundere debes, quod ex pretio habes; vel meis sumptibus pretiosiorem hominem feci, nonne aestimari 
haec debent? [...he also points out that it does happen on occasion that we can bring a condictio for 
something different from what we handed over. For instance, I give land not owed and bring a condictio for 
its fruits; or I give a slave not owed, and you sell him honestly for s small sum [‘modico’] in which case 
you certainly need only give back what you have left from the price [‘quo ex pretio haves’]; or again, if I 
have made a slave more valuable by expenditure upon him, must not this too be valued?] (Visser’s 
translation at D. P. Visser 1992 Acta Juridica 175, and Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 706). 
142  D. P. Visser 1992 Acta Juridica 175, and D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 706. 
143 Cf. Kruger, Mommsen & Watson edition of the Corpus Iuris Civilis (1985) and R. Zimmermann, The 
Law of Obligations. Roman Foundations of the Civil Tradition (1990) 899. 
144 W. Flume, ‘Der Wegfall der Bereicherung in der Entwicklung vom Römischen zum geltenden Recht’ in 
Festschirift für Hans Niedermeyer (1953) 103, 104-6. 
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grammatically possible, Visser argues that the true meaning of those words could only be 
arrived at by analysing the full context in which they are used coupled with evidence 
elsewhere in the Digest. Hence, a reading of D 12.6.65.5-8 and the interpretation given to 
it by certain glossators,145 and Commentators,146 as well as by some Roman-Dutch 
jurists147 and some German members of the ius modernus pandectarum,148 and after 
reconciling some differences between glossators and commentators, led Visser to 
conclude that there was a degree of consensus in the ius commune that ‘quod ex pretio 
habes’ had to be read as meaning ‘that which was received as price’.149
 
This meant that the position in the ius commune (until the time of the Pandectists) was as 
it was in Roman law, namely: 
 
‘If you lost a species you need not restore it, because loss of a species can be pleaded. However, if you 
have received money in the place of the species, you had to restore the money that you received – 
whether you still have it or not – because money is a genius and loss of a genius cannot be pleaded’.150  
 
Given that the loss of species until then could be pleaded, as a defence, but not the loss of 
a genus151 and the law still considered the calculation of exactly what had to be restored 
where a species had been lost, as being firmly based on the defendant’s surviving 
enrichment, it follows that ‘if the price received from the res was lost, the enrichment-
debtor would remain liable, because money is a fungible, a genus.152 Furthermore, Visser 
                                                 
145  E.g, the Acursian gloss ‘Non Tenebris’ to D 12.6.65.8; The gloss ‘Soluto’ to D12.6.65.6; The gloss 
‘Habes’ to D 12.6.26.12; the Cannon law gloss ‘Ad pretium’ to D 12.6.65.8. 
146 Bartolus Opera Omnia (Venetiis 1596) ad D 12.6.7; Jason de Mayo, In Secundum Digesti Veteris 
Partem Commentaria (Venetiis 16 29) ad D 12.6.7. 
147 Hugo Grotius, Inleidinge... (1952 Edition by F. Dovring, H.F.W.D. Fischer & E. M. Meijers); D.G. van 
der Keessel, Praelectiones iuris ad Hugonis Grotii Introductionem at Iurisprudentiam Hollandicam (1738-
1816);  W Pauw Observationes Tumultuariae Novae (1712-1787).  
148  WA Lauterbach, Collegii Theoretico-Practici (Tubingen 1726) 12.6.29; A Claudius, De Condictione 
Indebiti Commentarius (Francofurti 1605) Ch.7); and CF Glück,  Ausführliche Erläuterung der Pandekten 
(1798-1896) vol d ad D.12.6 (§835); A Faber, Rationalia ad Pandectas (Genevae 1626-1631) ad D 12.6.7 
and D 12.6.65.6. 
149  D. P. Visser 1992 Acta Juridica 181-183. 
150  D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 704 and 714. 
151 Visser cites here a 1745 Dutch case reported by W Pauw in Observationes Tumuluariae Novae (eds H.F. 
W.D. Fischer et al) vol. 1 (1964) 103 (case no. 148)). 
152 Note, however, that Visser contrasts Bartolus’ comments ‘Sed quando quantitas solvitur: tunc 
indistincte dicitur qui [esse] locupletior in eo quod recipit. Quantitas enim perire non potest’ = [but when a 
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explains the reason why the price, and not the true value, of a species which had been 
disposed of, must be restored. That is so because it represents the defendant’s remaining 
enrichment. 
 
 
 
1.2.1.1. The Current Civil-Law Approach to Change of Position. 
 
 
The defence of change of position/loss of enrichment is generally held to be available 
where the loss suffered by the defendant is causally connected to his enrichment. Mala 
fide defendants are generally excluded from the defence. Where the defendant has 
incurred expenses for the up-keep or improvement of the enrichment object, these 
expenses can be deducted under the change of position defence to the extent that such 
expenses cannot be deducted from secondary sources.153 For example, in German law 
where the defence is prominent, the cardinal principle of enrichment law is that ‘the 
recipient must under no circumstance end up worse off than before the enrichment’.154 
                                                                                                                                                 
quantity is paid, then it is generally said that someone is enriched by what he has received. For a quantity 
cannot perish] with Jason de Mayno’s response t  this passage ‘Considera si posset dici quod in frumento 
[D 12.6.65.6] loquitur quando frumentum consumptum fuit in usum familiae, quo casu est locupletior in 
pretio, quod necesse habuisset expendere, immo ad pretium tenetur. Hic quantitas illius generalis non erat 
tali modo consumpta... Sed cave in ultimo membro in quantum Bartolus tenet quod si soluta est pecunie 
quantitas per errorem indistincte tantundem repetitur, qua quantitas perire non potest, idem vult glossa in 
1. indebiti § si nummi [D 12.6.15.1] in gl.2 infra eodem [12.6.7]. Sed reprobatur per alios omnes ibi, qua 
petito hereditatis, sicut condictio indebiti solum competit ad id in quo quis est locupletior, 1. sed et si 1. 
consuluit ff. De pet. Her. [D 5.3.25] et tamen si pecunia sit consumpta non repetitur 1. utrum ff. De pet. 
Her. [d 5.3.23], ergo idem in condictione indebiti’ =[Consider if it could be said that D 12.6.65.5 is 
speaking of when corn is consumed in domestic use, in which case he is richer with regard to the price, 
which of necessity he would have had to pay, and indeed he is liable for the price. Here a quantity of a 
general commodity was not consumed in that way. But be careful in the second case, where Bartolus holds 
that if an amount of money has been paid in error, without distinction the same amount is claimed back on 
the grounds that a quantity cannot perish (and the gloss on that lex says the same). But he is contradicted by 
all the others on the grounds that the petitio hereditatis, like the condictio indebiti, is available to the extent 
that someone has been enriched, and therefore in that case if the money has been spent, it is not claimed 
back, and therefore the same applies to the condictio indebiti] (in Secundum Digesti Veteris partem 
Commentaria (Venetiis 1629) ad D 12.6.7). All references and translations in this note are taken directly 
from the updated version of  D. P. Visser publication originally appearing at 1992 Acta Juridica 185 and 
now embodied as part of chapter 12 in D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 703ff.  
153  BGH 11 January 1980, NJW 1980, 1970; B. S. Markesinis, W. Lorenz & G. Dannemann, The German 
Law of Obligations (1997) 764. 
154  R. Zimmermann (2005) 15 OJLS 403 at 413. Put in Zimmermann’s own words: ‘If it is correct that the 
law of unjustified enrichment is not concerned with the reparation of losses, but with skimming off of 
unjust gains, we have to focus our attention, in the first place, on the position of the recipient. And if that 
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This notion permeates both the jurisprudence of the courts155 and academic writings. The 
principle is further given full effect by interpreting BGB  818 (I) narrowly, so as to make 
the defence available even to a defendant who has been grossly negligent in failing to 
appreciate the fact that he was not entitled to keep the enrichment.  
 
The diverse manifestations of the defence appear generally in the following factual 
scenarios, though in some jurisdictions some of them will not be entertained: (i) where 
there is loss of the benefit itself; (ii) where there is an uneconomic use of the benefit; (iii) 
where there is an expenditure incurred in connection with the benefit;156  (iv) where there 
are other expenditures causally connected to the enrichment. 
 
Where, however, mutual performances have been exchanged and the situation creates an 
interface between the transfer and the application of the BGB § 818 III provisions, 
German law departs from the application of the disenrichment defence and employs the 
famous Saldotheorie157 (the difference in value between the performances). In other 
words, in the case of bilateral contracts which have been avoided ab initio, if 
performances have passed both ways, the measure of the enrichment claim is the 
difference in value between the performances. Sometimes German law in these cases 
applies the Zweikonktionenlehre or the Lehre vom faktischen Synallagma’ instead of the 
Saldotheorie. The Zweikonktionenlehre is often where the contract has been rescinded on 
                                                                                                                                                 
has induced us to extend his liability so as to cover all benefits retained by him without legal ground, that 
same consideration may also nduce us to limit his liability to situations where there is a benefit, at the time 
of the litispendente, that can be skimmed off. The restitutionary claim, in other words, should reduce the 
recipient’s economic position to the status quo ante but it should not force him to suffer a loss’.  See 
equally BGHZ 55, 128, at 134 where it is said: ‘(a) According to BGB 818 III BGB, the obligation to give 
up what has been obtained, or to compensate for its value, is excluded to the extent that the recipient is no 
longer enriched. This provision serves to protect the ‘bona fide’ enriched party who has used up what has 
been obtained without legal ground, in reliance on the (continued) existence of a legal ground. Such party 
should not be obliged to give up or to compensate for value over and above the amount of a true (surviving) 
enrichment’. 
155  For a collection of German cases on this issue and incidental matters translated into English see B.S. 
Markesinis, W. Lorenz and G. Dannemann, The German Law of Obligations, Vol. I (1997) 770-816 
(Gerhard Dannemann’s translations).  
156 See for example Case No. 131 BGHZ 118, 383 (Bundesgerichtshof  12th Civil Senate 17 June 1992 
(English Version by Gerhard Dannemann in B. Markesinis, W. Lorenz & G. Dannemann, The German Law 
of Obligations (1997) 777-778).  
157 Reference is made elsewhere in this work about the other competing theories to the Saldotheorie, 
namely the Zweikondiktionenlehre (according to this theory ‘each party to a synallagmatic contract has his own 
claim against the other party.) and the Lehre vom faktischen Synallagma’. See below at 3.6.2 (Failed contracts 
in South Africa). 
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ground of deceit, or is void for a minor’s lack of capacity to contract.158  Because the 
provisions of § 818 III BGB limit the duty to make restitution in species or in money to 
the surviving enrichment, the ‘something’ which has to be returned under the general 
provision in § 812 BGB is generally considered that it ‘cannot be any single value which 
has passed from the claimant to the defendant, but only the totality of what has passed 
taking account of the values which were given in exchange and the encumbrances resting 
on what has been received’.159 In essence in these cases the loss of enrichment defence is 
not applied.  
 
1.2.2. Common-Law Systems. 
 
The history of change of position in common law jurisdictions is closely associated with 
the development of Indebitatus assumpsit. One of the landmark cases in that development 
is Moses v MacFarlane in which Lord Mansfield among other things, said the following: 
 
‘This kind of equitable action, to recover back money, which ought not in justice to be kept, is very 
beneficial, and therefore much encouraged. It lies only for money which ex aequo et bono, the 
defendant ought to refund; it does not lie for money paid by the plaintiff, which is claimed of him as 
payable in point of honour and honesty … In one word, the gist of this action is, that the defendant, 
upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the 
money’ (emphasis added).160
                                                 
158 Example that fall on the application of the Zweikondiktionenlehre would be where A is deceived into 
buying a car with serious safety defects, and these very defects cause an accident in which the car is 
destroyed. In this case, it is argued, A can rely on change of position and still claim back the purchase 
price. (See generally B. Markesinis, W. Lorenz & G. Dannemann, The German Law of Obligations (1997) 
765). 
159  Staudinger/Lorenz § 818 No. 50 (as cited in T. Krebs, in E.J.H. Schrage (Ed) Unjust Enrichment (2001) 
311).  
160  Moses v MacFarlane 2 Burr 1005, 1012 (1760). In the common-law world Lord Mansfield raises 
mixed-feelings. He is regarded by some writers as a pioneer while by others with dissatisfaction for 
obscuring the action for money had and received with his liberality of subjecting this area of the law to 
‘good conscience’ and morality of ‘natural law’.   H. Cohen in (1932) Harvard. L.R.1333, 1338 referring to 
the extracts of Lord Mansfield in Moses v. MacFerlan below said: ‘Perhaps an impetus less diffuse would 
have resulted in formulations of more precise categories of defences in place of this generous outpouring of 
spirit. The question posed is whether, despite this unprincipled, yet still articulate, moral urge there is not 
today some ground for the assertion that defences in quasi-contracts are governed by law instead of by 
‘natural justice’. See also P. B. H. Birks (1984) Current Legal Problems 1, 5 referring to the ‘dark side’ of 
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From that proposition, as a matter of logical conclusion, Lord Mansfield adds: 
‘It is the most favourable way in which one can be sued: he can be liable no further than the money 
he has received; and against that, may go into every equitable defence, upon the general issue; he 
may claim every equitable allowance; etc; in short, he may defend himself of everything which 
shows that the plaintiff, ex aequo et bono, is not entitled to the whole of his demand, or to any part 
of it’.161
 
These texts clearly manifest that ‘unjust enrichment’ is rooted in equitable principles in 
the common-law world, and as such if recovery by the plaintiff is a matter of equity, and 
the plaintiff may always recover whenever it is equitable to do so, it also follows that the 
defendant must prevail when the equities are in his favour.  Put differently, where the 
equities are equal, the loss lies where it falls. Early interpretations of the right to recover 
money paid under mistake, especially in American law162 were to the effect that if the 
right to recover money paid under mistake was held to be measured by equitable 
principles, equitable defences would also adhere to it. Given the fact that change-of-
position was a defence in equity, it also followed that change-of-position was a defence 
in quasi-contracts.163 In a detailed analysis of the defence, George Costigan,164 back in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Moses v. MacFerlan with its ‘three unrelated forces which came together to deform an important area of 
the common-law’. 
161  Moses v McFerlan 2Burr 1005, 1012 (1760). 
162  G. Costigan (1907) 20 Harvard. LR. 205;  H. Cohen (1932) Harvard LR 1333, 1344 n 33. 
163 H. Cohen however disagreed with these holdings. As early as 1932 he expressed the view that if change 
of position in equity were simply an aspect of the wider attitude that any form of hardship was a cause for 
the denial of equitable relief, it would contradict equity itself, because a result which upheld the defence but 
left the suitor without remedy in any court was very unusual in equity; the normal result and the general 
intention was to relegate the suitor to an action at law where he could find some solace, adequate or not. He 
adds further that even if one assumed that the rights in quasi-contract were equitable, one could still reason 
that the defence of change of position did not necessarily attach. Hence, if validity had to be accorded to the 
defence, it did not legitimately follow from a confused analogy to equitable rights and remedies. But Cohen 
recognised that it did occasionally happen that the denial of equitable relief entailed denial of any relief. In 
his view however, such outcome only occurred where equity did not follow the law, but stood ready to 
grant an extraordinary remedy (H. Cohen (1932) Harvard. LR 1333, 1345 n. 35).  Contrast however his 
predecessor – Costigan – who says: ‘That the subject of  change of position as a defence to the action for 
money had and received is confused, seems at first sight strange. The obligation to repay money paid to one 
by mistake of a material fact is quasi-contractual, since it exists regardless of the consent and yet may be 
enforced by a contract action, and since it is imposed by law because ex aequo et bono the defendant ought 
to pay the money. Though the money is recoverable in an action at law, because common law judges saw 
fit to allow a remedy at law instead of requiring the plaintiff to bring a suit in equity, the right is essentially 
equitable’ (1906) 20 Harvard. LR 205). These discussions are today obsolete in American law, as by 
legislation, American law eliminated the distinction between action in equity and action at law. Today it 
holds that all non-criminal actions are to be called ‘civil action’ (see Laycok (1989) 67 Texas LR 1277). 
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1906 discussing the various circumstances in which the defence arose, especially where 
neither party was negligent, held that ‘the principle which forbids the defendant enriching 
himself at the expense of the plaintiff should clearly forbid the plaintiff indemnifying 
himself at the expense of an innocent and blameless defendant’. In a modernised 
philosophical language, one would say with Lionel Smith165 that ‘the plaintiff’s claim 
being based on the Kantian right, i.e, on his status as a self-determining agent, he must 
respect equally the defendant’s Kantian right’ – i.e, recognise the autonomy of the 
defendant as self-determining agent. That is so because in any circumstances in which the 
defendant, before he has any reason to suspect he is liable to a claim in unjust 
enrichment, he cannot be faulted for behaving as a self-determining agent, including 
through consuming that which he reasonably believes to be his own wealth. Therefore, in 
a common law system, the defence of change of position is primarily aimed at protecting 
the security of the receipt. That notion also accords with the liberal and individualistic 
approaches of the common-law towards restitution in general and its ordinary system of 
risk allocation. The defence is concerned with protecting the security of receipt because it 
is reckoned that where the defendant believes in good faith that he is the owner, ‘no 
moral issue’ is involved, because ownership is the ultimate right ‘in property’. Where 
such defendant has changed his position, to deny him a defence would be tantamount to 
subjecting him to liability without fault and without corresponding benefit. Furthermore, 
if it is also assumed that the plaintiff is equally without fault, then, the only question that 
indeed arises in such circumstances is which of the two innocent persons shall bear the 
loss that has been incurred.166 The equities being then equal, as already mentioned in the 
introduction to this chapter, common law in general sees no reason why the plaintiff’s 
loss should be shifted to the defendant who neither made a mistake nor reaped a benefit. 
Therefore, the logical conclusion is that in such cases the loss should indeed lie where it 
now falls.167  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
164  (1906) 20 Harvard LR 205, 214. 
165  L. D. Smith (2001) 79 Texas LR  2115, 2148-49. 
166 The notion of fault is more prevalent in some United States jurisdictions than in the Commonwealth 
jurisdictions. 
167  Further historical developments of the defence and prominent cases, especially in American law, are 
given in chapter two below. The modern application of the defence is also discussed in chapter two. 
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1.3. Conclusion. 
 
The common-law and civil law of unjustified enrichment developed along different lines, 
especially from the sixteenth Century. Both, however, had been influenced by the social 
thought of their times and particularly by the theological and natural law schools 
prevalent at the time. The notions of justice that prevailed at any given time and the 
social context in which they operated cannot be dissociated from the legal reasoning of 
that period. For English law, during the time where justice could not be obtained from the 
common-law courts due to the rigidity of the rules applied there, a claimant could have 
recourse to the courts of equity for a remedy, and courts of equity basically applied 
‘natural law’ principles. We have seen that the very notion that no one should be enriched 
at the expense of another without justification, was a notion founded in equity and the 
defences that could be advanced by a defendant were also seen as equitable, although 
with some reservation in many instances. The extension of the Roman remedies in civil-
law jurisdictions has some equitable elements as well, and when a general principle 
against unjustified enrichment was finally formulated, it became inevitable that its 
application should also be complemented with adequate defences to protect the interest of 
defendants. The most important defence has generally been accepted to be change of 
position or loss of enrichment. Although some jurisdictions do not directly have such a 
defence, or give it that name, they do have subtle mechanisms that in effect amount to 
applying a defence of change of position. 
 
Given that whenever there is a claim in unjustified enrichment a tension will inevitably 
arise between the demand for restitution of what was acquired without legal ground and 
the general interest of the receiver to protect his own assets, those jurisdictions that 
recognised a general principle against unjustified enrichment realised early on that the 
easier it is made to claim restitution, the more vulnerable members of society become in 
securing their own wealth and investments. Therefore to protect both interests, any 
generally liberalised system of unjustified enrichment had to afford honest and bona fide 
receivers a general tool to resist such claims whenever a receiver, inter alia, disposed of a 
wealth  that appeared to be his own as a self-determining agent. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
THE SCOPE OF CHANGE OF POSITION IN THE CONTEXT OF OTHER 
DEFENCES IN THE LAW OF ENRICHMENT. 
 
 
2.1. Introduction: 
 
Depending on the facts of the case, an enrichment claim can be resisted in toto or in part 
and in different ways. The manner in which a claim is resisted is commonly called a 
defence, though the cases may not necessarily use this exact term. Defences, in general, 
may be of various kinds. They may be positive or they may be negative; they may be 
total or partial; they may be permanent or temporary; they may go to the root of the claim 
itself (thereby denying the claim’s validity) or they may relate to extrinsic facts giving 
rise to the claim (thereby denying its effectiveness). They may be general, or they may be 
peculiar to certain types of claims or specific to a certain field of law or to a certain 
subset factual scenarios. Regardless of the nature of the defences, all of them have one 
thing in common, namely to either exonerate fully the defendant from liability or to 
reduce his or her liability. The recognition of certain enrichment defences is dependent on 
how the claim itself is perceived in a particular legal system, while others are neutral to 
any formulation adopted. There is also no exhaustive list of defences and their 
nomenclature varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to address particularly the defence of change of position 
(loss of enrichment) and its relationship to the other typical defences in unjustified 
enrichment. It explores what exactly amounts to change of position in four jurisdictions 
(England, the United States of America, Canada and South Africa) as well as what other 
defences in unjustified enrichment have to say.  
 
Brazil is not discussed in this chapter and in the next chapter. It will become clear why it 
is dealt with separately. For the time being it suffices to mention that change of position 
as a defence prima facie is not directly provided for in the Brazilian enrichment law. 
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Illegality and passing on are equally not discussed in this chapter either; they are simply 
mentioned. They are the subject of separate chapters for different reasons to be explained 
in the respective chapters. Some of the listed defences may not be discussed in certain 
jurisdictions if in the context they offered little impact on change of position.   
 
The analysis of the defences in each of the four jurisdictions is preceded by a general 
introduction of the defences in that particular jurisdiction. The introduction gives the full 
context of each defence in that jurisdiction and deals with incidental issues arising 
thereto.  
 
 
2.2. Descriptive Definitions of some Concepts used in this Chapter.  
 
  
Bona Fide Purchaser for value (bfp): - This defence is raised by a person who had no 
reasonable basis to suspect that the seller did not have good title and paid for what he 
acquired (i.e. for value) in good faith. It mostly arises if one person seeks to assert a right 
to a thing against a third party who has (or has acquired) legal title. 
 
Change of position (or loss of enrichment) is the theme of this thesis and is defined at the 
beginning of the thesis.168   
 
Election as a defence (specially found in Canadian law) means that an earlier case 
provided the plaintiff with a choice of remedies, and he choose what at the time he 
thought to be the appropriate remedy for his claim, and in a later case his earlier election 
might disentitle him enforcing the other right.  This defence often appears alongside with 
that of res judicata. 
 
                                                 
168 See pages. 1-2 above. The definition is repeated here for convenience sake: change of position is the 
defence in terms of which the defendant acknowledges the ‘validity’ of the plaintiff’s claim, but 
nevertheless pleads to be exonerated from the liability to restore in full or in part the said enrichment due to 
changed circumstances that would render it ‘inequitable’ for him to account to the plaintiff.  
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Estoppel is ordinarily a defence raised by someone to whom a representation was made, 
and who has altered his position detrimentally in reliance on that representation. The 
defence entails that the person who has made the representation is denied the right to 
assert that the representation is not true (so he is stopped).  
 
In law Incapacity is a privation arising from nature, or law, or from both, which deprives 
a person of a quality legally to do, give, transmit or receive something. It arises from 
nature such as in cases of youth, mental incompetence or frailty; it arises in law such as in 
cases of prodigals or convicted felons.  
 
Illegality is a defence in term of which one party asserts that the obligation in issue (or 
right at stake) should not be enforced or entertained by the courts due the fact the matter 
is tainted with unlawfulness or for being contrary to public policy and/or good morals.  
 
Laches is a defence (found mostly in American law) that is raised due to the plaintiff’s 
length of delay in bringing the suit that could be inequitable where it results in detriment 
to the defendant, although in extreme cases even the showing of prejudice can be ignored.  
 
Limitation is roughly the American term corresponding to ‘prescription’ in the other 
jurisdictions under discussion in this work.  
 
Ministerial Receipt (or Payment over) is the English law term for ‘agency’. It is a defence 
raised by an agent acting for a principal against an unjustified enrichment claim brought 
against him by a third party, where the agent has paid over money to his principal 
because it is thought the appropriate defendant is the principal.  
 
Passing on  is a defence in term of which one party resists another’s claim on the ground 
that the claimant has already recouped his losses by transferring to a third party (usually 
customers) all or part of the burden for which he now seeks to recover from the 
defendant.  
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Prescription  is a defence in term of which the right to claim performance of an action (or 
the prerogative to enforce a legal right) is lost due to an inaction over a specified period 
of time.  
 
Res judicata is a defence in term of which the defendant pleads that the matter at issue 
has already been adjudicated by a competent court with a final decision and should not be 
reopened for the interest of justice.  
 
Waiver is a voluntary and intentional relinquishment, surrender, or abandonment of a 
known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim, or privilege, which, except for such 
a waiver, the party would have enjoyed.  
 
NB. ‘Waiver’ differs from ‘laches’ primarily in that ‘laches’ requires a showing of 
prejudice to the party claiming it, whereas ‘waiver’ does not. 
 
 
2.3. Defences to Unjust Enrichment Claims in English Law. 
 
2.3.1. Introductory Remarks.  
 
A claimant who has established a claim according to the requisites that the defendant 
must have been unjustly enriched at the claimant’s expense due to an ‘unjust factor’ (or 
sine causa),169 may still be denied a restitutionary (unjust enrichment) remedy because of 
the existence of an appropriate defence. There are various ways a defendant can resist a 
claim based on unjustified enrichment, but all defences can be grouped into affirmative 
(positive) defences and negative defences. The negative defences simply deny the 
validity of the claim itself, while the affirmative defences invite an inquiry into the 
                                                 
169 Although the sine causa approach is not officially acknowledged in English law, more recent 
jurisprudence is increasingly leaning towards that notion in the law of unjust enrichment. As explained in 
the nomenclature note at the beginning of the thesis, unjust and unjustified enrichment do not square 
completely, and English law in particular uses unjust enrichment instead of unjustified enrichment. But 
these terminological differences are not insisted upon in this work and I will uniformly use unjustified 
enrichment for English law as well.  
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balance of equities between the parties. In this second category, the defendant concedes 
that he received a benefit of a kind which the plaintiff might ordinarily recover in 
unjustified enrichment, but he pleads that circumstances make it inequitable to hold him 
liable.  Put differently, these defences are a sort of plea of avoidance, i.e, confess and 
avoid. Some authors prefer to classify the defences according to the element of the 
enrichment claim to which each defence is related, viz, to ask, first, whether the 
defendant is actually enriched, or, secondly, if he is so enriched, whether such enrichment 
was a the claimant’s expense, or, thirdly, whether such enrichment is unjustified.170 
Whatever classificatory approach is used, the following are generally the defences against 
an unjustified enrichment claim: change-of-position, estoppel, counter-restitution, 
limitation (prescription), dispute resolved (res judicata), incapacity, illegality, bona fide 
purchase from a third party, ministerial receipt, and passing on.171
 
According to the last mentioned classificatory scheme, change-of-position, and probably 
counter-restitution go the question of the defendant’s enrichment; passing on goes to the 
question whether the enrichment was at the claimant’s expense;172 and limitation, dispute 
resolved (res judicata), incapacity, illegality and bona fide purchase all go to the enquiry 
of the unjustifiedness of the enrichment.173  
 
In a detailed analysis of the defences Birks opines further that incapacity and illegality 
could also be considered together under the heading of stultification, because all of them, 
in one way or another, defend the principle that if the plaintiff’s claim were to be allowed 
the law would be made ridiculous, indefensibly enabling with the right hand what it 
endeavours to prevent with the left.174 It is to be observed that these two defences also 
occur in contract, but there they arise in very distinct contexts, while in unjustified 
                                                 
170  P. B. H. Birks, The Foundations of Unjust Enrichment: Six Centennial Lectures (2002) 123. Note, 
however, that often English writers ask whether such enrichment is ‘unjust’ instead of ‘unjustified’.  
171 Some new cases are trying to amplify the list, although the one just cited is not exhaustive. But new 
suggestion such as the one found in CIR v Deutsch Morgan Grenfell Group Plc [2005] EWCA Civ. 78, 
[2006] 2 WLR 103 par. 93 and par. 113 that the law should now consider defences such as ‘settled 
understanding of the law’; ‘defence of compromise’ and ‘settlement of an honest claim’ are not finding 
favour in the courts.  
172  P. B. H. Birks, The Foundations of Unjust Enrichment: Six Centennial Lectures (2002) 145. 
173  Ibid 145. 
174  Ibid 124. 
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enrichment they seem to work in the same way, that is to say, they are recognised only 
when, as just mentioned, allowing the action in unjustified enrichment would make 
nonsense of the law’s rejection of some other claim arising on the same facts.175  This is 
to a certain extent akin to the civilian doctrine of subsidiarity briefly discussed in chapter 
4 below and also mentioned elsewhere. Obviously, not all cases of illegality and 
incapacity will lead to stultification, because stultification in this context implies 
indefensible contradiction. The law is stultified if it takes contradictory positions and can 
give no convincing reasons for doing so. Where the law is able to give good reasons for 
the ‘apparent’ conflicting positions, the contradiction is deemed not to be real. In such 
cases the defence of stultification will inevitably be defeated.176 In a later chapter I will 
return briefly to the law relating to illegality and we shall see the nuances of the ‘ex turpi 
causa non oritur actio’ in a wider context. 
  
Meanwhile, in the analysis of these defences in the context of English law one should still 
be mindful that what often counts as a defence rests on common practice or 
understanding rather than clear-cut principle.177 It is in this regard that we find, for 
example, estoppel being both classified as a cause of action, though mostly in contractual 
terms, and as a defence.178 In the same vein, as Burrows demonstrates, it is also 
theoretically possible in common law, albeit contrary to convention, to treat as a defence 
the traditional need for failure of consideration to be total: here one could say that a 
claimant who proves that he made a payment for a failed consideration establishes a 
prima facie case for restitution to which the defence is that the failure of consideration 
was partial.179 So here we see that the failure of consideration is both a ‘cause of action’ 
as well as a defence. The same is also true of the illegality defence. It is sometimes said 
that illegality is a cause of action, but it is not doubted that it is a defence as well to 
claims in unjustified enrichment. For example, Goff and Jones, while acknowledging that 
illegality operates as a defence, assert nonetheless that ‘there are situations where a 
                                                 
175  Ibid 124-125. 
176  Ibid 125. 
177  A. Barrows, The Law of Restitution, (2002) 509.  
178 See for example how Americans put it: ‘when pleaded as a defence, estoppel properly may be set in the 
answer; when it is a part of the cause of action, generally it should be set forth in the complaint or petition, 
or reply’ (28 American  Jurisprudence 2d § 168. 
179  A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution (2002) 509. 
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plaintiff is able to rely on illegality itself as a ground to support his restitutionary 
claim’.180 It is sometimes thought this to be an anomaly in the common-law, but the issue 
is of no effect for our purpose.181  
 
As in recent years the grounds of restitution in English law have been expanded, in part 
due to the acceptance of the ‘but for’ causation test for mistakes of fact and by the 
abolition of the mistake of law bar,182 coupled with an increasing willingness to evade the 
requirement of total failure of consideration. The corollary of these developments has 
been an increased emphasis on the defences to ensure sufficient security of the receipt 
and to avoid there being excessive restitution. Indeed, with this new approach, rather than 
the courts placing arbitrary restrictions on liability, the scope of unjustified enrichment 
has now become more openly and perhaps more satisfactorily controlled by the defences, 
especially the defence of change of position. This is so because English law realised that 
‘denial of the existence of the cause of action is seldom, if ever, the appropriate response 
to fear of its abuse’, as Lord Nicholls183 put it.  Let us now consider change of position 
itself and how it relates to the various other defences. 
 
 
                                                 
180  R. Goff & G. Jones (5th ed. 1998) 607. In support of such position Goff & Jones cited cases going as 
back as 1760 in Smith v Bromley (1760) 2 Doug 696n  and until very recently, they argue that that is still 
the position (see at p. 613 where they cite more cases).  A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution (1993) chap. 11 
and 15 once supported the same view by dedicating chapter 11 to Illegality as Ground of Action and 
another –chapter 15 for Defences. But it appears he has partially reversed himself in the 2002 edition and 
he treats now illegality as defence only in chapter 15, item 7, although in chapter 12 he still maintains it as 
a ground of restitution. 
181  However, this apparent anomaly in the common-law seems to have been mitigated in recent times as 
several English authors have now concluded that the distinction between prima facie liability and defences 
does have practical significance in that the burden of proof switches to the defendant once prima facie 
liability is established. See for example W. Swadling ‘The Role of Illegality in The English Law of Unjust 
Enrichment’ (2000) dealing with such anomaly in the treatment of the illegality defence. The Article is 
available at www.ouclf.org. 
182 Mistake of law bar was finally abolished from English law in Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City 
Council [1999] 2 AC 349. The same happened in many other countries:  In South Africa, as I already 
mentioned elsewhere in chapter 2, mistake of law rule was judicially abrogated in 1992 in Willis Faber 
Einthoven (Pty) Ltd v Receiver of Revenue (1992) 4 SA 202 (A); In Canada it has also been removed in 
1989 in Air Canada v British Columbia (1989) 59 DLR (4th) 161; in Scotland  it was abrogated judicially 
in Morgan Guarantee Trust Co of New York v Lothian Regional council 1995 SLT 299;  and in New 
Zealand it was removed by legislation in ss 94A-94B of  the New Zealand Judicature Amendment Act 
1958. 
183  Phelps v Hellingdon London Borough Council [2000] 3 WLR 776 at 792.  
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2.3.2. Change-of-Position Defence in English Law. 
  
As stated in the introductory chapter to this thesis, change-of-position as a defence to an 
unjustified enrichment claim arises where, on the reasonably held belief the defendant 
would not be called upon to restore the enrichment, he has incurred a loss or expenditure 
that he would not otherwise have incurred and that has reduced his total wealth.184 Put 
differently, change-of-position is a defence in line with the premise propounded by 
Keener more than a century ago, namely that ‘the principle that forbids the defendant 
enriching himself at the expense of the plaintiff should clearly forbid the plaintiff 
indemnifying himself against loss at the expense of an innocent [and blameless] 
defendant’.185 With some nuanced variations in form and substance, this has been the 
principle accepted (or rather re-accepted) in English law in the Lipkin Gorman case in 
1991, thus recognising the defence of change of position in England. Thus Lord Goff said 
in that case:  
 
‘[W]here an innocent defendant’s position is so changed that he will suffer an injustice if 
called upon to repay or to repay in full, the injustice of requiring him so to pay outweighs 
the injustice of denying the plaintiff restitution’ (…). Consequently, ‘bona fide change-of-
position should of itself be a good defence in cases such as these’.186  
 
Although is still subject to debate and disagreement, it is now widely argued (and often 
accepted) that the defence of change of position is indeed a general defence to all unjust 
enrichment claims, for it has a bearing both on personal rights (obligations) and on rights 
in rem (property rights).187 It is considered as a defence to rights in personam 
(obligations) because a claim to an unjust enrichment is often concerned with ‘abstract 
enrichment’, i.e, the units of value added to the fund which is the defendant’s entire 
wealth.188 As we shall see in greater detail at a later stage, in this sense its effect on those 
who are qualified to plead it is to reduce their liability to restore the units of abstract 
                                                 
184  R. Grantham & C. Rickett, Restitution & Enrichment in New Zealand (2000) 345. 
185  W.  A. Keener, A Treatise on the Law of Quasi-Contract (1893) 62-3. 
186  Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548, 579. 
187  P. B. H. Birks, The Foundations of Unjust Enrichment: Six Centennial Lectures (2002) 134-135.  
188  Ibid 134. 
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enrichment surviving at the time when they are notified of the claim.189 But it is also a 
defence to a right in rem (proprietary right), where the claim to an unjustified enrichment 
is focused on a special thing which is the vehicle of the enrichment.190  
 
Subdividing the change-of-position defence into a non-disenrichment arm and 
disenrichment arm, Peter Birks argues that the disenrichment arm of such defence can in 
principle do some or all the works done by some or all other defences.191  
 
But there is no unanimity in common law legal systems, and in English law in particular, 
as to the definitive characterization of the defence. While Burrows and Birks, and many 
others who hold similar views, seem to support one position, namely maintaining that 
restitutionary claims are based on a unifying concept of unjust enrichment at the 
plaintiff’s expense (thus explaining the rationale of the defence in terms of the concept of 
benefit192 or enrichment),193 Jackman,194 Hedley195 and others are critical of this 
approach and contend that the problem with those (the Burrows-Birksian) explanations is 
that they treat the defence as a mechanical exercise of giving the defendant credit for 
expenses referable to the initial receipt.  Jackman, in particular, is a vocal challenger of 
that position. Referring to the Lipkin Gorman case, where the defence was fully 
introduced in English law, Jackman states that  
 
                                                 
189  P. Key (1995) 58 MLR 505-522; P. B. H. Birks, The Foundations of Unjust Enrichment: Six Centennial 
Lectures (2002) 134. 
190  P. B. H. Birks, The Foundations 134. 
191  In the 2005 edition of his book, Birks is disinclined to see a global generalization of change of position 
and recognises more and more the functions and place of the other defences. 
192  For Burrows, the essence of the defence lies largely on an underlying principle and in its analysis one 
must naturally ask: ‘has the defendant’s unjust enrichment been cancelled out by his subsequent loss of the 
benefit?’ (A Burrows, Restitution (1993) 423 and in 2002 edition 510-529).  
193  In the same vein Birks thinks, as already mentioned, that the defence is ‘enrichment-related’, rather than 
‘unjust-related’, in that a change of position is an outflow of wealth which ought to be set against the 
enrichment received so as to reduce the plaintiff’s recovery’. (The Foundations of Unjust Enrichment: Six 
Centennial Lectures 128-136). 
194 I.M. Jackman, The Varieties of Restitution (1998). 
195  Restitution: Its Division and Ordering  (2001). 
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‘The emphasis on the defendant’s innocence (in that case) indicates that the defence is concerned as much 
with the moral quality of the defendant’s conduct as it is with the question whether the defendant is materially 
better off as a result of the transaction’.196  
 
While the Burrows-Birksian approach to the defence would only make it available if the 
defendant has acted in good faith, ignorant of the facts which give rise to the plaintiff’s 
restitutionary claim, Jackman’s approach sees it as going beyond those bounds, in that the 
defence’s complete explanation is that it is based on the ‘unfairness of requiring a 
defendant to restore the plaintiff to his previous position, in circumstances where the 
defendant receives money in ignorance of the facts which make that receipt vulnerable to 
a claim for restitution, and then spends some or all of that money in reliance on the 
validity of the payment’.197 On this basis, it is conceivable that the defence’s primary 
concern is the balancing of rival claims of two innocent parties: the plaintiff who did not 
intend to make the transaction, and the defendant who receives a windfall without notice 
of the vitiating circumstances and then spends it. 198 The premise in this argument, it 
would seem to me, is that where generally the plaintiff’s conduct would lead to an undue 
net loss to the defendant by reason of a changed position, as will ordinarily be the case 
where funds are disbursed then, the parties being equally innocent, recovery will indeed 
be denied.  
 
Jackman’s position apparently does not take into account that the defence of change of 
position often, although not necessarily, involves a third party and that the defence allows 
the defendant to resist the claim, in whole or in part, on the basis of some other 
transaction, usually occurring after199 the defendant’s enrichment. The defence also 
presents itself in at least two distinct versions: the reliance version and the disaster 
version.200 In the disaster version of the defence, the defendant shows that the wealth 
received from the plaintiff has been consumed by some disaster, such as where it was 
deposited in a bank which subsequently went insolvent. This version of the defence is 
                                                 
196 I. M.  Jackman, The Varieties of Restitution (1998) 164. 
197 Ibid. 164. 
198 Ibid. 167. 
199 Anticipatory reliance is dealt with in a separate heading in this thesis (see footnotes 934-941 below). 
200 See generally L. Smith (2001) 97 Texas LR 2115, 2148. 
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available even in the case of a defendant who knew that the wealth must be refunded. On 
the reliance version of the defence its rationale is that the defendant innocently relied on 
the receipt of the wealth which he thought belonged to him, and he therefore made 
expenditures he would not otherwise have made.201
 
In sum, the English defence of change of position emphasises the protection of security 
of receipt and it is a clear manifestation of the liberal foundations upon which the legal 
system asserts namely that the interests of individuals are properly protected only if they 
are all in general free to dispose as they please of whatever wealth appears to be at their 
disposal. If it were otherwise, so it s argued, freedom itself would be curtailed and each 
individual would be required to set up contingency insurance to guard against the dangers 
of double losses, to fire and to a restitutionary plaintiff, as Birks put it.202 In other words, 
the change-of-position defence in English law is the counterbalancing device of the 
potentially unruly general enrichment action.  
 
 
2.3.3. Estoppel defence in English Law. 
 
Estoppel in English law is a complex doctrine, with various ramifications. It is generally 
divided into common law estoppel and equitable estoppel.203 These two main headings 
have sub-species that vary considerably and often overlap. The concept is used in various 
other branches of law such as contract and property law. For this reason it is said that 
‘this defence, unlike change-of-position, which is not a defence to causes of action other 
than those based on unjustified enrichment, there is nothing peculiarly restitutionary 
about estoppel’.204 If one looks at English case law in the various branches it is clear that 
any private right,  
 
                                                 
201  L.D. Smith (2001) 97 Texas LR 2115, 2148-2149. 
202 P. B. H. Birks, ‘Change of position…’ in M. McInnes (ed.) Restitution: Developments in Unjust 
Enrichment (1996) 62. 
203  Some examples of these sub-species of estoppel are: proprietary estoppel, promissory estoppel, estoppel 
in pais, etc. 
204 A. Tottenborn, The Law of Restitution in England and Ireland 3rd Ed.  (2002) 279. 
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‘whatever its origin, may be barred by an express or implied statement that it will not be 
exercised’, coupled with change-of-position on the faith of it, in circumstances such that it 
would be inequitable to assert it. Nevertheless, ‘estoppel is commonly relevant in practice 
in restitutionary claims, in particular where payment by mistake is concerned’.205  
 
However, the estoppel that is of interest to the law of unjust enrichment is estoppel by 
representation.206 It is nevertheless to be noted from the outset that estoppel in English 
law is a rule of evidence or a procedural norm and not a substantive rule, and this fact 
may contribute to certain nuances in the common-law not being easily understandable in 
civil-law systems. As a procedural ‘defence’, it defeats the plaintiff’s claim in limine, that 
is to say, it prevents the plaintiff from making out his cause of action207 and for that 
reason it is never tailored to the defendant’s reliance expenditure.208 Where the facts 
suggest that the defendant, having relied to his detriment but without eliminating more 
than part of his enrichment, should be allowed to shut the plaintiff out of his action 
altogether, estoppel can indeed do a job that change of position, just discussed, cannot do. 
Therefore where, for example, a recipient of a sum of money queries it, but he is assured 
in the clearest possible terms that the payment is in order, and based on such assurance he 
invests the said sum and loses, say, 70 pe  cent of the sum received, change of position 
would reduce his liability by 70 percent, but estoppel, as an absolute defence, will deny 
the plaintiff altogether any cause of action, because of the plaintiff having represented 
that the payment was in order, and he will not be allowed to allege inconsistently with 
that representation that he had been mistaken. With the recognition of change of position 
as a general defence in English law, the importance of estoppel has diminished, but it still 
plays a role in appropriate circumstances, for it affords, as we have just seen, the 
                                                 
205  Ibid 279. 
206  Several commentators and academics are critical of the continued existence of so many divisions on 
estoppel, and whether it makes any logical sense to have equitable estoppel and common law estoppel. For 
a brief history of estoppel by conduct in English law and its adaptation from the fifteenth to the eighteenth 
century see G. Jones (1957) 78 LQR 49-53. 
207  See for example Avon County C v Howlett [1983] 1 WLR 605. 
208 This position is however resisted by the Australians who have a partial defence of estoppel. For example 
in Walton Stores (interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 – the High Court of Australia recognised 
what is termed as the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which was an amalgam of proprietary and promissory 
estoppel, whereby relief would be awarded only to the extent of the defendant’s detriment.  
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defendant a better defence because of its all or nothing approach.209 Hence, the notion of 
estoppel by representation essentially entails that one party, due to a statement made by 
him or his manifest conduct preceding an agreement (or certain other state of affairs), 
may be denied a relief (or claim a relief) that in ordinary course of events he would be 
entitled to.  
 
The particular kind of representation that is relevant in this context is a statement to the 
effect that the recipient of an enrichment may regard himself as secure in his receipt.210 
The representation may be express or implied. Where the performance consists of paying 
a sum of money, the representation may be inherent in the payment itself it may be 
collateral to it.211 A representation is considered as being inherent in the payment if it is 
inferred from the fact of the payment itself in the context in which it is made, while a 
collateral representation is one which is distinct from the inherent representation and 
which, if it is implied rather than expressed, is based on facts additional to the bare fact of 
payment.212 Where, for example, a payer owes a duty to the payee to pay over the correct 
money, there is a factual representation inherent in the payment that that is money owed 
to the defendant. In contrast, most payments do not carry an inherent factual 
representation that the payee is entitled to the payment and the defendant needs to show a 
representation collateral to the payment if he is to make out an estoppel.  
 
Once there is representation capable of being relied upon, the other elements of the 
defence are that the defendant must actually have relied on it and must have done so to 
his detriment.213 But reliance also has different nuances, and not any reliance will suffice 
to defend successfully the case under estoppel. Generally, where the claim is a claim for 
money, a reliance which is detrimental can in principle appear in three different forms as 
                                                 
209   See for example A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution 2nd Edition (2002) 528.  However P. Jaffey in The 
Nature & Scope of Restitution (2000) 256 opines that estoppel is only a complete defence in circumstances 
where there would be available a change of position defence to do justice between the parties. That view 
also finds some support in Australian law as alluded to elsewhere in this chapter. 
210   P. B. H. Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (1985) 402 and P. Birks Unjust Enrichment 
2nd Ed. (2005) 213-223, 258-260. 
211  A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution 2nd Edition (2002) 531. 
212  P. B. H. Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (1985) 402. 
213  Ibid. 407. 
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Beaton and Bishop214 have suggested: ‘Conventional reliance’, ‘out-of-pocket reliance’ 
and ‘real reliance’. ‘Conventional reliance’, according to the authors, requires simply that 
the defendant must have spent or committed the money in a way which cannot be 
recouped; ‘out-of-pocket reliance’ requires that the defendant must have spent or 
committed the money in a way which cannot be recouped and in a way which he would 
not otherwise have done; and ‘real reliance’ brings into account against out-of-pocket 
reliance the additional benefit that the defendant has derived from spending the money in 
the way in which he would not otherwise have done. 
 
Of these three forms, usually only the second is taken into account in the application of 
the estoppel doctrine. That is so because the first form ignores the need for loss to have 
been caused to the defendant by the representation. In other words, if one would have 
spent his money in the same way anyway, it can easily be said that one has been saved an 
expense and therefore cannot be said to have suff red any detriment as a result of the 
representation. The third form requires an impossible assessment into subjective values. 
Burrows opines that taking account of subjective values simply cancels out the 
expenditure on the reasoning that any exchange is worth to the defendant what he paid 
for it.215 That being the case, we are left with only the second form of reliance. On its 
terms it is clear that the law must take account of the ‘out-of-pocket reliance’ view. (This 
is the approach that is usually taken on proprietary and promissory estoppel with which, 
as I said earlier, I am not going to deal with).  Therefore, to establish estoppel (by 
representation), the defendant must show that, if he were now required to pay back the 
money, he would be in worse position pecuniarily than if representation and payment had 
not been made to him in the first place.216  
 
Mistaken payments constitute a natural realm for the application of estoppel in 
enrichment claims. However, English law traditionally took a narrow view of the 
recovery of mistaken payments restricting it to payments made under certain kinds of 
mistakes. First, payments made under mistake of fact were recoverable only if the 
                                                 
214  J. Beatson & Bishop (1986) 36 Univ. Toronto LJ 149, 151-152. 
215  A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution (2002) 532. 
216  Ibid. 532. 
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mistake was as to liability to make the payment. This is the so called ‘supposed liability’ 
test.217 Secondly, payments made under a mistake of law, as opposed to fact, were 
irrecoverable. In recent developments, both these restrictions have been judicially 
removed218 and the English law on mistaken payments has thereby been brought into line 
with the pure principle against unjust enrichment.  
 
Although it is a contested requirement, it is said that a proper reading of English case law 
on estoppel subtly reveals that many cases have held that there should also be a need to 
show a breach of duty of accuracy (i.e., special fault) by the claimant before estoppel 
could succeed.219 Burrows, for example, analyses two sets of apparently conflicting cases 
in which he thinks one set supports the breach-of-duty requirement, while the other 
regards such requirement as merely being an alternative rather than an essential 
ingredient of estoppel. In RE Jones Ltd v Waring And Gillow Ltd220 and Weld-Blundell v 
Synott221 the defence of estoppel was pleaded but it failed on the ground that there was no 
breach of duty. In the first case, the claimants had been tricked by a rogue into paying 
£5,000 to the defendants under a contract with the rogue. In allowing the claimants 
restitution of the mistaken payment, the decision of the majority in the House of Lords 
was that there could be no defence of estoppel because there was no breach of duty owed 
by the claimants to the defendants in making the overpayment. In the later case,222 where 
the claimants had miscalculated their own entitlement in a mortgage arrangement and 
                                                 
217  In the application of the supposed ‘liability test’ in real cases two main exceptions can be identified. 
The first is revealed by a group of cases which could only be justified on an extended meaning of supposed 
liability, and the second, cases which cannot be justified even on that extended meaning. In the first group 
fall all cases in which the claimant paid the money to the defendant under the mistaken belief that he was 
bound to do so under a legal liability to a third party.; and in the second group all cases that do not fit in the 
first and in any event cannot be justified under the traditional ‘supposed liability test’ such as many cases 
on the rescission of formal gifts on the ground of mistake. These last cases have traditionally required 
merely that the mistake of fact be a serious one and not one of supposed liability. (See generally A. 
Burrows, The Law of Restitution (2002) 134 footnotes 11-13. 
218  Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349 especially at 372.  
219 A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution (2002) 529; See also K. Zweigert & Kötz, An Introduction to 
Comparative Law Vol. II (1977) 254 (Weir translation) who say of English law: ‘In cases of payment by 
mistake English judges tend to ask which of the parties was responsible for the error in the particular case 
and which of them should bear the loss in view of the underlying relationship. Another relevant factor is 
weather either party was guilty of any breach of duty to the other’. 
220  RE Jones Ltd v Waring And Gillow Ltd  [1926] AC 670. 
221 Weld-Blundell v Synott [1940] 2 KB 107. 
222 Ibid 114-115. 
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hence paid over too much to the defendant, the court allowed the claim and rejected the 
defence of estoppel by holding that ‘when the decisions as to estoppel in connection with 
payment of money under a mistake of fact are closely examined, much seems to turn on 
whether the payer was subject to a duty as against the payee to inform him of the true 
state of the account – in effect, a duty not to make a mistake of fact in that regard’.223 But 
in the earlier case of Holt v Markham,224 estoppel was successfully invoked without any 
requirement of breach of duty; and in other earlier cases225 breach of duty was regarded 
as an alternative to, rather than an essential ingredient of, estoppel.  
 
After highlighting these discrepancies, Burrows concludes that they are not irreconcilable 
and that their result can be harmonised if one considers that where the payer owes a duty 
to the payee to pay over the correct money there is a factual representation inherent in the 
payment that that is money owed to the defendant that is being paid. In contrast, most 
payments do not carry an inherent factual representation that the payee is entitled to the 
payment and the defendant needs therefore to show a representation collateral to the 
payment if he is to make out an estoppel.226 Therefore, reconciliation can be achieved by 
stating that there must be either a breach of duty, and hence an inherent representation, or 
a collateral representation.227  
 
In sum, estoppel by representation that constitutes a defence in unjustified enrichment in 
English law entails a representation which is either collateral or inherent, and leads to a 
prejudicial change of position on the part of the defendant as a result of reliance upon the 
said representation.  It is also clear that, despite the recognition of change of position as a 
general defence, there is still space for the estoppel doctrine, for there are cases which 
cannot be catered for under the change of position doctrine but which can fully be 
explained and handled under estoppel. Estoppel operates as an all-or-nothing defence and 
to that extent is clearly distinct from change-of-position. In the same vein, the 
                                                 
223 Ibid 115. 
224 Holt v Markham [1923] 1 KB 504.  
225 Skyring v Greenwood  (1825) 4 B & C 281;  Deutsche Bank v Beriro & Co (1895) LT 669;  A. Burrows, 
The Law of Restitution (2002) 531. 
226  Compare with Birks , An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (1985) 402-407. 
227 A. Burrows, (2002) 531. 
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requirement of prejudicial representation makes it very distinct from change-of-position 
which does not require that aspect to be pleaded successfully.  
 
2.3.4. Ministerial Receipt or Payment Over. 
 
In English law, an agent who has paid over money to his principal has a complete 
defence to a claim in unjustified enrichment (restitution) brought against him, because it 
is thought the appropriate defendant is the principal. For this reason, it is sometimes 
argued that ministerial receipt is not really a defence to the claim itself but rather a means 
of identifying the correct defendant.228 But this view is not entirely shared in many 
English cases nor by many writers, as evidenced by Goff & Jones who regard this 
defence as a species of change of position, albeit with special features because of the 
agency context in which it operates;229 and by Swaddling,230  who argues that ‘the real 
reason for the defence is that the plaintiff is in certain circumstances stopped from 
bringing a claim against an agent who has done no more than follow his (i.e; plaintiff’s) 
instruction and make a payment over to his principal’. Birks, however, holds the view 
that the ‘principal recipient’s agent can be sued in unjust enrichment in two situations, 
namely (i) if the agent has not paid over, or to the order of, the principal, and (ii) if, 
though the agent has so paid over, he did so with notice of the plaintiff’s claim’.231 
(Burrows deals with the issue in detail, but it is remarkable that instead of discussing it as 
part of the chapter on defences, he places it in a category headed as ‘miscellaneous’ 
issues: agency and the conflict of laws’ in the 2000 edition of his book on Restitution).232
                                                 
228  Portman Building Society v Hamlyn Taylor Neck [1998] 4 All ER 202, 207 (per Millett, LJ). 
229  R. Goff & G. Jones, The Law of Restitution  6th edition (2002) 833-33. 
230 W.  Swadling in P. B. H. Birks (ed.)  (1995) 243. 
231  P. B. H. Birks, The Foundations of Unjust Enrichment: Six Centenary Lectures (2002) 137. See also the 
cases of Kleinwort and Co V Dunlop (1907) 97 263 (CA); Gowers v Lloyds and national Provincial Bank 
[1938] 1 All ER 766 (CA). 
232   A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution (2002) 597-625 (chapter 16 of the book, while defences are 
discussed in chapter 15). 
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There are at least five233 elements characterizing this defence in English law: first, the 
benefit must be received in a ministerial capacity, that is to say the defendant must 
receive such benefit qua agent; secondly, such an agent must be acting for a disclosed as 
opposite to an undisclosed principal; thirdly, he (the agent) must have paid the money 
over or otherwise acted to his detriment; fourthly the payment over must precede any 
notice of the claimant’s right of recovery; and fifthly, the agent must not have knowledge 
of or be privy to any wrongdoing which resulted in the benefit.234  
 
Like change-of-position, the ministerial-receipt defence is not available to an agent who 
is a wrongdoer. Stated positively, good faith (or ‘without notice’ – as good faith is 
sometimes referred to in this context) is a requirement sine qua the defence will be lost. 
One oft-cited example is an old case Snowdon v Davis,235 in which the agent who 
claimed the defence was considered as a wrongdoer and was denied the defence. In that 
case, the plaintiff paid money under duress of goods levied by the defendant bailiff (the 
agent of the sheriff) in excess of his powers while executing a writ for so-called ‘distress 
of goods’.236 The bailiff paid the money over to the sheriff and resisted an action for 
money had and received on the ground that he had paid over. The defence was rejected in 
the circumstances and the court held that it did not apply in cases of compulsion or 
extortion of money colore officii in excess of authority. Sir James Mansfield CJ (not the 
famous Lord Mansfield) who delivered the judgment added further that ‘the plaintiff pays 
it under terror of process, to redeem his goods, not with an intent that this should be 
delivered over to anyone in particular’.  
 
                                                 
233  Swadling thinks that there are only four elements (a) the receipt must be ministerial, not beneficial; (b) 
the recipient must have passed on the benefit to his principal; (c) the recipient must not be tainted by 
wrongdoing and (d) the claimant must have known he was making a payment to an agent. With this 
analysis he further concludes that this defence can only operate in the context of unjust factors such as 
mistake or failure of consideration. It cannot be relied upon in cases of duress or restitution for wrongs, nor 
significantly in cases of ignorance, where the claimant gave no consent to the transfer. In such case, 
Swadling argues, the claimant cannot fulfill the fourth requirement above (d) and knowingly make a 
payment to an agent (see W. Swadling, in P. B. H. Birks (1995) 259-260. 
234  G.  McMeel, The Modern Law of Restitution (2000) 437. 
235  (1808) 1 Taunt 359, 127 ER 872. 
236  Basically a warrant for ‘distress of goods’ can be described as a writ authorizing the seizure of goods 
for the purpose of satisfying either a debt or other obligation, or for the purpose of discharging someone’s 
liability. 
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In more recent judgments the same rationale continues to be applied.237 For example, in 
Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson,238 a case that still manifests the perennial problem of the 
English law division between common law claims and equity claims, leading to 
contradictory and often unprincipled results,239 Millet J concluded (at 288) that  
 
‘there is a clear answer to the plaintiff’s claim for money had and received. Jackson & Co. must be 
treated as being in the same position as an agent who has accounted to his principal. Money paid by 
mistake to such an agent cannot afterwards be recovered from the agent but only from the principal. 
In every previously decided case the agent has received the money directly from the plaintiff, and it 
is well established that to obtain the benefit of the defence the recipient must have been known to 
the plaintiff to have been acting for a disclosed principal. In such a case the agent is treated as a 
mere conduit pipe and the money is taken as having been paid to the principal rather than the 
agent’.240  
 
Since the principal in this instance was a company which the judge considered to be a 
shell payee, the judge concluded it could not avail itself of the defence (although he 
appeared to have allowed the money laundering accountants to benefit from the defence, 
the judge nonetheless observed that the defence was not available to somebody who was 
implicated in the principal’s fraud).  
 
A direct mention of the relationship between change-of-position and ministerial receipt is 
to be found in Portman Building Society v Hamlyn Taylor Neck.241 In this case, Millett 
LJ, rejected the attempt to merge two defences. He states: 
 
                                                 
237 Keegan v Palmer [1961] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 499; Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1990] Ch 267. Burrows thinks 
that this line of cases can be explained on the basis that the agents, even if acting within their authority, 
could not be said to have paid over the money bona fide. 
238  [1990] Ch 267. This case was upheld by the Court of Appeal and is reported at [1991] Ch 547. 
239 In this case for example the accountants were clearly wrongdoers and they should not get the benefit of 
the defence. But due to the traditional division of common law claims and equity claims, in which the 
elements of liability may differ, the accountants were acquitted, because the position of the agent is not 
treated in equity claims as giving rise to a special defence. Rather liability in knowing receipt (as Millet  J 
considered the claim based on knowing receipt – which is the equity form) is treated  as only attaching to 
one who receives beneficially, rather than ministerially. So agents are excluded by the definition of the 
cause of action framed in equity.  
240 Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson, [1990] Ch 267 at 288. 
241  [1998] 4 All ER 202. 
CHAPTER II - Change of Position Defence Within Other Enrichment Law Defences          
        
             © Jorge Aimite  Cape-Town 15/08/2009    [This is   Page 61 ]
Change of Position Defence
  (Unjustified Enrichment)
61
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 ©
 J
or
ge
 A
m
ite
 ©
‘I myself do not regard the agent’s defence in such a case as a particular instance of the change-of-
position defence, nor is it generally so regarded. At common law the agent recipient is regarded as a 
mere conduit for the money, which is treated as paid to the principal, not to the agent. The doctrine 
is therefore not so much a defence as a means of identifying the proper party to be sued. It does not, 
for example, avail the agent of an undisclosed principal; though today such an agent would be able 
to rely on a change-of-position defence. The true rule is that where the plaintiff has paid the money 
under (for example) a mistake to the agent of a third party, he may sue the principal whether or not 
the agent has accounted to him, for in contemplation of law the payment is made to the principal and 
not to his agent. If the agent still retains the money, however, the plaintiff may elect to sue either the 
principal or the agent, and the agent remains liable if he pays the money over to his principal after 
notice of the claim. If he wishes to protect himself, he should interplead. But once the agent has paid 
the money to his principal or to his order without notice of the claim, the plaintiff must sue the 
principal’. 242
 
In any event, the result in this case could not have been different, because in addition it 
was also fatal to the claim that the money was paid pursuant to an operative binding 
contract whereby the defendant solicitors were required to transfer the money in 
accordance with the instruction of the lender. 
 
In sum, in English law there are two views of the defence of ministerial receipt. The first 
is that only the principal can be sued in unjust enrichment, and on this view it does not 
matter whether the principal receives the money or not because payment to the agent 
constitutes payment to the principal.243 The second view is that an unjust enrichment 
claim does lie against the agent (or against the principal) unless the agent has in good 
faith paid the money over to his principal, or done something equivalent, in which case 
only the principal is liable in unjust enrichment.244  
 
There is no conclusive answer in English law to the question whether ministerial receipt 
(or payment over, as it is sometimes called) is different from the change-of-position 
defence. Both the case law and academic writers are divided to the extent that these 
                                                 
242  Portman Building Society v Hamlyn Taylor Neck [1998] 4 All ER 202 at 207. 
243  See A. Burrows (2002) 600 and cases cited there that range from the year 1766 to 1991. 
244  See A. Burrows (2002) 602. Cases in support to this approach also date back to 1777 and as recently as 
1998, if not later. 
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defences are different or overlap and/or one is swallowed by the other. But it is not 
disputed that whenever there is payment over and there are elements of change of 
position in that specific circumstance, the context itself can be described as being 
concerned with identifying the proper party to be sued rather than as merely going to a 
defence. And that description, which Burrows supports, does not seem to contradict any 
holding that payment over is an aspect of change of position, for whatever position is 
assumed, the principal and the agent are prima facie liable, subject to defences. And if in 
the application of payment over there is a necessity to ascertain whether detriment or 
prejudice is central to that defence as it is central to change of position, then the most 
plausible scenario is to say that payment over has been swallowed by change of position 
defence.245   
 
2.3.5. Concluding Remarks. 
 
With the exposition above it is clear in today’s English law of unjust enrichment the 
defence of change of position assumes a central role, it is both a means of avoiding 
excessive restitution and protecting the security of receipts by innocent defendants. 
Several elements that had previously been explicable in terms of the concepts of the bona 
fide purchaser for value, estoppel and the payment over doctrine are or can now 
adequately be catered for by the defence of change of position. However, the role of other 
defences remains important for specific cases in respect of which change-of-position is 
not an adequate defence and its application would be inappropriate.  
 
 
 
2.4. Change of Position and other Enrichment Defences in Canadian Law.  
 
2.4.1. Introductory Remarks.  
 
                                                 
245  See similar position advocated in the Australian case Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v 
Westpac Banking Corp. (1988) 78 ALR 157.  
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Early developments of the Canadian law of enrichment (the common-law branch) to a 
great extent mirrored that of England, with a clear manifestation of the historical 
interrelation between the law of unjust enrichment and the law of contract, which in a 
considerable number of cases led to the attempted utilization of contractual defences to 
enrichment causes of action. But due to Canada’s proximity to the United States of 
America, with which it has a great interchange of ideas as well as for other reasons, and 
other factors, the Canadian enrichment law soon started diverging from several aspects of 
English law authorities.246  
 
The most important early departure was the recognition of unjust enrichment as a 
separate doctrine, independent of other obligations, which can be traced back to Delgman 
v Guarantee Trust Company and Constantineau.247 This was a doctrine to which the 
older contractual limitations would hence forth no longer be applied unless there were 
good reasons in so doing. This recognition was consolidated in the authoritative 
formulation of the elements of unjust enrichment in Pettkus v Becker248 as well as the 
approach that the Canadian law of unjustified enrichment requires proof of a ‘negative’ 
factor instead of the ‘positive’ factor as asserted in Garland v Consumer Gas.249
                                                 
246  See for example McCarthy Milling Co v Elder Packing Co (1973) 33 DLR (3d) 52; more recently Air 
Canada v British Columbia (1989) 59 DLR (4th) 161 (SCC) par. 194-197. The English case CIR v Deutsch 
Morgan Grenfell Group Plc [2006] 2 WLR 103 (EWCA) also make such mention at par. 67 (per Jonathan 
Parker LJ). 
247  [1954] 3 DLR 785 (S.C.C).  in this case Rand and Cartwright J.J. decided the matter at issue, which 
involved a claim for the enforcement of a contract, but which was unenforceable for being incongruent with 
the Statute of Frauds, because it was not in writing as required, both judges proceeding on the footing that, 
quite apart from contract, there was a distinct head of recovery, derived from the notion of unjust 
enrichment.  
248 (1980) 117 DLR (3rd) 257 (SCC) at 274. In this case, as already mentioned elsewhere Dickson J 
authoritatively stated that the cause of action in unjust enrichment consist of: ‘(i) an enrichment to the 
defendant, (ii) a corresponding deprivation to the plaintiff, and (iii) absence of any juristic reason for the 
defendant’s enrichment’.  For a sustained criticism of the third element and its application on subsequent 
cases see M. McInnes (2000) 79 Can Bar. Rev 459; L. D. Smith (2000) 12 Supreme Ct L Rev (2d) 211. 
249 [2004] SCC 25 and [2004] 1 SCR 629; (2004) 237 DLR (4th) 385. Since the decision in Pettkus v Becker 
(1980) 117 DLR (3rd) 257 that advanced ‘juristic reason’ as the third element for enrichment liability in 
Canada, there has been a confusion whether the test of enrichment in Canada required proof of a negative 
or positive factor.  In Garland  v Consumers Gas [2004] 1 SCR 629; [2004] SCC 25; (2004) 237 DLR (4th) 
385 the Supreme Court of Canada finally resolved the dispute. Iacobucci J who delivered the court’s 
judgment dealt with the definition of ‘absence of juristic reason’ and related issues roughly from pages 40-
46 of the judgment. After discussing the academic and judicial debate surrounding ‘juristic reasons’ versus 
‘unjust factors’, in particular the difficulty of requiring a plaintiff to prove a negative, the court proposed a 
reformulation of the Canadian test. Thus from the year 2004 on the reading of Garland’s case the proper 
approach to ‘juristic reasons’ encompasses two distinct steps. First the ‘plaintiff must show that no juristic 
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Despite this independent development, all of the various roots of the Canadian law of 
unjust enrichment - the historical reliance on notions of ‘just and equitable’, ‘unjust 
enrichment’ or ‘implied contract’ as the ‘initial’ doctrinal basis250 for the law of 
enrichment -  have combined in the development of defences peculiarly suited to 
enrichment causes of action.251 The defences generally raised against enrichment claims 
in Canadian law include, inter alia, res judicata and election, limitation provisions 
(prescription), change-of-position, estoppel, illegality and the role of the innocent third 
party (bona fide purchaser for value without notice) and payment over (agency or 
ministerial receipt). The list is not exhaustive, but ultimately most of the defences have a 
counterpart in English law and it can safely be that said they are almost the same as in 
English law, differing only in nuances. (The defences that have not been specifically 
mentioned here are not as prominent as the ones mentioned, or if they are equally 
prominent, they present fewer problems in relation to the topic of this study). It is 
interesting to note that res judicata and election are treated together as they are often 
pleaded in the same cases and this association is to some extent peculiar to Canadian law. 
It is also important to note from the outset that most principles of Canadian enrichment 
law developed in the particular context of marital relationships, and that very fact may 
have left its mark on the defences as well. This last observation is particularly true on the 
defences of res judicata and election, among others, but the topics on agency (payment 
over) and some enrichment issues emanating from bills of exchange are sometimes 
treated together.  
 
The discussion that follows placed emphasis on change-of-position, res judicata and 
election and payment over, because these defences have important nuances in Canadian 
law that are not apparent in other jurisdictions.   
                                                                                                                                                 
reason from an established category exists to deny recovery’ with the established categories comprising a 
contract, a disposition of law, a gift, and other valid common law, equitable or statutory obligations’. The 
court finally argued that by closing the list of categories the ‘objection to the Canadian formulation of the 
test that it required proof of a negative is answered’. Secondly, once a prima facie case is established under 
step one, the burden of proof in step two is placed on the defendant to show any reason why the enrichment 
should be retained.  The court however emphasised that ‘restitution was an ‘equitable remedy’, and as such 
the second step required carefully examination of the ‘reasonable expectations’ of the parties, and ‘public 
policy considerations’. 
250  See P. H. Winfield (1948) 64 LQR 46. 
251  G. H. Fridman &  J. C. McLeod, Restitution (1982) 589. 
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2.4.2. The Change-of-Position Defence in Canadian Law. 
 
Unlike in England, where the general recognition of the defence came late, change of 
position had been accepted in Canada for a number of years as a defence of general 
application throughout the law of unjust enrichment (and it was not restricted to its 
original particularised application with respect to agency, and bills of exchange). In 
Storthoaks v Mobil Oil Canada Ltd,252 where the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly 
dealt with this defence and implicitly sanctioned it as being of general application, the 
court specifically held that change of position was a defence to a claim to recover money 
paid under mistake. The approach adopted in this case is a clear manifestation of the 
Canadian interrelation with the United States.253 In trying to keep with the American 
position that had earlier sanctioned the defence in section 142 Restatement of the Law of 
Restitution, the Canadian Supreme Court distanced itself from the English approach and 
was willing to hold that ‘the right of a person to restitution from another because of a 
benefit received was terminated or diminished if, after the receipt of the benefit, 
circumstances had so changed that it would be inequitable to require the other to make 
full restitution’. On reading the facts of the case it is self-evident that the issue of general 
applicability of the change-of-position defence was squarely accepted in the Storthoaks 
case, though the case itself was mostly connected with a mistaken payment. In this case 
money had been paid out under a mistake of fact to a municipality by a company. The 
municipality argued that the money received from the company was put into a general 
account along with tax money to pay general everyday expenses. It was held that, prima 
                                                 
252  (1975) 55 DLR (3d) 1,13 (SCC). 
253  For the view that Canadian law of enrichment distanced itself from old English authorities and moved 
closer to the United States, see generally Klippert (1980) 30 Univ. Toronto LJ 356, 363-364. The author 
identifies at least four stages through which Canadian law of enrichment has passed since Delgman case. 
The first is the clear recognition by the Canadian Supreme Court that liability on restitutionary issues is 
based on unjust enrichment; secondly, the judiciary initially reacted against accepting the principle of 
unjust enrichment as one of general applicability; thirdly, the reaction gradually decreases, and the 
acceptance of the principle gained momentum; and fourthly  the recognition that the new principle requires 
refinement, with the result that the judiciary develops control devices limiting the circumstances in which 
the principle is applied.  Change of position defence in such structure of development is indeed one of such 
devices limiting the general applicability of the principle. 
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facie, the company was entitled to recover the money as money paid on a mistake of fact. 
The defendant however alleged to be entitled to retain the money on the basis of change 
of position or estoppel. Both defences failed, but they were fully discussed and the court 
was prepared to accept them if the evidence of the defendant were satisfactory. The court 
also opined that estoppel and change-of-position were separate doctrines of general 
application throughout the law of restitution. In Canada, as a matter of general policy, the 
defence of change of position ought only to be allowed if the conduct of the recipient was 
not tortuous and if he was no more at fault for the receipt or dealing with the subject 
matter than the claimant was.254  
 
There is also a trend in the cases that the defendant must establish that he has entered into 
a transaction or legal relationship which he would not otherwise have done had he not 
been in receipt of the particular funds in question.255 In the same vein, the defence has a 
dual feature: it may be a partial defence, as well as a total defence. For example, if a 
defendant receives money under mistake and invests it in shares which afterward 
depreciate in value before he is aware that the money so received was not his to keep, he 
will only be obliged to disgorge the value of the shares at the time he is put into notice, as 
long as he can establish that such an investment would not have been made without the 
particular money in question.256  
 
There is still some uncertainty in Canadian law as to the extent to which the doctrine of 
change of position applies to proprietary restitutionary claims.257 It was highlighted 
elsewhere in this chapter that the common-law in general considers the law of unjustified 
enrichment as encompassing both rights in rem and rights in personam. That is also true 
of Canada. Based on the notion of enrichment law as encompassing also right in rem, the 
                                                 
254  G. H. Fridman  &  J. C. McLeod, Restitution (1982) 607-608 and cases cited there. 
255 Storthoaks v Mobile Oil Canada Ltd (1975) 55 DRL (3d) 1 (SCC); Nepean Hydro Electric Comm. v 
Ontario Hydro [1982] 41 NR 1 (SCC). 
256  Purity Dairy Ltd v Collison (1966) 58 DLR (2d) 67 (B.C.C.A.); Midland-Olser Securities Ltd v Dudek 
(1966) 56 DLR (2d) 378 (Man).   
257 ‘Restitutionary proprietary’ rights that give rise to restitutionary proprietary claims arise whenever no 
transaction has taken place which is effective to deprive the plaintiff of his title to the property in question 
or where, to prevent defendant’s unjust enrichment, it is necessary to allow the plaintiff the additional 
benefit flowing from a proprietary claim as opposed to a purely personal claim. 
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Canadian courts have imposed so-called constructive trusts,258 for example, in 
matrimonial cases such as Pettkus v Becker. But the extent to which the right in rem is 
part of the law of enrichment is not always clear and the uncertainty of that fact is 
reflected on the defences as well. On the one hand, as a matter of general policy, it seems 
unjust to impose, for example, a constructive trust or lien on the assets of a defendant, in 
circumstances where he has changed his position in detrimental reliance on his rights to 
the funds or property. In any event, as long as the actual property or something clearly 
attributable to the property can be returned without causing substantial harm to the 
defendant, no change-of-position will be established.259 On the other hand where the 
proprietary claim asserted is a legal proprietary claim260 as opposed to an equitable 
right,261 the applicability of the doctrine of change of position is less clear, for it is 
commonly said that the common-law right to trace is generally more easily lost than the 
equitable right. Be it as it may, common law writers think that if a proper case arises, 
there seem to be no reason on general principle to d ny the applicability of the defence to 
the cases of a legal proprietary claim.262 From the discussion above it is clear that the 
defence of change of position in Canada has some peculiarities not found elsewhere.  
 
2.4.3. The Estoppel Defence in Canadian Law. 
 
Like in England, estoppel in Canada is an evidentiary rule,263 and as such it can defeat 
plaintiff’s claim in limine. For this reason it operates in toto.264 It requires a 
                                                 
258  For more details on constructive trusts remedies in unjust enrichment see M. M. Litman (1988) 26 
Alberta L R 407, especially 431-437. 
259  This aspect is generally referred to as the tracing mechanism. 
260  Proprietary restitutionary claim is mostly known in civil law world as one that is able to support a rei 
vindicatio. 
261  I alluded elsewhere this perennial common law problem of dividing law and rights into common law 
(legal) rights and equitable rights. The distinction makes usually little sense and has very little logical 
structure, but it is still adhere to in Canada and many other common law countries, and one has to live with 
it and hope that one day it will be done out with. 
262  G. H. Fridman & J. C. McLeod, Restitution (1982) 612. 
263  Bank of Montreal v Glendale (Atlantic) Ltd  20 NSR (2d) 217. 
264  Due to this harsh effect of estoppel, Fridman & McLeod, (Restitution (1982) 618) back in 1982 opined 
that the doctrine of estoppel within the confines of the law of restitution should, by analogy to the doctrine 
of change of position, be treated as a matter of substantive law and not a matter of evidentiary law alone. In 
this way, the authors thought that once the doctrine of estoppel was established (as substantive rule), the 
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representation by the plaintiff in reliance upon which the defendant has acted to his 
detriment. Estoppel only applies to proceedings between the parties; the dividing line 
between estoppel and change of position is the need that there should have been 
representation to invoke the doctrine of estoppel. As Birks put it, change of position is 
like estoppel with the elements of representation struck out.265 However, estoppel by its 
nature incorporates the change-of-position doctrine by requiring reliance. In addition 
however, before the plaintiff can rely on estoppel he must show that there has been some 
representation so as to amount to prejudicial conduct on the part of the other party before 
he may put forward his detrimental reliance as ground to bar the other side from denying 
the truth of the representation. Breach of duty is not a requirement for estoppel in Canada 
and the cases seem to establish that the doctrine of estoppel is a doctrine of general 
application throughout the law of restitution. The doctrine of change of position is 
distinct from the doctrine of estoppel, for each has its own different elements.  
 
2.4.4. Res Judicata in Canada. 
 
Like in many other jurisdictions, it is well established in Canadian law that a judgment of 
a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits of the case may not be challenged on the 
grounds that the decision itself was wrong in law or fact. The fundamental values being 
protected by such a norm are the interests of the parties themselves, the administration of 
justice in general and the concern of the public at large that there is an end to litigation. It 
is not a novelty that a decision of a competent court might turn out to be wrong and one 
of the parties may be aggrieved by such a decision. All legal systems have built-in 
safeguards in the structure of the law itself and ordinarily where an individual appears 
aggrieved as a result of a decision of a court of competent jurisdiction, the proper 
procedure is to appeal the decision to the appropriate appellate body or to seek a review 
as the case may be. Until a judgment is set aside or reversed it is conclusive as to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
extent of estoppel should be determined by reference to the extent of the prejudicial conduct. Whether this 
proposal has now been accepted in Canada, I have found no evidence of it. 
265  P. B. H. Birks,  An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (1985) 410. 
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subject matter of it. The original cause of action between the parties merges into the 
judgment itself266 and no further action can be brought on the cause of action.267  
 
However, the parameters of establishing the res judicata defence may present some 
difficulties in particular cases where there could be complex overlaps between different 
causes of action and branches of law on the same facts or a factual scenario. That is 
particularly true of factual scenarios that produce both criminal proceedings and civil-law 
proceedings, or where one event has led to a chain of events. Thus in Hamilton v 
Bushell268 a Canadian court was faced with one such scenario269 and decided to set out 
the basic nature of the doctrine of res judicata. In the view of the court, for a defendant 
successfully to invoke the doctrine of res judicata, it is necessary to establish that the 
second proceedings involve the same parties and are for the same relief in substance. In 
this particular case the court said that the doctrine of res judicata did not apply to the 
second proceedings. As justification for denying the application of the doctrine, the court 
said that where reliance was placed simply on a prior criminal order of restitution, there 
could be no res judicata in the civil suit.  
 
Further issues that prevent the application of the res judicata doctrine are where the 
tribunal that heard the previous case had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter, or where, 
as in Sheaves v Graham,270 the doctrine of res judicata had no application because the 
merits of the issue were not dealt with in the previous case.  
 
In some circumstances the factual scenario reveals that the previous proceedings that are 
now invoked to sustain the res judicata defence involved an election of remedies by the 
                                                 
266 In Widrig v Strazer [1964] SCR 376 the court at one stage said:  ‘I therefore think that on a question of 
alternative remedies no question of election arises until one or other claim has been brought to judgment. 
Up to that stage the plaintiff may pursue both remedies together, or pursuing one may amend and pursue 
the other; but he can take judgment only for one and his cause of action on both will then be merged in the 
one’ (at 387-89). 
267  G. H. L. Fridman &  J. C. McLeod , Restitution (1982) 590. 
268  [1980] 39 NSR (2d) 691 (CA).  
269  In this case the defendants were convicted for breaking-in into someone’s house and were ordered to 
make restitution for damages caused. Subsequently, the plaintiff sues the defendant for damages resulting 
from a fire the defendants had set while on the premises.   
270  (1977) 37 NSR (2d) 272 (Co. Ct). 
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plaintiff. In Canadian law, it is established that where the facts of the case provided the 
plaintiff with a choice of remedies, the plaintiff’s election as to the appropriate remedy 
will only be final so as to preclude him from further proceedings if he has proceeded to 
judgment.271 Extreme protection may even exist in some circumstances. It has even been 
suggested that no election arises until the judgment has been satisfied.272 The election 
scenario may, however, have involved a choice between two inconsistent rights, as 
opposed to a mere choice between alternatives remedies. In such scenarios, in order for 
the plaintiff to become disentitled to a right by electing to enforce the other, he must first 
actually have had a choice of two rights.273 If he had no such a choice, res judicata will 
be applicable. The doctrine of election presupposes that one right should be a substitute 
for the other and denies the party the privilege of enjoying the benefit of both. However, 
the doctrine of election is restricted to cases involving alternative and inconsistent rights 
and has no effect where the rights which are alleged to have arisen from the facts are 
disparate and independent.274 The doctrine of election has equally no application where 
the jurisdiction of the tribunals involved is overlapping and the rights in issue are 
cumulative.275  
 
In sum, although Canadian law has a very carefully crafted doctrine of res judicata with 
several qualifications, there is no question that if none of the exclusions above is 
sustained, the defence of res judicata will be applied and, if in the circumstances the 
defendant should be enriched by the application of such defence, its effect is similar to 
change-of-position defence when restitution is denied in full due the loss or dissipation of 
to the enrichment received or its destruction due to an unforeseen event. As Garland v 
Consumer Gas276 confirmed, res judicata qualifies as one of the established categories of 
‘juristic reasons’ for being one of the ‘dispositions of law’ that can finalise a dispute. 
Because it is a ‘juristic reason’ (or a causa in other jurisdictions), the windfall that one of 
                                                 
271  Widrig v Stazer 37 DLR (2d) 629 varied 44 DLR (2d) 1 (SCC). 
272 Findlay v Findlay [1952] 1 SCR 96.  
273 Findlay v Findlay [1952] 1 SCR 96.  
274 Findlay v Findlay [1952] 1 SCR 96 at 106. 
275 G. H. L. Fridman & J. C. McLeod, Restitution (1982) 596. 
276  [2004] SCC 25. 
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the parties derives from its application is justified, even if in the process the ultimate 
outcome would seem unjust. 
 
2.4.5. Payment over (Agency) in Canada.  
 
Based on the principle laid down in the English case Kleinwort, Sons & Co v Dunlop 
Rubber Co,277 Canadian law still holds today that an agent who has received money on 
his principal’s behalf is liable to refund the money to the payer where the money was not 
due, in fact, to the principal,278 or if it was due and duly paid over, the agent had done so 
with notice of the claim.279  If, however, the agent, prior to learning of the claim, had 
paid the money over to the principal or done something equivalent on the principal’s 
behalf on the faith of the payment, he will have a good defence to the claim and the 
plaintiff will have to sue the principal.280 This defence is generally known as payment 
over, or sometimes as ‘ministerial receipt’281 or sim ly as ‘the agency defence’. The 
claimant in these circumstances will be required to sue the principal, because both in 
logic and on principle it seems unconscionable if an agent who is clearly acting on behalf 
of a principle were to be held liable in personam, thereby  ignoring his innocence. By 
having paid over to the principal, any benefit the agent might have received has instead 
augmented the principal’s assets and that is where the claimant must look for his redress. 
Because the agent, by paying over the benefit received, keeps nothing for himself, the 
defence of payment over naturally embodies a change-of-position type situation on the 
part of the agent. That is why it has been discussed frequently in the context of the 
change-of-position defence in general (where one such defence is available and 
recognised as of general application).  
 
                                                 
277  (1907) 97 LT 263 at 264 (HL).  
278  Teasdall v Sun life Assurance Co. [1927] 2 DLR 502 (Ont.CA). 
279 See P. B. H. Birks, ‘Change of Position: The Nature of the Defence…’ in M. McInnes (ed.) Restitution: 
Developments in Unjust Enrichment (1996) 66-67. 
280  G. H. L. Fridman  &  J. C. McLeod, Restitution (1982) 619. 
281  P. B. Birks, ‘Change of Position: The Nature of the Defence…(supra) in M. McInnes (ed.) Restitution: 
Developments in Unjust Enrichment (1996) 66. 
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However, if a change-of-position defence is not readily available in a particular legal 
system, the success of the payment over defence depends on the agent proving a genuine 
payment over of the benefit so received. Therefore payment over is not synonymous to a 
mere crediting of the principal’s books of account by the agent, but a de facto parting 
with the very benefit received and its concomitant ability to deal with it.282 If money has 
been received, such money must in fact have been used on the principal’s behalf. As long 
as the agent retains the money within his control there is no possibility of the application 
of the defence unless the retention is pursuant to a settled account with the principal.283
 
The doctrine of payment over depends, in substance, on whether it is conscionable to 
order the return of the money against the agent. For that reason, where the agent has paid 
the money over after receiving notice of the plaintiff’s claim, the defence is inapplicable. 
It is inapplicable in this scenario because the defendant, by virtue of knowing the 
existence of the claim and parting with the benefit, disqualifies himself from being 
considered to have acted in good faith. Furthermore, if the defendant has indeed paid over 
the money to his principal, but such payment is not a permanent one or it is simply a 
facade, and the agent’s position is still in effect the same as it was prior to the payment 
over, the agent will be forced to disgorge the benefit so received.284  
 
At some stage in the development of the law, it was held that the defence of payment 
over turns also on the conduct of the recipient, i.e, it inquires whether the defendant 
received the benefit now being claimed as a result of his own wrongdoing, or as a result 
of a wrongdoing to which he was a participant, or merely as a result of  wrongdoing of 
which he had no notice.285 On this approach, some cases went on to establish that the 
agent was deprived of the defence not only where he had indulged in wrongdoing on his 
own behalf but also where he had acted on behalf of his principal. This situation was 
sometimes called the ‘conduit pipe’ approach,286 a notion that originated in an old 
                                                 
282  G. H. L. Fridman and  J. C. McLeod, Restitution (1982) 620. 
283  British America Continental Bank v British Bank for Foreign Trade [1926] 1 KB 328. 
284  [1926] 1 KB 328, 331-332. 
285  G. H. L. Fridman and  J. C. McLeod , Restitution (1982) 623. 
286 As to ‘conduit pipe’ concept see Hazlewood v West Coast Securities Ltd (1976) 68 DLR (3d) 172, 
varying 49 DLR (3d) 46 (B.C.C.A.). 
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English case Owen & Co v Cronk287 and, following the approach advocated in that case, 
the defence was sometimes held to be inapplicable.288 However, the defence of change of 
position, of which payment over seems a subspecies, or with which it is sometimes 
merged, unlike the defence of estoppel, is not determined by reference to any conduct on 
the part of the payer. Rather, what is involved is whether the recipient has acted in such a 
fashion as to render it unconscionable289 to order the return of the payment. However, 
more recent developments have questioned that approach which seemed to have been tied 
up with the fact that the old English cases in which the approach was developed had 
come to such a conclusion because the change-of-position defence was not recognised as 
being of a general application.290  
 
2.4.6. Concluding Remarks.  
 
The analysis of the Canadian defences has shown that the whole of that country’s 
enrichment law is premised on equitable considerations and this very fact influences the 
understanding of the change-of-position defence and its relation with other defences. That 
was confirmed as recently as 2004 by the Supreme Court of Canada in British Columbia 
v Canada, Forest Products Ltd291and reiterated in Kingstreet Investment v New 
Brunswick Finances.292 In British Columbia v Canada, Forest Product Ltd the court 
alluded to its treatment of the passing-on defence in Garland’s case of the same year and 
the close connection of that defence with the defence of change of position. The court 
said: ‘This court refused to deal the defence of passing on (a defence that Jacobucci J 
correctly noted would fall under the broader rubric of change of position defence in 
restitution law’.293 Thereafter the court remarked: ‘This equitable analysis, omnipresent 
                                                 
287  [1895] 1 QB 265 (CA). 
288  See generally G.H. Fridman  &  J.C.  McLeod, Restitution (1982) 619-621 and authorities cited there.  
289  The notion of unconscionable is widespread in Australian law of enrichment. The cases there seem to 
use ‘unconscionable’ in place of ‘unjust enrichment’ itself.  It is a manifestation unjust enrichment 
understood as a generic approach (see chapter 2 above).  
290  G. H. Fridman &  J. C. McLeod , Restitution (1982) 621. 
291  British Columbia v Canada, Forest Products Ltd  [2004] 2 SCR 74, (2004) 1 SCC 38) par. 199. 
292  Kingstreet Investment v New Brunswick Finances [2007] 1 SCC 3. par. 32-39. 
293  British Columbia v Canada, Forest Products Ltd  [2004] 2 SCR 74, (2004) 1 SCC 38) par. 199. 
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in the restitution law context, is a good reason why the defence of passing on is best 
confined to that area of law’.  
 
 
2.5. Change-of-Position and other Enrichment Defences in the Law of the United 
States of America.  
 
2.5.1. Introductory Remarks. 
 
Most of the defences discussed above in the context of English law are essentially the 
same in American law, although they are sometimes given different names. The nuances 
of the American defences, too, differ from their English counterparts. For example, 
estoppel is ordinarily treated alongside waiver in American law, while such association is 
almost unknown in English law. Prescription (limitation) is also often discussed with 
laches,294 which is seldom discussed under current English law. The defences of change 
of circumstances and bona fide purchase for value without notice receive extensive 
coverage, with the former placing great emphasis on the fault requirement, while the 
latter is premised on the commercial function of safeguarding the finality of 
transactions.295 Change of circumstances also often overlaps with the defence of laches, 
and it is analogous to estoppel,296 but as will be seen below with more detail, change of 
circumstances is not necessarily bound up with unreasonable delay on the part of the 
claimant nor with any detrimental reliance on another’s representations. The passing-on 
defence, in turn, is not so prominent. As to the illegality defence, which will be dealt with 
                                                 
294  Laches is an unreasonable delay in the pursuit of rights resulting in prejudice to the defendant.  
295 See for example the impact of Grant Gilmore’s article ‘The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith 
Purchase’  (1954) 63 Yale LJ 1057 on current position of UCC on good faith purchase aspects and 
repercussions elsewhere in the private law. Examples: UCC (Uniform Commercial Code § 3-418 (1990);  
UCC § 3-418 Comment 1 whereby the rule denies restitution to a bank that pays a forged or an overdrawn 
cheque to a person who took the instrument in good faith and for value. For much older views of the 
defence see J.B. Ames ‘Purchase for Value Without Notice’ (1887) 1 Harvard L R 1. See also A. Kull 
(1995) California LR 1233-34 criticizing the excessive glorification of the commercial function of the 
doctrine. 
296 Estoppel has also some features of laches, as in modern case law it is not unusual to find the notions that 
a plaintiff can be estopped, for example by  a long delay resulting in prejudice to the defendant. (see for 
example Willmar Poultry Co v Morton-Norwich Products Inc 520 F.2d 289 (C.A. Minn, 1975); See 
generally 51 American Jurisprudence 2d, Limitation of Actions, § 431 et seq). However, this explanation 
of estoppel seems nothing more than laches in a thinly disguised form.  
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in another chapter of this study, American law discusses it alongside the so-called 
‘unclean-hands’ defence, which is to some extent quite separate from the illegality 
defence. It appears nonetheless that the ‘unclean hands’ defence is more discretionary 
than the illegality defence itself is, but the demarcation between the two defences is not 
always clear. In the exercise of a discretion to deny relief on the basis of ‘unclean hands’, 
the courts require that the claimant’s inequitable conduct must be related to the identical 
transaction in which he seeks relief, as misbehaviour of a collateral nature which bears no 
relation to the transaction sued upon is disregarded. In this respect, since the illegality 
defence developed more in equity than at law, it is still often held that ‘equity does not 
demand that her suitors lead blameless lives’.297 Another important issue in American 
law, which may not necessarily be apparent in other jurisdictions, especially in civil-law 
countries, is the question: from which date does time begin to run for the purposes of 
limitations (prescription)? That is important because in general terms, for the purpose of 
statute of limitations, time begins to run from the date the cause of action arose. That is 
not necessarily the case in equity, which is still found in American law, although the 
courts have been merged long ago.298 However when restitution is sought, the enriching 
transaction may have been at one time, and the receipt of the benefit at another, and the 
discovery by the claimant of the fact at yet another. Ordinarily, when the action is based 
on unjust enrichment, the favoured view, although not unanimous, is that time begins to 
run from the date of the receipt of the benefit. This view is, however, in sharp distinction 
to the reality when prescription is not in issue, because ordinarily for a claim in unjust 
enrichment the measurement of the defendant’s enrichment is calculated as of the time of 
the institution of the claim (litis contestatio).  
 
Be it as it may, what binds all the defences mentioned above together is the fact that if 
they are successfully pleaded, their outcome is to leave a windfall in the hands of the 
defendant, although the extent of the windfall may vary from defence to defence. 
Whether such a windfall in the hands of the recipient is justified or not it will transpire 
from the discussion that follows on each defence or collectively treated.  
                                                 
297   See G. Douthwaite, Attorney’s Guide to Restitution (1977) 368. 
298  There appear to be four American States that still have separate equity courts. 
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2.5.1. The Change-of-Circumstances Defence in American Law. 
 
As pointed out in chapter one, the American law of unjust enrichment varies considerably 
among the various States, with some still using the language of quasi-contract and 
implied contract, while others have departed from that language. That variation in the 
cause of action is noticeable in the defences available in respect of a particular claim and, 
as we have seen, there is much overlap between the defences. Nevertheless, the defence 
of change of circumstances is accepted in most States299 and its development can 
generally be said to have followed a three-stage300 trend, - a trend which was especially 
visible in New York. It should be mentioned that American law does not hesitate to 
depart from the English-law approach whenever it deems it necessary and opts for a more 
principled approach rather than adhering unquestioningly to the views expressed in the 
old English authorities. This approach enabled a revolution in the law of restitution and 
unjust enrichment. The change in thinking over time was not an even one and can be 
gleaned from a variety of sources, including case law, and other legal instruments 
[statutes] and even academic writings.301 As the bulk of unjust enrichment claims arise 
out of mistaken transfers or payments, that is also where most elements were first focused 
in the early development of the defence,302 but the field is now wider and the importance 
of mistake itself is no longer relevant. Let us consider the details of the three phases 
themselves.   
 
In the first stage, the courts adopted the view which prevailed in England until 1991, 
namely that money paid under mistake was recoverable without regard to any subsequent 
alteration of position, subject to special exceptions in relation to payments to agents and 
                                                 
299 For the almost universal acceptance of the defence in American law see generally 66 American 
Jurisprudence (2002) §§ 134 – 154.  
300  For a more detailed discussion of these phases, especially in New York, see generally  R. J. Sutton in J. 
B. Elkind (ed) Impact of American Law on English and Commonwealth Law (1978) 166ss. 
301  See for example the comments of  M.P. Gergen (2005) 84 Texas LR 173, 181—183 on a recent book on 
the theory of Restitution and cases there cited. 
302  On the importance of mistake in the law of unjust enrichment in current America see M.P. Gergen 
(2005) 84 Texas LR 173, 181—183; and M.P. Gergen (2003) 56 Current Legal Problems 289, 304-05; 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution And Unjust Enrichment § 5 (Tentative Draft No. 1 (2001)).  
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payments on the faith of forged commercial papers (bills of exchange).303 This position 
was essentially based on the argument that whenever there has been a mistaken payment, 
legal title remained in the payer, and that in these circumstances the party having the 
legal right must prevail, regardless of whether the party receiving such payment had 
incurred liabilities or paid money which he would not otherwise have done, except for the 
receipt of the money.  In other words, loss had always to be borne by the payee, because 
he had, so to say, an ‘inferior’ legal right, if any. In my view, this absolute right to 
restitution certainly gave the claimant too little incentive to guard against mistaken 
transfers and justice could not always be seen to be done. 
 
In the second stage, the defence of change of circumstances became available in any case 
where the payer had been negligent, the concept of ‘negligence’ being gradually widened 
to the point where failure by the payer to take adequate steps to look after his own 
interests was regarded as negligence. Hence in May r v Mayor of New York,304 the courts 
for the first time held that 
 
‘[t]he general rule that money paid under mistake of material fact may be recovered back, although there 
was negligence on the part of the person making the payment, is subject to the qualification that the 
payment cannot be recalled when the position of the party receiving it had changed in consequence of the 
payment and it would be inequitable to allow a recovery. The person making the payment must, in that 
case, bear the loss occasioned by his own negligence’. 
 
In subsequent cases the concept of ‘negligence’ advocated in this case in its wider sense 
of ‘carelessness’ was consolidated and extended. At some point the courts began to make 
findings of negligence in circumstances of very slight blame. Forgetfulness, delay in 
inquiring into one’s legal rights,305 and even the failure to check out an insured’s own 
statements before paying out to his estate, were just few of the examples in the cases 
                                                 
303  The cases involving bills of exchange were generally distinguishable from the rest because in these 
cases it was thought that one party had superior capacity to discover the mistake.  
304  63 NY 455 (1875), 457. 
305 William v State 25 NYS 2d 866 (1942) where a delay of the plaintiff in inquiring into its legal rights was 
held as sufficient to ground the defence of change of circumstances. So was Semble Nusbaum v Rialto 
Securities Corp 264 NY Supp. 513 (1933) where the plaintiff’s forgetfulness was enough for the defence to 
succeed. 
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regarded as sufficient to bring the change-of-circumstances defence into play. For 
example in Continental National Bank v Tradesmen’s National Bank,306 a bank 
erroneously paid out on a cheque which had been fraudulently ‘raised’ after certification. 
Recovery was precluded because the bank could, with a better business system, have 
discovered the forgery and prevented the cheque being relied upon during its currency 
and after payment. The same reasoning appears at the same time beyond New York in 
Copper Belle Mining Co of West Virginia v Gleeson,307 in which it was held that ‘where 
the plaintiff alone is at fault, or his fault is greater than that of the defendant’, (…) 
‘alteration of position of the defendant is a defence to an action for the recovery of the 
money by the plaintiff’.308 The limits on the doctrine of relief for mistaken payments was 
once again reaffirmed shortly afterwards in Ball v Shepard,309 and there a further tag was 
added to the reasoning namely that if the payment did not arise in the ‘transaction 
between the parties to the action’, then recovery could not be had in any 
circumstances.310 The development also took into account situations where either party is 
equally to blame for the mistake or equally innocent thereto. In these circumstances, as a 
general rule, it was commonly held that an alteration on the part of the payee had to 
prevent liability in action for recovery.311  
 
In the third and final stage, which can generally be said to represent the current position 
of the defence, negligence was almost discarded altogether as a basis for the defence,312 
and the courts acknowledged that the defence was available in any case where an order 
                                                 
306  173 NY 276, 286; 65 NE 1108, 1118, 1113 (1903).  
307  14 Ariz 548, 134 P 283 (1913. 
308 This position is still present today in many other States. For example as recently as the year 2000 in 
Wilson v Newman 617 NW 2d 318 (2000) the fault requirement is still applied. Hanoch Dagan who has 
recently written a book on the modern theory of restitution (The Law and Ethics of Restitution (2004))  has 
suggested that the law should shift to the comparative fault regime to allocate a loss resulting from a 
mistaken transfer by highlighting the desirable incentive effect of comparative fault on precaution. But see 
M. P. Gergen (2005) 84 Texas LR 173 for criticism of this approach. 
309  202 NY 247; 95 NE 919 (1911). 
310  202 NY 247, 253;  95 NE 719, 721 (1911). 
311  See for example Lake Gogebic Lumber Co. v Burns 40 ALR 2d 993 (1951). 
312 America Nursing Resources Inc v Forest T Jones & Co. Inc 812 SW 2d 790 (Mo Ct. App WD 1991); 
Warrior River Towing Inc. v Kennedy 574 So 2d 843 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); Toupin v Laverdiere 729 A 2d 
1286 (R.I. 1999); Blue Cross Health Services Inc v Sauer 800 SW 2d 72 (Mo. Ct App. Ed 1990). 
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for restitution would impose a net loss on the payee.313 In Paramount Film Distributing 
Corp. v State of New York314 the New York Court of Appeals decided by four against 
three that restitutionary claims were generally liable to be met with a change-of-position 
defence. It is noteworthy that, whereas all previous cases were concerned with mistaken 
payments, this case did not involve such a mistake, but was about money paid 
involuntarily under a statute which was subsequently held unconstitutional. For this 
reason, the decision has an all-encompassing implication for the law of unjustified 
enrichment, for whether the benefit claimed came into the hands of the defendant by 
mistake or otherwise, the difference is not a material one as long as there was no valid 
ground for the ‘transfer’. In reaching its decision the court held: 
 
‘Such a claim is undoubtedly equitable and depends upon broad considerations of equity and justice 
(…). Generally, courts will look to see if a benefit has been conferred on the defendant, under a mistake 
of fact or law, if the benefit still remains with the defendant, if there has been otherwise a change-of-
position by the defendant and whether the defendant’s conduct was tortious or fraudulent’.   
 
Thereafter the court adds:  
 
‘Generally, if the plaintiff’s conduct will lead to an undue net loss to a defendant by reason of a 
changed position, as will often be the case where funds are disbursed then, the parties being equally 
innocent, recovery may be denied’.  
 
The current position can still be said to be based on Keener’s doctrine that ‘the principle 
that forbids the defendant from enriching himself at the expense of the plaintiff should 
clearly forbid the plaintiff indemnifying himself against loss at the expense of an 
innocent and blameless defendant’. Hence, we still read in modern cases such as Monroe 
Financial Corp v DiSilvestro,315 and Westamerica Securities, Inc v Cornelius316 that ‘the 
                                                 
313  For a more detailed discussion of these phases, especially in New York, see generally R.J. Sutton in 
J.B. Elkind (ed.) Impact of American Law on English and Commonwealth Law (1978) 166.   
314  285 NE 2d 695, 334 NYS 2d 388 (1972). The Court decided the case on 4 -3 majority.  
315  529 NE 2d 379 (Ind. Ct App. 1st Dist. 1988).  
316 520 P 2d 1262 (1974). Pilot Life Insurance Co. v Cudd, 36 SE 2d 860, 863 (SC 1945) which held that 
the general rule that when money is paid to another under circumstances of mistake of fact it may be 
recovered as long as there has not been a change in the payee’s position such that the refund would be 
unjust.  
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rule that money paid under a mistake of fact317 may be recovered back 318 does not apply 
where the payment has caused such a change-of-position of the other party that it would 
be unjust to require him or her to refund the payment or the recipient cannot be restored 
to the status quo’. Obviously, such principle has over time been refined319 and its scope 
limited in some circumstances, but its main idea still permeates the case law on the issue. 
As Keener’s earlier work320 demonstrated, there is a profound relationship between the 
change-of-circumstances defence and the restitutionary doctrines he was concerned to 
expound, which has now culminated in the almost ‘unified’ principle of unjustified 
enrichment.  
 
Apart from the general elements above mentioned, current American law calls for further 
requisites that must be established before a defendant can have the benefit of the defence 
of changed circumstances. Such elements are usually termed as ‘detrimental reliance’,321 
                                                 
317  As to mistakes of fact and mistakes of law there is still no unanimity in the cases, for some still insist 
that only mistakes of fact qualify to sustain an action for recovery while others make no difference of 
mistakes of fact and law. In an older Tennessee case, the issue was put this way: ‘A payment of money 
under mistake of law may be recovered where it would be unconscionable for the party who obtains the 
advantage in such a transaction to retain it, but although there was a clear mistake of law, yet if the party 
benefited he may retain the advantage in good conscience; neither a court of law nor of equity will give 
relief’ (Leach v Cowan 125 Tenn 182; 140 SW 1070 (1911); in New York and Ohio the distinction was 
abandoned as early as 1936 and 1957 respectively in Rosenblum v Manufacturers Trust Co 270 NY 809, 
200 NE 587, 105 ALR 947 (1936) and Botzum Bros Co v Brown Lumber Co 104 Ohio App. 507,  150 NE 
2d 485 (1957). It is also to be noted that in American law in general, a mistake as to foreign law is regarded 
as mistake of fact, and ordinarily the rules governing such mistakes (in those jurisdictions that still maintain 
the difference) apply (see generally American Jurisprudence 2d, Equity § 20; and 66 American 
Jurisprudence 2d, Restitution and Implied Contracts §§ 134ss and § 154). 
The drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution recommend however that the distinction between 
mistake of law and of fact be abolished altogether, and they suggest that the unjustness of the enrichment is 
the critical factor in determining whether restitution is appropriate, and not whether the mistake was of fact 
or law (Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 5f (Discussion Draft 2000); § 5f 
(Tentative Draft No. 1 2001).   
318  66 American Jurisprudence § 134 (2001). 
319 For the initial refinements see the various comments in the Restatement of Restitution (1937) to par. 
142(1) ‘The right of a person to restitution from another because of a benefit received is terminated or 
diminished if, after the receipt of the benefit, circumstances have so changed that it would be inequitable to 
require the other to make full restitution’. 
 
320  A Treatise on the Law of Quasi-Contracts’, first published in 1893. 
321  ‘To assert a valid defence to [plaintiff’s] mistaken payment of money had and received cause of action, 
[the defendant] must demonstrate detrimental reliance on the subject payment’ (Manufacturers Hanover 
Trust Co v Chemical Bank 559 NYS 2d 704, 710 (App. Div 1990)). 
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‘irrevocability and materiality of the change’, and ‘causal connection’.322 Thus in 
Jonklaas v Silverman323 the court held that ‘in order that there may be such a change-of-
position as will defeat an action to recover money paid by mistake, the change must be 
detrimental to the payee, material and irrevocable and the change of position must have 
been caused by the payment in question’.324 The reliance element can be found in 
circumstances such as where a defendant who received a payment by mistake, believing 
that he is entitled to retain it, surrenders collateral security for a debt or suffers a loss of 
rights and remedies against others who could have been required to make payment, so 
that he cannot be placed in status quo.325  It is to be noted however that in such 
circumstances the right or the collateral security surrendered must have been of value, for 
where the collateral is worthless or, as in the case of release of the lien, as an example of 
a surrendered a right, if such a lien be void, the loss of the collateral or the release of the 
lien does not constitute a detrimental reliance.326 A change-of-position is not considered 
detrimental and therefore constitutes no defence if it can be reversed or the status quo can 
be restored without expenses.327 Where, for example, the defendant incurred new debts or 
extraordinary living expenses in good faith reliance upon the right to an overpayment, 
and can establish such a fact by proving that but for the mistaken overpayment, he would 
not have incurred these costs and liabilities, there is a detrimental reliance, and the 
change of position deriving from such reliance constitutes a defence precluding the 
claimant’s right to relief.  
 
                                                 
322 The test of causal link, although not always expressed in the cases, is obviously, a ‘but for’ test. See for 
example in England where the judge in Scottish Equitable Plc v Derby [2000] 3 All ER 793 said that ‘had 
Mr. Derby not received the overpayment, he would not have taken any steps (or abstained from taking any 
steps). 
323 Jonklaas v Silverman 117 RI 691; 370 A 2d 1277 (1977). 
324 66 American Jurisprudence 2d §§ 151-153 (2002). 
325Jefferson County v McGrath’s Executor 205 Ky 484, 266 SW 29, 41 ALR 586 (1924); Monroe Financial 
Corp v DiSilverio 529 NE 2d 379 (Ind. Ct App 1st Dist. 1988), PaineWebber Inc v Levy 293 NJ Super 325, 
680 A. 2d 798 (1995). 
326 National Shawmut Bank of Boston v Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance  61 NE 2d 18, 159 ALR 478 (1945).  
327 First National City Bank v McManus 29 NC App. 65, 223 SE 2d 554 (1976). 
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Because change-of-position is an affirmative defence,328 the party invoking it also bears 
the onus of proof in the proceedings. That is so because by virtue of the defendant 
avowing the truth of the averment of the facts in the plea, either expressly or by 
implication, but thereafter proceeding to allege new matter that will deprive the facts so 
admitted of their ordinary legal effect, the defendant will thereby effectively neutralise or 
obviate and destroy the cause of action and defeat recovery.329 The general rationale of 
the affirmative defences when applied specifically in the law of unjustified enrichment 
leads one to conclude with Andrew Kull that ‘defences to restitution are conceptually 
coherent where the requirements of an affirmative defence, if made out by the defendant, 
tend logically to refute the claim that he has been unjustly enriched’.330
 
For these reasons, the law places the burden upon the defendant t  establish the defence. 
Generally the proof offered to establish the defence must be certain with nothing left to 
mere inference. This, however, does not mean that the elements required to establish the 
defence have to amount to a beyond-reasonable-doubt standard, but it simply means that 
the proof of the elements required must generally be clear, and there is no need for more 
than a fair preponderance of the evidence.331 The evidence must nevertheless establish 
that the change has been detrimental to the defendant, and that it was material and 
irrevocable, such that the defendant cannot be returned to the status quo.  
 
2.5.2. Estoppel and Waiver. 
 
                                                 
328 An affirmative defence rests on matters outside the scope of the plaintiff’s prima facie case. If a defence 
negates an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, it is not considered as an affirmative defence. (61A 
American Jurisprudence 2d ‘pleadings’ § 355ss). American law distinguishes between ‘listed affirmative 
defences’ and ‘non-listed affirmative defence’. Substantively the distinction is of little importance. But it is 
so for procedural reasons, for a listed affirmative defence must be pled, if not the defence is waived. For 
this reason, Sanden  v Mayo Clinic 495F 2d 221 (8th circ. 1974) clarified that ‘because an affirmative 
defence raises a matter extrinsic to the plaintiff’s claim/case, even a matter listed in Federal Rules Civil 
Procedure (Rule (8c)) is not an affirmative defence if it merely negates an element of the plaintiff’s prima 
facie case. 
329  Oyler v Oyler 293 SC 4, 358 SE 2d (Ct. App 1987);  61A American Jurisprudence 2d § 298 (2002). 
330 A. Kull (1995) 83 California L R 1191, 1234 
331  66 American Jurisprudence § 151. 
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Estoppel and waiver332 constitutes another pair of American defences to enrichment 
claims. Like in all other jurisdictions, estoppel is not peculiar to enrichment law; it can be 
raised in any field of private law. The defence is premised on representation, express or 
implied from the situation, which leads the recipient relying on it to change his position 
to his detriment. Closely parallel to estoppel is the doctrine that a known right can be lost 
by its waiver, or intentional relinquishment, and the intention to waive can be implied 
from the conduct. The conceptual difference between estoppel and waiver, in so far as 
they relate to defences to restitution, is explained as follows:  
 
‘when a claimant is defeated by reason of estoppel it is because he has been ‘estopped’ from 
claiming another’s enrichment as unjust because it is he, himself, who by words or conduct has 
caused the other to act to his detriment; when, on the other hand, the defence is based on waiver, the 
thinking is more that it is the policy favouring the stability of transactions, of requiring that 
‘commitments seriously assumed are to be honoured,’ that stands in the way of his claim’.333
 
Mere negligence on the part of the mistaken payer of money is not of itself a bar to 
restitution if the recipient has not changed his position, but a wilful neglect to investigate 
the facts before making payment can, in a strong enough case, be so blatant as to stop the 
payer from asserting his mistake. After discovery of the mistake, if the payer fails 
promptly to notify the recipient of the mistake, and this result in prejudice to the latter, 
there is an overlap between change-of-position and estoppel as a defence.334 There is also 
the so-called ‘estoppel against estoppel’ whereby a party is precluded by counter estoppel 
from asserting an estoppel; and where he is so precluded, the matter in issue is to be 
determined and disposed of otherwise than by application of the doctrine of estoppel.335  
 
                                                 
332 Waiver is comprehensively defined as a voluntary and intentional relinquishment, surrender, or 
abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim, or privilege, which except for such 
a waiver the party would have enjoyed.  Ordinarily a waiver occurs or exists when one dispenses with the 
performance of something he is entitled to exact, or when in possession of any right, whether conferred by 
law or by contract, with full knowledge of the material facts, does or forebears to do something the doing of 
which is inconsistent with the right or his intention to rely upon it. (1996) 31 Corpus Juris Secundum § 67.  
333 G. Douthwaite, Attorneys’ Guide to Restitution (1977) 374-375. 
334 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co v Central National Bank of Cleveland  112 NE 2d 636 (1953). 
335  (1996) 31 Corpus Juris Secundum § 65. Where an estoppel exists against an estoppel, the matter is 
set at large, or is left as if neither estoppel had been offered; the two estoppels destroy each other and the 
interest of justice requires that both parties be liberated therefrom. 
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In sum, although in the American context most of the estoppel and waiver cases are 
frequently applicable where derivative suits are brought against stockholders, and where 
a beneficiary seeks restitutionary relief against a fiduciary, there is no reason why both 
defences should not be raised to any claim where restitution is sought. 336   
 
2.5.3. Good Faith Purchase for Value without Notice.  
 
 
What is said above about Canadian law on the defence of ‘good faith purchase for value’ 
mostly applies mutatis mutandi to American law. The defence is commonly called the bfp 
(bona fide purchaser) doctrine, and it is often invoked in bills of exchange matters and 
other commercial settings. Its complexity is considerable where commercial intangibles 
are concerned, such as negotiable instruments, stocks and bonds, documents of title, and 
the like. Within these commercial intangibles the results of the application of the bfp tend 
to be challenged.337 Its importance in these commercial matters is so great that at some 
point it might have seemed as if it were an expression of capitalist ideology itself. 
However, there has always been an attempt to balance the bfp doctrine with the 
preservation of property rights. For example, in 1874 in First National Bank of Toledo v 
Show,338 the then New York Commission of Appeals (the highest court in the state in 
those days) held, inter alia, that ‘[w]hile commercial convenience must be respected, the 
rights of property must not be sacrificed’ and added: ‘The true interest of commerce 
demands that the claims under bills of lading and other such instruments should be 
scrupulously protected, since commerce will not flourish where the rights of property are 
not protected’.  
 
                                                 
336  G. Douthwaite, Attorneys’ Guide to Restitution (1977) 375. 
337  See for example the challenges advanced to a famous case Banque Worms v BankAmerica International 
77 NY 2d 362, 568 NYS 2d 451 570 NE 189 (1991) where the intricacies of the doctrine surfaced. The 
defence there was called ‘discharge for value rule’, but the court made it clear with reference to the 
Restatement of Restitution (Second –which was never approved), section 14 (1) comment a) that the 
discharge for value rule was simply a ‘specific application of the underlying principle of bona fide 
purchase’ set forth in section 13 of the Restatement of Restitution. 
338  61 NY 283, 304 (1874). 
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Grant Gilmore339 describes the same philosophy of commercial convenience thus:  
‘The triumph of the good faith purchaser has been one of the most dramatic episodes in our legal 
history. In his several guises, he serves a commercial function: he is protected not because of his 
praiseworthy character, but to the end that commercial transactions may be engaged in without 
elaborate investigation of property rights and in reliance on the possession of property by one who 
offers it for sale or to secure a loan’.340
 
An ‘innocent purchaser’ is one who had no reasonable basis to suspect the seller did not 
have good title. The most significant impact of the bfp doctrine, as a defence to an 
enrichment claim, arises when one is seeking to assert a right of ‘equitable’ origins 
against a third party who has acquired legal title. To establish the defe ce of bona fide 
purchase it must be shown that the defendant has given value, in good faith, for the 
subject matter which the plaintiff claims; and, ordinarily, that he was without knowledge, 
actual or constructive, of such a claim at the time he acquired title.341 For our purposes 
the analogy and the relationship with change-of-position is that once a bona fide 
purchaser for value is accorded the right to hold title, he is secure in what he has, and the 
plaintiff cannot lay claim on him. Put differently, what is at issue here is competing 
‘equities’ if not interests. Both the claimant and the defendant have ‘title’, so to say, to 
the subject matter; but in such cases the best title is with the defendant, and therefore he 
must prevail in any claim for restitution. The apparent windfall he acquires is fully 
justified because he ‘paid’ for it.342  
 
                                                 
339  G. Gilmore (1954) 63 Yale L J 1057. 
340  (1954) 63 Yale L J 1057, 1058 footnote 3. 
341  Lake City Corp v Michigan Avenue National Bank of Chicago 337 NE 2d 251 (1975); 76 American 
Jurisprudence 2d, Trusts, § 269 et seq; G. Douthwaite, Attorneys’ Guide to Restitution (1977) 389.  
342  Of course civil-law countries might have a problem with this conclusion, for taken to the maximum, a 
‘thief’ can pass title, even though he did not have one.  Grant Gilmore illustrates this scenarios in the 
context of American law with reference to the 19th centuries Factor’s Acts, whereby the courts 
subsequently developed the so-called ‘concept of voidable title’ and the new ways of shifting the 
distribution of risks: ‘If B buys goods from A, he gets A’s title and can transfer it to any subsequent 
purchaser; if B steals goods from A, he gets no title and can transfer none to any subsequent purchaser, no 
matter how clear the purchaser’s good faith. ‘Voidable title’ in B came in as an intermediate term between 
the two extremes: If B gets possession of A’s goods by fraud, even tough he has no right to retain them 
against A, he does have the right to transfer title to a good faith purchaser’. Most of this doctrine with some 
little variations is now embodied in the Uniform Commercial Code. 
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2.5.4. Laches and Statutes of Limitations. 
  
 
As it was mentioned in the introductory remarks on this section, American law treats the 
issue of limitation (prescription) defence alongside laches, although laches are also 
treated alongside estoppel for particular reasons. While the limitation defence sprang 
generally from  the common law, laches developed exclusively in equity, and courts of 
equity did not regard themselves bound by statutes of limitations.343 However, the courts 
of law and equity have now been merged in nearly all US States and the continuation of 
two ‘limitation’ regimes has come under pressure. Laches is a defence that is raised due 
to the plaintiff’s length of delay in bringing the suit that could be inequitable where it 
results in detriment to the defendant, although in extreme cases even the showing of 
prejudice can be ignored.344 The real importance of these two defences is, inter alia, to be 
found in the burden of proof. There is a proposition to the effect that where the plaintiff 
has delayed in bringing the claim for a period longer than what the period spelled out in 
the analogous statute of limitations,345 the burden is on him to persuade the court that he 
should qualify for relief notwithstanding; whereas if the delay is shorter than the statute 
of limitations, the burden of proof is on the defendant to show the delay was 
unreasonable and prejudicial to him.  
 
Although there is an interface between estoppel, waiver, laches and change of position, in 
practice most cases restrict laches where equitable relief in its usual form is being sought. 
As to prescription itself, which is mostly regulated by statutes, the main problem is to 
determine from which date time begins to run in the context of unjustified enrichment.  
Thus far there is no unanimity among academic writers or in the courts and the questions 
that were raised in the introductory remark may still need further investigation.  
                                                 
343 G. Douthwaite, Attorneys’ Guide to Restitution (1977) 378-379; L. M. Burson (1999) Loyola of Los 
Angeles L R 799; 31 Corpus Juris Secundum § 66 (1996).  
344 See for example Rockshire Civic Association inc v Mayor & City Council of  Rockville 358 A. 2d (1976) 
(Md App.). In this case for example, the delay in bringing the suit was nine and half years. However, the 
plaintiffs were appealing an administrative zoning decision, normally to be done within 30 days. The court 
held that ‘under these circumstances, and considering the magnitude of the delay, a separate showing of 
prejudice is not required’;  G. Douthwaite, Attorneys’ Guide to Restitution (1977) 379. 
345  G. Douthwaite, Attorneys’ Guide to Restitution (1977) 380. 
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2.5.4. Election of Remedies and Res Judicata in American Law.  
 
Here, as in the defences discussed under the previous heading, American courts face 
similar situations to those described in the Canadian law above.346  
 
Modern American law on pleadings allows demands for alternative relief very freely, and 
pleadings can be readily amended. For that reason, modern courts do not favour election 
of remedies as a defence unless either the plaintiff’s conduct has resulted in prejudicial 
reliance of some sort by the defendant; or the res judicata doctrine calls for such a result; 
or where not to hold the plaintiff as having made a conclusive election might tend to 
facilitate a double recovery. Pursuit of an unavailable inconsistent remedy will not bar the 
pursuit of a viable remedy unless there was detrimental reliance on the part of the 
defendant.347  Obviously, where the exceptions just mentioned are met, the claim will be 
barred and as a consequence whatever windfall the defendant has acquired will lie where 
it is. Though the outcome might seem unjust, it can be legally justifiable that the plaintiff 
should bear such a loss, if any, where he has taken the risk upon himself. The final result 
is therefore analogous to the change-of-position defence, whereby the plaintiff is denied 
recovery due to an extrinsic element of the claim.  
 
2.5.5. Concluding Remarks. 
 
                                                 
346 See item 2.4.4 (‘Res Judicata in Canada’) above. Some of the issues in American law arise analogously 
in the contexts of rescission where there might be an interrelation with a damages claim. The problem in 
those cases is sometimes procedural because one of the litigants has made an election to disaffirm, say, a 
contract for fraud. It is said that courts have become flexible and today they do permit, for example, 
‘reliance damages’ along with a decree of ‘rescission’. Sometimes it had been held that the bar to institute 
the other claim is not sustained because what is at issue is a choice between substantive rights and a mere 
choice of remedy.  A clear example in this regard is Schlotthauer v Krenzelok 79 NW 2d 76 (1956). In this 
case, at some point the judge held that ‘the reason why a suit at law to recover damages for fraud bars 
subsequent suit for rescission is not because there has been an election of inconsistent remedies, but rather 
that the act of instituting an action at law for damages recognises the existence of the contract and affirms 
it. Such action is no different than any other act indicating an affirmation of the contract, such as 
proceeding with the performance of the contract after discovery of the fraud, or disposing some of the 
property acquired under the contract, thus putting it beyond the power of the defrauded party to rescind and 
place the parties in status quo’. 
347 Bank Building & Equipment Corp. of America v Georgia State Bank  209 SE 2d 82 (1974). 
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In one way or another, it is obvious that in American law all defences discussed above, if 
successfully raised, tend to converge at least in the outcome with a feature of a change-
of-position defence; i.e., to leave the loss where it falls based essentially on an extrinsic 
element to the claim itself. Although none of them is able to achieve a partial restitution, 
the success of any of them depends, inter alia, on there being some reasonableness, a 
rationale for the denial of the claim, and to some extent some equitable and policy 
considerations.  
 
 
 
2.6. Loss of Enrichment and other Enrichment Defences in South African Law.  
 
2.6.1. Introductory Remarks. 
 
As there is no general enrichment action in South African law, one would also think that 
there is no express ‘general defence’ to enrichment claims. Inasmuch the elements of 
each condictio are different, so different defences will also attach to each claim. 
However, this is not the case and, even though the South African law of unjustified 
enrichment remains fractured, a number of defences have come to be recognised as 
applying across all, or many, enrichment actions. One of the defences – and also the most 
important one – is the ‘loss of enrichment’.  
 
Despite the scarcity of systematic studies of enrichment defences in South African law, 
some generalizations can be attempted in regard to this defence. First, a difference must 
be made between cases where the recovery of the benefit being sought is the product of a 
one-sided performance by the plaintiff and those cases where both parties have performed 
under a bilateral transaction that has failed (e.g. as a result of supervening impossibility) 
such as to give both parties a cause of action in unjustified enrichment, or a cause of 
action in contract that resembles an enrichment and in other countries is recognised as 
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such (e.g. where a contract fails due to it having been rescinded as a result of say, 
misrepresentation).  
 
In the first group of cases, the claim may, or may not, be met by a defence raised by the 
defendant, but when it is met by a defence, the possibility of a complete bar to recovery 
may arise should there be an alteration in the defendant’s position. In the second group of 
cases,348 it seems that as a matter of principle, one party can recover what he conferred 
only if he can restore the benefit that he received. It is a contentious issue classifying the 
winding up the consequences of ‘frustrated contracts’ utilizing the unjustified enrichment 
doctrine, because it appears that such approach is prone to inevitably bringing with it the 
availability of the change-of-position defence to a ‘contracting party’, thereby subverting 
bargains. But it is also clear that not all cases fall into the ‘subverting bargains’ rationale. 
Therefore the unjustified enrichment doctrine seems an equally appropriate avenue for 
winding up of such cases. And if the rules of unjustified enrichment apply to such cases, 
the ‘value remaining’ as the measure of enrichment once again comes into play.  
 
The outcome of both approaches above appears to lead to a dilemma: contract rules may 
not solve adequately the effects of some failed bilateral agreements and the application of 
enrichment rules may subvert the bargain with the application of change of position 
defence. Faced with this impasse one needs to find an exit door to the dilemma. The 
probable avenues would seem to be the following:  either (i) declare that the model of 
winding up the consequences of failed contracts within the unjustified enrichment 
doctrine as being not valid at all, for few would contest the correctness of the assertion 
that there can be no claim in unjustified enrichment unless the claimant shows that he 
was not otherwise obliged to confer the benefit in question, or (ii) if the model is valid, as 
some cases seem to confirm - and in appropriate circumstances the ‘value remaining’ 
cannot represent the measure of liability in unjustified enrichment - then a dual measure 
of liability must be sanctioned, or (iii) alternatively, a concession must be made that the 
                                                 
348  This group of cases is the subject matter of chapter three below.  
CHAPTER II - Change of Position Defence Within Other Enrichment Law Defences          
        
             © Jorge Aimite  Cape-Town 15/08/2009    [This is   Page 90 ]
Change of Position Defence
  (Unjustified Enrichment)
90
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 ©
 J
or
ge
 A
m
ite
 ©
defence of change of position is not applicable to these cases, thereby acknowledging an 
important exception in the application of the defence. 
 
In this respect Daniel Visser349 while briefly dealing with the point of ‘Measuring 
enrichment: Value received versus value remaining’ says that ‘however strongly the 
change-of-position (defence) is embedded in a legal system, there are cases where the 
value received is the appropriate measure’. By way of example he cites the cases of failed 
reciprocal contracts in which he is of the view that it would be inequitable if one of the 
contracting parties could rely on change of position due to an inability to return what he 
had received. Secondly, it would also appear that some of the defences in unjustified 
enrichment apply to some extent to all condictiones regardless how they are categorised, 
while others may only apply to specific condictiones. For example, the assertion in 
Govender v Standard Bank of SA Ltd350 that ‘[i]t is a defence to the condictio indebiti that 
the mistake was not reasonable but negligent, but it would not seem to be a defence to the 
condictio sine causa since no error need to be proved, whether reasonable or 
unreasonable’,351 illustrates the fact of there being defences that only apply to certain 
condictiones. Loss of enrichment, on the other hand, is a defence that in principle applies 
to all condictiones, because it is an ‘affirmative’ defence and it is not dependent on the 
elements of the claim per se, but it is advanced on ‘facts’ extrinsic to the claim itself. 
Therefore, whenever a claim is prima facie established, and regardless of the condictio to 
which it is attached, if the defendant can show that he is no longer enriched and has lost 
                                                 
349 D. P. Visser ‘Unjustified in Comparative Perspective’ in M. Reimann & R. Zimmermann (ed.) The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (2006) 970, 992 (Chapter 30); D. P. Visser ‘Unjustified 
Enrichment’ in J. M. Smits (ed.) Elgar Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law (2006) 779. 
350  (1984) 4 392 (C) 400F-G. 
351 See also FirstRand Bank Ltd v ABSA Bank Ltd (2001) 1 All SA 92 W at 101E-F. In the light of 
Bowman, De Wet and Du Plessis NNO v Fidelity Bank Ltd (1997) 2 SA 35 (A) the reasonable or 
unreasonable mistake issue may have become irrelevant, but for our purpose the assertion is still a useful 
illustration that shows that the defences to a condictio sine causa are not necessarily the same as those to 
the condictio indebiti or other condictiones. Indeed, the full passage in Govender case clearly so states. It 
reads: ‘The condictio sine causa is brought where plaintiff’s money is in defendant’s hand without cause, 
there need be no erroneous belief that the money was owing to the defendant, as is the case under the 
condictio indebiti. It is necessary for a condictio indebiti to show reasonable mistake of the plaintiff, but a 
condictio sine causa lies whether the money is in the hands of the defendant without cause, whether due to 
mistake of the plaintiff or not. It is therefore a defence to the condictio indebiti that the mistake was not 
reasonable but negligent, but it would not seem to be a defence to the condictio sine causa since no error 
need to be proved, whether reasonable or unreasonable’. 
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the enrichment in good faith and in reliance on the receipt of the benefit, save some 
qualifications, he (the defendant) will be exonerated in full or in part from the liability to 
restore the benefit so received to the extent he is no longer enriched. As a mater of 
principle the defendant is obliged to return the enrichment that was received at the 
plaintiff’s expense, but once losses of enrichment have been discounted in favour of the 
defendant, the claim can rightly be said to be for value surviving. Hence we read in 
LAWSA352 (§§ 207-244) in the context of the condictio indebiti (§ 211) that ‘where the 
defendant has lost or disposed of the thing, his liability is likewise restricted to the 
amount by which he is still enriched at the time of the action, subject to the exceptions set 
out in paragraph § 213 above’, i.e, the defendant must not be at fault at all353 and if the 
defendant is in mora, the rule mora debitoris perpetuat obligationem applies, that is to 
say, from that moment the ‘defendant’s liability is reduced or extinguished only if he is 
able to prove that the event which diminished or extinguished his enrichment would also 
have operated against the plaintiff if performance had been made’.354 The same is held to 
apply mutatis mutandi to all other condictiones, subject to the same caveats as those 
provided for in the condictio indebiti. So at § 211 in LAWSA it is clearly said that ‘as the 
condictio causa data causa non secuta is an enrichment action, non-enrichment is a good 
defence’, subject to the same qualifications referred to above (§ 217). The same applies 
also for the condictio sine causa at § 219. In the limited circumstances in which the 
                                                 
352 Law of South Africa: Enrichment Vol.9 2nd Edition (2005) by J.G. Lotz (Revised by F. D. J. Brand). 
353 The full text of the qualifications reads as follows: ‘(i) From the moment that the defendant becomes 
aware that he has been enriched sine causa at the expense of another, his liability is reduced or extinguished 
only if he is able to prove that the diminution or loss of his enrichment was not due to his fault; (ii) If the 
defendant should have allowed for the possibility that the benefit received might later prove to constitute an 
unjustified enrichment, his liability is again reduced or extinguished only if he can prove that the 
diminution or loss of the enrichment was not due to his fault; (iii) from the moment the defendant is in 
mora the rule mora debitoris perpetuat obligationem applies. From that moment his liability is reduced or 
extinguished only if he is able to prove that the event which diminished or extinguished his enrichment 
would also have operated against the plaintiff if performance had been made’. 
354  See similar wordings to this caveat in the Quebec Civil Code art 1050 which reads: ‘ (i) If the thing 
unduly received be a thing certain, he who has received it is bound to restore its value, if through his fault 
and bad faith it has perished or deteriorated, or can no longer be delivered in kind’; (ii) if he has received 
the thing in bad faith, or after being put in default retain it in bad faith, he is answerable for its loss by a 
fortuitous event, unless the thing would have equally perished or deteriorated in the possession of the 
owner’ (emphasis added). 
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negotiorum gestio action is considered as enrichment action,355 non-enrichment also 
constitutes a good defence (§ 222). 
 
The condictio ob turpen vel injustam causam, which will be dealt with in more detail in a 
separate heading, presents an exception to the general application of the defence of loss 
of enrichment. In the case of this condictio South African law has opted for a flexible 
approach epitomised by Jajbhay v Cassim,356 but there are still some that doubt the 
soundness of the approach adopted in that case.357 For present purposes it is enough to 
say that the defendant may defeat a claim based on such condictio on the ground that he 
is not in pari delicto with the plaintiff. As the law currently stands, in regard to the extent 
of the defendant’s liability, the approach advanced by Voet, Comentarius 12.5.1 is still 
followed,358 i.e, the recipient remains liable for the full value of the thing received even 
where the object has been lost or destroyed because the action falls within the ‘ex 
quodam quasi maleficio descendat’ reasoning, or the modernised reasoning as expressed 
in Minister van Justice v Van Heerden359 case that the recipient remains liable because a 
turpis person is always in mora.    
 
It also seems that the obligation to restore unjustified enrichment in principle 
encompasses the extent to which the defendant was enriched, not only by retention of the 
principal thing, but also of the fruits of that thing, whether those fruits have been 
consumed or not.360 ‘Fruits’ as a concept encompasses both interest on money361 (civil 
                                                 
355 Negotiorum gestio was discussed in details in chapter 1 of this study. The following are however the 
circumstances in which in South African law negotiorum gestio gives rise to an enrichment action: (i) 
where the gestor has administered the affairs of a minor; (ii) where he has mala fide administered the 
affairs of another for his own account and not that of the dominus; (iii) where he has administered the 
affairs of another in the bona fides belief that they were his own; (iv) where he has administered the affairs 
of another against the express consent of the dominus. (see LAWSA § 222-223).  
356  (1939 AD 537). 
357 See LAWSA § 214. 
358 See for example Minister van Justice v Van Heerden 1960 (4) SA 377 (O). 
359  1960 (4) SA 377 (O). 
360  For a detailed historical study on the issue of fruits in Roman law and the ius commune see J. 
Hallebeek, The Concept of Unjust Enrichment in Late Scholasticism (1996) 67-73. 
361  The issue of interest in unjustified enrichment is really a matter of debate. There is no clear cut position 
on the issue yet. Unlike in common law countries where enrichment claims are both seen as encompassing 
rights in personam and rights in rem, South African law, like other civilian law countries does not adhere to 
that proposition. Claims in unjustified enrichment law are in personam only and for that reason the 
foundations of claiming interest, say on money mistakenly paid, may be very shaky. If one asserts that 
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fruits) and natural fruits, in response to a claim for restitution of  benefits and the defence 
of loss of enrichment applies both in respect of the principal thing and the fruits. For 
example, a defendant who has consumed the fruits in good faith may claim that he has 
changed his position by the mere fact of consumption. However, the questions whether, 
and the extent to which, the position of the defendant has been changed by consumption, 
are issues of fact.  
 
The demarcation of enrichment claim itself in this area is still nebulous in South African 
law. The question of who is entitled to fruits is especially relevant in cases of possessors 
and occupiers. This problem brings with it the inevitable interaction of property concepts 
with unjustified enrichment concepts, and ultimately raises the question whether the issue 
of civil fruits (such as interest) is the exclusive preserve of property law or it is amenable 
to be treated within the enrichment doctrine. In this regard, it is always asked whether the 
party that generated the fruits was in the position of a bona fide possessor or that of a 
mala fide possessor; or a bona fide occupier or mala fide occupier; or even whether he 
was an usufructuary whose right is subject to a personal servitude of usufruct or as a 
person with a servitude of use.362 For example, it is accepted that if ‘the possessor or the 
occupier happens to have an enrichment claim against the owner on the basis of 
                                                                                                                                                 
interest is recoverable, say on mistaken payments, this very fact may reveal that the legal system may 
subtly viewing the nature of the claim with some interface with proprietary claim, viz, the claim may be 
treated as though the plaintiff were recovering his own property, a nuanced rei-vindicatio in disguise. 
Alternatively, the plaintiff may be seen as suing for a debt, but this would introduce a contractual nuance to 
the claim. If the claim could be viewed with vindicatory nuances, the analogy would be made to the loss of 
interest the payer would have made by investing the amount mistakenly paid to the recipient. But we know 
that an unjustified enrichment claim is personal in nature, and as such interest is not normally recoverable, 
because if it were otherwise, specially where mistaken payments are at issue, such claim would amount to 
claiming damages; but damages are only maintainable in delictual or contractual actions, or proprietary 
claims as already mentioned. A further hurdle is that a claim for mistakenly paid money, for example, is for 
the return of the precise amount ‘mistakenly’ paid; as there is no question of fault on the part of the 
recipient, unless special circumstances have occurred, there is also no theoretical basis why interest should 
be allowed on such a sum.  See however a different line of development in American law expressed in 
some cases such as Ball v County of Los Angeles (1978) 82 Cal. App. 3d 313; McDonald Corp v RL Moore 
(1965) 237 Fed. Supp 874 (S.C.A.) and Alexander Hamilton Life Insurance Co. of America v Lewis (1977) 
550 SW  2d. (Ky)  all of them suggesting that interest may be payable by the defendant, at the discretion of 
the court, at least as from the time when the defendant had notice of, or could have discovered the extent of 
his obligation. Perhaps in our law if one were to follow this American suggestion it could be developed 
basing it on some extension by analogy to the proposition that from the time the defendant is put in mora 
the rule mora debitoris perpetuat obligationem applies.  
362  D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 664-667. Visser presents a detailed discussion of the issue 
and refers to the conflicting views still prevailing in this area in the South African legal literature.  
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necessary or useful improvements, the value of the fruits acquired (minus production 
costs) is set off against this claim’. In Visser’s view this is a ‘back-door way of 
acknowledging that the possessor or the occupier was enriched by acquiring the fruit’.363 
In effect this also means that the matter is amenable to be treated under unjustified 
enrichment law.  
 
On the one hand, where the party in question is a possessor or an occupier and as such he 
acquires fruits in terms of the rules governing the ius fruendi, then he is considered as 
being in the position of a ‘suum recepit’ and is not enriched by having acquired the 
fruits.364 On the other hand, however, where a person has servitude of use, his position is 
said to be similar to some extent to that of a usufructuary.365 But significant differences 
are acknowledged in so far as the right to take fruits is concerned. In essence, the position 
is that if the holder of a servitude of use takes more than the fruits to which he was 
entitled, the owner will have the same remedies available as when a mala fide possessor 
has taken fruits.366 If however he does not take any excess, the right to take fruits which 
is inherent in his position as usufructuary allows him to cover his daily needs as well as 
those of his household. The main thrust of the issue is then encapsulated in the rules 
governing ius fruendi.  
 
Prescription may also constitute a defence in unjustified enrichment.367 Although it can 
be pleaded in the alternative, it is unlikely to overlap with loss of enrichment.  In any 
event, the institution of Prescription in South African law is regulated by the prescription 
Act of 1969. Any claim or right alleged to have been prescribed is in principle catered for 
by this Act.  Obviously, debts can arise from several sources, but the Prescription Act  
draws no distinction based on the source of the debt. It refers in general to debts and it 
would seem that such general reference encompasses both debts arising in private law as 
well as those arising in administrative-law relationships. Because the effect of 
                                                 
363  D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 674-678. 
364  D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 665. 
365  P. J. Badenhorst, J. M. Pienaar & H. Mostert, Silberberg’s The Law of Property  5th Edition (2006) 341; 
Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas 7.81.4; D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 677. 
366 D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 675. 
367  See D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 752-766. 
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prescription is to extinguish the debt after the period which applies in respect of that 
debt,368 its effect is analogous, to some extent, to the change-of-position defence, though 
the defences are based on different rationales. After the lapse of the period laid down by 
the statute there is no debt that can be enforced in any of the ways in which debts can be 
enforced at law.369  
 
It is to be noted, however, that procedurally prescription has to be raised by the 
defendant, since the court cannot mero motu take notice of prescription. Since on one 
analysis this legal institute falls in the category of payments and other factors 
extinguishing debts (or other rights), the onus of proof in enrichment claims where this 
defence is advanced will also fall on the defendant. 
 
 
Because some of the recognised defences identify the circumstances in which the 
defendant has the right to defeat, or to diminish the measure of, a claim that would 
otherwise succeed, there is therefore a broad relationship between a claim and a defence 
in the South African law of unjustified enrichment. On re-reading the cases, it is also 
obvious that one can distinguish between defences that depend on the change of 
circumstances of the defendant and those that do not, or between those that operate to 
defeat the plaintiff’s claim completely and those that need not. For example in ABSA v De 
Klerk370 the court, dealing with estoppel in a claim to a payment sine causa, held, inter 
alia, that ‘an essential element of the defence (estoppel) is that the plaintiff must have 
made the payment negligently’…as ‘I am unable to find negligence on the part of the 
person of the plaintiff, … it follows that the defence has not been established’. Thereafter 
the judge continues: ‘Another feature of the defence of estoppel is prejudice. The 
defendant must show that in relying upon the representation he has changed his position 
                                                 
368  L. E. Krause ‘The History and Nature of Acquisitive Prescription and of Limitation of Actions in 
Roman-Dutch Law’ (1923)  SALJ  26. 
369  D. J.  Joubert, General Principles of Contract Law (1989) 305-308. 
370  (1999) 1 SA 861 (W) 865F. 
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to his detriment’371. ‘The action of ‘payment to another’ must have affected the 
defendant’s patrimony by way of reducing it’.372  
 
 
2.6.2. The Contours of Loss of Enrichment in South African Law. 
 
Though there is meagre jurisprudence on this defence and its scope still ill-defined, there 
is, however, a leading case, African Diamond Exporters v Barclays Bank, addressing 
some of the fundamental issues and from which one can glean what the remaining 
questions are and possibly what direction future developments should take.  
 
To start with, the facts of the case were as follows: A South African Company (African 
Diamond Exporters) engaged in a diamond business deal with a California firm (Antwerp 
Distributing Co) in October 1972. In the execution of their transaction African Diamond 
agreed to dispatch a consignment of diamonds and in exchange received a sum in excess 
of $188 000 instead of a sum of just $18 000 as agreed between the parties. The 
overpayment was due to a mistake made in the London office of Barclays Bank while 
transmitting a payment from Wales Fargo Bank of Los Angles to a Johannesburg Branch 
of Barclays Bank. The transfer was initiated by the California firm Antwerp Distributing 
in payment of the said consignment of diamonds to be received from African Diamond 
Exporters. Obviously the South African Company noticed the overpayment and made 
enquiry to establish where the mistake was made, whether it was in London or in 
California. Kuetgens, a crooked man heading the Antwerp Distributing branch in 
California, fraudulently informed African Diamond that the mistake was made in 
California instead of London, and that the Antwerp account had been debited by Wales 
Fargo Bank in Los Angeles. Then, the extra sum was accordingly in good faith returned 
to California and the diamond dispatched. Out of the $188 000 the sum of $55 000 was 
used for a further consignment of Diamonds. Kuetgens, having received both the 
diamonds and $100 000 absconded. Few days later it was discovered that the mistake had 
                                                 
371  Ibid.  865G. 
372  Ibid.  865J. 
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been made in London instead. Therefore the Barclays Branch in London was out of 
pocket. It sought recovery of the overpayment from African Diamond Exporters through 
a conditio indebiti, but African Diamond raised the defence of loss of enrichment and 
succeeded in thwarting plaintiff’s claim.  
 
In arguing the case, the plaintiff challenged the view that ‘in the claim under condictio 
indebiti, the defence of non-enrichment is applicable where the defendant has received 
fungibles (money being regarded as fungible),373 as the defendant had contended. To this 
argument, the court (per Muller JA) unequivocally countered that 
 
‘[T]he better and more authoritative view is that, generally speaking, a defence of non-enrichment 
can be pleaded where money, and other fungibles, have been received indebite’.374  
 
And thereafter the court reiterated: ‘Is the recipiens who is a defendant to a claim under 
the condictio indebiti entitled to plead non-enrichment which is attributable to some fault 
or neglect in his part?’ Answering its own question, it concluded that 
 
‘A person who receives money or goods, well knowing that what he receives is indebite, cannot deal 
with such goods quasi rem suam and will be liable in damages for any loss or deterioration caused 
by his negligence. However, in view of the particular circumstances of the instant case, I do not 
think it is necessary to come to a final decision on this aspect of the law. For present purposes I shall 
assume, without deciding, that that is the correct statement of the law’.375
 
Before coming to such a conclusion however, the court made it clear that there is a 
fundamental difference between, on the one hand, the legal position of ‘a recipiens who 
has resold the property mala fide and with the knowledge of the theft [in the original 
acquisition of the property] and, on the other hand, the recipiens who his bona fide in the 
acquisition and resale of the property, i.e., has no knowledge of the theft.’376 In contrast, 
                                                 
373  This discussion appears in an earlier case King v Cohen, Benjamin & Co 1953 (4) SA 641 (W) at 650-
651 and also discussed by professor Scholtens in an article entitled ‘Condictio Indebiti and Unjust 
Enrichment’  in (1954) 71 SALJ at 108ff.  
374  African Diamond Exporters (Pty) Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd 1978 (3) SA 699 (A) at 709C. 
375  Ibid. 711H-712A. 
376 Ibid. 711F-G. The court here was distinguishing the positions stated in two previous cases namely 
Morobane v Bateman 1918 AD 460 at 465-466 and John Bell & Co Ltd v Esselen 1954 (1) SA 147 (A) at 
153.  
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where ‘the acquisition and the re-sale had been bona fide, then there would be no liability 
to make good the value’. That is so, ‘because the good faith of the purchaser would 
protect him against any claim ex delicto, and there would be no contractual relationship 
and no consideration of natural equity’.377
 
The case raises not only problems of the acceptability of loss of enrichment as a defence 
in the legal system, but also to what extent the defence is to be made available where 
fungibles are at issue, and the interaction of good faith and knowledge in parting with the 
enrichment received. Equally important is the issue of establishing who bears the onus of 
proof when things acquired indebiti are sold or given away bona fide. Similar to all other 
jurisdiction thus far discussed, the case confirms that in South African law loss of 
enrichment is not available to those who receive goods or money and part therewith in 
bad faith.378 The case deals with the loss of enrichment received itself as the facts show, 
but it does not deal directly with other kinds of losses such as the causally related 
expenditures or any other losses,379 nor does it say anything about anticipatory reliance 
expenditures. The role of negligence in disposing of the enrichment is also not clarified, 
because the case refers to it in an obiter dictum only.380 I deal with most of these issues 
below.  
 
In fact, the African Diamond Exporters case leaves the loss-of-enrichment defence wide 
open. Apart from the ordinary circumstances in which it is explicitly acknowledged to be 
available, the defence should equally be made available where a defendant receives an 
asset from the plaintiff or receives money which the defendant uses to purchase an asset, 
and the value of that asset falls. The defence should apply in these circumstances to the 
extent that the value has fallen. This facet of the defence would ordinarily be catered for 
                                                 
377 African Diamond Exporters (Pty) Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd 1978 (3) SA 699 (A) at 711A; 
The same position also appears in Van der Westhuizen v McDonald & Mondel 1907 TS 933; and an older 
authority is Voet Ad Pandectas 6.1.10. 
378 African Diamond Exporters(Pty) Ltd  v Barclays Bank International Ltd 1978 (3) SA 699 (A).   
379 For some aspects of possible future developments in this regard see D. P. Visser (2008) 736-740. Visser 
addresses briefly, among others, the issue of ‘costs of retaining the enrichment received’, the ‘unsolicited 
gifts’ problem, the role of negligence, the concept of contributory negligence, etc. 
380 On the role of negligence in this area see the historical position in American law discussed earlier in this 
chapter at item 2.5.1. 
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under the ‘disaster version’ as discussed in this thesis. This version of the defence ties in 
with the thinking in the South African legal system regarding an obligation that has 
become impossible of fulfillment due to a supervening impossibility for which the 
defendant is not to blame.381 The traditional South African common law authorities382 are 
unanimous that where there is an absolute or objective impossibility of performance the 
rule, save exceptions, is that the duty of the debtor to perform either specifically or by 
means of a surrogate is extinguished.383  
 
Additional manifestations of the defence can also be gleaned from the language used in 
Morobane v Bateman,384 a case that compares the legal position between, on the one 
hand, the recipiens who has resold the property mala fide and with knowledge of the theft 
and, on the other hand, the recipiens who is bona fide in the acquisition and resale of the 
property, i.e. has no knowledge of the theft.385 While the defence cannot be made 
available in the former situation, undoubtedly it is made available in the latter situation. 
 
Where a ‘recipient knows that what he received is indebite but parts therewith without 
any mala fides on his part but in circumstances which shows that some fault or neglect in 
his part’, it is not very clear whether the defendant can indeed plead the defence of loss of 
enrichment. All that can be inferred from the South African jurisprudence is that there is 
a strong presumption the defence might be applicable as hinted obiter in the African 
Diamond case. What are the implications of accepting the defence in such circumstances? 
And if it is not acknowledged, what effect will such an approach have on the legal system 
as a whole?  
 
One possible implication endorsing the defence in such circumstances is that a slack 
application of the defence might open the gates of judicial discretionarism, thereby 
sacrificing the predictability of the remedy of unjustified enrichment. However, it must 
                                                 
381  Obviously in this context if the claim arises in contract …. 
382  Authorities relevant in this regard would for example be D. 44.7.1.4, De Groot, Inleidinge 3.47.1 and 
Voet, Commenatrius ad Pandectas  45.1.24. 
383  D. J. Joubert, General Principles of the Law of Contracts (1987) 293.  
384  This case is referred to favourably in African diamond case, though it was distinguished for different 
reasons. 
385  Morobane v Bateman 1918 AD 460 at 460-466. 
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be remembered that loss of enrichment is a ‘positive defence’ in term of which events 
occurring ‘after the transfer’ but which causally lead to the erasure of the enrichment, 
may cancel out or reduce the liability to restore such an enrichment. Therefore, where an 
initial liability is established, but the elements of the defence are nevertheless equally 
sufficiently established, predictability of a remedy need not be accorded so high a 
priority.  That is so because what the law usually requires is a considerable certainty of 
the initial liability, in the same way that it is more vital that we know and distinguish 
what is right from what is wrong, than that we be able to predict with absolute precision  
the monetary consequences of crossing the line. A counter argument to this assertions is 
that it ignores the fact that any litigant is generally concerned not with liability per se, but 
with its effects. Put differently, litigants usually go to court to get a remedy not 
necessarily to establish liability. As McInnes put it, ‘in areas of strict liability, private law 
is not a morality play about good or evil; the remedy is the thing’.386 We must equally 
remind ourselves that in unjustified enrichment claims fault is irrelevant because the 
defendant can be held responsible even if he was entirely innocent, and the plaintiff can 
equally demand relief even if he was wholly responsible for his own error.   
 
In the same way that in  unjustified enrichment doctrine it is reasonable to hold that 
where the ground of liability is established, the remedy that should follow should be the 
most appropriate one on the facts, rather than a slavish adherence to formalism and to 
historical categorizations, it is equally reasonable to assume that where the defendant has 
established all the elements of the defence of loss of enrichment in a situation where he 
parted with the enrichment without any mala fides on his part, but in circumstances 
which shows some fault or neglect in his part’, he (the defendant) should equally succeed 
on such a defence. His fault or neglect where he acted bona fide should not bar him to 
raise the defence successfully.  
 
 
Terminologically, the African Diamond Exporters case seems to facilitate the 
maintenance of a problematic nomenclature. It refers to the defence of loss of enrichment 
                                                 
386  M.  McInnes  (2002) Univ. Toronto L J 163, 200. 
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as ‘non-enrichment’. This nomenclature is problematic because there may be some 
confusion between the use of the term ‘non-enrichment’ and ‘loss of enrichment’, which 
is also encountered in other South African legal literature and apparently also in Scottish 
law. Obviously, in many circumstances where the defence is successfully applied, the 
situations will coincide and the end result on analysis may lead to the same thing because 
where the enrichment was lost, there is non-enrichment left, and hence the expression 
‘non-enrichment is a defence’ as African Diamond Exporters  and others cases as well as 
LAWSA put it. But one must be careful in using these terms interchangeably, because it 
would appear to me that ‘non-enrichment’ connotes a negative defence, and ‘loss of 
enrichment’ connotes a positive or affirmative defence. That is so because when one 
asserts that there is ‘non-enrichment’, the assertion goes to the root of the elements of the 
claim itself. In this sense there is an opaque interface between a defence strictu sensu and 
factors that cohere to the claim but in respect of which, in special circumstances at least, 
the onus of proof lies upon the defendant.387 This is based on the fact that in order to 
substantiate his claim the plaintiff must establish, inter alia, that the defendant was 
enriched. For him to do this he must prove that it was the defendant who received the 
benefit in question. Once this has been proven, it creates the presumption of enrichment. 
And from this moment, the onus of overcoming this presumption falls upon the defendant 
who in his turn may prove, for example, that he did so on behalf of someone else.388 
Consequently, at one level of the analysis one may reasonably refer to this as a defence of 
non-enrichment but in reality it concerns facts that are part of the constitution of the 
claim itself,389 and not extrinsic to it. 
 
In any event, African Diamond Exporters acknowledges that where ‘the plaintiff bases 
his claim for relief on an equitable doctrine the court will be careful so that in the desire 
to do justice to the plaintiff, an injustice is not done to the defendant.’390 That being the 
case, in my view, the decision implicitly acknowledges that a general defence will look 
beyond the mere loss of the actual enrichment received to encompass all situations that 
                                                 
387  R. Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment (2003) 325. 
388 Le Riche v Hamman 1946 AD 648. 
389  R. Evans-Jones, (supra) 325. 
390 African Diamond Exporters (Pty) Ltd  v Barclays Bank International Ltd 1978 (3) SA 699 (A) 713E-F;  
Trahair v Webb & Co 1924 WLD 227 at 235. 
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might be detrimental to the defendant if he were required to restore all and any 
enrichment to the plaintiff without consideration of what is happening in his own assets. 
It is in this wider sense we should understand the judge when he emphasised that ‘for the 
reasons afore stated it is my opinion that the defendant is not precluded from pleading 
that, because of what happened, it was in fact not enriched by the over payment received 
by it’.391  
 
2.6.3. Loss of Enrichment versus Change of Position. 
 
Despite my proposition above that there is a judicial indication that the South African 
loss of enrichment defence seems wide enough to encompass situations beyond the actual 
loss of that which was received, it is nonetheless true that the defence has been so far 
referred to exclusively as ‘loss-of-enrichment’ or ‘non-enrichment’.392 That being the 
case, its characteristics might still differ slightly from a full fledged ‘change of 
position’.393  Loss of enrichment can succinctly be describe as follows: ‘if at the time of 
the litis contestatio (the date of the commencement of the action) the defendant’s 
enrichment has been extinguished, he is not obliged to restore anything to the plaintiff; if 
a portion of the enrichment has fallen away, only the remaining enrichment need be 
restored’.394  Change of position, in contrast, is generally described as encompassing not 
only the loss of the object or benefit received, but also any encumbrances deriving from 
the changed circumstances. In other words, the concept is related not only to the element 
enrichment but also to the notion of justice which underlies the law itself.395 Thus § 
                                                 
391  African Diamond Exporters (Pty) Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd (1978) 3 SA 699 (A) at 713F. 
392  The nuances of ‘loss of enrichment’ and ‘non-enrichment’ were already discussed above. 
393  Contrast however this discussion with Paul Key’s understanding of the differences ((1995) 58 Modern 
Law Review 505, 507-508). Key refers to three different conceptualisations of change of position, namely 
(a) a change of position that could be equated with the English ‘equitable estoppel’, (which he himself 
discounts as inadequate); (b) a change of position that is based on ‘detrimental reliance’, and (c) a change 
of position that is based upon “losing” the enrichment’. In Key’s view the first two are narrower than the 
later. Therefore, a defence based on ‘losing the enrichment’ is wider than the one base upon ‘detrimental 
reliance’. I am not persuaded with his description, because the view can only be true if the word ‘loss’ is 
stretched, as he indeed does, by describing ‘losing’ enrichment as any detriment the defendant would suffer 
by being required to make restitution (see particularly p 507).  
394  See R. Zimmerman & D. P. Visser, Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa  (1996) 526.  
395  P. Key (1995) 58 Modern Law Review 505.  
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142(1) of the American Restatement of Restitution396 puts it this way: ‘the right of a 
person to restitution from another because of a benefit received is terminated or 
diminished if, after receipt of the benefit, circumstances have so changed that it would be 
inequitable to require the other to make full restitution’.397 Under this approach the 
defence is not limited to situations where the benefit (usually money) is spent and there is 
nothing to show for it. For example, a defendant may rely on change of position defence 
if it can be demonstrated that he has forgone an income-generating opportunity,398 or 
where there is a surrender of a guarantee or a collateral security,399 say, for a debt, or 
where he suffers a loss of rights and remedies against others who could have been 
required to make payment, so that he cannot be placed in status quo.400 In short, when the 
defence of loss of enrichment is conceived in its wider sense, it encompasses both the 
‘reliance version’ and the ‘disaster version’ as this thesis has so far argued. This is the 
ideal scope of the defence.  
Let us now consider in detail loss of enrichment defence and the relationship between it 
and other relevant defences.  
 
 
2.6.4. Estoppel and Change-of-Position (Loss of Enrichment) in South African Law. 
 
Like in English law discussed earlier, estoppel differs from the defence of loss of 
enrichment in several respects. It is one of the defences that renders support to the 
proposition that defences may be of a general ambit in a dual sense, one in a wider 
context and the other in a more restrictive one, i.e, they may be ‘general’ in that they 
apply to claims that derive their cause in private law as a whole inclusive of unjustified 
enrichment or they may be general in the more restrictive sense that they apply to all 
                                                 
396 Restatement of Restitution  (1937) § 142(1). 
397 Ibid. §142(1). 
398  See for example Scottish Equitable Plc v Derby (2001) 3 All ER 818, 827. 
399  Comparative illustrative examples of this aspect would be PaineWebber inc v Levy 293 NJ Super 325, 
680 A. 2d 798 (1995); Monroe Financial Corp v DiSilverio 529 NE 2d 379 (Ind. Ct App. 1st Dist 1988).  
400 See for example the American cases cited above, item 2.5.1 footnote 305-306 and accompanying text. If 
one were to use Peter Birks’ nomenclature it could be said that the defence ‘will relate to the enrichment 
condition where the detriment suffered by the defendant consists of a subtraction from his wealth; but is 
there is no subtraction from the defendant’s wealth, then the defence is related to an unjust retention 
condiction.  
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claims of unjustified enrichment.401 Guided by this premise, it can be said that the first 
aspect that distinguishes loss of enrichment from estoppel is that, unlike loss of 
enrichment, estoppel is not peculiar to enrichment claims, but is a defence to any claim in 
the private law in general.402 The second aspect is that estoppel requires proof of 
representations on the part of the plaintiff that will found a complete defence which 
negatives the plaintiff’s assertion of his right, whether it be on contract, delict, property 
or unjustified enrichment, but a representation is not a requirement for loss of 
enrichment. Thirdly, in estoppel the defendant must show that in relying upon the 
representation he has changed his position to his detriment’403 or prejudice, but for loss of 
enrichment such detrimental change-of-position can be established independent of any 
such representation, but based exclusively on the good faith requirement. Estoppel, 
however, is not a procedural rule in South African law, but it is a substantive rule404; 
therefore it does not necessarily defeat the plaintiff’s claim in limine. The defence of loss 
of enrichment, by contrast, pertains to the extent to which the defendant has ceased to be 
enriched by the receipt of the benefit due to the intervention of events subsequent to the 
receipt.405 As stated above, loss of enrichment is an ‘affirmative (or positive) defence’, 
for the defendant claims that, notwithstanding a justifiable cause of action or claim, 
subsequent events often acting on the part of the defendant himself such as expenditure or 
consumption, or events beyond the defendant’s control, have rendered it ‘inequitable’ for 
him to have to restore what he received either in part or in full because to this extent, he 
has ceased to be enriched.406 The operation of estoppel is also subject to some 
                                                 
401  R. Evans-Jones R, Unjustified Enrichment  (2003) 326. 
402  For example Glofinco v ABSA Bank Ltd (t/a) (United Bank) (2001) 2 SA 10448 (W) dealing with the 
defence of estoppel in Agency situation ; Road Accident Fund v Mothupi [2000] 3 All SA 181 (SCA) 
where litigant is estopped from raising new point on appeal; Worldwide Vehicle Supplies Ltd v Auto 
Elegance (Pty) Ltd 1998 (2) SA 1075 (W) estoppel applied in a vindicatory action; Oakland Nominees 
(Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 441 (A) estoppel applied in the context 
of  contract of sale; ABSA Bank v De Klerk (1998) 4 All SA 674 (W) estoppel considered in an enrichment 
claim. 
403 ABSA v De Klerk 1999 (1) SA 861 (W) 865G-J. 
404  The doctrine of estoppel by representation is based on considerations of fairness and justice, and is 
aimed at preventing prejudice and injustice. It is a rule of substantive law, and its function is to provide a 
defence to a claim, or to counter a defence to a claim ( see LAWSA Vol 9, §§449ff First Reissue (1996)) 
405 African Diamond Exporters (Pty) Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd 1978 (3) SA 699 (A); Le Riche 
v Hamman 1946 AD 648. 
406 While it may not be apparent on the face of it that current South African law recognises the defence of 
change of position beyond the actual loss of the enrichment received, there is clear judicial guidance in the 
South African common law that the system does recognise change of position beyond that limit.  Thus, 
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limitations. The most obvious one is that estoppel in any of the fields of private law in 
which it may be available, will not be allowed to operate in circumstances where it would 
have a result which is not permitted by law. A defence of estoppel will therefore not be 
upheld if its effect would be to render enforceable what the law, whether by statute or 
otherwise, has in the public interest declared to be illegal or invalid.407 Although it is 
controversial and the cases that support this view have been vehemently criticised, some 
leeway appears to be allowed where minors are involved.408
 
In addition to what has so far been said, the formal availability of the defence of loss of 
enrichment to a defendant in a claim for unjustified enrichment requires such a defendant 
to show at least that he had a reasonable ground for believing that the benefit he received 
was his to keep and having had that reasonable belief, he acted upon it so as to alter his 
position in such a manner as to make restitution unjust.409 Reasonableness, however, 
connotes the idea of ‘equity’ which does not squar ly quadrate with the rigor of a legal 
rule, but evokes a general and fluid legal principle. Of course even ‘reasonableness’ itself 
has some opaque nuances that are susceptible to attack. In its determination, questions 
often arise as to what amounts to ‘reasonable grounds’ for believing that the benefit 
received is the defendant’s to keep. So, too, it might be noted whether ‘good faith’ (which 
is at the basis of ‘reasonableness’) may not be sufficient to permit the operation of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
when one reads in Trahair v Webb 1922 WLD 227 at 235 and again sanctioned in African Diamond 
Exporters Ldt v Barclays Bank 1978 (3) SA 699 at 713 that  where ‘the plaintiff bases his claim for relief 
on an equitable doctrine the court will be careful so that in the desire to do justice to the plaintiff, an 
injustice is not done to the defendant,406 this assertion is clear and wide enough to allows one to firmly state 
that the situations that go beyond the loss of the actual enrichment received if they are causally connected 
to the enrichment factor, are covered in this conception of enrichment law. The defence, therefore, is wide 
enough to encompass both causally related expenditures and any other situations entitling the defendant to 
be protected.  
407  See for example Fuls v Leslie Chrome (Pty) Ltd 1962 (4) SA 784 (W) 787 where the lack of formalities 
required by law to render an agreement valid, for example by the requirement of writing or notarial 
execution, could not be remedied by estoppel, since the recognition of the defence of estoppel in such cases 
would be to give effect to what the legislature has in the public interest declared to be invalid. See also 
Barkhuizen v Jackson 1957 (3) SA (T) 59C-D, where similar conclusion as in Fuls case were reached, 
when the court expressed the view that where a contention based on the exceptio doli was advanced in a 
case similar to Fuls facts, the equitable defence (of estoppel) cannot prevail in cases which fall within the 
rule that contracts required by law to be in writing or notarially executed cannot be varied save by writing 
or a notarial instrument. 
408  See for example Louw v MJ & H Trust (Pty) Ltd 1975 (4) SA 268 (T).  
409 See notes 359 and 377 above referring to Trahair v Webb 1922 WLD 227 at 235 as well as African 
Diamond Exporters Ldt v Barclays Bank 1978 (3) SA 699 at 713E and accompanying comments. 
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defence in defendant’s favour if he were negligent as to his belief in the entitlement to the 
benefit. The consideration of this issue may raise questions as to how the benefit came 
about to the defendant, i.e., whether by a ‘deliberate’ conferral by the plaintiff or 
otherwise. The theme of fault that this consideration may raise in relation to the defence 
will be dealt with in a separate chapter later in this study. It is sufficient to mention here 
that, generally, where one is dealing with a deliberately conferred enrichment, the law has 
no interest whether the behaviour that gave rise to the claim was negligent. Where, for 
example, the defendant demanded payment of a sum that was not due, there will probably 
be less reason for him to be allowed to raise loss of enrichment as a defence than if he did 
not. However, both as regards the question whether the defence of loss of enrichment 
should be allowed and for how much, it is difficult to see why the defendant’s negligence 
should normally be a relevant consideration.  
 
 
 
2.6.5. Concluding Remarks.  
 
As in the previous jurisdictions, the defence of loss of enrichment is South African law is 
also intertwined with the other defences in enrichment law. But it is a general defence 
applying across the board of the various condictiones and analogous legal institutions 
producing enrichment liabilities. Though it is a general defence it does not override all 
other defences, which are still applicable in particular contexts. It is a positive 
(affirmative) defence which is advanced on elements extrinsic to the claim; wrongdoers 
are not allowed to plead it, and fault is generally not a requirement; depending on the 
facts it may exonerate the defendant from liability either in toto or in part, but its scope 
and application in some areas remain nebulous. Although it may be unstated, it also 
appears to have some equitable features, and the notions of justice, balance, rational and 
reasonableness as denoted, inter alia, by the requirement of bona fides and the need of a 
causal connection between the enrichment and the event leading to its demise, permeate 
the whole field. For policy considerations its application may be limited in some areas 
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and there is scope that the manner in which the enrichment came about may influence the 
ambit of its application. 
 
 
2.7. Overview and Conclusion. 
 
In the analysis of the defences above it clearly transpired that whenever a general 
principle of enrichment is recognised in a legal system, there arises a need to state clearly 
the limits of such wide liability. It was stated that some jurisdictions do so by enacting a 
strong change-of-position defence, other by insisting, inter alia, on a mirror image 
between enrichment of the defendant and impoverishment410 of the plaintiff, or a 
combination of all these mechanisms, and yet others by circumscribing the application of 
enrichment law either through an unqualified doctrine of subsidiarity or an outright denial 
of the claim based on the ‘supposed liability’ test and perhaps some still on the ‘mistake 
of law’ rule.  
 
Those who opt doing so via change of position as a general defence, face the task of 
defining the ambit of such a defence, its scope and that of the other defences and the 
inter-relationship between the general defence and the other particularised ones. It is 
however evident that whenever a change-of-position defence is recognised, its ambit and 
scope are not always clear. On the one side, it is a general defence to all restitutionary 
claims; on the other it does not cater for all the situations arising from unjustified 
enrichment. The need for the other traditional defences for specific situations and fact 
patterns is seen as necessary in all the jurisdictions we have discussed above. There may 
be overlaps, but objectively the law of unjustified enrichment requires more than the 
defence of change of position. It is however important to note that if one accepts that the 
defence of change of position operates to ensure that a defendant is never left in a worse 
position than if he had never received the enrichment at all, then, the ‘but for’ sense of 
causation must be adopted. Any loss which the defendant would never have suffered but 
for the enrichment, will support a plea of change of position.  
                                                 
410  See here for example the impoverishment requirement in South African law at C.J. Pretorius (1995) 58 
THRHR 736 and the concomitant symmetry of enrichment at 737. 
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Deeper analysis permits us to remark that if due to the recognition of a general 
enrichment liability emphasis is placed on the defences, the law becomes amenable to 
striking a balance between competing interests: on the one hand, it helps the courts to 
avoid there being excessive restitution, and on the other it ensures that security of receipts 
is sufficiently protected. The expansion of change of position as a general defence to all 
enrichment claims also ensures that there are no arbitrary restrictions placed on liability. 
This is exactly what all other defences discussed above cannot do. All other defences 
protect, in one way or the other, a specific interest such as res judicata (which protects 
the general interest of justice in ensuring that litigation is brought to an end); payment 
over or agency (which ensures that agents are not exposed to unforeseen liability in the 
exercise of their duty and while acting within the scope of their mandate, save where they 
have acted for their own benefit, or have not genuinely paid over, or where they have 
acted in bad faith, i.e, they have paid over, but did so with due notice of the plaintiff’s 
claim). In the same vein estoppel (which specifically protects defendants from disgorging 
benefits they now hold as of right because of a situation encompassing a clear 
representation either through a statement, an act, conduct or omission that genuinely 
allowed them to regard themselves as secure in their receipt and the right of entitlement 
thereof, and in reliance of such situation they changed position to their prejudice).  
 
Meanwhile, the concrete relationship of change of position defence to other defences in 
unjustified enrichment depends ultimately on the underlying principles that a particular 
jurisdiction adopts for the doctrine of enrichment as a whole. For, if a certain jurisdiction 
bases its unjustified enrichment doctrine more on legal values than on non-legal values411  
                                                 
411  By legal values it is meant all values that relate to, and involve considerations of a legal policy which is 
to be effectuated by the law of unjustified enrichment. Non-legal values denote all values that are 
concerned with such social or other policies that, in turn, give birth to legal ideas and principles.  For 
example, in some contexts, the courts are anxious to differentiate the notion of ‘public policy’ from that of 
‘policy’. Public policy is a matter of law: it determines what the law says and does, how the law approaches 
certain issues, such as for, example, the validity of contract, whether damages for pure economic loss 
should be recovered when these have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, etc. In this respect the 
courts utilise legal concepts such as  ‘legality’, ‘foreseeability’, ‘remoteness’, in coming to a conclusion as 
to the underlying policy to be served by adopting one attitude or another to the problem raised by the 
litigation. Policy on the other hand, is not directly or immediately concerned with the issue of law; rather it 
involves more complex matters of economics, morals, and the social or political purposes of the law, even 
CHAPTER II - Change of Position Defence Within Other Enrichment Law Defences          
        
             © Jorge Aimite  Cape-Town 15/08/2009    [This is   Page 109 ]
Change of Position Defence
  (Unjustified Enrichment)
109
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 ©
 J
or
ge
 A
m
ite
 ©
as its jurisprudential explanation of the field as a whole, the ambit of the change-of-
position defence will indeed differ, from the one that bases it mostly on non-legal values. 
 
Where legal values are the jurisprudential basis of the law of enrichment, the main 
concern of the law is to limit the scope of the doctrine of unjustified enrichment only to 
those forms or instances of recovery which have thus far been recognised by the legal 
system. Any novel case should be interpreted or dealt with only in accordance with 
previous authority. If a case can be fitted within some existing type of recovery, then a 
claim may be granted. If it cannot, then the law should not be distorted, in the name of 
development, in order to provide what a court may well think of as a ‘deserving’ plaintiff 
with a remedy.412 It is however doubtful whether such an approach is ever fully adopted 
by any legal system, although some do come very close to fully embracing it. Where, 
however, non-legal values are the jurisprudential foundations of the doctrine of 
unjustified enrichment in a legal system, the emphasis may be placed on the general aims 
and nature of the law of unjustified enrichment, and not the legal and technical basis for 
the law. In such an approach, there might be at least three basic explanations for the 
existence of enrichment law. The first is founded on the notion of ‘efficiency’, i.e. 
enrichment law fulfils an economic function; the second is that enrichment law enshrines 
and promotes certain perceived social values; and the third is that the foundations of 
enrichment law is to be found on the idea of morality, which may be expressed variously 
as the law acting ex aequo et bono or in terms of the ‘equitable’  nature of the law, using 
such an expression in its sense of according to ‘natural law’ rather than in the more 
technical ‘equity’ form of the English law.413 Of course in the 21st century saying that a 
certain branch of law may be based on morality, is somewhat contentious, if not properly 
                                                                                                                                                 
the philosophical underpinnings of the law. Ordinarily in reaching a conclusion based upon, or involving, 
‘public policy’, the  courts are dealing in, and with, legal concepts and do not go outside the confines of 
legal doctrine or the precedents (where such are used) to find the appropriate solution. Where matters of 
‘policy’ are concerned, however, it may be open to the courts to seek an answer outside the narrow ambit of 
the law, by reference to history, public morality, economic efficiency, or something else. For details on this 
distinction and implications on the law in general see Fridman ‘The Morality of Common law’ (1979) 28 
Univ. of New Brunswick L J 67, 85-86; King v Philips [1953] 1 QB 429; Anns v Merton London Borough 
Council [1978] AC 728; G. H. Fridman  &  J. C. McLeod, Restitution (1982) 48. 
 
412  Cf. Lord Diplock in Orakpro v Manson Investments Ltd [1977] 3 All ER 1, at 7. 
413  G. H. Fridman & J. C. McLeod,  Restitution  (1982) 52-53. 
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understood, but the reality is that in practice such thing is still found in many 
jurisprudential writings, even of very technically advanced nations. 
 
We have seen from the beginning that unjustified enrichment, especially in common law 
countries, has an equitable connotation, and allusion was made elsewhere that that being 
the case, also equitable defences should attach to hit. This assertion is certainly 
perplexing and not readily acceptable. But that it permeates enrichment law, is hardly 
disputable. Though it continues to be controversial, the fact is that whenever a claimant 
seeks a remedy in unjustified enrichment, what really the plaintiff is seeking is justice, 
and the connotation of ‘justice’ includes within its ambit the idea that one person should 
not be enriched at the expense of another where this is against his will, intent or desire of 
the latter, or comes about because of, or as an accompaniment to the letter’s ignorance.  
Therefore in one way or another, the ultimate reason for, or explanation of the law of 
unjustified enrichment is to achieve certain standard of justice based on principles and 
not fictions. The ultimate standard must of necessity include the idea of justice,414 the 
notions of balance, rationality and reasonableness. Only in this way it is possible to 
explain why courts permit unjustified enrichment recovery in some instances and deny it 
in others.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
414  See for example what is said of the concept in the recent Canadian case Kingstreet Investments v New 
Brunswick Finances (2007) 1 SCC 1 par. 37-38. See also Peel (Regional Municipality v Canada [1992] 3 
SCR 762 at 804. 
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CHAPTER III: 
 
CHANGE OF POSITION IN SYNALLAGMATIC CONTRACTS: 
AN  APPRAISAL OF THE ‘‘PARTY  WHO  HAS  CONTROL  AND  CAN  
INSURE  AGAINST  THE  LOSS’. 
 
 
3.1. Introduction. 
 
 
In this chapter I endeavour to deal with ‘failed agreements’ and explore the applicability 
or otherwise of change of position in such circumstances. The chapter will first and 
briefly analyse on what theoretical foundations are grounded both the unqualified 
adherence to the proposition that ‘whenever there is a bilateral agreement, the creditor 
always bears the risk of loss of the object of exchange unless the debtor was at fault’415  
as well as the alternative theory of apportionment of losses 416 which is at times applied in 
similar circumstances. 417 The alternative theory is now and then applied in English 
law.418 The chapter also considers other related positions suggested in common-law 
jurisdictions, but it does so in passim only. The emphasis is on the former two 
approaches. The discussion scrutinises not only the grounds upon which both contentions 
above are based, but also it discusses them critically and in comparative perspective 
examining the feasibility and desirability or otherwise of each approach for current South 
African law. The discussion will centre on the compatibility of each approach with the 
adoption of a general enrichment principle. 
   
It must, however, be noted from the outset that several cases falling within this category 
are often borderline cases, and much of this ‘discussion’ may traditionally not be 
                                                 
415  This is the position adhered to currently in South Africa Law. For detail on this position see D. P. 
Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 475-500.  
416  For other pitfalls and related concerns raised by a loss sharing approach apart from those mentioned by Visser see 
also A. Syke (1990) 19 Journal of Legal Studies 43 at 47-49;  M. White (1988) 17 Journal of Legal Studies 353; G. G. 
Triantis (1992) 42 Univ. Toronto L J 450;  R. A. Hillman (1987) Duke LJ 1; L. E. Trackman (1985) 69 Minnesota LR 
471. 
417 In this recent book Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 475-500, Visser articulates these two contentions in 
detail and deals with the pros and cons of each approach. 
418 See for example E.  McKendrick, ‘Frustration, Restitution and Loss Apportionment’ in A. Burrows (ed) 
Essays in the Law of Restitution (1991) 147 at 151. 
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regarded as part of the law of enrichment, or at least when the position is advanced that 
they are, some theorists resist the extension of enrichment liability to such situations.   
 
Given the fact that the desirability or otherwise of the defence of loss of enrichment being applied 
in such circumstances entails that the cause of action must first be characterised as arising in 
unjustified enrichment rather than in ‘contract’, this chapter will start by examining succinctly the 
applicable remedies in a range of circumstances of ‘failed agreements’ in the jurisdictions under 
consideration and some incidental issues arising thereto. The rationale of this discussion is that 
only when the remedy is characterised as arising from unjustified enrichment, can the defence of 
change of position become a relevant issue. 
 
Considering however the vastness of the issues of failed agreements, the chapter will only 
deal in some detail with two kinds of ineffectiveness: failure due breach and rescission as 
well as discharge due to impossibility of performance (frustration of purpose). Even then, 
the focus will mostly be on the risk allocation in cases of ‘loss’ or ‘impossibility’ of 
performance, with the objective of  highlighting why it is significant to identify the 
person who has control and can insure against the loss.  
 
 
3.2. General Observations.  
 
It is unquestionable that the majority of legal systems recognise that ‘ineffective 
contracts’ understood in a very broad sense give rise to unjust or unjustified enrichment 
claims. A contract can be ineffective because it is void, or illegal, or it has been 
rescinded, or  aborted in the form of discharge de futuro by frustration, or aborted, for 
instance, for failure to register it where that is a pre-requisite for its validity or where its 
object was unfulfilled, or where the condition upon which it was dependent never 
occurred, or simply it is ineffective for having been breached. While there is almost 
unanimity in many legal systems under discussion that in all cases mentioned above the 
remedy of unjustified enrichment will be entertained, it is not so in respect of the last 
example, where the ineffectiveness of the contract is the result of a breach and to certain 
extent also on the issue of ‘rescission’. So, for example, the ‘orthodox view’ in South 
CHAPTER III - Change of Position in Synallagmatic Contracts          
        
             © Jorge Aimite  Cape-Town 15/08/2009    [This is   Page 113 ]
Change of Position Defence
  (Unjustified Enrichment)
113
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 ©
 J
or
ge
 A
m
ite
 ©
African law is that in all circumstances the remedy for breach of contract is contractual,  
that is to say, a claim for damages, and ‘never’ (or almost never) an unjustified 
enrichment one. The same is also true of England419 and Brazil, but not so of the United 
States of America. In England, apparently the orthodox view admits two slight exceptions 
to the rule, to which I will refer in due course. The orthodox view however, is 
increasingly being questioned both in England and South Africa and its orthodoxy in 
some contexts may be founded on fragile grounds. Ordinarily where the same facts give 
rise to claims both in contract and delict (tort or ‘civil responsibility’ for Brazilians), 
Anglo-American law, with a few exceptions, has admitted concurrent liability.420 No 
convincing argument has been adduced in support of the idea that the simultaneous 
commission of two ‘wrongs’ means that one must be excused.421 Civilian systems do not 
generally have much difficulty either in this regard. Breach of contract, however, is 
different. In Anglo-American law, though breach of contract in its origins was conceived 
as a wrong, it has not shared the characteristics of other wrongs422 nor does it generally 
attract moral censure, nor are most contractual breaches generally treated as contrary to 
public policy. For these and other reasons, the ordinary measure for breach of contract in 
Anglo-American law is damages (compensatory damages). However, the interaction 
between damages as the measure of recovery in cases of ‘losing-contracts’ or other 
circumstances,423 and the notion of ‘discharge’ for breach or ‘cancellation’424 has created 
                                                 
419 See however the qualification referred to at 3.4.2 below about English and the difficulties it encounters 
in practice. 
420 More detail on this issue appears in my separate treatment of the subsidiarity concept of unjustified 
enrichment in common law and civil-law which is to be published in due course in Columbia Law Review 
(New York) - Spring 2010.  For the time being the manuscript is obtainable from the author.  
421 For a succinct discussion of the interrelations of obligations in Anglo-American law see S. Waddams, Dimensions of 
Private Law: Categories and Concepts in Anglo-American Legal Reasoning (2003) chapter 8 (pp 142-171).  See also 
D. P. Visser 1992 Acta Juridica 230;  D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008), particularly chapter 2;  J. Beatson, 
‘The Temptation of Elegance’ in W. Swadling & G. Jones (Ed) The Search For Principles: Essays in Honour of Lord 
Goff of Chievrley (1999) 143-170. 
422  Non-contractual wrongs usually have, among others, the following consequences: profits obtained from them must 
be given up; benefits obtained by a threat of a wrong must be restored; persuading another to commit a wrong will 
itself be a wrong; non-contractual wrongs, are usually contrary to public policy, and often they attract moral 
disapprobation, and in certain cases they may be deterred by penal sanctions. But Anglo-American law has not attached 
most of these to breaches of contract. 
423  See P. B. H. Birks (1990) JCL 232 for details and related issues. S. Waddams, Dimensions of Private Law (2003) 
pp. 161-162; D. Stevens &  J. Neyers (1999) 37 Alberta LR 173; K. Barker (1995) Oxford JLS  456. 
424 Where some legal systems such as the United States of America appear to use interchangeably 
‘rescission’ and ‘cancellation’ in the context of voidable contract, South Africa uses specifically 
‘cancellation’.  
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some difficulties, sometimes blurring the line between contractual and enrichment 
remedies,425 or, as it is sometimes put, between primary and secondary obligations.  
 
Once again, although in some cases under Anglo-American law, particularly under the 
doctrine of frustration, discussed in detail below, a contract may be discharged 
automatically on the occurrence of an event, discharge of an effective contract for breach 
or repudiation is rarely automatic. Accordingly, where the contract is alleged to be 
ineffective by reason of ‘discharge’, the general rule is that in order to claim restitution an 
election to discharge the contract must be proved.426  
 
Though it is generally admitted in both civilian and common law systems that an 
effective contract cannot found an unjustified enrichment claim, it is also now widely 
acknowledged that to deny absolutely the availability of enrichment claims in the absence 
of termination of contracts ‘may neglect a small but theoretically important category of 
cases’.427 That is the case because, although the general rationale that an enrichment 
claim operating before the contract is declared ‘null and void’ or it is ‘discharged’  
subverts  the contract, this position would seem valid only to the extent to which a 
contract allocates the risk inconsistently with any duty to make restitution.428 Hence, one 
of the dominant models is now to say that, except in the case of speculative contracts, it 
should not be assumed, without more, that all risks have been distributed to one side or 
the other. That being the case, there might always be a gap in the contractual allocation of 
risk, which in turn might make room for adjustment either by applying the principle of 
unjustified enrichment or some other principle’.429 Therefore, for some theorists, it 
should, in principle, be possible to bring an enrichment claim where it would not 
                                                 
425  G. E. Palmer, The Law of Restitution (1978) 378-421. 
426  See discussion on American law below on the issue of election in this regard. See also R. Goff & G. Jones, The Law 
of Restitution (6th Edition), (2002) chapter 20, particularly §§ 20-001 to § 20-023; §20-035 to §20-046). 
427 See generally J. Beatson (2000) 1 Theoretical Inquiries in Law at 86; (D. P. Visser, 1992 Acta Juridica 203. 
Unjustified Enrichment (2008) ch. 2; G. Mead (1991) 11 Legal Studies 172; K. Mason & J. Carter, Restitution in 
Australia (1995) 918 observe that ‘the fundamental point is that, as a general rule, restitutionary issues arise in respect 
of ineffective rather than effective contracts. Only rarely will the law of restitution operate in the context of an effective 
contract’. Amongst such rare occasions is where for example ‘termination of a contract is impossible’, the contract has 
been frustrated. 
428  J. Beatson, (2000) Theoretical Inquiries in Law at 94. 
429  J. Beatson, (2000) Theoretical Inquiries in Law at 94. See the section on American law below where I highlight the 
possibility of these gaps and the fault-line between the contract and unjustified enrichment doctrines.  
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reallocate risks or reassign value as an alternative to an action for breach of contract even 
before discharge.430
Let us now see how specifically these considerations are applied in the various 
jurisdiction under consideration. 
 
 
 
3.3. Ineffectiveness of Contracts in Canadian Law. 
3.3.1. Introductory Remark. 
 
Like in other aspects of the law, the treatment of ineffective contracts in Canadian law is 
influenced by from both the English and American law, but its courts’ ‘creativity’ often 
distinguishes it from the other two jurisdictions more noticeably than it is often imagined. 
A closer look at case law and academic writings reveals that the system has subtly 
departed from its sibling systems in some aspects of ineffective contracts due to breach or 
frustration of purpose (impossibility of performance), while remaining ‘faithful’ to the 
English approach in others. The discussion that follows highlights some pertinent points 
and approaches followed by the Canadian jurisprudence in that regard. 
 
3.3.2. Ineffectiveness of Contracts due to Breach.  
 
In Canadian law, the situation of ‘restitution’ on breach of contract in so far as the 
measure of recovery is concerned is ambivalent. First, it varies depending on whether the 
claim is for services rendered pursuant to a contract which is subsequently discharged by 
breach, or whether it concerns other contractual situations, or whether it is part of a 
matrimonial431 issue. Some writers such as Maddaugh & McCamus432 defend the 
approach that the calculation of the ‘restitutionary relief in cases of breached contracts 
should be made by reference to the market value, because a contractually based limitation 
                                                 
430  J. Beatson (2000) Theoretical Inquiries in Law at 94-95. 
431  For claims in matrimonial issues, see generally Petkus v Bekker and similar cases referred to in chapter three above. 
For criticism of the principle in such area see among others Hubar v Jobling (2000) 195  D.L.R. (4th) 123 (B.C.C.A.) at 
135 per Southin J.   
432  P. Maddaugh & J. McCamus, The Law of Restitution, 1st ed (1990) 427-428. P. Maddaugh & J. McCamus have 
now a second edition of their work, but it was not available to me at the time of writing. 
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(i) may not reflect a number of benefits, financial and otherwise, that may flow from the 
ability to complete performance’, and (ii) may deprive the innocent party of ‘an 
opportunity to reduce the anticipated losses to be sustained by full performance through a 
possible range of cost reduction techniques’. This approach is not, however, supported by 
many other writers.433 Generally, in cases of contracts for services, there are two different 
approaches to breach, depending on whether the defendant breached a warranty or a 
condition. If the defendant merely breached a warranty, that is to say, the defendant’s 
breach of contract does not substantially deprive the plaintiff of what he expected to 
receive, then, the solution is that neither party is excused from further performance. In 
contrast, if it is a breach of a condition, that is to say, the defendant’s breach does deprive 
the plaintiff of what she/he expected to receive, then, the innocent party has generally a 
choice which is as follows: (i) he may affirm the contract and insist upon completion of 
the agreement as initially contemplated. If he does so, he must then fulfil his end of the 
bargain. However, he is also entitled, under an action in breach of contract, to claim 
compensatory relief with respect to losses arising from the defendant’s wrong. (ii) 
Alternatively, he may discharge the contract and thereby release both parties from the 
need to perform any primary obligations that remain outstanding. If he exercises this later 
option, he again may have a choice: (i) he can bring an action in breach of contract and 
claim compensatory relief with respect to losses arising from the defendant’s wrong; or 
(ii) alternatively, he may be able to bring an action in unjust enrichment and claim 
restitutionary relief with respect to benefits that he conferred upon the defendant.434
 
Despite what was said above, it must however be observed that, even if the claimant has 
discharged the contract on the basis of the defendant’s breach of condition, the plaintiff 
cannot escape  the consequences of a bad bargain by means of contractual relief. He is 
generally entitled to choose between expectation damages and reliance damages. Each 
option is compensatory in so far as it aims to repair a loss. The former pertains to benefits 
that the plaintiff expected to receive under the contract, whereas the latter pertains to 
                                                 
433   M. McInnes (2002) 52 Univ. Toronto LJ 163 at 214 footnote 181. 
434  See generally S. Waddams, The Law of Contract, 4th Ed. (Toronto, 1999)., at ch. 16; M. McInnes (2002) 52 Univ. 
Toronto LJ 163 at 210-211;  M. McInnes  (1995) 23 Australian Business LR  218;  A. Skelton, Restitution and Contract 
(1998). 
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losses that the plaintiff incurred as a result of relying upon the agreement. In either event, 
however, relief is refused to the extent that the claimant entered into a losing contract.435   
 
The ambivalence in the Canadian law can be illustrated with two cases, one relatively old 
and the other somewhat more recent, that reached diametrically different results, and each 
of which continues to influence the courts to varying degrees. The first is Bowlay 
Logging Ltd v Domtar Ltd436 and the second Lindsay v Sutton.437 In the first case, the 
plaintiff agreed to ‘cut, skid and load’ 10 000 cubits of firewood at $15 per cubit (100 
cubit feet of solid wood). After the plaintiff performed part of the contract, the defendant 
committed a serious breach438 by failing to provide trucks. The plaintiff then discharged 
the agreement and claimed compensation on the basis of the defendant’s wrong. The 
court allowed the action but limited liability to $250 in nominal damages. That decision 
is thought to have been correct as matter of contract law. The plaintiff had entered into a 
disastrous bargain. Although it was to have been paid a total of $150 000 upon 
completion of the project, it had already incurred expenses of $233 000, against actual 
payment of $108 000, when the agreement was discharged. Therefore, as a matter of 
contract law, expectation damages were unavailable for the simple reason that, from the 
plaintiff’s perspective, the contract was wholly unprofitable. Reliance damages were also 
refused on similar grounds. That is so, because, although the plaintiff incurred substantial 
expenses under the contract, its losses were attributable not to the defendant’s breach but, 
rather, to its own improvident bargain and inefficient practices. Curiously, in this case the 
defendant’s breach that led to the discharge actually saved the plaintiff from suffering 
even greater losses. As said in the American discussion below on the characterization of a 
losing contract,439 here we have a typical situation of the wrong party breaching the 
contract.    
 
How is this case illustrative of the situation?  The case is illustrative because it brings to 
the fore what is really recoverable upon a breach of contract that appears to be a losing 
                                                 
435  (2002) 52 Univ. Toronto L J 211-212. 
436  (1982) 135 DLR (3d) 179 (B.C.C.A.) 
437  [1947] O.W.N. 951 (H.C.J.). 
438  On the issue of serious breach see American discussion below as well as South African discussion below.  
439 On what constitutes a ‘losing contract’ see the American section above at 3.5.2. 
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one. The case clearly suggests that the consequences of a bad bargain cannot be avoided 
by means of a contractual relief, but seemingly they can be avoided by mean of 
enrichment relief. Several commentators on this case suggested that counsel apparently 
was not aware of the fact and might have ‘doomed’ the plaintiff to probably lose $100 
000 for such oversight440 as a result of their being less familiar with enrichment law than 
with contract law. That is the case because several Canadian authorities, in line with 
Lindsay v Sutton441 that is briefly discussed below, also recognise that ‘once a contract is 
discharged for breach, the innocent party generally enjoys the ability to recover the 
market value of the benefit it conferred upon the defendant without regard to the terms of 
the contract’.442  
 
In Lindsay v Sutton,443 the plaintiff constructed part of a house before the defendant 
breached the agreement by failing to make periodic payments. Although the defendant 
owed $1 300 only under he contract, the claimant was awarded $2 650 for the actual 
value of the work performed. The court came to this conclusion despite evidence 
indicating that it was ‘unlikely that the plaintiff would have made any profit on this job 
and indeed might have suffered a loss’.444 From this observation, some Canadian 
scholars445 conclude that, if the plaintiff in Bowlay Logging had pursued an action in 
unjust enrichment, it would presumably have been entitled to recover the market value of 
he services that it conferred upon the defendant. Although it had been paid $108 000, its 
expenses amounted to $230 000. While part of that cost was attributable to inefficient 
practices, the objective value of the plaintiff’s services clearly exceeded the price the 
defendant had paid. For that reason, McInnes, for example, suggests that, as a matter of 
                                                 
440  M.  McInnes (2002) 52 Univ. Toronto LJ  212. 
441  Lindsay v Sutton [1947] O.W.N. 951 (H.C.J.). 
442  See generally Marrison-Knudsen Co. v British Columbia (Hydro & Power Authority (No. 2)) (1978) 85 
DLR (3d) 186 at 234 (B.C.C.A.); Stevens v Colonial Homes Ltd (1961) 27 DLR (2d) 698 (Ont. CA); Kemp 
v Williams (1978) 87 DLR (3d) 544 (Sask. CA); O’Brien v Buffalo Narrow Airways Ltd (1998) 171 Sask R. 
217 (QB). 
443  [1947] O.W.N. 951 (H.C.J.). 
444 Lindsay v Sutton [1947] OWN 951 (HCJ) at 954. 
445  M.  McInnes, (2002) 52 Univ. Toronto LJ 212. 
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precedent, a restitutionary relief could have been awarded with respect to the 
difference.446  
 
For other cases of breach of contract generally not involving services, but money, the 
issue is generally approached on the basis of the notion of ‘incontrovertible benefit’.447 
Usually the plaintiff would be able to satisfy the requirement of ‘enrichment’ at his 
expense by proving that the defendant acquired an ‘incontrovertible benefit’. That is the 
case because money is the very means by which the law recognises value, and no 
reasonable person can refuse to accept responsibility for its receipt. As a result, an 
innocent party who provided a monetary benefit uncontrovertibly can escape the 
consequence of a bad bargain by means of a claim in unjust enrichment. An 
incontrovertible benefit can also arise if the plaintiff provided goods or services which 
either allowed the defendant to realise a financial gain or saved him from incurring a 
necessary expense.448 In any event, despite the probable characterization of the claim in 
unjust enrichment, there seem to be no indication that change-of-position is applied to 
such circumstances.  
 
 
                                                 
446  Contrast this case – Lindsay Logging – with the apparently unsettling American case  Boomer v Muir 
referred to in the American section below, a case in which the plaintiff recovered $ 257 000 under a claim 
in unjust enrichment, even though it was contractually entitled only for $ 20 000 for work it performed for 
partial completion of the dam.  For further insight in partial performance cases, see H. Matter  (1982) 92 
Yale LJ 14, who discusses such cases and the underlying philosophy behind the whole law in this area and 
in private law in general.   
447 The essence of the ‘principle’ of incontrovertible benefit was identified by McLachlin J in Regional 
Municipality of Peel v Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada (1993) 98 DLR 140, 159 (McLachlin) in 
the following terms: ‘An unquestionable benefit, a benefit which is demonstrably apparent and not subject 
to debate and conjecture. Where the benefit I not clear and manifest it would be wrong to make the 
defendant pay, since he or she might well have preferred to decline the benefit if given the choice’. From 
this proposition it is evident that the incontrovertible benefit principle defeats the subjective devaluation 
principle because it identified those circumstances in which it can be presumed that the defendant would 
not have declined the benefit even if  he had been given a choice to do so. In other words, the defendant 
will be incontrovertibly benefited where the only possible conclusion is that he has received a valuable 
benefit. Hence, the simplest example of an incontrovertible benefit is the receipt of money, because no 
reasonable person would ever regard the receipt of money as anything other than money. (See generally BP 
Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v Hunt [1979] 1 WLR 783, 799 (per Robert Goff); G. Virgo, The Principles of 
the Restitution (1999) 72-73; M. McInnes (2002) 52 Univ. Toronto LJ 163, 165; Sherwood  and Co v 
Municipal Financial Corp. (2001) 197 (4th) DLR 477 (Ont. CA). 
448 M. McInnes (2002) 52 Univ. Toronto LJ 163, 216. 
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3.3.3. Ineffectiveness due to Impossibility of Performance in Canadian Law. 
 
 
Virtually all instances that would fall under the heading of frustration of contract under 
English law are also recognised with similar effects under Canadian law. A contract may 
be discharged on the grounds of frustration when something occurs after the formation of 
the contract which renders it physically or ‘commercially’ impossible to fulfil the 
contract or which transform the obligation to perform into a radically different obligation 
from that undertaken at the moment of entry into the contract. But due to the complexities 
of the issues arising from frustrated contracts and the potential for inconsistency, the 
Uniform Conference of Canada adopted, in 1974, the Frustrated Contract Act 1974,449 
which tried to harmonise some inconsistencies arising from the common-law. This Act 
has now been adopted by the various Canadian Provinces almost with little alterations.450 
The Act speaks of apportionment of losses in the occurrence of certain circumstances of 
unforeseen events, but it heavily qualifies this possibility.451 It also provides for the 
allocation of risks through insurance mechanisms in preparation for performance.452 The 
Act does not apply to contracts of insurance, nor to charterparty or a contract for the 
carriage of goods by sea, except a time charterparty or a charterparty by demise.453  
 
                                                 
449  Full text available online at Frustrated Contracts Act 1974. 
http://www.canlii.org/pe/laws/sta/f-16/20070410/whole.html (last retrieved 09/09/2008). 
450 For a list of the various Canadian Provincial Acts on the matter see the online versions at 
http://www.chlc.ca/en/us/index.cfm?sec=1&sub=1f4 (last retrieved 10/09/2008). 
451 Section 5(3) of the Act provides for apportionment in the following terms: ‘Where the circumstances 
giving rise to the frustration or avoidance cause a total or partial loss in value of a benefit to a party 
required to make restitution under subsection (1), that loss shall be apportioned equally between the party 
required to make restitution and the party to whom such restitution is required to be made’. But this section 
is subject to the provisions of section 2 which make it clear that the Act only applies to a contract that 
‘upon its construction, it contains no provision for the consequences of frustration or avoidance’.  In other 
words, the Act does not apply where the parties have expressly allocated the risks themselves.  
452  Section 6(2) provides that  ‘[t]he fact that the party performing such an obligation has in respect of 
previous similar contracts between the parties effected insurance against the kind of event that cause the 
loss in value is evidence of a course of dealing under subsection (1). And section 6(3) ‘the fact that persons 
in the same trade, business, or profession as the party performing such obligations generally effect 
insurance against the kind of events that caused the loss in value, or entering into similar contracts, is 
evidence of a custom or common understanding under subsection (1)’. 
453  Frustrated Contract Act of 1974, s. 1(2)(a)-(c). The various Provincial Acts also recognise such 
exceptions almost verbatim in their respective sections 1(2) as well.   
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3.4. Ineffectiveness of Contracts in English Law. 
3.4.1. Introductory Remarks. 
 
Unlike civil-law systems that emphasise specific performance as the primary remedy in 
cases of ‘non-fulfilment’ of a voluntarily assumed obligation, English law generally 
adheres to the model that compensatory damages (save exceptions) represent an adequate 
remedy for protecting the aggrieved party’s interest. This approach has significant 
implications for how this system conceives and addresses the consequences of failed 
agreements due to breach as well as due to frustration (impossibility of performance).  
 
3.4.2. Ineffectiveness of Contracts due to Breach in English Law.  
 
There is still some degree of uncertainty as to what extent it can be said that breach of 
contract gives rise to an enrichment claim in English law. For that reason there is also no 
all-encompassing answer that change of position is ipso facto made available or 
disallowed just because a claim arises from an ‘ineffective’ synallagmatic agreement.454
 
The detailed distinction referred to above under Canadian law between claims for the 
recovery of money, services rendered and goods delivered, also applies in English law.455 
If a fundamental breach456 of contract occurs, the innocent party has an election either to 
affirm the contract or bring it to an end. In the latter event, if he has paid money to the 
defendant under the contract, he can, as an alternative to claiming damages, sue for the 
                                                 
454 R. Goff and G. Jones, The Law of Restitution, 6th ed. (2002) § 19-001 put it this way: ‘benefits may be conferred 
under transactions which are or have become ineffective. As the law now stands, there is a regrettable asymmetry 
between money claims and claims for services rendered and goods delivered. The receipt of money is an enrichment, 
but receipt of services or goods delivered may not enrich the defendant. See also at § 1-056 (on brief history of the 
approach on services rendered) §§ 1-017 to 1- 018 (for money) and §§ 1-027 t0 1-030 (for goods). The 2007 edition of 
Goff & Jones does not essentially alter these positions. 
455  See heading 3.3.2 above. 
456 Fundamental breach is sometimes referred to as ‘material breach’. (Note however the position in South African law 
which does not subscribe to the idea of ‘fundamental’ or ‘material’  breach before discharging the contract. The notion 
of rescission as hitherto understood in South African law does not entail the repudiation or the material breach which 
puts an end to the contract but rather the aggrieved party’s decision to rescind must, as a general rule, be communicated 
to the party in default (Swart v Vosloo 1965 (1) SA 100 (A) at 105, 112-113)). 
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recovery of the money provided that the consideration for the payment has wholly 
failed.457 As the law currently stands, the plaintiff cannot recover money paid if the 
failure of consideration is partial. In such a case, his only action is then on the contract.458 
A party to a contract who brings it to an end on the ground of the other party’s breach can 
recover money paid under that contract only if he can show that there has been a total 
failure of consideration. If he receives any part of the benefit under the contract which he 
can restore he has no remedy in ‘restitution’ (unjust enrichment). A breach of contract 
may be so fundamental that ‘it deprives the party who has further undertakings still to 
perform of substantially the whole benefit which it was the intention of the parties as 
expressed in the contract that he should obtain as the consideration for performing those 
undertakings’.459  Despite the above, English law is not without problems in this respect. 
The difficulties besetting English law, and to some extent other common law 
jurisdictions, were succinctly summarised by James Carter in the following terms: 
 
Common law writers complain that the current approach to restitution in the context of 
discharged contracts is unsatisfactory. Three main reasons are advanced for such 
unsatisfactory state of the law: the first reason is in relation to money claims, for which it is 
thought that the requirement of total failure of consideration is unduly restrictive; the 
second reason is in relation to claims for the reasonable remuneration brought against a 
party whose breach or repudiation led to the discharge of the contract, the rationalization of 
such claims in term of a right to elect between remedies in contract and restitution has led 
to successful claims notwithstanding that the requirements of unjust enrichment do not 
appear to be satisfied; the third is the difficulty of finding a general basis for restitution in 
relation to claims for reasonable remuneration brought by the party  whose breach or 
repudiation led to the discharge of the contract, or in relation to the benefit conferred under 
a contract discharged without breach by either party.460
 
It is however worth noting that, since these problems are of ancient origin, some of the 
difficulties did not escape legislature, which has explored ways of attenuating some of 
them by dealing with a large body of ineffective contracts within the doctrine of 
                                                 
457  R. Goff and G. Jones, The Law of Restitution, 6th ed. (2002) § 20-007 to § 20-018 (pp. 502-510). 
458  Ibid, § 20-018 (p. 510). 
459  Ibid, § 20-007 (p.502). 
460  J.W. Carter (1997) JCL 130. 
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‘frustration’ that was enacted into law by the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 
1943 or other special rules. Thus, in the examination of the English approach to 
ineffective contracts, one must first look at what the Act may say of a particular instance, 
before advancing to consider the position at ‘common law’ (jurisprudence in the 
Brazilian parlance), in general. In essence however, if the contract fails due to breach, the 
defence of change of position is ordinarily not made available to the parties, as it would 
indeed subvert the regime of risk allocation agreed upon by the parties.461 That is the case 
even in those instances that are deemed not to potentially subvert the contract. 
 
What is then the general approach to frustration of contracts under English law and what 
effects does frustration bring to the contractual duties? I pass now to consider some of 
these effects. 
 
3.4.3. Effects of Frustration in English Law: The Doctrine of Impossibility. 
 
Like in American law, the English law of frustration due to ‘infeasibility of performance’ 
can also be looked upon in three subsets:  infeasibility due to ‘frustration of the purpose’ 
of the contract, frustration due to ‘impracticability’ and frustration due to an ‘absolute’ 
impossibility (or physical impossibility).462 Frustration463 of purpose, when successfully 
pleaded, discharges both parties from such of their contractual obligations duties as 
remain unperformed at the time of discharge. The doctrine of frustration of purpose 
however, has the danger of undermining the principle of sanctity of the contract, and for 
                                                 
461  T. Krebs ‘Change of Position and Disenrichment in England and German’ in E.J.H. Schrage (ed) Unjust 
Enrichment and the Law of Contract (2001) 311. 
462  For detailed description of these subsets see the American subsection below. 
463  For the various meanings and uses of the word ‘frustration’ in English law see Lord Devlin [1966] C.L.J. 192, 206; 
G. H. Treitel, Frustration and Force Majeure (1994) §§ 2-044 to § 2-050. Treitel refers at least to four meanings: a 
‘frustration of contract’, ‘frustration of the adventure’, ‘frustration of purpose’ and ‘frustrating breach’ (§ 2-045) and he 
critically discusses them in details in the subsequent paragraphs (§ 2-046  to § 2-050). He also refers to five theories of 
frustration under English law, viz, ‘implied term theory’, ‘construction theory’, ‘just solution theory’, ‘foundation of 
the contract theory’ and ‘failure of consideration theory’. Failure of consideration theory has been expressly rejected by 
the House of Lords ((1981) AC 675, at 687 and 702)), and all other theories, according to the author, ultimately 
dissolve in the ‘construction theory’, which is the predominant model currently applied under English law. The theory 
is succinctly expressed by the maxim ‘Non haec in foedera veni’ i.e.; ‘it was not this that I contracted to do’ sanctioned 
by the House of Lords in (1956) AC 696, 729 (per Lord Radcliff). 
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this reason it is seldom applied in England.464 The same danger is also present in the 
concept of discharge for impracticability, for each doctrine operates in circumstances 
falling short of impossibility, and, because those circumstances are hard to define, each 
leads to uncertainty and therefore threatens the sanctity of contract.465 The only subset 
that goes unchallenged is frustration due to ‘physical impossibility’, which is sometimes 
termed as ‘absolute impossibility’. Such impossibility is ordinarily a posteriori, i.e.; it is 
made manifest after the contract has been concluded, but usually before a full execution. 
 
It must, however, be observed that discharge by supervening impossibility is not a 
common law rule of general application466 like discharge of contract by supervening 
illegality.467 Whether the contract is terminated or not depends on its terms and the 
surrounding circumstances in each case. Some kinds of impossibility may in certain 
circumstances not discharge the contract at all, while in other cases, impossibility might 
be too stiff a test.468 For these reasons, it is thought that in English law the idea that there 
can be no contract to do the impossible is not ‘recognised’. The rejection dates back to an 
early eighteenth century decision of Holt CJ who asserted that ‘when a man will for 
valuable consideration undertake to do an impossible thing, though it cannot be 
performed, yet he shall answer in damages’.469
 
But this unqualified proposition was later tempered by the now well-known doctrine of 
frustration whose history dates back to Taylor v Caldwell470 (per Blackburn J.) - a case 
that established the doctrine of discharge by supervening events. The doctrine of 
                                                 
464  See reluctance of English courts in applying the doctrine in Amalgamated Investments Property Co v John Walker 
& Sons Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 164. 
465  G.H. Treitel, Frustration and Force-Majeure (1994)  § 7-032 (p.316 -317). 
466 Treitel put this assertion in the following terms: ‘The common-law has never adopted the simple explanation that 
supervening impossibility, on itself, is a ground of discharge, and that explanation would in any event not be adequate 
since the scope of the doctrine extends to cases in which performance is not impossible at all’ ((1994)  § 16-007 (p. 
578). See also a fuller discussion of this aspect in chapter 7 of his book §§ 7-001 to §7-033 (pp. 281-317)).  
467 For detailed discussion on English doctrine of illegality see P. B. H. Birks, (2000) 1 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 
155; N.  Enonchong, (1995) 11 LQR 135. This last author has since produced a full book on the law of illegality under 
English law. 
468 See the famous Coronation cases often quoted for the doctrine of ‘impossibility’ understood as ‘frustration of 
purpose’ rather than impossibility of performance per se (Krell v Henry [1903] 2 KB 740. See also McLeroy and 
Williams (1941) 4 MLR 241 and (1942) 5 MLR 1.  
469 Thornborow v Whitacre [1706] 2 Lt. Rayn 1165; 1165; the same approach was confirmed 100 years later in Bligh v 
Page [1801] 3 B & P. 295 where it was also held that ‘if a man undertakes what he cannot perform, he shall answer for 
it…’. For further details, subsequent cases, and development up to modern times, see G.H. Treitel, Frustration and 
Force-Majeure (1994) ch. 2 especially at  § 2-007 to § `2-009 (pp. 18-22). 
470  [1863] 3 B & S. 826 per Blackburn J. 
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frustration is now known by varying names.471 In Taylor v Caldwell it is stated that the 
‘performance which is excused is only that which has become impossible’. In the earlier 
case that Taylor v Caldwell would later qualify (Paradine v Jane)472 – a case famous for 
stating the doctrine of absolute contract – it was held that ‘where a party has either 
expressly or impliedly undertaken without any qualification to do anything, and does not 
do it, he must make compensation in damages, though the performance was rendered 
impracticable by some cause over which he had no control’. 
 
There are three further aspects of discharge in English law which are illuminating in 
respect of the analysis of the general ineffectiveness of contracts: These are that 
discharge is automatic, that it is total and that it gives rise to problems of adjustment, 
which have been in part to be resolved by legislation. However, the English rules 
governing these effects of frustration are often criticised by the judiciary. Lord Simon in 
National Carriers Ltd v Paralpina (Northern) Ltd473 thought, for example, that the 
English doctrine of frustration could be made more flexible, so as to avoid the ‘all or 
nothing situation, the entire loss falling exclusively on one party, whereas justice might 
require the burden to be shared’. However, GH Treitel thinks that this criticism is too 
severe, as from the very case founding the English doctrine of impossibility – Taylor v 
Caldwell,474 – the doctrine of discharge itself already operates as a mechanism of 
splitting, or ‘sharing’ the loss.475 It did so in the sense that, while the plaintiffs were not 
entitled to damages, the defendants were also not entitled to the promised payments. The 
same was also true of Krell v Henry,476 the outcome of which was that the plaintiffs 
received and retained part of the promised payment while the defendant was released 
from his liability to pay the balance. Some commentators, however, argue that ‘these 
solutions either did not carry the process of ‘sharing of loss’ far enough, or that theirs 
were due to accidents of timing’.477  
                                                 
471  See G. H. Treitel, Frustration and Force-Majeure (1994) § 2-044 to § 2-050. 
472 [1647] Aleyn 26. See equally G.H. Treitel (supra) Ch. 2 for the facts of  this case and other historical 
authorities cited there. 
473 National Carriers Ltd v Paralpina (Northern) Ltd [1981] AC 675, 707. 
474 [1863] 3 B & S 826. 
475  G. H. Treitel, Frustration and Force-Majeure (1994) § 15- 058. 
476 [1903] 2 KB 740. 
477  G.H. Treitel, Frustration and Force-Majeure (1994) § 15- 058. 
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3.4.4. Concluding Remarks. 
 
In sum, by recognizing that in certain circumstances a supervening impossibility 
dissolves the obligation, English law obliquely sanctions a change-of-position defence in 
the ‘disaster version’ as discussed in this thesis. To what extent that sanctioning brings 
symmetry to the law is, however, not very clear, as the system also sanctions in some 
instances a loss-sharing theory. But by adhering to the theory of loss-sharing such 
recognition does not amount to an all or nothing approach as is the case in some 
‘systems’ on similar scenarios. The loss-sharing approach apparently postulates that 
contracting parties are often risk-neutral. For our purpose, the loss-sharing viewpoint, 
though it might be satisfactory in some circumstances, it is an approach prone to taking 
away the incentive to get insurance or to take sufficient precautions. If it is not clear 
when a risk is allocated and when it is not, one cannot be sure what a court will do under 
any particular scenario. That position, thus, suits only the parties who are risk neutral. But 
as will be seen in greater detail later in this chapter, in real life, contracting parties are not 
always risk neutral. Sometimes, and even often, they are risk averse (or adverse). That 
being the case,  someone who is risk averse and who values certainty and predictability 
might prefer a fixed, predictable (albeit, perhaps, inappropriate) allocation of risks to a 
more flexible (but perhaps, more appropriate) allocation of risks that offers only a vague 
idea of what a court will do. Such approaches are especially valuable in situations of long 
term contracts. 478
 
 
 
3.5. Ineffectiveness of Contracts in American Law. 
 
3.5.1. Introductory Remark.  
 
In addition to looking at the ineffectiveness of the contract due to breach and 
impossibility of performance as such, and the proscription or otherwise of the defence of 
                                                 
478 D. G.  Baird (1990) 19 Journal of Legal Studies 583, 591. 
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change of position in such circumstances, this section also considers briefly the issues of 
a losing contract which might be at the heart of accepting or denying an enrichment claim 
within a valid contractual allocation of risk.  
 
3.5.2. Ineffectiveness of Contracts due to Breach in American Law. 
 
Like in any legal system, it is commonplace in American law that when a contract has 
‘failed’ the parties’ relationship may come to an end and the aggrieved will be entitled to 
subsequent redress by a recognised remedy. The nature of the redress will, however, 
depend on how the relationship between the parties failed; the reason for the ‘failure’ and 
at what stage the ‘relationship’ came to an end. The redress may differ depending on 
whether the contract is either at a pre-executory stage, in the process of execution or it 
has already reached the stage of executed exchanges. The risk allocation becomes fixed if 
the agreement has reached the stage of executed exchange; that is to say, as the 
performance of the contract unfolds, the parties become committed not only to the 
benefits of the contract, but also to the risk allocation of their bargain. There is a 
fundamental difference, however, between a situation where the contract is deemed to 
have existed and subsequently ‘fails’ due to ‘breach’, and it is therefore either 
‘rescinded’479 or ‘cancelled’, and a situation whereby the ‘contract ‘fails’ not because it 
has been ‘rescinded’ or ‘cancelled’ due to failure of performance but because it seemed to 
exist but in fact did not exist. Where the contract is deemed to have existed, but it 
subsequently ‘failed’ to achieve its objective due to breach by one of the parties (or both) 
the relationship may come to an end through cancellation480 and the aggrieved will be 
entitled to a redress which may take one of the three forms: expectation damages to 
protect the expectation interest, reliance damages to protect the reliance interest and 
                                                 
479  See below note 458 on this notion of rescission in cases of breach of contract. See also S. Lurie (2003) 19 JCL 250 
on the history of Rescission as remedy for breach of contract. 
480  See generally American Jurisprudence Vol. 17A, 2d (2004) § 554ss (Contracts)  - Rescission for Cause (b) Breach 
or Default in Performance). There are however slight differences between the various American jurisdictions. In some 
jurisdictions (States) rescission of a contract will not be granted solely on the basis of breach, in the absence of fraud, 
mistake or some other independent ground justifying rescission (See for example Hibiscus Associates Ltd v Board of 
Trustees of Policemen and Firemen Retirement Systems of Detroit 50 F. 3d 908 (11th Circ. 1995); however, in other 
jurisdictions, rescission is a recognised remedy upon proof of breach (see example Beckman v Kitchen 555 N.W. 2d 
699 (Iowa) and Ross-Simons of Warwick Inc v Baccarat Inc 217 F.3d 8 (1st Circ. 2000), cases in which it was held that 
‘every enforceable contract involves a bargained-for exchange of obligations, the material breach of which by one party 
gives the other party a right to terminate’.  
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restoration ‘damages’ to protect the restoration interest- also known as restitutionary 
interest.481 The standard, though elliptic, definition of the expectation interest is that it 
puts the injured party in the same position as if the contract had been properly performed. 
Thus, the expectation interest measures and defines a person’s rights and duties in terms 
of the bargain that was struck.482 The expectation and restoration interest pull logically 
and intuitively in opposite directions, one looking forward to the fulfilment of the duties 
created by the contract and the other backward to the status quo ante.  
 
In conventional contract law, the relationship of reliance to expectation is that of a lesser 
included remedy – that is, expectation includes the reliance interest, and adds to it the 
profit or gain a party would have realised from the transaction’.483 It is also significant to 
note that if that profit or gain would have been negative because the contract would have 
been a losing one for the non-breaching party, then the reliance interest is reduced by the 
amount of the loss. From this holding, it has traditionally been accepted, though not 
without controversy, that expectation may exceed reliance, but not vice-versa, and the 
expectation interest is therefore considered as a ceiling on reliance damages.484  
 
Unlike reliance, which focuses on the costs incurred by the non-breaching party, or 
expectation, which is concerned with the gains and losses that full performance of the 
contract would have produced, restitution as a remedy for breach looks to the benefits 
conferred by one party on the other. Here we enter the delicate fault-line between the 
                                                 
481  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347) (1981). It must be noted here that these three interests already 
presuppose a substitutional remedy, that is to say the possibility of ‘specific performance’ – especially 
where the ‘termination of contract is for breach’ - is already discarded. Specific performance in common 
law is not the ‘primary’ remedy as it is in Civilian systems, though the doctrine of good faith in contract is 
bringing both systems closer and closer in this respect.  Specific performance is in effect a method of 
protecting the expectation interest; it is a remedy that raises prudential and policy concerns not present 
when the remedy is substitutional.  
482  Fuller and Purdue, Part 1 (1936) 46 Yale L .J. 52 & Part 2 (1937) 46 Yale L.J. 373. T. D. Rakoff  (1991) 
Wis. L. Rev 204. R. E. Hudec (1982) 67 Cornell L. Rev. 704. For a good starting point on criticisms of  
Fuller and Purdue’s tripartite regime of remedial interest see E. G. Andersen (1994) 53 Maryland LR 1 and 
further literature cited there. 
483  E. G. Andersen (1994) 53 Maryland LR 1, 13. 
484 E. G. Andersen (1994) 53 Maryland LR 1, 13. Sections §§ 37-38 of the New Restatement (Third) of 
Unjustified Enrichment (Tentative Draft # 3) are however reversing this proposition as they advocate the 
contract price as a ceiling; though the language is cast in a facultative expression  ‘may not exceed the price 
of such performance at the contract rate, where the contract price can be determined’ (emphasis added). See 
generally Tentative Draft #3 ‘Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum’ and § 38 itself. See also Introductory 
Note to Chapter 4 (entitled ‘Restitution and Contract’) in the same Tentative Draft # 3. 
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contractual and the enrichment doctrines, which reveal that ‘restitution’s concept of 
benefit is somewhat elusive’.485 On the one hand, it may be understood as requiring an 
increase in the wealth of the receiving party. In that event, one of the primary purposes of 
restitution is to avoid unjustly enriching one person at the expense of another. 
Alternatively, a ‘benefit’ may be understood as the commitment of labour, material, 
money or other resources on behalf or at the request of the receiving party. If so, 
restitution is measured by what it would cost in the market to procure the goods or 
services of the supplying party, whether or not the recipient actually was enriched 
thereby.486 Here the notion of ‘restitution’ pushes us towards a contractual measure.  
 
However, where the contract fails not because of having been breached, but because its 
existence was only apparent, the traditional American view on this point has long been 
that 'if the contract is null and void, the law assumes that there was never a contract’487 
and whatever performances rendered under it are to b  viewed differently from the 
previous situations.488 That is so because if there was ‘never’ any transaction, the fact 
that the ‘apparent’ transaction had been completely performed or not, is totally 
irrelevant’.489 The new Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment,490 
however, departs from that traditional approach and adheres to a novel ‘general principle’ 
according to which ‘a void, unenforceable and even a ‘broken contract’ position is the 
preferred basis for the parties’ rightful positions for the purpose of determining if one has 
                                                 
485 See the different approaches adopted between the Restatement First of Contracts which drew a 
distinction between ‘restitution’ in other contexts and ‘restitution’ as a remedy for breach, (a distinction 
owed to Professor Arthur Corbin as Reporter on the Chapter on Contract Remedies), and that of 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) §§ 344(2), 349, 370 and 372 in which E Allan Farnsworth 
(Reporter of the chapter on Contract Remedies) abandoned this distinction.  While the former Restatement 
described the object of the remedy as a means of restoring the parties to the pre-contractual status quo, in 
the latter Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the object of the remedy was now said to serve the so-called 
‘restitution interest’. According to the new explanation, the object of restitution for breach is not to return 
the parties to the status quo ante (this is the object of what is called ‘reliance interest’); rather it is to 
deprive the defendant of an unjust gain realised at the expense of the plaintiff.  
486  E. G. Andersen (1994) 53 Maryland LR 1, 12. 
487  G. Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution’ (1999) 391. 
488  See generally American Jurisprudence, 66  2d (2002) §§ 15-19 - ‘Restitution and Implied Contract’. 
489  See American Jurisprudence 17A, 2d (2004) § 548ss (Contracts – Rescission for Cause – Invalidity of 
Contract). See also G. Virgo, The Principles of The Law of Restitution’ (1999) 402, commenting on 
American law on the aspect of material breach in relation to English law. 
490 Restatement Third of the Law of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, Tentative Draft 3 §§ 37-38. (Herein 
after this Restatement will be called the ‘Draft Restatement’unless the circumstances require otherwise). 
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been unjustly or unjustifiably enriched at another’s expense’.491 For some commentators 
the approach being followed by the new Restatement represents a major step in 
integrating unjust enrichment and contract, though it is also being already acknowledged 
that on the initial reading of the Draft Restatement, it seems that it is neither very clear 
about what this new principle actually entails, nor is it entirely consistent in working 
through its implications.492 The new approach, in essence, is a refined reflection of the 
view already expressed by the current Reporter – Andrew Kull - in 1994 when he stated 
that ‘the attempt to identify unjustified enrichment in a contractual context dissolves into 
contract interpretation, because we have no standard by which to measure either injustice 
in a contractual exchange apart from the parties agreement, actual or imputed’.493  
 
Despite countless discussions and writings on the issue and various attempts at 
clarification, the relationship between restoration interest and expectation interest still 
remains a heated debate in American law,494 especially in cases of losing contracts. The 
contention raised by such classic and notorious cases such as Boomer v Muir495 is ever 
                                                 
491  See generally M. P. Gergen (2005) RLR 224, 225. In the Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum to the 
Tentative Draft # 3 (Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment), A. Kull (the Reporter), 
observes that the ‘New Draft § 38 proposes that an award of restitutionary damages may not exceed the 
price of such performance at the contract rate, when a contract price can be determined’. This position 
obviously, departs from the language used in the Restatement Second of Contract § 372 and others, and 
reverts to what the First Restatement of Contracts had earlier provided. But the reporter acknowledges that 
‘adopting this position would associate the Institute (ALI) with the minority rule on a notoriously 
controversial point’.   
492  M.P. Gergen (2005) RLR 225. For further criticism of the New Restatement’s approach see C. Saiman, 
‘Reemergence of Restitution: Theory and Practice in The Restatement (Third) of Restitution’ (2006) 
Villanova Law School (Paper available online at http://law.bepress.com/villanovalwps/papers/art60 
(Retrieved.13/8/08)).  
493 A. Kull (1995) 83 California LR 1209 footnote 54.  Kull then contrasts, in the same place, the 
contractual situations to those which arise under tort (delictual – or ‘civil responsibility’ for Brazilians) 
situations holding that ‘by contrast, where the defendant has committed a profitable tort, the reason unjust 
enrichment does not similarly dissolve into tort law is that the parties are in the case strangers: they have 
not fixed by agreement the rules by which each shall account to the other for benefits derived from their 
interaction. Justice between wrongdoer and victim is therefore defined not by contract but by external 
social defendant’s gain (restitution) or plaintiff’s loss (tort)’. 
494  M. P. Gergen (2002) 71 Fordham LR 709’; C. Saiman (2006) ‘Reemergence of Restitution: Theory and 
Practice in The Restatement (Third) of Restitution’ (Paper available online at 
http://law.bepress.com/villanovalwps/papers/art60
 (Retrieved 13/08/2008)). 
495  24P 2d 570 (1933).  For good starting points on this issue the following literature is instructive: 
Childres & Garamella (1969) 64 NW ULR  433; T. C. Galligan, Jr. (1989) 63 Tulane L R  799;  G.M. 
Cohen (1994) 80 Virginia LR 1225;  E.G. Andersen (1994) 53 Maryland LR 1; J.M. Perillo (1973) 73 
Columbia LR 1208); J.M. Perillo (1981) 81 Columbia LR 37;  M.P. Gergen (2002) 71 Fordham LR  709;  
M.P. Gergen (2005) RLR 224.; J. Dawson (1959) 20 Ohio State LJ 175; H. Mather (1982) 92 Yale LJ 14. 
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present.496  In different styles, American law continues to ask itself: ‘What is the position 
where the contract is a losing one, so that performance would have resulted in a net loss 
to the plaintiff, is he entitled to rescind rather than use his remedies aimed at enforcement 
of the contract’? While in such contexts some commentators argue that to allow such 
recovery constitutes an unwarranted disturbance of the risks assumed by the parties,497 
others are of the view that such a recovery is justified on the ground that the defendant 
must bear the consequences of his ‘wrong-doing’.498 Restitution as a remedy for breach is 
sometimes viewed as a component of the reliance interest in that it includes any reliance 
loss to one party that also entails a benefit to the other,499 but in other contexts it is also 
viewed as contained within and limited by the expectation interest.  
 
Because the issue of the relationship between restoration and expectation interests 
notoriously arises more from cases deemed to be losing contracts, attempts have been 
made to clarify what actually a losing contract is. Before describing what a losing 
contract is, and the issues that it raises, an observation must first be made in regard to the 
fundamental nature of restoration interest itself in relation to contractual performance. It 
has already been highlighted above that the essence of restitution is the return by each 
party of the value of the benefit received. For this reason, restitution is thought to be 
about predictability and certainty.500 The inquiry ends if the victim chooses the former 
(expectation interest) and succeeds in making the proof. If the victim claims and proves 
restoration, however, the breaching party has still a possible defence: that restoration 
damages exceed the expectation interest. However, the law as it currently stands, places 
on the defaulting party the burden of establishing that fact with reasonable certainty.501
                                                 
496 For similar cases to Boomer v Muir see for example United States for Use of Sussi Contracting Co v 
Zara Contracting Co 146 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1944). In more recent times Allen v Dunston 958 P.2d (Idaho, 
1998); Klein v Arkona Products Co 73 F.3d 779, 786 (8th Circ. 1996); Corino Livetta Construction Corp v City of New 
York 493 N.E. 2d 905 (NY 1986). See also M.P. Gergen (2002) 71 Fordham LR 710, footnote 6).  
497 Childres & Garamella (1969) 64 NW ULR 433; E. Yorio & S. Thel (1991) 101 Yale LJ 111. In this 
article, the authors amply demonstrate with case law that courts usually protect the expectation, rather than 
the reliance, interest when enforcing promises.   
498  G. E. Palmer, The Law of Restitution (1978) § 4.8;  J.R. Harker 1980 Acta Juridica 61, 84. 
499  E. G. Andersen (1994) 53 Maryland LR 1, 15 note 50.  
500  The requirement of certainty demanded from the victim has been relaxed over time, and in recent years 
the Drafters of the Restatement Second of Contracts recommended further relaxation. See for details 
Farnsworth on Contracts, (2d Ed. 1990) § 12.15 (pp. 921-923); E. G. Andersen (1994) 53 Maryland LR 1, 
56 note 254. 
501  See Restatement Second of Contracts (1981) § 352 comment a. 
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It must also be noted that nothing in the fact of ‘cancellation’ on account of material 
breach, however, requires the victim to have access to restitution rather than expectation 
damages. It is simply an election.502 That being the base, then, strictly speaking, a 
material breach means only that the victim is entitled to bring a contract to an end and 
receive damages according to on an appropriate measure.503 That measure could be 
either expectation or restitution. There is no final indication in the notion of contract 
cancellation itself which suggests that one measure should be preferred over the other.504 
In consequence, it can be concluded with Andersen that the finding that a breach is 
material raises, but does not solve, the question whether restitution in excess of 
expectation should be permitted.505  
 
There is however a considerable terminological confusion as to what exactly 
‘cancellation’ entails. Sometimes ‘cancellation’ is interchangeably used with ‘rescission’ 
and ‘termination’506 of contract. If cancellation is indeed equated to ‘rescission’, a 
considerable ambiguity arises: Where a contract is said to be ‘rescinded’ – which 
ordinarily occurs on ‘mutual agreements’ b tween the parties, the corollary is that the 
contract may be ignored as a source of damages measurement.507 This line of argument 
treats rescission and restitution as a linked pair, which suggests that the invocation of the 
latter as a measure of damages necessarily brings the former into play. This is not the 
place to enter into the terminological debate. There are already excellent treatments of 
this issue elsewhere.508 It is enough to say that though ‘cancellation’ may resemble 
‘rescission’ in some cases, the term ‘avoidance’ has been preferred by many American 
writers to describe what occurs when mistake, lack of capacity, misrepresentation, or 
                                                 
502  For the doctrine of election in this context see J. M. Perillo (1973) 73 Columbia LR 1208; but see some slight 
change of tone in his 1981 Article  (1981) 81 Columbia LR 37. 
503  See E. G. Andersen (1994) 53 Maryland LR 1, 17. 
504  Ibid, 17. 
505  Ibid, 17. 
506 Note however that the American UCC clearly distinguishes ‘cancellation’ or bringing a contract to an end on 
account of breach from ‘termination’, in which no breach occurs (UCC § 2- 106 (3) – (4). 
507  Boomer v Muir put this matter this way: ‘A rescinded contract ceases to exist for all purposes. How can then it be 
looked to for one purpose, the purpose of fixing the amount of recovery? …The contract is annihilated so effectually 
that in contemplation of law it has never had any existence, even for the purpose of being broken’ (24 P. 2d 570 (Cal.  
Ct. App. 1933), 570 at 577).  Contrast however this position with that sustained by Andrew Burrows in English Law  
who thinks that where the contract is discharged  by ‘mutual agreement’, there is no room to speak of applying a 
different  standard than that of contract law. 
508  For South Africa see D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 515-525 and literature cited there. 
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duress infect the contract formation process.509 When a contract comes to an end on 
account of impracticability or frustration of purpose, though that event is sometimes 
loosely described as ‘rescission’, the basic term ‘discharge’ appears to be more accurate 
and has been preferred by many theorists.510  But when one party seeks relief on account 
of the other’s breach, the word ‘rescission,’511 if employed, can be misleading. Therefore, 
to bring a contract to an end on account of breach is more accurately referred to as 
‘cancellation’.512  
 
3.5.3.2. What is a ‘Losing Contract’?   
 
There is no unanimity about what exactly a losing contract entails and even the 
expression ‘losing contract’ itself is ambiguous. There, is however, some convergence as 
to why that one of the main reasons many theorists detest applying enrichment liability to 
contractual relationships, namely is the fact that one of the parties might be tempted to 
terminate a losing contract, and thereby subvert the regime of risk allocation voluntarily 
undertaken under the agreement. In principle, all contract breaches occur because the 
contract is a loser for one side, though not all such contracts are considered ‘losing 
contracts’. George Cohen,513 using illustratively an economics concept of profitability, 
observes that ‘not all ‘losing contracts’ are jointly unprofitable, and not all jointly 
unprofitable contracts are ‘losing contracts’’.514 According to the author, a ‘losing 
contract’ is one in which the breaching party is not the ‘loser’ but the party who appears 
to be advantaged by the contract; that is to say, the (apparently) wrong person breaches’. 
The problem can occur, continues the writer, ‘in contracts that are jointly profitable and 
contracts that are jointly unprofitable, though the restoration remedy is often appropriate 
in both cases’.515 In losing contract cases the court need not decide whether the contract 
                                                 
509  E. A. Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts §§ 9.3 – 9.4. See also the American position in CISG (Convention for 
the International sale of Goods) and the influence it brought to that Convention in the use of the term ‘avoidance’ in 
Art. 7 of the Convention.  See detailed comments in Traveaux Préparatoires collected in P. Schlechtriem, Commentary 
on the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 2nd. Ed (OUP 1998) and 3rd Ed. (OUP 2005). 
510  E. G. Andersen (1994) 53 Maryland LR 1, 21-22. 
511  On the history of ‘rescission’ see generally S. Lurie (2003) 19 JCL 250. 
512  E. G. Andersen (1994) 53 Maryland LR 1, 22. 
513  G. M. Cohen (1994) 80 Virginia LR 1225, 1270. 
514  Ibid. 1270. 
515  Ibid. 1270. 
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is jointly profitable. The joint profitability determination matters when the court must 
choose between expectation and reliance.516  
 
Where contracts sound in money, losing contract cases can ordinarily be grouped into 
two classes, according to Cohen, depending on whether the paying party or the 
performing party breaches. Seen from the compensation perspective the issue that arises 
in these cases is whether the ‘losing’ non-breacher can recover more as a result of the 
breach than he could if the breaching party had performed. If the performing party 
breaches, the other question that often arises is whether the paying party can get 
restitution of the prepaid contract price, even though the value of the performance to the 
paying party has dropped below that price.517 In other cases involving a breach by the 
performing party, the paying party may seek recovery of its reliance expenses, even 
though the value of the performance dropped below the value of those expenses. 
Alternatively, if the paying party breaches, the question is whether the performing party 
can get restitution of its costs of performance, even though those costs exceed the 
contract price.518  
 
George Palmer519 also addressed the difficulty of the interrelation of contractual and 
enrichment actions in the losing contract scenarios, and basically came to the conclusion 
that the theoretical difficulty encountered in determining whether or not an enrichment 
claim ought to be available in the case of a losing contract lies in the fact that the question 
can be approached from several different perspectives: ‘it may be viewed in terms of 
contractual principles only or from the point of view of unjustified enrichment or a 
combination of both’. If the problem is approached exclusively in terms of contractual 
terms, ‘rescission’, says the author, ought to be available since substitutionary or specific 
relief would adequately protect the aggrieved party’s expectation interests. On the other 
hand, ‘a contention on the part of the defaulter that the aggrieved party’s negative 
expectancy be taken into account lacks appeal where he has been given nothing, except a 
                                                 
516  Ibid, 1270. 
517  Ibid, 1270-71. 
518  Ibid, 1272. 
519 G. E. Palmer, The Law of Restitution (1978)  § 4.8; See also an excellent excursus of American law on the issue by 
J.R. Harker 1980 Acta Juridica 61, 84-85. 
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broken promise, in exchange for the performance received’.520 Therefore, consideration 
of unjustified enrichment become applicable, since justice and equity do not require the 
party in default be permitted to retain an amount for which he gave nothing, merely by 
reason of the fact that the aggrieved party would have lost that amount had he (the 
defaulter) performed the contract which in fact he did not perform. In essence, if the issue 
is viewed solely in terms of unjustified enrichment, the focus is laid instead on the assets 
unjustly held by the party in default. Because considerations of enrichment do not 
emphasise the aggrieved party’s benefits and losses under the contract, he is therefore 
entitled to restitution, in kind or in value, of the performance rendered unless justice and 
equity require otherwise.521   
 
What is the implication of the above discussion for change-of-position defence? 
 
It would seem obvious that in neither of the cases of the benefits arising through breach 
of contract that initially existed but whose object failed to materialise due to breach, there 
is adequate room to speak of disposing the benefit arising thereunder in reliance of the 
receipt or being lost without the defendant’s knowledge (or in good faith). The element of 
‘reliance’ is crucial for successfully proving a change-of-position defence arising from 
the ‘reliance version’. In bilateral agreements, it seems a fact that a loss should be seen as 
possible risk voluntarily undertaken and for which the parties could or should bargain or 
insure. For this reason it is not surprising that the defence of changed circumstances is not 
favoured in such contexts. In essence, where the facts reveal that the outcome of a breach 
of a bilateral contract gives rises to a claim in unjustified enrichment, the defence of loss 
of enrichment is generally disallowed.   
 
It is with this view in mind that the First Restatement of Restitution (1937) clearly made 
the distinction at § 65 between an enrichment arising from a ‘void transfer’ and that 
arising from ‘other situations’ when it stated:  
 
                                                 
520  G. E. Palmer, The Law of Restitution (1978) § 4.8. 
521  J.R. Harker 1980 Acta Juridica 84. 
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‘With certain exceptions the right of a person to restitution for a benefit conferred upon another in a 
transaction which is voidable for fraud or mistake is dependent upon the return or offer to return to 
the other party anything received as part of the transaction or, where specific restoration is not 
required, to return its value. Accordingly, in regard to voidable contracts or transactions involving 
an exchange or a mutual receipt of benefits, it is a general rule that the one who seeks to rescind or 
avoid the contract and recover back what he has parted with must restore the other party to the 
transaction to the status quo what was received under the transaction.’522  
 
To all intents this spirit has been preserved ever since523 and all indications point to it 
being to a large extent preserved under the new Restatement Third of Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment as evidenced by §§ 31-36524 among others. Furthermore, §§ 37-38 of 
the new Restatement Third of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (Tentative Draft # 3) 
deal specifically with Restitution and Contracts and clarify pertinent matters, as already 
mentioned above, departing however from the view supported in the Restatement of 
Contracts which does not stick to the contractual price as a ceiling in cases of losing 
contracts discharged for breach.  Change of circumstances, however as a defence, does 
not seem to be considered within these provisions. Does the same rationale of 
ineffectiveness due to contractual breach apply in cases of ‘rescission due to frustration 
of purpose’ on account of impossibility of performance? I turn now to this aspect.  
 
3.5.4. Frustration of Purpose or Impossibility of Performance in American Law. 
 
Generally speaking, if for some reason a contract cannot be performed due to a 
‘supervening impossibility’525 there arises the situation that one of the parties might 
shoulder the loss arising from that fact. The difficulty that flows from this is to establish 
who that party is, if the parties themselves have not previously agreed the assignment of 
risks in such eventualities. In general terms, risk allocation is an issue arising mostly in 
the context of validly concluded contracts which the courts either accept as having been 
                                                 
522  Restatement First of Restitution (1937) § 65.  
523 See collection of authorities and jurisprudential application of that approach in various States at 66 American 
Jurisprudence 2d (2004) ‘Restitution and Implied Contract’ §§ 15- 16. 
524  References to sections made here are those of Tentative Draft # 3 (Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment (2004).  
525  Elsewhere in this work I explain what actually ‘impossibility of performance’ may mean in contractual settings.  
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‘discharged’, or alternatively the ‘discharge’ of which they deny. In this context, the risk 
allocation of the failed contract and the ascertainment that the contract is ‘discharged’, 
are also linked pairs, but with diametrically differing results. That is so because on the 
one hand, the effect of ‘granting’ discharge is to place the risk of the event preventing 
performance on the ‘promisee’, while the effect of denying discharge is to place the risk 
on the promisor.526  
 
Be that as it may, the classical approach in American jurisprudence is succinctly 
expressed in the following terms:  
 
The obligation of restoration which is a condition to restitution upon rescission applies to anything 
of value which was received in execution of the contract, and the avails therefrom. Where the right 
to restitution is dependent upon restoration of the other party of that which has been received from 
him, such restoration must ordinarily be in specie; if specific restoration is impossible, restitution is 
denied. The restoration and offer to restore must be of the specific thing received in substantially as 
good a condition as when received, if that is possible, except where money or fungible things have 
been received.  
 
If specific restoration becomes impossible before the party seeking restitution knew the facts and 
had an opportunity to act thereon, restitution is granted upon the payment of value or the imposition 
of conditions if justice cannot otherwise be done, except that where chattels other than fungibles 
were received, restitution will not be granted unless substantially all of that which has been received 
can be returned in as good condition as when received, if restoration is required.527 A person who 
has received money or fungible things, and who is required to make restoration as a condition to 
restitution, is entitled to substitute a like amount of such a money or things in place of those which 
he has received. Where the subject matter has deteriorated or a portion of it has been destroyed or 
transferred, restitution is granted only upon the return of, or offer to return, what remains, if it is of 
any value.528  
 
In addition to the return of what was received or its value, a party seeking restitution 
upon rescission may be required to compensate the other party for the deterioration of the 
                                                 
526  E. W. Patterson (1924) 24 Columbia LR 335, 348-353.  
527  See Restatement, First of Restitution (1937) § 66 (1 to 3). 
528  See Restatement, First of Restitution (1937) § 66 (4 and 5). 
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subject matter, or to pay for its use, or to compensate the other for expenses incurred 
while holding the subject matter sought to be regained, as well as to account for losses.529
 
What does the above citation imply? 
 
While it seems very clear that where a synallagmatic contract comes to an end due to 
breach, change-of-position is not available because the element of reliance, among other, 
cannot easily be satisfied; were it otherwise, the situation would open the door to an 
unacceptable subversion of the risks voluntarily assumed. But where the contract is 
frustrated by a supervening impossibility of performance due to the deterioration of the 
thing or other act of God, such as flooding, earth-quakes, or other similar or analogous 
situations, the defence of changed circumstances is not necessarily proscribed. In other 
words, change-of-position in the ‘disaster version’ may be available in such 
circumstances as a defence. This is exactly how one should understand the contention 
that the obligation is extinguished in so far as it has become absolutely impossible to 
perform it. 
 
 
 
 
3. 6. Ineffectiveness of Contracts in South African Law. 
 
3.6.1. Introduction. 
 
Ineffectiveness of contracts and the resulting consequences thereof in South African law 
are at the crossroads of two differing approaches: On the one hand the system maintains 
its piecemeal approach based on the various condictiones and the logical inferences that 
can be drawn from them, while on the other, it endeavours to achieve a milestone 
development with a balanced general enrichment principle. The result of such interaction 
may not always be legally sound, but it is often pragmatically logical. The section that 
follows will try to draw attention to some of such possible incongruencies.  
                                                 
529  See Restatement, First of Restitution (1937) §§ 65, 66 Comment (a); § 157(b); § 158, § 159(1)(a). 
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3.6.2 - Ineffectiveness of Contracts arising generally from Failed Agreements. 
 
The position in South African law on enrichment situations arising from ‘failed 
agreements’ is in short hand put as this:  
 
‘if you have received a performance in terms of a contract which subsequently fails for whatever 
reason, you give it back if you still have it; if you cannot give it back, you are absolved, unless you 
were culpable in relation to the loss’.530  
 
Loss of enrichment, being a general defence under enrichment liability, might also be 
available in cases of failed synallagmatic agreements in so far as such failure is seen to 
give rise to enrichment liability. This position is fully stated, articulated and critically 
discussed in the most recent work of Professor Daniel Visser,531 and I refer the reader to 
that discussion for more details and nuances arising from such situations. What is 
discussed here is only whether it is a sound policy to allow a general enrichment principle 
to always apply the defence of change of position when all the elements for establishing 
such defence are present regardless of the nature of the situation in which the claim 
arises. The discussion here is, therefore, to a certain extent an appraisal of Visser’s 
suggested approach. 
 
Though it has long been established under South African law that enrichment law is a 
body of law separate from contractual obligations, it is still true, and unavoidable, that a 
contract lawyer cannot ignore unjustified enrichment law because that part of the law 
may and does solve certain problems not dealt with by the application of contract law. As 
said in the introduction to this chapter, such is the case, for example, where (a) contract 
rules hold that there is no contract’ (e.g. void or illegal contracts); and (b) where 
agreements not recorded in due form (in witting, when required) are concerned. The same 
applies to many other analogous situations referred to earlier. In such cases, in South 
                                                 
530  D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 498. 
531 Ibid. chapter 9. For failed mutual contracts, and the contrary views expounded by other critics or adherents to the 
writer’s position see more specifically pages 498-500 in which the writer discusses them in detail, and where necessary 
he reconciles them with his position. 
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African law, enrichment rules are frequently applied, to do justice between the parties in 
respect of performances rendered despite the invalidity.532  Hence, in the context of failed 
agreements, Visser summarises the South African position in this way:  
 
Here [South Africa], the person who makes the performance carries the risk. This state of affairs is 
brought about by the fact that the defence of loss of enrichment or change-of-position is available to 
each party. In other words, if you have received a performance in terms of a contract which is 
frustrated, you give it back if you still have it; if you cannot give it back (unless you were culpable 
in relation to the loss) you are absolved.   
 
Visser however thinks that this solution, though simple and sure, is not based on good 
philosophy.  That is so because, says the author, ‘the person who carries the risk has no 
control over the object’.533 Thus, Visser recommends that the model suggested by 
Hellwege,534 should ideally be followed as the correct one; that is to say, ‘rather than res 
perit domino, the person who is in control of the object of the performance should bear 
the risk if it goes under’.535 A further advantage in structuring the law in this way, says 
the writer, is that ‘placing the risk in this way means that the person who is in control can 
insure the object of the contract (and so this model also works with the identity of risk 
and insurability’, which also implies that ‘it recognises the autonomy of each contracting 
party to be able to make the decision whether or not to take the risk of making 
disbursements in preparations for performance’,536 or put plainly, the defence of change 
of position is proscribed in situations of ‘synallagmatic frustrated agreements’. Hence, 
                                                 
532  See D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) chapter 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9;  H. McQueen 1997 Acta Juridica 186. 
533 The author also notes that this positions is sometimes justified by a recourse to the adage ‘res perit domino’, 
explication that he finds unconvincing (D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 498). He also notes that the current 
South African position corresponds to the German model - Zweikkondiktionentheorie - in term of which ‘each party to 
a synallagmatic contract has his own claim against the other party. ‘In other words’, says the author ‘the fact that you 
cannot give back what you have received is irrelevant because your claim for the return of the amount by which the 
other party had been enriched is completely independent from the claim of the other contracting party for that which he 
might have received from you’.  Note however that according to R. Zimmermann (1995) 15 Oxford JLS 403, 413 
footnote 17) at the time of his writing there appeared to be three theories vying for recognition in the aforesaid 
circumstances, namely the Zweikondiktionenlehre, the famous Saldotheorie and the Lehre vom faktichen Synallagma). 
Whether one of them has now triumphed it is still to be ascertained. For a more detailed discussion of these theories see 
R. Zimmermann & J.E. Du Plessis (1994) 2 RLR 14 at 40ff and other sources cited there including Detlef König, 
Ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung. Tatbestände und Ordnungsprobleme in Rechtsvergleichender Sicht (1985) at 81ff; 
Werner Larenz in J. v. Staudingers, Kommentar zum Bürgelichen Gesetzbuch (23th Ed) (1994) § 818, nn 41ff.  
534 P. Hellwege ‘Unwinding Mutual Contracts’ in D. Johnston & R. Zimmermann (Eds.) Unjustified Enrichment 262. 
535  D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 499.  
536  Ibid, 499. 
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where ‘you have received any performance in terms of the frustrated contract you give it 
back; if you cannot give back what you received, you give back the value’.537  
 
The issues that Visser’s model raises are the identification of risk and its insurability. 
That being the case, it is vital to know what is understood by risk under contractual 
obligations. Is the party in control always the same as the one who can insure against the 
loss? Under what circumstances is risk assignable to one party? Is risk uniform or 
multiform? Does the nature of the risk and its nuances matter? What factors influence the 
decisions to take or not to take the risk of making disbursements in preparations for 
performance’? At what stage must the conclusion of insurance contract occur (or at what 
stage will the object of the contract be insured)? 
 
Depending on the angle of analysis one takes, risk can have differing nuances. In one 
sense akin to an economic analysis, risk under contractual obligations may be conceived 
as the factor that is equal to the probability of an event multiplied by its cost. The fact 
that people are willing to pay to avoid risk shows that risk is a cost. Generally, however, 
risk denotes the probability of specific eventualities. Its precise definition varies with the 
field in which it is used538 and within certain fields with the complexity of the endeavour. 
In some areas, the notion of risk is independent from the notion of value, while in others 
it is intertwined with that notion.539 Where risks constitute eventualities independent of 
the notion of value, such eventualities may have both beneficial and adverse effects. 
                                                 
537  Ibid. 499. 
538  For example, the notion of risk in Engineering is somewhat different from its counterpart in finances and that of 
statistics varies considerably with that of insurance, and so on. Commonly, in engineering the simplest definition is said 
to be the probability of an accident multiplied by the losses per accident, or simply is the probability of a risk occurring 
times the impact of such risk occurring. But as the engineering fields diversify and more complex endeavours are 
considered, the concept of risk becomes also more sophisticated, especially in potentially dangerous industries. In 
financial matters, risk is often understood as the unexpected variability or volatility of returns and it includes both 
potential worse-than-expected as well as better-than-expected returns. In statistics, risk is mapped to the probability of 
some event which is seen as undesirable. Usually, the probability of that event and some assessment of its expected 
harm must be combined into a believable scenario (an outcome), which combines the set of risk, regret and reward 
probability into an expected value for that outcome.  A contractual risk, in several scenarios is associated with either 
the possible failure of contracting parties to deliver products, services or devices or (money) to the agreed cost, 
specification or at the agreed time, or with the adjacent notions of physical and natural ‘disasters’, such as theft, 
vandalism, arson, building related risks, storms, floods, droughts, or other weather related occurrences, etc, or socio-
cultural and regulatory occurrences such as changes in legislations, political regimes, national or multi-national 
regulatory bodies,  or market changes, fundamental changes in supply and demand functions and global prices for 
commodities. (For the concept of risk in financial world see generally P. L. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The 
Remarkable Story of Risk (J. Wily, New York 1998).  
539  For further details, see among other, F. H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit  (Chicago- 1924) § I.I.26. M. J. 
White (1988) Journal of Legal Studies 353;  A. M. Polinsky (1983) 12 Journal of Legal Studies 427. 
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However, in general usage, risk refers more to potentially negative impacts that may arise 
from future events, both foreseen and unforeseen if they materialise.540 And, as such, 
there are some characteristics of value attached to it. The concept of risk is therefore 
complex. But before turning to the analysis of some of the above questions about risk and 
ancillary issues they may raise, a quick look at the South African doctrines of restitutio in 
integrum and that of impossibility of performance in general are in order.  
 
 
3.6.3A. Restitutio in Integrum and Change of Position.  
 
At this moment restitutio in integrum in South Africa is a matter of some debate because 
the proposition is sometimes advanced by the courts that this notion can sometimes mean 
that one party is excused from returning what he had received541 and this approach is not 
always welcome in academic circles. On one side, restitutio in Integrum if seen, for 
example, in the context of failed contracts in general it raises the problem of the proper 
assignment or allocation of risks:542 if the risk is placed on one of the persons, say, for 
example, on the plaintiff, the end result could be to allow, in effect, the defence of loss of 
enrichment to the defendant (although the formal position of the courts is that restitutio in 
integrum is not a contractual remedy), and consequently he (the defendant) could 
unwittingly found himself with a windfall ‘conferred’ upon him by the very application 
of law;  on the other hand, if the risk were placed on the person who effectively is best 
able to manage it, say, the defendant, the end result could mean that the defence of loss of 
enrichment is not allowed; and therefore a fortuitous windfall on the defendant could be 
avoided. But the hurdle on this last leg of the argument is that the risk may have been 
allocated to the wrong party; for example where the defendant is an ‘innocent’ party. In 
any event, the issue of ‘restitutio in integrum arises only (or mostly) where reciprocity is 
                                                 
540 B. Flyvbjerg (2006) 37 Project Management Journal 5-15. 
541 See for example Feinstein v Niggli (1981) 1 SA 684 (A) at 700 and Extel Industrial (Pty) Ltd v Crown 
Mills (Pty) Ltd (1999) 2 SA 719 at 733-734. For a detailed discussion of the authorities and some problems 
they raise see D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 519-525 (Chapter 9:  Reversing Transfers in the 
Context of Failed Contracts).  
542 See in this regard the discussion of the issue by R. Zimmermann and J.E. Du Plessis (1994) RLR 14, 40 
discussing the application and limitations of the Saldotheorie arising from invalid reciprocal agreements in 
the German law context.  
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at issue, and the realm of that situation is really a bit contractual, though ineffective ones; 
i.e., where ineffective, invalid or failed contracts are at issue. For the time being it is 
enough to say that this area may constitute an exception to the general rule of the 
application of change of position defence as hitherto discussed in this study.  
 
3.6.3B. Impossibility of Performance in South African Law. 
 
 
One of the main differences between common law and civil-law systems on the doctrine 
of impossibility of performance comes down to the primary remedy for breach each 
system subscribes to. On the one hand, if a system provides that its primary remedy is 
specific performance,543 then, as a logical consequence, if performance of the obligation 
becomes impossible, the obligation is discharged.544 That is so because the courts cannot 
enforce an obligation that is impossible – impossibilium nulla obligatio.545 On the other 
hand, if a system subscribes to the damages (compensation) approach as the primary 
remedy for contractual breach, save exceptions, then on the occurrence of the 
‘impossibilium’, the value can always be given, unless it is entirely infeasible. Being 
South Africa a mixed legal system, where does it stand between these two approaches?546
 
It is well established under South African law that the primary remedy upon breach is 
specific performance, which is the logical consequence of the principle pacta sunt 
servanda. If that [specific performance] is no ‘longer possible’ or it would be 
unreasonable to demand enforcement, then an award of damages is the following step. 
                                                 
543 For an Anglo-American writer advocating a general right to specific performance of contracts are the primary 
remedy, see A. Schwartz (1979) 89 Yale LJ 271. For the extreme opposite view see the reprinted article of O.W. 
Holmes (1998) 78 Boston Univ. LR 699 (originally published in 1897); R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (5th Ed. 
Boston, 1998). See also the Holmes & Posner positions sanctioned by the Supreme Court of Canada in Bank of 
America Canada v Mutual Trust Co (2002) 211 DLR (4th) 385, para. 31).  
544  Where a contract becomes impossible of performance after it has been entered into, the general rule in (Roman law) 
is that it then ceases to be binding (Wilson v Smith 1956 (1) SA 393 (W) at 396ff.   
545  D. 50.17.185 and also D. 45.1.140.2 specially applied in Wilson v Smith 1956 (1) SA 393 (W) at 396 and the case 
of Bischofberger v Van Wyk 1981 (2) SA 607 (W) at 610-612 discussing the different approaches between Civil-law 
and English law on the application of the ‘supervening impossibility of performance’.  
546 For some early interaction between the views expressed in the South African sources and the English doctrine of 
impossibility in courts see the Transvaal Provincial Division case  Herman v Shapiro & Co 1926 TPD 367 at 372-373 
(per Stratford J). See also Peters, Flamman v Kokstad Municipality 1919 AD 427; Benjamin v Myers 1946 CPD 655 
and Rousouw v Haumann 1949 (4) SA (C) 796 at 799-801 (per Herbstein J.).   
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This also aligns with the principle of good faith in contract. However, one must be aware 
that not all contracts are equal in nature, for, some are of a personal nature, where a 
specific thing which is the subject-matter of he contract may have been destroyed; in 
other cases the alleged impossibility is brought about by operation of law; and there are 
even instances in which the impossibility is caused by the promisee himself, but where he 
is not at fault. In all these circumstances the courts may follow different approaches to 
deal with the specific case of impossibility of performance.547 However, it may be said 
that under South African law, a supervening impossibility, in general, discharges the 
obligations of both parties to the contract if the impossibility is entire, i.e. it affects the 
obligation as a whole, whatever the type of contract involved. It extinguishes the parties’ 
obligation by operation of law.548  Therefore, if the obligation that would compel the 
defendant to disgorge the enrichment is extinguished by operation of law on the 
occurrence of a supervening impossibility, its effect is the same as an acknowledgement 
of a change-of-position exonerating the defendant from liability. Put differently, in such 
circumstances, the creditor ordinarily bears the loss, if the thing does go under.  Is there 
anything wrong with this approach?  
 
 
3.7. Risk Allocation: ‘The Person who has Control’.  
 
3.7.1. A Brief Overview of Visser’s Approach. 
 
Thus far South African law, as far as the passage of risk in general is concerned, adheres 
unqualifiedly to the view that ‘a supervening impossibility discharges the contract’ and as 
a consequence of which the ‘parties are released from the obligation to perform in term of 
it.’549  On the strength of this approach,  the legal system has concluded that ‘where one 
                                                 
547 See generally W. A. Ramsden, Supervening Impossibility in South African Law of Contracts  (1985) Ch. 4 (pp. 46-
58). The author offers several references in the Digest for the application of the principle to specific areas of law, as 
well as references to Roman-Dutch and other European authors on the subject-matter.  
548  Voet 18.6.2;  19.1.14; Grotius, Inleiding 3.19.12; 3.47.1; 3.47.3; Justinian Digest,  D. 13.1.20. Note however that 
under French law, supervening impossibility does not necessarily have the effect of discharging the contract. This 
French view is based on Pothier, Obligations 3.6.2.621and 3.6.3.622.  
549 Van der Merwe et al, Contract: General Principles (2003) 512; D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment 
(2008) 480-481. See also J. C. De Wet & A. H. Van Wyk, Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en 
Handelsreg (1992) 172ff. 
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party has performed in terms of a contract which is discharged by supervening 
impossibility and it is possible for the other party to give back the performance and that 
party had no expenses related to the contract’,550 the other party can reclaim his 
performance. The appropriate avenue to claim such performance, according to the 
standard view in South Africa, is the condictio sine causa specialis.551 On the face of it, 
the virtues of the current South African position are that it avoids ‘uncertainty’ in the 
judicial interpretation of contractual allocation of risks. But does it achieve justice as the 
law is expected to do?  
 
Visser, for example, considers whether the law should move towards apportionment of 
losses in cases of supervening impossibility outside what is achievable under the 
principle of unjustified enrichment as tempered by the loss of enrichment defence, or if 
that is a bridge too far, whether to adapt in any way the application of the condictio sine 
causa specialis.552  
 
In answering these questions, Visser argues that ‘it is inappropriate to make 
apportionment of losses a goal of the winding up of frustrated contracts, neither the 
                                                 
550  D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 484.  
551 The ‘condictio sine causa specialis’ is one of the forms in which the Roman law ‘condictio sine causa’ 
could appear, i.e., a ‘condictio sine causa generalis’ and a ‘condictio sine causa specialis’. The ‘condictio 
sine causa generalis’, according to historians, could take the place of any of the three condictiones (i.e., 
‘condictio indebiti’, ‘condictio causa data causa no secuta’, ‘condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam’). If 
one of these condictiones lay, the condictio sine causa generalis could be used instead. If none of them was 
available, neither the condictio sine causa generalis (See generally Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas 
(1778) 12 7 1; LAWSA (2005) § 219.  The ‘condictio sine causa specialis’, on the other hand, was available 
in certain circumstances where none of the other condictiones could be instituted. The terms ‘condictio sine 
causa generalis and ‘condictio sine causa specialis’ are not themselves, however, of Roman origin. They 
are the creation of later writers on Roman law. The ‘condictio sine causa specialis’ in current South African 
law tend to be available in the following areas: (i) where money or property has been transferred to the 
defendant in term of a valid causa which later falls away’ (here would fall our example of performance 
terminated by a supervening impossibility);  (ii) in the case of a defendant who has bona fide disposed of or 
consumed the plaintiff’s property if (a) the defendant obtained the possession of the property through 
negotium between himself and the plaintiff; (b) the defendant obtained possession of the plaintiff’s 
property consisting of money otherwise than through negotium with the plaintiff, gratuitously, that is to say 
ex-causa lucrativa’; (iii) in the cases where, for example, banks seek to recover the amount paid to the 
payee of a cheque after the cheque had been countermanded by the drawer; and (iv) in cases where 
ownership of property is transferred sine causa to the defendant but the circumstances are such that none of 
the other condictiones sine causa would apply” (See generally LAWSA 2nd. Ed. Vol. 9 (2005) §§ 220-221) 
(per JG Lotz, updated by F.D.J. Brand); D. H. Van Zyl, Negotiorum Gestio in South Africa Law (1985) 85-
97; 160-171). 
552  D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 484. 
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change of position defence should be made available to frustrated bilateral contracts.553 
Visser also thinks that ‘loss apportionment (“allocation” in his text) is sometimes 
defended (indicated) by the need to protect the ‘reliance interest’ of the parties’.554 But he 
questions the soundness of that approach in cases of frustration by supervening 
impossibility, save where the contract is divisible and parts of which were capable of 
having been performed independently, for, says the author, ‘one might argue that it is not 
the contract as such that is being relied upon, since there is no contract’.555 But this is not 
the approach that is usually followed556 and therefore the ambiguity continues. As there 
is no clear-cut answer, Visser then suggests that the way forward is placing the risk on 
the person who has control and can insure against the loss. In essence, Visser’s 
suggestion is to the effect that there must be a ‘judicial identification’ of the ‘superior’ 
risk bearer at the moment the loss occurs, and therefore, there should be no pre-
determined liability in cases of ‘impossibility of performance’ due to frustration. In other 
words, the principle that ‘res perit domino’ should not be accepted without exception. In 
order to make his point clearer, the author illustrates the argument with the following 
example taken from Philip Hellwege’s writings:557  
 
‘A and B have a contract of sale [of a horse]’. B has transferred the horse to A; the full price is 
already payable but A has so far paid only half. A and B are in different countries and the contract is 
frustrated by an outbreak of war between them. The war destroys the horse’. 
 
With this illustration Visser argues that ‘if A sues for the return of the payment that he 
has made (the amount by which B can be said to have been benefited), B has to give the 
value of the horse which he is unable to return. If B sues A for the return of the horse, he 
must give back what he received’.  At this point, Visser enters the realm of risk insurance 
                                                 
553 See also Thomas Krebs who argues that ‘where exchanged performances are concerned, there is a 
general agreement that the change of position defence needs to be modified, or disregarded completely’.  T. 
Krebs ‘Change of position and Disenrichment in England and Germany’ in E.J.H. Schrage (ed) Unjust 
Enrichment and the Law of Contract (2001) 311. 
554 D. P. Visser,  Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 496. 
555 D. P. Visser,  Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 496. 
556 D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 496-497; P. Hellwege, ‘Unwinding Mutual Contracts: Restitution in 
Integrum v the Defence of change of position’ in D Johnston & R. Zimmermann (eds.) Unjustified Enrichment (2003) 
243 at 272. 
557 P. Hellwege, ‘Unwinding Mutual Contracts: Restitution in Integrum v the Defence of Change of Position’ in D. 
Johnston & R. Zimmermann (eds.) Unjustified Enrichment (2003) 243 at 272 and again P. Hellwege’s Rückabwicklung 
130ff. 
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in the illustration process before he concludes the argument. So he continues explaining 
that ‘if A has not insured the horse, the fact that the value received is the measure of 
enrichment means that he will be out of pocket, but because he was able to insure it and 
elected not to do so makes it completely unobjectionable that he should shoulder the 
loss’. Obviously, there are exceptions to every rule, and according to the author, the only 
exception to the principle that ‘each party must restore what they received, or its value, is 
‘where the loss would also have happened if the enrichment creditor had had it under his 
control, and it is not an instance where it is customary for the enrichment creditor to 
insure the object even though it is not under his control’.558  On the other hand, continues 
Visser:  
 
If B has spent the money that he received while it is still possible for the contract to be frustrated, 
the same principle will mean that he will be out of pocket, but the fact that this outcome is in 
accordance with recognizing his autonomy in determining the degree of risk that he wishes to take, 
also makes it appropriate that he should bear this risk.559  
 
3.7.2. The Person  ‘Who Has Control And Can Insure Against the Loss’:  An Appraisal.  
 
Visser’s argument presented above is concise, articulate and clear; it needs no further 
glosses to understand it. The pro  and cons of his approach are clearly set out in his own 
argument and explanations, a task that he did thoroughly and persuasively. The further 
question that however arises is whether the suggested approach has touched upon all the 
nuances of risk allocation in the event of failed synallagmatic contracts, especially those 
that are terminated due to impossibility of performance. That is so, because, impossibility 
of performance is a complex and intricate doctrine.560 First of all, it may be argued that in 
contractual context, impossibility as such is an ‘artificial’ concept, as performance is 
almost never impossible, because if that which was agreed is not physically possible, its 
                                                 
558  D. P. Visser Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 500; also citing Hellwege’s Rückabwicklung 130, who also cited W. 
Flume ‘Der Wegfall der Bereicherung…’ (1953) 103, 172ff. 
559  D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 501. 
560   Visser explanations does refer to some of the complexities such as objective and subjective impossibility, and the 
difference between legal impossibility and physical impossibility, and the contention of divisibility or otherwise of the 
performance (pp. 479-486). 
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value is always possible, unless it is an agreement that involves the status of a person.561 
What is really logical is to say that on the happening of certain events, requiring a party 
to perform can be so ‘uneconomical’ with the result that if the law stood silent, it would 
be ridiculed. But even if one immediately accepts the conventional wisdom that there is 
such a thing as impossibility of performance, it is not always self-evident from the case 
law what exactly impossibility of performance means. For example, no one would doubt 
that, either ‘commercial impracticality’ or ‘frustration of purpose’ constitute impossibility 
of performance; but the case law sometimes lump them together as cases of impossibility 
of performance.562 Thus, for practical purposes and brevity sake one can say with Posner 
& Rosenfield563 that the subject of impossibility could be subdivided in three 
subheadings, namely: ‘impossibility of performance’, ‘frustration of purpose’ and 
‘extreme impracticability’. ‘Impossibility’ per se is the rubric to use when the carrying 
out of a promise is no longer ‘physically possible’, and ‘frustration of purpose’ is the 
rubric to use when performance of the promise is physically possible, but the underlying 
purpose of the bargain is no longer attainable.564 Impracticability, in turn, should be the 
catch-all term for any discharge case that does not fit comfortably into either the pure 
impossibility or the frustration moulds. Impracticability is therefore suitable for use when 
performance of the promise is physically possible and the underlying purpose of the 
bargain achievable, but as a result of an unexpected event enforcement of the promise 
would entail a much higher cost than originally contemplated.565 It is noteworthy 
highlighting that for this third subset it is difficult to articulate a standard as to what 
magnitude of cost change is necessary to justify discharge on the ground of 
impracticability.566 Where courts have used it as applying to impossibility cases, they are 
                                                 
561  For example, where the agreement is for marriage and the bride dies, there is indeed a ‘physical impossibility’, to 
marry a dead person. But if the agreement is a trip to the moon, the performance may be technically feasible, but 
economically prohibitive. On subjective and objective impossibility see also Unibank Savings and London Ltd 
(formerly Community Bank) v ABSA bank Ltd 2000 (4) SA 191 (W) 198. 
562 Other terms used in practice are ‘physical impossibility’, ‘legal impossibility’, ‘impracticability’, ‘personal 
inability’, ‘increased difficulty’, and of course ‘frustration of object’. 
563  R. A. Posner and A. M. Rosenfield (1977) 6 Journal of Legal Studies 83, 85. 
564  See for this subset the famous English ‘coronation cases’ in which landlords rented premises to customers who 
were eager to view the coronation procession of King Edward VII, but the coronation was cancelled due to Edward’s 
illness and discharge of contracts was sought on ground that the underlying purpose (the viewing of the procession) had 
been frustrated. (For comments on this cases see McElroy & Glanville Williams (1941) 4 MLR 241; Posner & 
Rosenthal (1977) 6 Journal of Legal Studies 83, 85 footnote 8 and 9.  
565  For some practical examples, see Restatement (First) of Contracts (1932) § 454. 
566 Discharge on this ground is normally not objectively recognised in most of the jurisdictions under 
consideration. But a more critical analysis can yield unexpected subtle recognitions even on this ground. 
CHAPTER III - Change of Position in Synallagmatic Contracts          
        
             © Jorge Aimite  Cape-Town 15/08/2009    [This is   Page 149 ]
Change of Position Defence
  (Unjustified Enrichment)
149
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 ©
 J
or
ge
 A
m
ite
 ©
prone to say that ‘mere hardship’ is not enough. They thus safeguard the integrity of the 
bargain principle.  Some cases point to examples of costs being infinite, if performance 
were required; hence the label of impossibility applied to them.567 But whether the cost is 
infinite, or merely prohibitive relative to the gains from performance (as in the 
impracticability and frustration cases), it is really a distinction without much relevance to 
the purpose of contract law in general. For this reason, it is thus thought that there is no 
functional distinction between impossibility and frustration cases on the one hand and 
impracticability cases on the other.568 The reality indicates that in every discharge case 
the basic problem is the same: to decide who should bear the loss resulting from an event 
that has rendered performance by one party highly ‘uneconomical.569  
 
Based on the reflection and observations above, I explore some further contours of risk 
allocation in this section. In doing so, I will not repeat the discussion which is already 
clearly set out in detail in Visser’s work, save to direct the reader for some salient points, 
should the need to do so arise. My objective here is to highlight those additional nuances 
associated with the concept of risk allocation in contractual contexts that may deepen the 
understanding of the ‘person who has control and can insure against the loss’.  
 
 
3.7.3.  Is ‘The Person who has Control’ also and always the same as the ‘One who can 
insure against the Loss’? 
 
 
If the answer lies in identifying the ‘person who has control and can insure against the 
loss’, and remembering that we are dealing with situations where the ‘contract’ was 
initially validly concluded, then the further question that arises is really about knowing 
how the parties allocate risks in contractual settings. We must first ask ourselves, what is 
a risk? At what moment the risk must be allocated in contractual settings? Is the risk of 
                                                 
567  See R.A. Posner & A.M. Rosenfield (supra) at 86, footnote 9. 
568 See Comment: (1948) 46 Mich. LR 401. For related issues to impossibility of performance Robert L. Birmingham 
(1969) 20 Hastings LJ 1393, especially at 1399;  Allan Schwartz (1976) 50 S. California LR 1 (this author discusses 
contract cases in which inflation was the event causing no performance. In that light, inflation is a risk, which if it 
becomes uncontrollable, is tantamount similar to frustration of purpose cases.  
569  Posner & Rosenfield (1977) 6 Journal of Legal Studies 83, 86.  
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loss allocated invariably and similarly between the parties? Does allowing a ‘judicial 
identification’ of the superior risk bearer at the ‘moment of loss’ conform to an ‘ex post 
facto’ (a posteriori) allocation of risk or to an a priori allocation?  
 
3.7.4. The Dynamics of Risk Allocation. 
 
There are two possible differing effects in evaluating the risk allocation in the context of 
failed agreements due to a supervening impossibility.  In either case, the first question is 
to ascertain whether the contract is deemed to have been discharged or not on the 
occurrence of the unforeseen event. That is so because, on the one hand, the effect of 
discharging the contract is to place the risk of the event preventing performance on the 
promisee, while the effect of upholding it is to place the risk on the promisor.570 These 
effects, of course, depend in part, on how the parties themselves allocated, or are assumed 
to have allocated, the risk of the unforeseen events from the inception of the agreement 
itself.  
 
At the stage of the formation/or negotiation of the contract the parties may directly or 
indirectly have chosen to allocate the risk of the unknown and unforeseen events 
differently, depending on how the parties could have estimated the probability of the 
occurrence of such a risk. Unquestionably, if the parties have objectively chosen to 
allocate the risk of unforeseen events in a particular way, that manner should be followed. 
This, of course, brings back the contention that ‘reliance’ must be placed on the contract, 
and the resulting remedy should also be ‘contractual’. Whatever perspective one chooses, 
the resulting approach is not a contentious issue for the time being.   
 
To start with, one must distinguish two types of risks: an ‘endogenous risk’571 and an 
‘exogenous risk’.572 Equally important is the risk attitude assumed by each party towards 
                                                 
570  E. W. Patterson (1924) 24 Columbia LR 335, 348-353.  
571  As examples of an ‘endogenous risk’ one can cite a mechanical failure of an aircraft engine, which is ordinarily and 
mostly preventable, though not at 100 per cent assurance; an insolvency of a Bank, although it depends on which side 
of the coin one sees it; etc.  
572  Are ordinarily considered exogenous risks the following: ‘acts of God’ (or natural disasters),  fires, acts of war, 
riots, insurrections, orders of court or regulatory agencies, destruction of machineries, strikes, lockouts, or other 
industrial disturbances.  
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the various subsets of possible future risks. While an ‘endogenous risk’ is generally more 
amenable to control, obviously, depending on its nature, an ‘exogenous risk’ tends to be 
completely independent of the parties and sometimes nothing can be done to control it. If 
a party to an agreement assumed an attitude that was risk neutral, it cannot be expected of 
him to take measures beyond ordinary risk control, because, in principle, such party 
would only be interested in the averse risk.573 However, a risk averse party is not 
precluded from adopting secondary strategies to minimise the chances of it happening 
and the costs of bearing the residual risk.574  This possibility of a risk averse party 
bearing the residual loss is, in my view, what underpins Visser’s approach in its second 
leg when he asserts that the method also ‘recognises the autonomy of each contracting 
party to be able to make a decision whether or not to take the risk of making 
disbursements in preparation for performance’. In essence, Visser’s account on this 
second leg is about the optimal allocation of the risk. An optimal allocation of the risk is 
ordinarily a function of the parties’ comparative advantages in risk control and the 
residual risk management, as well as their risk preferences. In circumstances where all 
things are equal, a given risk should ordinarily be borne by the party who can implement 
measures to control it at the lower cost.575 This is typically the party whose performance 
is affected by the risk, should there be one. If that party is also risk neutral, it should bear 
the risk.  
 
It must be highlighted however that the optimal allocation is less clear where the superior 
risk controlling party is averse to the residual risk. In this situation, if all other things are 
equal, the residual risk should be allocated to the party that is the superior risk manager. 
However, in real life, the superior risk manager is not always easy to identify, and is 
often not the party with the comparative advantage in risk control. Being this the case, in 
ascertaining ‘the person  who has control and can insure against the loss’ further 
consideration must be given to the parties’ attitude to the risk, because such attitude also 
varies according to the context and the nature of the agreement entered into. As already 
highlighted above, in some cases a party may be risk neutral, while in others it may be 
                                                 
573  G. G. Triantis (1992) 42 Univ. Toronto LJ 450, 455. 
574  Ibid, at 455. 
575  Ibid, at 456 
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risk averse. Even where the parties have agreed on risk allocation, there may remain a 
possibility of under-assessing the extent of the risk by one party or by both. But it should 
still be emphasised that if the parties have expressly assigned the risk to one of them, 
there should normally be no occasion to inquire into which of them is the superior risk 
bearer. Nonetheless, a party can be a superior risk bearer for one of two reasons: first, he 
may be in a better position to prevent the risk from materializing (here because either he 
has control of the object (or of the situation), as in the first leg of Visser’s approach; or he 
is the superior insurer. As insurance is a method (alternative to prevention) of reducing 
the cost associated with the risk that a performance of a contract may be more costly than 
anticipated, it is a particularly important process of cost avoidance in the impossibility 
context because the risks with which that doctrine is concerned with may not necessarily 
be preventable by the party charged with non-performance.  
 
Given that prevention is but one way only of dealing with risk, insurance is then the other 
means of dealing with the effects of risk, if it does materialise. Here we encounter the 
second leg of Visser’s approach, as already mentioned above. Should the promisor be the 
one in the position of a ‘superior risk insurer’, then his inability ‘to prevent the risk from 
materializing should normally not operate to discharge him from his contract, anymore 
than an insurance company’s inability to prevent, for example, a fire on the premises of 
an insured should excuse it from its liability to make good the damage caused by the 
fire.576  
 
On this insurance leg of the analysis, one must also take into account two further aspects 
that may arise, should the parties have directly or indirectly assigned the risk in their 
agreement. There may be a mutual under-assessment or simply a unilateral under-
assessment of the risk. If both parties under-assessed the risk to the same extent, the 
allocation of the risk should appropriately be determined by other factors, such as 
differences in risk management capabilities and risk preferences.577 If there was a 
unilateral under-assessment of the risk, the party so assessing it should bear the loss, if all 
other factors also militate against him. It must be noted however that to the extent that the 
                                                 
576  See R.A. Posner  and A.M. Rosenfield (1977) 6 Journal of Legal Studies 83 at 90-91. 
577  G. G. Triantis (1992) 42 Univ. Toronto LJ 476. 
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unilateral under-assessment was influenced either due to persistent cognitive errors or 
due to biases, the party to whom such risk is allocated may suffer disproportionate loss in 
the contract for bearing the risk. In such circumstances, judicial intervention might be 
justified to redress a possible inequity, and avoid potential unjustified enrichment of one 
party to the detriment of another. 
 
In certain other circumstances, the determination of the superior risk manager may be a 
complex exercise, because from time to time it depends on factors that frequently may 
point to opposing directions. If such is the case, sophisticated parties usually may be able 
to weight themselves at the stage of the formation of their agreement the comparative 
advantage in each aspect of risk management and allocate the risk to the lowest bearer in 
the aggregate. Alternatively, they may agree to a risk sharing arrangement. For example, 
one party may be in a better position to estimate the probabilities of the occurrence and 
the other party may be better able to estimate the magnitude of the loss in the event risk 
materialises.578 But all of these depend on how the parties’ attitude to risk is in the 
particular circumstances. One cannot pre-deterministically assign the risks in such 
circumstances.  
 
 
3.7.5. The challenges of an ex-post facto risk allocation. 
  
The challenges to Visser’s suggested approach is that to a certain extent it postulates a 
judicial identification of the superior risk bearer and it makes the case for an ex-post facto 
judicial allocation (or reallocation) of risks. That is so because it rejects a ‘pre-
determination’ of a loss bearer, as hitherto advocated in South African law. The virtues of 
the current South African position are that it avoids ‘uncertainty’ in the judicial 
interpretation of contractual allocation of risks. Its main ‘axiom’ could equally run like 
this: ‘better have one person know for certain that he is responsible, even if the other 
[person] is the superior risk bearer’, regardless of whether that might result in injustice or 
not. Visser’s suggested approach is, however, essentially to the effect that if, on the same 
factual scenario, one of  the parties was in control of the thing (or of the situation) or he is 
                                                 
578  G.G. Triantis (1992) 42 Univ. Toronto LJ 452. 
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deemed to be the superior risk bearer and the situation might result in injustice to the 
creditor, the risk can be re-allocated. That allocation (or rather re-allocation) must 
however follow an ‘optimal’ approach. 
 
On the face of it, Visser’s suggested approach will come up against, among others, two 
possible hurdles, namely: (i) the ‘competence’ of the courts to identify the superior risk 
bearer and (ii) the predictability of such determination. It might face the predictability 
hurdle because critics might argue that if it is not clear when a risk is allocated and when 
it is not, one cannot be sure what a court will do under any particular scenario. Someone 
who is risk averse and who values certainty and predictability might prefer a fixed, 
predictable (albeit, perhaps, inappropriate) allocation of risks to a more flexible (but 
perhaps, more appropriate) allocation of risks that offers only an imprecise idea of what a 
court will do. Given that in many contractual situations some parties are risk averse, the 
legal system might be tempted to stick to the current approach that seemingly offers more 
predictability with its pre-deterministic view.  
 
The suggested approach, however, makes it clear that the factors that make one party a 
superior risk bearer are the party’s ability to prevent or control the materialization of the 
risk, as well as its risk preferences and its ability to reduce the cost of the residual risk 
through insurance or perhaps even through ‘hedging in the financial markets’579 if there 
is such opportunity in som  complex business dealings. That is so because when the 
author remarks in the hypothetical Hellwege example of a horse he uses to illustrate the 
approach that ‘(…) but because he [the party] was able to insure it and elected not to do 
so makes it unobjectionable that he should shoulder the loss’, or earlier in acknowledging 
the exception (…) ‘where the loss would also have happened if the enrichment creditor 
had had it under his control, and it is  not an instance where it is customary for the 
enrichment creditor to insure the object though it is not under his control’,580 the 
approach demonstrates that the fears of unpredictability may be unfounded or at least 
overstated. Although it is mostly true that allocations of risks by law to the superior risk 
                                                 
579 ‘Hedging in financial market’ here is understood as the practice of purchasing and/or selling a financial 
instrument specifically to reduce or cancel out the risk in another investment.  
580  D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 500. 
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bearer fulfill their purpose only to the extent that they are certain or predictable, the 
author also makes it plain that should the risk be ‘exogenous’ and at the time of 
contracting could be deemed to be remote, but the materialization of which could be 
severe, the contractor should always avail him/herself of the residual risk management 
opportunities available to the parties, as safety nets. A party who unreasonably ignores 
them, must bear the loss should the risk materialise. Furthermore, the author’s position 
when he asserts that ‘he was able to insure it and elected not to do so’, seems to me to 
exactly express these precautionary measures that are available to the contracting parties 
in order to offset any supervening risks. 
 
 
3.8. Conclusion  
 
In sum, the suggested approach that in synallagmatic agreements the way forward is to 
first ‘identify the party who has control and can insure against the loss’ is founded on 
solid grounds and accords more with justice in situations of frustration of purpose for 
supervening impossibility, than the ‘pre-deterministic approach’. This view also squares 
with the general principle of unjustified enrichment as argued throughout this thesis that 
places emphasis not only in what is happening on the assets of the claimant but also in 
those of the defendant. But because there are mechanisms available to the parties to avoid 
the consequences of unforeseen future risks, even if such risks might seem remote at the 
time of contracting, common sense dictates that the one that was able to take measure to 
avert the risk or minimise its impact, if it did happen, must shoulder the risk of loss.  
Said, differently, loss of enrichment (change-of-position), as a general defence, should 
not be open to the parties.  
  
The loss-sharing approach is equally properly rejected because of its potential to inject 
some confusion in the administration of justice. That is the case, notwithstanding the 
possibility of being satisfactory in some circumstances, it would be utterly unsatisfactory 
in a range of other cases if it is meticulously scrutinised. The loss-sharing approach is 
prone to taking away the incentive to get insurance or to take sufficient precautions. That 
is so because the approach postulates that the risk can be in one of the parties or the other, 
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but it fails to explain why it should not be on the party who might not have chosen to 
shield itself from the risk of some unforeseen future event rather than on the party that 
did not want to take any.  
   
Furthermore, where one of the parties is risk-neutral, if the risk were truly unexpected, so 
that no precautions could have been taken against it, and if neither party was better 
equipped to deal with the problem when it arose, then it would make no difference who 
bore the loss. The amount of the loss being borne is the same. It cannot be reduced by 
dividing it in smaller pieces. In such scenarios the reality dictates that there is no reason 
to keep the risk on one party, but there is equally no compelling reason to shift it away 
either.581 Hence, where the balance does not favour one party or the other, the risk should 
lie where it now stands.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
581 D. G. Baird (1990) 19 Journal of Legal Studies 583, 590. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
 
ENRICHMENT SINE CAUSA: THE ENIGMA OF THE LOSS OF ENRICHMENT DEFENCE IN 
BRAZILIAN LAW. 
 
4.1.0. Introduction.  
 
Despite its Roman law foundations, and even though it provides for a general enrichment 
action which is essentially an actio de in rem versio, Brazilian enrichment law, prima 
facie, does not directly recognize loss of enrichment (or change of position) as a defence 
to an enrichment claim. The reason for such direct omission is not very clear. The 
legislative history is silent on the issue and academic writing (known as ‘a doctrina’ in 
the country) seldom discusses the field as a whole in any great detail, and virtually none 
of the writers has alluded to this defence. However, a careful reading of various 
provisions of both the 1916 and 2002 Civil Codes reveals that the system does not escape 
entirely from such a defence.  Traces of it subtly appear in the formulations used in 
drafting certain provisions of the Civil Code on unjustified enrichment, as well as in other 
parts of the Code. Because the drafters felt the need to remain faithful to the Roman 
tradition, and structured the whole law of unjustified enriched using the dual structure582 
of condictio and actio de in rem verso, some of those traces became prominent, perhaps 
unwittingly so. In addition, some early academic writings such as that of Pontes de 
Miranda drew some attention to the defence when he held that: ‘what is given in the case 
of unjustified enrichment is not the value of the thing at the time that the enrichment 
occurred, but the value of the defendant’s enrichment as it enriches him at the time the 
action is brought’.583 This clearly suggests that the measure of enrichment is the 
remaining enrichment and not the received enrichment, save exceptions.  In the same 
vein Agostinho Alvim also espoused, it would seem, the same view when he contended 
                                                 
582  It could also be said that the structure is ‘tri-dimensional’ if one adds negotiorum gestio which appears 
in the same title as the other two. But because only some aspects of negotiorum gestio qualify as leading to 
an enrichment claim, I prefer to refer to the structure as strictly dual rather than tri-dimensional, save when 
explaining the nomenclature of the field and related aspects which will appear below.  
583  Pontes de Miranda, Tratado das Obrigações, Vol. 26 (1959) 167. 
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that one of the essential elements of an enrichment sine causa is the existence of the 
enrichment, and thought that  
 
‘because [in an enrichment action] what is at stake is restitution for enrichment, and not 
indemnification for damages, the enrichment must exist at the time of the action. If it existed, but 
ceased to exist, as a rule, there is nothing to restore. Such hypothesis, however, must not be 
confused with the substitution of the thing, because, if it does not exist because it was transferred, 
this will be a case of subrogation in the price’.584  
 
The author is very clear here. Subrogation in the price applies only if the non-existence of 
the thing is due to a transfer of the original thing; that is to say the replacement of the 
thing by its value. In all other cases not falling within the subrogation rule, something 
else must be considered.  
 
There is however one writer, Claúdio Michelon,585 who directly hints at a nuanced 
justification as to why there is no such defence in Brazilian law. Discussing very briefly 
the need of the enrichment to be in existence at the time of litis contestatio to succeed in 
such claims, he compares the provision embodied in BGB § 818(3), which he does not 
expressly mention as the loss of enrichment defence in German law, but he merely sees 
the provision as pointing to the need of the enrichment to be in existence at the time the 
claim is brought. He then observes that ‘the codified Brazilian law did not explicitly opt 
for such rule because there was no need for it, since the need for the enrichment to be in 
existence is effectively part of the factual support (suporte fático)586 of the obligation to 
                                                 
584  A. Alvim (1954) No. 173 Revista Forense 47-67, at 57. 
585 C. Michelon, Direito Restitutório (2007) 196. The writer however does not offer in loco any other 
sources for that proposition (save those I cite in the note immediately below) nor does he make any 
reference to the ‘travaux préparátoires’ or other Brazilian writers that that was indeed the clear position of 
the Drafting Committee of the ‘Anteprojecto’ in omitting the defence. His conclusion appears to be more of 
an ex post facto inference than one that is grounded on the sources. 
586 This notion of ‘the need of the enrichment to be in existence as constituting part of the factual support of 
the obligation’ which Michelon equates to ‘loss of enrichment’ remind us the confusion of not 
distinguishing between establishing the existence of the enrichment in the first place (the onus here is on 
the plaintiff) and establishing its loss if it existed at some stage (here the onus is on the defendant). Strictly 
speaking ‘non enrichment’ is not synonymous to ‘loss of enrichment’ because when one asserts there is 
‘non enrichment’, the assertion goes to the root of the claim itself. As explained in the South African 
section on ‘loss of enrichment’ above (see item 2.6.1.), to equate ‘non enrichment’ to ‘loss of enrichment’ 
manifests an opaque interface between a defence strictu sensus and factors that cohere to the claim, but in 
CHAPTER IV - Unjustified Enrichment in Brazil: Part I - Structure & Nomenclature          
        
             © Jorge Aimite  Cape-Town 15/08/2009    [This is   Page 159 ]
Change of Position Defence
  (Unjustified Enrichment)
159
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 ©
 J
or
ge
 A
m
ite
 ©
restore an enrichment sine causa itself’. Afterwards he adds that the provisions of arts. 
238-240587 of the CC serve such function because ‘they regulate a series of cases in 
which the existence of the enrichment may be doubted and such provisions offer solution 
for such cases’. He continues by explaining that art. 238 establishes ‘that the total 
disappearance of the object giving rise to the restitutionary obligation, if it occurs without 
the debtor’s fault, implies an ex-lege ‘termination’ of the obligation’.588  ‘If the 
disappearance occurs after the debtor is put in mora (which can take place either by 
notice or even by a judicial action), then the rules applicable in other cases of mora will 
ipso facto apply’.589   
 
I discuss Michelon’s view in detail further below.590 For the time being it suffices to say 
that, in my view, the justification advanced by Michelon cannot fully account as plausible 
explanation for the ‘omission’ of the loss of enrichment defence. It can hardly be said that 
the provisions he cites account for most situations of enrichment acquired at the expense 
of another in the absence of any justification. Because of certain contradictions with the 
provisions of articles 884-886 of the new CC, I partially cast doubt on it.  
 
Michelon also mentions in the same heading arts. 479(2) and 480 of the Portuguese Civil 
Code that he considers as being to the same effect as the German BGB § 818(3). In 
                                                                                                                                                 
respect of which the onus of proof lies upon the defendant.  That is the case because for the plaintiff to 
substantiate his claim he must establish that the defendant was enriched, which creates a presumption of 
enrichment; and once the pla ntiff has done that, the onus of overcoming  this presumption falls upon the 
defendant. Thus, as said earlier, at one level of the analysis one may refer to this as a defence of ‘non-
enrichment’ but in reality it concern facts that are part of the constitution of the claim itself and not 
extrinsic to it. But it is plain that whenever loss of enrichment defence is accepted in a legal system, it is 
thought of as a ‘positive defence’ because it relates to facts extrinsic to the constitution of the claim. The 
claim must first be ascertained to exist, and thereafter the defendant assert that the enrichment no longer 
exists or the ‘circumstances have changed’ (as the Americans put it) and therefore he should be exonerated 
from the liability to restore it.  
587  Full translation of these provisions is offered further below, and in Appendix II at the end of the thesis.  
588  Art. 238 reads: ‘If the obligation to restore a certain thing, and this thing, without the debtor’s fault, is 
lost before the transfer (tradictio), the creditor shall ‘suffer’ the loss, and the obligation will be terminated, 
save his rights up to the date of the loss’.  
589  Such rules according to the writer ‘are notably those applicable in cases of impossibility even if arising 
from fortuitous events or force majeure’ provided for in art. 339 of the CC. Art. 240, according to the 
author, establishes that the impossibility arising from the debtor’s fault results in damages (perdas e danos). 
Hence, the writer concludes that in such a situation an enrichment claim transmutes itself into a delictual 
(tort) claim [‘transmute-se daqui o regime da obrigação restitutória em um regime de responsabilidade 
civil].  
590 See the discussion at item  4.3.2.1.  
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addition he mentions three writers, two French (François Terré and P. Maularie et al) and 
one Italian. The Italian mentioned is coincidently the same Paollo Gallo to whom I have 
referred elsewhere as advocating both the need of a direct application of a change-of-
position defence in Italian law and the curbing of the subsidiarity requirement to bring 
Italian law in par with other powerful countries.591 In my view, while the ‘existence’ of 
the enrichment is a requirement envisaged both by the German BGB and the French, 
Portuguese and Italian laws, the equating of BGB § 818(3) to art. 479(2) and 420 of the 
Portuguese CC is inaccurate. Portuguese law does not expressly have loss of enrichment 
as a specific defence.592  
 
Apart from the possibly ‘limited recognition’ of loss of a enrichment defence by cross-
reference as suggested by Michelon, the best that can be said, in my view, is either that 
the defence per se is not recognised under Brazilian enrichment law, or if it can be said 
somehow to have been recognised by inference, the approach followed is that such a 
defence is only applicable in situations analogous to the doctrine of impossibility of 
performance under a contractual obligation. The mere fact that a defendant has relied 
upon the receipt and parted voluntarily with the benefit in reliance thereof, will not 
exonerate him from liability if the benefit received may still exist. The view advocated by 
Michelon, however, scores a vital point here, because it clearly tells us that there must be 
a ‘total’ disappearance of the object for the obligation to terminate ex lege. Therefore, 
Brazilian enrichment liability is clearly focused entirely on that which was received by 
the defendant, and it considers the loss of the received value in isolation from the rest of 
the defendant’s assets,593 and any other loss that might appear causally connected to the 
enriching fact is to be disregarded entirely.  
                                                 
591 For references see the conclusion of my Article on Subsidiarity to appear in due course in Columbia 
Law Review – New York (Spring 2010). (For the time being the manuscript is obtainable from the writer). 
592  See the lengthy discussion offered by J. M. Vieira-Gomes, O Conceito de Enriquecimento  (Porto 1998) 
Chapter XIV (p. 817-851) in which the Portuguese author discusses a series of German, English, American 
writers on ‘Desaparecimento do Enriquecimento’ and in no single instance he refers to art. 479(2) and 480 
of the Portuguese Code as being the equivalent of that notion.  
593 See the explanation given by Pontes de Miranda (Tratado de Diteito Privado: Parte Gera, Vol 26 
(1959) 167) on this aspect namely, that a complete enrichment law has also to take into account what is 
happening in the defendant’s assets and not consider the duty to restore the benefit received without that 
consideration, because if that were the case, the law of enrichment would be viewing the subject 
restrictively by thinking that all cases of enrichment are linked to (or entail) a ‘payment’.  See also D. P. 
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The objective approach sanctioned under current Brazilian law, if Michelon is right, 
would then seem to manifest a legal system that eschews ‘net enrichment’, that is to say, 
it sanctions a specific type of change of position in that the loss of the item received 
itself, which indicates that it is based on the premise that enrichment is specific and that it 
should not be concerned with ‘net enrichment’.594 In addition, the approach might 
equally indicate that the law of unjustified enrichment is mostly conceived in terms of 
recovery of distinct ‘pieces of property’ (certa res) that the defendant holds at the 
expense of the plaintiff at the time when the claim is raised. The claim conceived in this 
manner would seem to lie for the return of the specific object that was transferred and 
probably plus its ‘fruits’ and ‘additions’. Because of the interactions of the various 
manifestations within this formulation of the aspects emanating from the old Roman 
‘condictiones’, the general right of restitution of that which has been acquired at 
plaintiff’s expense must logically also include an obligation to restore an exact amount of 
money (certa pecunia) received by the defendant under certain circumstances. Support to 
this position can indirectly be gleaned from the very organization of the section of the 
Code from which Michelon deduces his conclusion. In fact art. 238 of the new Brazilian 
CC, which he thinks can be fully equated to BGB § 818 (III), is indeed in a section 
denominated “das obrigações de dar coisa certa” (on obligations to give a certain thing), 
while arts. 243-246 are part of the grouping identified as “das obrigações de dar coisa 
incerta” (on obligations to give an uncertain thing). But it will be mentioned later in detail 
that art. 238 and the provisions immediately following it appear in a section of the Code 
dealing with the “obligation to give”, and not on the section on “enrichment sine causa”, 
and only incidentally and even then, only with difficulty can they be related to 
enrichment liability in general.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 731-732 noting and expanding on this observation in other legal 
systems.  
594 Apparently similar approach has been proposed for the new DCFR (Draft Common Frame of Reference) 
for a European Civil Code, Book VII – Unjustified Enrichment, presented to the European Experts on 
Mach (2009). Note that the DCFR was presented to the European ‘experts’ as a whole, and not only Book 
VII. For general assessment and initial criticisms of the DCRF see Horst Eidenmüller, R Zimmermann et al 
“The Common Frame of Reference for European Private Law—Policy Choices and Codification 
Problems” (2008) 28 Oxford JLS 659-708. See also the Whittaker Report, commissioned by the Ministry of 
Justice, United Kingdom, “The Draft Common Frame of Reference: An Assessment” (November 2008). 
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In any event, in whatever way one reads the provisions of the Code it is clear that some 
of the difficulties that might have led the writers who hinted at, but did not develop and 
articulate clearly a full blown defence of ‘loss of enrichment’, would seem to be the 
difference that Pontes de Miranda identified between the structure adopted in the 
Beviláqua Code and those of other jurisdictions, i.e, the exclusive adoption of the 
condictio based approach in that Code which only provided for ‘undue payment’ while 
other Codes at the time already spoke of ‘unjustified enrichment’. In the reasoning of 
Pontes de Miranda, when the emphasis is placed on undue payment, the legal system 
looks exclusively at the ‘pending assets’ (património pendente), while if the weight is 
placed on unjustified enrichment, particular attention is paid to what is happening in the 
assets of the receiver. In this sense, according to the writer, ‘the thinking that all cases of 
restitution (repetição) are linked to a payment is avoided’. For example, asserts the 
author, ‘restitution (repetição) of that which was given as a donation, or the restitution 
due to the extinction of a credit sine causa is not a restitution of a payment; the reason for 
such restitution is that ‘there would be no causa solvendi’. From there the author 
concluded that the cases provided for in the then arts. 964-971 of the 1916 Code (now 
arts. 876-883) represented but one form of the condictio. The principles envisaged 
applied mutatis mutandi to other species as well, according to the writer. Today we can 
safely say that ‘these other species’ represent all cases of enrichment sine causa, as 
recognised by the new Code. Thus, if on the construction of a coherent doctrine of 
unjustified enrichment, due regard is also had to what is happening to the assets of the 
receiver, and if such a receiver is in good faith or other legally recognised reasons are 
present that might justify a different outcome, it is just one step from recognizing that one 
cannot ignore the possibility of an ‘unjust depletion’ of the defendant’s assets in the 
calculation of the measure of enrichment. This is the same as to say that change-of-
position (or loss of enrichment) could possibly be a general defence to all unjustified 
enrichment claims in the Brazilian law now that both manifestations of an enrichment 
claim are sanctioned – the condictio approach represented by the chapter on ‘undue 
payment (arts. 876-883) and the actio de in rem verso, represented by the provisions on 
‘enrichment sine causa’ (arts. 884-886).   
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In this chapter, divided in three parts, I attempt to analyse in the first part the structure 
and the content of the Brazilian enrichment law as a whole under the new Code in order 
to provide a glimpse of some of the underlying principles and issues. Thereafter, I 
proceed in the second part briefly to discuss some ordinary defences to the enrichment 
claim itself which do not appear in the title on enrichment in the Code and I try to provide 
an explanation for that absence. The defence of change of position (loss of enrichment), 
though directly absent from the provisions of the Code, is nonetheless discussed given 
traces that either resemble of it or manifest the need for it. The discussion of this defence 
is an exploratory journey with a twofold objective: First, it serves to make accessible to 
non-Portuguese speaking scholars and readers the treatment of the field as a whole under 
current Brazilian law; and secondly, it seeks to stimulate the Portuguese-speaking 
scholars that in the future might like to study the field to clearly articulate why their legal 
systems do not seem to need an explicit change-of-position (loss of enrichment) defence 
in the face of the recognition of a general enrichment principle. Other situations that may 
lead to apparent windfalls to the defendant are also discussed, though very briefly.  
 
Because the general purpose of the study is a comparative analysis of change of position 
defence, which does not appear on the face of it recognised under Brazilian law, but, on 
inference, it seems to be applicable or being applied in a nuanced manner under certain 
provisions of the Code, this chapter contrasts the objective and direct application of the 
defence in the other four jurisdictions595 presented in chapters two and three above with  
the seemingly indirect and subtle application of a change-of-position defence in certain 
scenarios when the need arises in a system that has recognised a general enrichment 
principle, but omitted objectively the general defence. The chapter starts by offering an 
overview of the Brazilian enrichment law as a whole, and incidentally discusses the 
contentious application of an unqualified subsidiarity rule that might be hindering an 
objective recognition of a general defence, and other ancillary issues. The study does not 
discuss the provisions of the Code one by one, but as a whole, except where there is a 
                                                 
595  The reader is reminded that the jurisdictions under discussion include Canada, United States of 
America, England and South Africa, apart from Brazil. 
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need to do so for some underlying apprehension on the provision itself or due to the 
novelty of the matter. Finally, the chapter deals with the ‘controversial’ appendage of the 
notion of ‘updating (adjustment of) the monetary value’ to the general principle of 
enrichment sine causa under the new Code, and infers from that, among other things, 
another potential head of the applicability of loss of enrichment defence. Part three, 
which is mostly in connection with the contentious addition of ‘updating the monetary 
value’ to the general principle and its potential effects, identifies specific ‘flash-points’ as 
peculiar messages that Brazilian enrichment law relays, so to say, to other jurisdictions in 
the context of the enrichment law doctrine as a whole. The passing-on defence under 
Brazilian law is discussed alongside the other four jurisdictions in examination in chapter 
five.  
 
 
PART  I – STRUCTURE OF THE BRAZILIAN ENRICHMENT LAW. 
 
 
4.2. Nomenclature, Subdivisions and Related Issues. The Trio Structure. 
 
As it was said in the introductory chapter to this dissertation, the new Brazilian law of 
enrichment in general is captured under the umbrella title of ‘atos unilaterais’596 
(unilateral acts) in the new Civil Code 2002. This general description has been somewhat 
differently formulated than in the 1916 Civil Code, which treated the same subject matter 
under the heading of ‘obrigações por declaração unilateral da vontade’ (obligations 
arising from unilateral declarations of the will). The old description seems to have been 
influenced by the then predominant notion of quasi-contract in this area of law (under the 
influence of the French codification). The nuanced use of the expression ‘declaração 
unilateral da vontade’ subtly reveals some contractual similarities that were mostly 
described as ‘obrigações por declaração bilateral da vontade’ (obligations arising from 
bilateral declaration of the will). However, despite the vital change, the central idea still 
remains the same: every legal aspect that is captured under enrichment liability or 
institutes akin to it is treated as though emanating from a unilateral act. Thus, the new 
                                                 
596   For the appropriateness or otherwise of the choice for the heading ‘unilateral acts’ see C. Michelon 
Direito Restitutório (2007). 
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Code collects under the new heading four different categories of ‘unilateral acts’, viz, the 
promise of recompense,597 negotiorum gestio, undue payment and enrichment sine causa. 
The choice of the heading ‘unilateral act’ is also a clear manifestation of the legislature’s 
desire to differentiate these subjects from matters arising from contract, for, under the 
general principles of contract the manifestation of the free will of two or more parties 
immediately comes into play in assuming the obligation that is capable of triggering a 
legal response. What motivated the legislature to assemble undue payment, enrichment 
sine causa and the like under the heading of ‘unilateral acts’ is the fact that prima facie 
the obligation deriving from all of them is imposed by law and it does not depend upon 
the will of any of the parties. Hence, for example under promise of recompense,598 the 
law imposes on the promisor the obligation to fulfill the promise, according to art. 854 of 
the new Code.599 Although the treatment of recompense can reveal some minuscule 
features of an enrichment liability, enrichment law proper commences with the 
negotiorum gestio and grows progressively in importance until it is stated in a general 
principle. 
 
 
                                                 
597  Several academics are unhappy for the drafters to have brought ‘promise of recompense’ under this 
title. A handful of others also criticise why negotiorum gestio was brought in here. Such was for example 
the view held by Caio Mario da Silva, author of the 1964 ‘Ante-Project of the Code of Obligations’ (O 
Anteprojeto do Código das Obrigações) who tried again to include the institute of negotiorum gestio 
between the Contracts. However, the Revising Committee altered that orientation and adopted that which 
appeared more preferable under modern understanding of the institute. In effect, the project of the Code of 
Obligations assigned an autonomous title to negotiorum gestio, treating it as a source of obligations (art. 
841ss). I think the former view has more substance than the latter, as almost every legal system recognises 
that enrichment liability often arises also from managing another’s affairs, though without a mandate.  
598  The concept of promise of recompense is described as the act of someone that, by public announcement 
directed to an indeterminate person, undertakes to gratify whoever fulfills a certain condition or performs 
certain service. In these circumstances, it is obvious that the promissor undertook of his own free will the 
obligation and as soon as someone from the general public or the class to which the announcement is 
directed fulfills that condition or undertakes the service, the law will impose upon the promissor the 
obligation to fulfill the undertaking. 
599  The choice of the scheme also manifests another vision that permeates the whole new Code, somewhat 
contrasted with the previous Code, i.e., - under the new Code the law is expected to fulfill a social function 
and the interests of the society at large. The treatment of promise of recompense has its intricacies and 
complexities. Among issues that may raise complex analysis are the revocability of the promise and its 
relationship with the binding aspect that was alluded to earlier; the possibility of the act or the service 
required being realised by more than one  person, or where the promise of recompense assumes the 
character of public tender in which various bidders will compete for example for the price, and thereby the 
negotium assuming an aleatory nature with the possibility of both (two people) winning and thereby being 
conferred the prize or being defeated  and thereby suffering losses. 
CHAPTER IV - Unjustified Enrichment in Brazil: Part I - Structure & Nomenclature          
        
             © Jorge Aimite  Cape-Town 15/08/2009    [This is   Page 166 ]
Change of Position Defence
  (Unjustified Enrichment)
166
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 ©
 J
or
ge
 A
m
ite
 ©
 
4.2.1. The Tripartite Division600 and its Underlying Ideas. 
 
Despite the treatment of promise of recompense in the same ‘title’, enrichment law 
proper under the new Code commences with the treatment of the notion of negotiorum 
gestio,601 and grows progressively from there until it is stated in a general principle of 
enrichment sine causa602 after consideration of its ‘undue payment’ aspect. This trio 
shares various elements in common but also each one of them has its peculiarities.  
 
4.2.2.1. Negotiorum gestio (Art. 861 to 875). 
 
Because negotiorum gestio only manifests features of enrichment liability when it 
presents itself in some instances akin to the forms of th  old Roman actio negotiorum 
gestiorum contraria603 (when it is the claim of the gestor against the dominus) and 
occasionally instances of the old form of the actio negotiorum gestorium directa (the 
claim of the dominus against the gestor), it is only briefly discussed here. Negotiorum 
gestio is normally understood as the voluntary administration of another’s affairs without 
a mandate,604 which supplies the reason for placing it amongst the unilateral acts.605 In 
                                                 
600  See introductory note to this chapter at item 4.1.0 for the use of the tripartite division in this study and 
my preference of the dualistic approach.  
601 For a recent treatment on negotiorum gestio see C. Michelon Direito Restitutório (2007) who devotes 
half of this book to this notion (pages 38-126). 
602  While Negotiorum gestio is dealt with from Art. 861 to  875, ‘undue payment’  is dealt with from Art. 
876 to 883 and ‘enrichment sine causa’ from Art. 884 to 886.  
603  See C. Michelon (supra) (2007) 58-59. For the treatment and conception of negotiorum gestio in 
common law and its current nuances as well as in old Roman law and the development in the European ius 
commune, see the discussion in this thesis in chapter 1 above.   
604 For the treatment of Mandate under Brazilian law, see among others S. Rodrigues, ‘Do Mandato Tácito’, 
Revista dos Tribunais, No. 191/ p. 579. 
605  C. Michelon, Direito Restitutório ((2007) 30) thinks that these three institutions were brought together 
under the title ‘unilateral acts’ because the new Code adopted as foundation of ‘restitutionary law’ the 
principle of ‘static conservation of patrimonies’, and not because they manifest the common feature of 
‘unjustified enrichment’ should the law not intervene, while admittedly he acknowledges that many other 
Brazilian writers think that that is indeed the case because all such institutions manifest features of 
enrichment sine causa. He also denies that art. 884-886 of the new CC have their foundations on principles 
of ‘equity’ and ‘justice’, not because of its falsehood, but because, he says, that ‘equity, morality and 
justice have little explicative value’ (p.31-33), but again in fact many Brazilian textbooks  and case law 
(jurisprudence) assert that the general principle of enrichment sine causa is indeed founded on equitable 
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contrast, undue payment, which is discussed immediately below, is often said to be 
nothing more than a species of the general notion of enrichment sine causa. Because by 
administering another’s affairs without a mandate the party doing so will have conferred 
a benefit to the ‘owner’ which he did not request, or did not agree to have, but the owner 
might nevertheless have had his assets enhanced with such benefit or they might have 
been prevented from depletion, and thus an unjustified enrichment claim could 
theoretically be made out if he refuses to compensate the gestor. The approximation of 
negotiorum gestio to an enrichment claim was already evident under the old Code, 
because under the old provisions, whoever administered another’s business was under a 
duty to restore to the owner of that business everything he acquired in such 
administration, regardless of what the cause was, subject however to the need to prove 
that were the owner in the same position as the gestor, the outcome of that administration 
would have been the same, that is to say, he would either have made the same profits, or 
the same loss, as the case might have been. The foundation of negotiorum gestio in the 
old Code and the new Code remain the same, varying only in nuances.606
 
 
4.2.2.2. Undue Payment (arts. 876-883). 
  
Undue payment is the subject matter dealt with under arts. 876-883 of the new CC. These 
provisions have remained virtually unchanged607 compared to what was already in the 
1916 Code. The discussion that follows does not deal separately with each provision but 
briefly runs through the underlying principles, issues and structure of the institute. As 
pointed out above, not all writers agree as to the specific characterization of this institute, 
whether it is a self-standing or is it a species of general enrichment sine causa. Sílvio 
                                                                                                                                                 
foundations as  the provisions just cited are nothing but the manifestation of the Roman actio de in rem 
verso even if they have been now elevated to a higher principle of generalization and systematization.  
606  For a detailed discussion of the issue see C. Michelon, Direito Restitutório  (2007) 39-129. 
607  The few changes made are the explicit inclusion of the obligations to do in the scope of the institution 
(art. 881) and the possibility under art. 883 of payments effected to attain unlawful, immoral or prohibited 
aims to revert to charities.  
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Rodrigues,608 for example, succinctly characterises the notion of undue payment in his 
treatment of the Brazilian law of enrichment under the new Code as a species of the 
general enrichment sine causa. He says that on a teleological perspective undue payment 
is just a chapter of the wider concept of enrichment sine causa.609 As a species of the 
wider notion610 it shares not only its main features and manifestations, but presumably 
also the mechanisms of resisting such claims. In his brief treatment of the historical 
development ‘do pagamento indevido’ (undue payment) from the Roman condictiones, 
he acknowledges that the ‘condictiones sine causa’611 – as he generically calls all the 
condictiones’ – arose as a reaction against a system of abstract acts, for, on the one side, 
they were meant as a corrective mean imposed by equity in order to  avoid that an act 
could produce consequences different either from the parties’ will, or from the law, or 
else different from good morals.612 After describing the condictiones one by one, the 
author finally remarks that ‘in all other cases in which no specific condictio could be 
found, but equity imposed the restitution of the undue payment, it was certainly possible 
to have recourse to the generic idea of condictio sine causa to demand restitution’.  
Hence, it is obvious from this analysis that the author, like many other Brazilian writers, 
recognises that the foundations of enrichment law lie greatly on equitable principles.613 
                                                 
608  Direito Civil, 29th ed., Vol. 3: Dos Contratos e das Declarações Unilaterais da Vontade (Editora 
Saraiva, São Paulo, 2003)  409-410. 
609  ‘O pagamento indevido constitui no plano teleológico, apenas, um capítulo de assunto mais amplo, que 
é o enriquecimento sem causa. Este repersenta o gênero do qual aquele não passa de espécie’.  
610  See however C. Michelon, Direito Restitutório (2007) 128-129 discussed below. 
611  I believe that the author described the Roman condictiones in this way for brevity sake, as there is a 
detailed analysis of the Roman condictiones one by one in the Brazilian legal literature done mostly by 
Pontes de Miranda in Tratado de Direito Privado, Parte Especial, Vol. 26 (1959) 131-155 though it would 
appear that the orientation of the discussion is essentially based on German legal literature.   
612  Rodrigues, Sílvio (2003) 410-411.  
613  J. M. Carvalho-Santos expressed the same idea in the following terms: ‘A equidade a nosso ver, é o 
fundamento do não lucupletamento à custa de outrem’ (We are of the view that equity is the foundation of 
the idea that no one shall be enriched at another’s expense’ (Código Civil Brasileiro Interpretado:  Direito 
das Obrigações, Vol. XII, 13th Edition (1988) 382-383.  C. L. Gonçalves, Tratado de Direio Civil Vol. 4 
(1957) 607 also supported the same view when he says that there is no precise theory to justify an 
enrichment action other than the classic principles of justice and law suum quique tribuere, neminem 
laedere (dar a cada um o seu, e não lesar ninguém), because these principles do not reflect anything else 
other than rules of equity. Rodrigo Xavier Leonardo indirectly arrives at the same conclusion in his 
discussion of causality in the ‘transmission of goods’ in the Brazilian law as he remarks that ‘given that the  
negotium jurídico on disposition of goods is directly related to the diminution of the active patrimony of the 
transferor in order to increase the assets of the receiver, causality must be seen as the rule and not the 
exception, mainly because the [Civil] Code in operation, explicitly and generally proscribes the enrichment 
sine causa according to art. 884’ (R. X. Leonardo ‘Cessão de Créditos: Reflexões sobre Causalidade na 
Transmissão de Bens no Direito Brasileiro’ (2005) 42 Revista da Faculdade de Direito da UFPR 133, 
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There is no way of escaping from that conclusion, and the idea of equity emerges in the 
various formulations adopted to describe the various instances in which a reversal of 
enrichment is required. Claúdio Michelon,614 however, disagrees with this position and 
says that undue payment cannot be seen under the current Brazilian law as simply a 
species of the wider notion of unjust enrichment. He attempts to give several 
explanations, amongst which the difference in the prescription regime under undue 
payment and those under enrichment sine causa, as well as the difference in the form 
each ‘institute’ determines the consequences of the action.  In sum, he says that the 
relation is not that of genus and species, but as that of a general rule and an exception to 
the general rule. Unfortunately he cites no other Brazilian writers supporting such a view 
on this point, and therefore it cannot firmly be said that such position is the entrenched 
Brazilian view of the law. Be that as it may, the distinction between ‘undue payment’ and 
‘unjustified enrichment’ (denominated enrichment sine causa in the current Brazilian 
Civil Code) is once again a certain manifestation of the ‘Pothier School’ to which I made 
reference earlier, though admittedly more attenuated than the difference on the measure 
of enrichment. In the same way that there is no unanimity about the measure of 
enrichment, there is also no unanimity about the relationship between the ‘undue 
payment’ and the enrichment ‘sine causa’ in some legal systems as well. Adopting 
Pothier’s presentation, the French Civil Code and those codes that in one way or another 
originally modelled their enrichment law on the French configuration, deal with the 
‘paiement de l’indu’ (condictio indebiti) quite extensively and tend to see it as 
‘completely separate’ from the other forms of enrichment. Thus the new Dutch Code, for 
example, devotes nine sections to ‘undue payment’ (onverschuldigde betaling)615 (art. 
                                                                                                                                                 
150). This analysis reveals that the Code throughout its structure emphasises the notion of justice and 
equity and whenever justice would not be served, such as in circumstances that would enrich one person at 
the expense of another without a justification the law must offer a redress.  
614  Direito Restitutório (2007) 128-129. 
615 Sections 6:203-211 BW. These provisions are generally considered as ‘betaling’ (payment) but their 
scope differs significantly from the one encountered in the old Dutch Code which corresponded with the 
concept in the French Civil Code. Thus, under the new Dutch Code the concept of ‘payment’ is wider; it 
includes a payment of money strictu sensu, as well as other forms of benefits such as, for example, 
transporting a stowaway or dredging a harbour, where restitution in kind is impossible. (See M.W. 
Scheltma ‘Restitution and Mistaken Payments’ in E.J.H. Schrage (ed) Unjust Enrichment and the Law of 
Contract (2001) 90). In contrast, in French law a benefit will only be regarded as a ‘payment’ when 
something, a property or a sum of money, is given which can be restored in kind (see for example Ghestin 
and J. Billiau & M. Billiau, ‘Répetition de l’indu’ in Encyclopédie Dalloz, Répertoire de Droit Civil  IV 
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6:203-211 BW) before it deals with other cases of unjustified enrichment’;616 the Québec 
Code Civil617 also follow similar lines ((CCQ arts. 1491-1492 - undue payment) and 
(CCQ arts. 1493-1406 - unjustified enrichment)). However, the current language of arts. 
876-883 in the Brazilian Civil Code seem to have adopted a wider view of ‘paiement de 
l’indu’, though maintaining the dichotomy ‘undue payment’ and ‘enrichment sine causa’, 
as the legislative intention was to depart from the restrictive position embodied in the 
1916 Code.  
 
While art. 876 of the new Brazilian Civil Code imposes upon the receiver (accipiens) the 
duty to restore what he has unduly acquired from the payer (solvens), the right of the 
solvens under this article is not to be construed as an unlimited one, for art. 877 
immediately adds a caveat that whoever has voluntarily paid what was not due, is under 
the obligation to prove that he has done so by mistake.618 The reading of art. 877 
obviously suggests that there may be two kinds of problems in this area of the law. First, 
there is the issue of an undue payment that has been performed involuntarily and, 
secondly, the need to prove an error in case the performance was voluntary. Where the 
payment or performance was rendered involuntarily, a few problems turn upon the issue, 
though it must still be distinguished between an involuntary performance due to coercion 
and one devoid of it, or where sometimes the degree of coercion does not necessarily 
vitiate the performer’s will. In spite of some divergences in the classification of what 
degree of coercion impairs totally a free will, it is nonetheless safe to say that the degree 
of coercion does not necessarily vitiate the performer’s will if such a coercion is what is 
usually termed as relative or compulsive (or still moral coercion) for such coercion 
reduces the freedom of the ‘actor’ (o coagido) but does not eliminate it altogether; hence 
the adage coatas voluntas, semper voluntas used in these circumstances.619 But where 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Dalloz, Paris) no. 4. Consequently a benefit such as stowaway or dredging an arbour would not qualify as 
‘payment’ under French law (i.e. not claimable under répetition de l’indu). In such a case it is only possible 
to claim the benefit under the action de l’enrichissement sans cause’ as recognised by the Boudier case.  In 
essence, if one looks at Brazilian law with Michelon’s, the position advocated is the same as that still 
prevailing in France. If that is the case, then the change operated under the new CC is cosmetic.  
616 Section 6:212 BW – this is the ‘unjust enrichment’ clause in Dutch law.  
617  CCQ = Code Civil de Québec. (Québec Civil Code). 
618  ‘Art 877 – `Aquele que voluntariamente pagou o indevido incumbe a prova de tê-lo feito por erro’.  
619  Where there is a mere threat to use the course of the law in order to exact a performance from an 
existing right, such a threat does not qualify as coercion that renders a performance null and void. See art. 
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coercion is absolute or ablative the performer is reduced to a mere automaton and any 
resulting act by him performed is legally considered as null and void, i.e, non-existent, or 
more technically it is an act sine causa. However, where the performance occurred 
voluntarily and free from any sort of coercion, it is the duty of the performer to prove that 
he has done so by mistake.  
 
4.2.2.2.1. Mistake: Nature and Assessment of Error. 
 
As in many other jurisdictions, the notion of mistake has received some extensive 
coverage under Brazilian law. The erstwhile debate620 about error of fact and error of law 
has presently been overcome, and both are nowadays admissible under art. 139(3) of the 
new Code. It is generally acknowledged that an error produces in the performer a false 
conception of the reality and its invocation does not frustrate the applicability of the law, 
as long as such an error, if of law, is substantial, and it is the sole or the principal motive 
for the performance – be it a payment or any other juridical negotium - to have occurred.  
There still subsist some nuanced difficulties as to whether in the assessment of a mistake 
of law consideration should be given to the notion of excusability as is done in the 
assessment of an error of fact. It is sometimes argued that such a requirement strengthens 
the applicability of the law, since the complainant alleging to have been mistaken is 
                                                                                                                                                 
100 of the 1916 Code. This article in the Brazilian Civil Code also influenced the revision of the approach  
in the Portuguese law that now provides under Art. 255 (3) of its Code the theory invoked by M. Andrade 
that ‘não consititui coação a ameaça do exercício normal de um direito’ [The threat of a normal exercise of 
a right does not constitute coercion] (See generally C.A. Mota-Pinto, Teoria Geral do Direito Civil 3rd 
Edition (Coimbra 1986) 529). 
620  The debate persisted throughout the Project and up to the eve of the approval of the new Code and was 
epitomised by the position defended by Professor Couto e Silva against that of José Carlos Moreira Alves 
among others. (It is to be remembered that Professor Couto e Silva was one of the collaborators in the 
drafting Committee as evidenced by the Speech of Miguel Reale presenting the new Code). In sum while 
Couto e Silva objected to the position adopted by the Project holding that the error of law would ultimately 
be confused with error over legal effects,; the position of Moreira Alves, which finally won over, is 
inspired by the Italian Code  (art. 1429(4) and others) and holds that the error of law must be substantial 
and that will be the case ‘if such error was the only motive or the principal reason for the transaction (or the 
negotium) and it does not result in the negation of the application of the law’ . For more details on the 
issues see José Carlos Moreira Alves A Parte Geral do Projecto Código Civil Brasileiro – [1986] 45-55; 
P.G. Gonet-Branco ‘Em Torno dos Vícios do negócio Jurídico – A Propósito do Erro de Fato e do Erro de 
Direito’ in D. Fraciulli Netto et al, O Novo Código Civil: Estudos em Homenagem ao Professor Miguel 
Reale’ (2003) 129-146; M.M. Monteiro, Erro de Direito e Causa Falsa no Negócio Jurídico (1998).  
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required to show that he applied all possible due diligence.621 There is also a suggestion 
that the onus of proof in the assessment of such diligence should be more rigorous when 
an error invoked is that of law compared to the standard required when the error is of 
fact, because of the importance of the laws.622 In addition to the above, there are some 
nuanced vestiges of a penal nature in some unjustified enrichment provisions in special 
laws. That is the case, for example, in the Consumer Code enacted under Lei No. 8.078 
of 11 September 1990 which provides under the caveat to art. 42 (parágrafo único) that ‘a 
consumer billed for an undue quantity has a right to restitution of that which was not due, 
in an amount equal to double of that which he paid in excess, increased by a monetary 
correction (adjustment) and legal interest, save in the case of an hypothesis of a 
justifiable mistake’.623  
 
The notion of the plaintiff’s duty to prove that he has acted under mistake is in line with 
the main holding that where the performer has transferred the assets or paid voluntarily 
and conscientiously, his act is to be understood as a free act with the concomitant 
consequences attaching to it. However, where such act is incapable of being classified as 
a free act, it may still reflect the so-called notion of an innocent simulation624 that 
encapsulates and hides within it a donative intent approach.625 That being the case, it is 
                                                 
621  See P.G. Gonet-Branco (supra) 146. See also S. de Salvo-Venosa, Direito Civil: Parte Geral 3rd Ed. 
(2002) 428-436. 
622   Ibid. 
623 Artigo 42- da cobrança  de dívidas.   ‘Na combrança de débitos, o consumidor inadimplente não será 
exposto a ridículo, nem será submetido a qualquer tipo de constrangimento ou ameaça.  
Parágrafo único – ‘O consumidor cobrado em quantia indevida tem direito à repetição do indébito, por 
valor igual ao dobro do que pagou em excesso, acrescido de correcção monetária e juros legais, salvo 
hipótese de engano justificável’ (emphasis added).. 
624 See for example  Jorge Americano,  Ensaios Sobre o Enriquecimento Sem Causa (SP, 1932); S. 
Rodrigues (2003) 413.  
625  Simulation as a legal concept is understood as the the practice of an act or a negotium that hides the real 
intention. It occurs when the parties do not ‘want’ the negotium that they show to everyone; they only want 
to produce an external appearance, a semblance of truth, an illusion of the existence of the affairs to third 
parties, but in truth there is a opposition between the declared and the intended affairs. There are different 
categories and classifications of simulations, namely: innocent simulation and malicious simulation, 
relative simulation and absolute simulation depending from which point of view the situation is accessed. If 
simulation is seen from the perspective of good faith and bad faith, then the important categories are 
innocent simulation and malicious simulation. In innocent simulation the ‘declaration of affairs’ does not 
harm anyone, and it is therefore tolerated. And as such innocent simulation does not lead to the annulation 
of the act, because it does not cause troubles to third parties; therefore the Brazilian legal order does not 
consider such simulation as a defect per se. When the ‘simulated’ defect is unmasked the negotium will be 
valid, as long as it is not contrary to law or does not harm third parties. In the case of malicious simulation, 
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obvious that in these circumstances the law comes clearly to the help of whoever has paid 
by mistake, avoiding in this way and for equitable consideration that he be unjustifiably 
impoverished. In order to benefit from the protection of the law, the victim is obliged to 
prove the error; in other words, where a performer alleges that he has voluntarily 
performed an undue obligation and that the law should come to his assistance in obliging 
the receiver to restore to him what was unduly performed or unduly transferred, the onus 
falls upon him to prove that he has done so by mistake. Failing to do so, the courts will 
not come to his assistance. It is, however, to be noted that there is a reversal of onus of 
proof in the Consumer Code, which for practical and special reasons, was enacted to 
counter a general trend in the industry. 
 
4.2.2.2.2. Alternative Analysis: Voluntary Performance and Involuntary Performance.  
 
Seen from a different angle of analysis, i.e. that of the aggrieved person claiming 
restoration of an ‘enrichment’, the Brazilian law of enrichment clearly distinguishes two 
species of enrichment liability, which have traditionally been termed as ‘prejudicado 
voluntário’ and ‘prejudicado involuntário’ (an aggrieved person who has performed 
voluntarily or involuntarily). First, if the factual scenario in which an enrichment claim is 
based reveals that the aggrieved person acted voluntarily, having he so acted, the other 
party’s enrichment deriving from such an act will prima facie be deemed as justified, and 
therefore no enrichment claim will be entertained, because the voluntariness of the act 
constitutes the cause or the justification of the said enrichment. Secondly, if the factual 
scenario in which an enrichment claim is based reveals that the aggrieved person acted 
involuntarily, or the act sustaining the transfer was that of a third person, or the 
enrichment being claimed resulted from an unilateral act of the enriched person himself, 
the enrichment will prima facie be deemed as unjustified or sine causa, and therefore an 
enrichment action will lie. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
however, there exists an intention to harm or cause damage by using the simulatory process (art. 162(2) 
new Código Civil). The effects are therefore different from the innocent simulation. (See generally S. Silva 
Venosa, Direito Civil – Part Geral (2006). 
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4.2.2.2.2.1. Voluntary Performance. 
 
Voluntary performance, as noted above, presupposes a justified enrichment and, for that 
reason, no claim will lie. It is, however, to be noted that in the first factual scenario, the 
existence of the cause precluding the action is a deemed exclusion only, because such a 
cause may well have been invalidly or ineffectively concluded, in which case an 
enrichment action will be entertained. The action will equally be entertained in the first 
factual scenario where a validly concluded ‘negotium’ was made dependent upon the 
happening of a future event and such event failed to happen (here it is said that there was 
indeed a cause, but such a cause was dependent). Finally, an enrichment action will also 
be entertained under the first factual scenario where the aggrieved person acted 
voluntarily, but the objective envisaged for such act ceased to exist, and thereafter there is 
no cause (this is the condictio ob causam finitam). Examples that fall under this last 
category are cases in which an insurance contract that has been validly concluded, the 
aim of which was to insure against robberies and burglaries. If the event insured against 
happened, and the insurer having duly indemnified the insured, but latter the insured 
recovers the assets stolen from the thieves, an enrichment action will lie, in the form of 
condictio ob causam finitam. Were it otherwise, the insured would be unjustifiably 
enriched at the expense of the insurer through the so-called ‘double recovery’. Another 
example where an enrichment action will be considered is in the case of contracts of lease 
or services validly concluded, where advance payments have been made, but such 
contracts are later rescinded or cancelled. Here the performance rendered under the 
contract must be restored to the payer; otherwise the payee would be unjustifiably 
enriched at the expense of the payer. As in other jurisdictions, there is some debate here 
whether the action in this factual scenario is indeed contractual or an enrichment action. 
In the cases of bilateral contracts, if the counter-performance becomes impossible, 
without fault of either of the parties, an enrichment action is also considered, save some 
qualifications. 
 
4.2.2.2.2.2. Involuntary Performance. 
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As to the ‘prejudicado não-voluntário’, in which case the enrichment is prima facie 
deemed as unjustified and ordinarily an enrichment claim is ipso facto expected to lie, 
that will indeed be the case if the act transferring the enrichment was that of a third party 
who is not in law able or allowed to validly transfer an enrichment or an asset to the 
enriched person. In the same vein, an enrichment action will lie where the act that 
brought about the enrichment was that of the enriched person himself and was not 
performed in the exercise of a right conferred upon him by the law, or such an act was 
illegal, or objectively contrary to law and had no foundation in any existing factual debt. 
For example, if Y has stolen X’s car and has since sold it to C, an unknown person, under 
Brazilian law it is possible for X  to institute an enrichment claim here against Y for the 
value he received for the car or, alternatively, an action for damages (pretensão de 
indenização). There is a possibility of concurrence of actions, but this view is not 
universally shared in the Brazilian doctrine,626 nor is the jurisprudence on the issue 
uniform. It was recently held in respect of the whol  enrichment law, and in particular of 
art. 886 of the new Civil Code which prima facie seems to proscribe a concurrence of 
actions, that such art. does not preclude the right to restitution of what was the object of 
an enrichment sine causa in cases where the alternative means conferred upon the 
aggrieved person encounter obstacles of fact.627  Therefore, under this interpretation of 
the provision, Brazilian law is moving towards the approach that a claim in unjustified 
enrichment will be available whenever justice requires that a remedy be given for 
‘property’ or ‘services’ rendered even under a contract and in circumstances where no 
remedy is available by action on the contract. 
 
                                                 
626 Pontes de Miranda summed his view in this regard as follows: ‘Conforme noutros lugares desta obra se 
diz, an acção por enriquecimento injustificado pode coexistir com outras acções, uma vez que os 
pressupostos de cada uma sejam satisfeitos. Porque o que há de restituir, por outra razão que o 
enriquecimento injustificado, se torna, se lhe fica o que teria de prestar, devedor da repetição por 
enriquecimento injustificado’ [As it was said elsewhere in this treatise, an unjustified enrichment action can 
coexist with other actions, provided that the requirements of each action are satisfied. That is so because he 
who has to restore to another for a reason other than unjustified enrichment, becomes a debtor under undue 
payment if he retains what he had to perform]. (Pontes de Miranda, Tratado de Direito Privado Vol. 26 
(1959)  135). 
627  See C.E. Nicolletti-Camillo et al, Comentários ao Código Civil De Acordo Com a Lei 11.280/2006 
(Editora Revista dos Tribunais (2006) art. 886; See also Enunciado No. 36 – I Jornada de Direito Civil – 
Conselho de Justiça Federal (11 a 13 de Setembro 2002).   
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Subtle indicators of the concurrence of actions between an enrichment claim and any 
other is also seen in the so called ‘enriquecimento cambial injustificado’ (unjustified 
enrichment ‘cambial’) that was for the first time introduced into the Brazilian law by art. 
48 of  Law No. 2.044 of 31 December 1908,628 allegedly a provision of Germanic 
origins,629 which held that ‘without thwarting the liability arising from negotiable 
instruments, a drawer or an acceptor is obliged to restore to the holder, with all legal 
interests, a sum of which he enriched himself at the expense of the holder. To this end, 
the action of the holder is the ordinary action’.630 The possibility of concurrence of 
actions is manifest in the relationship of this claim and the law dealing with prescription 
or decadence of a claim. To a certain extent, the concurrence in this respect depends upon 
the procedural rules in effect at the time. The nature of this enrichment claim, though it 
has been characterised since its introduction as controversial, is seen as a special 
application of the enrichment law. It is said that if the action against the drawer or the 
acceptor has prescribed, there arises an enrichment, and the corresponding action or the 
                                                 
628  The Decree No. 2.044/1908 is also known as ‘Lei Saraiva’. It continues in operation until today, but it 
has been supplemented by Decree No. 57.663 of 1966 (Lei Uniform). The new Code has devoted a special 
Title (Title VII) to such matters entitled ‘Títulos de Crédito’ (Credit Titles) which comes immediately after 
the Title on ‘Atos Unilaterais’ (Unilateral Acts). For a brief exposition of the various aspects pertaining to 
Title VII (Titles of Credit) under the new Code, see Carlos Roberto Gonçalves, Direito Civil Brasileiro: 
Vol III (2004) 592-617. 
629 See Pontes de Miranda, Tratado de Direito Privado: parte geral, Vol. 6 (1955) 437. Carlos R 
Gonçalves, Direito Civil Brasileiro, Vol. 3: Dos Contratos e Atos Unilaterais (2004) 618. In German law 
itself this situation is part of the classical conundrum on tri-party cases where “B” (for example a supposed 
client of a Bank) instructs “A” (the Bank) to pay his creditor “C” in circumstances where ‘A’ and ‘B’ are 
not linked by any underlying ‘covering obligation’. (See generally a comparative study by Catherine 
Maxwell, Aspects of Multi-Party Unjustified Enrichment in South Africa: A Comparison with German Law 
(unpublished PhD thesis – University of Cape Town (2006)) 200-203). Here many German authors sustain 
the view that ‘any enrichment action should lie between the parties to whichever the “Kausalverhätnis” 
(causal relationship) is defective. Canaris, for example, argues that “B” should sue “A”. That is so because 
“C” should not be exposed to an enrichment action brought by “A” in such circumstances, because he 
should not be detrimentally affected by a defect in a relationship to which he is not a party. For Canaris, to 
expect “C” to suffer the consequences of such defects would be unfair because, unlike “A” and “B” he is 
not in a position to recognise possible defects or to influence the validity of their underlying relationship’. 
Koppensteiner and Kramer (Bereicherung 25), using the example of  the post office man who paid a holder 
a postal check for which the drawer had no sufficient funds in the account (see RGZ 60, 24), also say that 
the ‘holder should not have to defend himself for a mistake made by an official at the post office’. See 
equally Larenz & Canaris ‘Lerhbuch des Schuldrecht: II/2 (1994) 224. 
630  ‘Sem embargo da desoneração da responsabilidade cambial, o sacador ou o aceitante fica obrigado a 
restituir ao portador, com os juros legais, a soma com a qual se lucupletou à custa deste. A ação do portador 
para este fim é a ordinária’.  In this citation Pontes de Miranda’s reference to ‘ordinary action’ of the holder 
is to be understood as the normal enrichment action under the general provisions of the 1917 Code, in 
contrast to a ‘special enrichment action’ (somewhat cumbersome) that was sanctioned under such ‘cambial 
law’.  This ‘cambial law’ is still valid under the new Code, therefore both actions still coexist. 
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claim arises on this very same day; the period of prescription – which in these cases is 
three years,631-  starts to run from the time the claim arose, because ex hypothesi, the 
other action has prescribed, and, in consequence of that, the said enrichment has arisen. If 
due to lack of protest the possessor has lost his cambial right against the drawer, the 
‘prescription’ time starts to run from the day he lost such a right. Whether the ‘author’ 
can institute the action of ‘cambial enrichment’, in his application for sanctioning the 
‘specific cambial action’, if the other action is denied, depends on procedural law, 
because it is possible to prove that the ‘specific cambial action’ which has not yet 
prescribed is of no value.632  
 
It is also important to know from which date the prescription period in the case of 
‘cambial enrichment action’ starts to run so that one can ascertain when the specific 
cambial action has ceased to exist. If there is still a direct action against any of the 
persons obliged to perform, inclusive of that against the ‘guarantor’ [avalista] of the 
drawer or the ‘guarantor’ of the acceptor, or the ‘guarantor of the guarantor’ [o avalista 
do avalista], the action cannot be instituted.  It remains to be known, however, whether 
the existence of an action dependent upon the cause excludes the possibility of there 
arising an enrichment action, even if it is against any of the other persons obliged to 
perform. There is no doubt that the defendant can interpose this as a means for the holder 
to be indemnified from the occurrence (or to redress his grievance), and the assessment of 
the diminution of the holder’s assets would not be understandable, without taking into 
account the subsistence of the positive element such as the existence of a causal element 
or any other action commonly given in law against any of the persons obliged to perform, 
provided it is in relation with the title. However, the onus to prove the uselessness of the 
action cum causa or any other action ordinarily given in law as against the one now 
envisaged falls on the party who instituted the cambial enrichment action.633
 
 
                                                 
631  Article 206 (3)(iv) of CC 2002. 
632  Pontes de Miranda, (supra) vol. 6 (1955) 437-8. 
633  Ibid.  438. 
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4.2.2.2.2.3. Enrichment other than by Performance. 
 
While the ‘prejudicado voluntário’ and the ‘prejudicado involuntário’ aspects of the 
enrichment normally require an active involvement of the aggrieved in the transaction or 
performance which is the subject matter of the enrichment claim, there exists also a third 
alternative giving rise to an enrichment situation in which, strictly speaking, there is no 
act of the aggrieved, but a pure factual scenario (fato stricto sensu) or an ‘act-fact’ of 
someone else (ato-fato de alguém) giving rise to the enrichment. In this hypothesis, the 
enrichment is prima facie deemed unjustified if such fact stricto sensu (fato stricto sensu)  
or ‘act-fact’ (ato-fato) enriches someone, and at the same time it erodes the economic 
advantage of another person, in situation where the law was not enacted envisaging such 
an outcome. In this category would fall examples such as the identification of one’s 
assets in matrimonial cases. Where, for instance, at the end of a marriage in community 
of property, the personal assets of one spouse increased at the expense of the common 
assets, or at the expense of the personal assets of the other spouse, the condictio in these 
circumstances will be entertained to avoid that one spouse be enriched to the detriment of 
the other. In this example it is clear that it is the pure factual scenario (fato stricto sensu) 
that gave rise to the enrichment. 
 
This third aspect, alongside the others, reveals that an enrichment action does not require 
capacity on the part of either the enriched person or the aggrieved; it is the enrichment 
per se that founds the claim or the material relation between two patrimonial assets.634 It 
is indeed an action imposed by law where the will of parties is not an essential element.  
 
4.2.2.2.2.4. Enrichment and Causa:  General Observations. 
 
While the Brazilian law of enrichment proper is mostly premised on the notion of causa 
(but see below the drafting pitfalls on this issue), the law on undue payment does not 
prima facie appear strictly to require such an element, especially where an undue 
payment is the result of a mistake. There has, however, been some debate as to whether 
                                                 
634  Pontes de Miranda, Tratado de Direito Privado,  Vol. 26 (1959) 127. 
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the notion of causa should be generalised, and in the cases concerning mistake some 
writers have advanced a position that the need to prove an error is an excessive demand 
on the performer. Some of such authors are of the view that the best approach should be 
that the performer or the solvens need to show only the non-existence of the cause for the 
payment.635 Carvalho de Mendonça, for example, thinks that whenever it is proved that 
what has been paid was not due, the logical inference to be drawn from that fact is that 
the payment was made by mistake. Hence, in such cases, once the solvens has proved the 
payment and the lack of causa for such payment, restitution should follow. The same line 
of thinking has long also been defended by other continental writers such as Baudry-
Lacantinerie.636  There is no doubt, however, that it is the basis of the Brazilian law that 
there has to be a justification for any transfer of value. This justification equates to the 
presence of a legal basis (causa). That is because, in the law of obligations in general, the 
absence of a legal ground creates a restitutionary obligation, either under the rules of 
undue payment or under the rules of enrichment which is not justified or as now 
designated in the new Civil Code 2002: ‘sem causa’. Whether one is dealing with the first 
aspect (undue payment) or the second aspect (enrichment sine causa), or even the third 
aspect of specific cases of negotiorum gestio that lead to enrichment claims, as said 
earlier, what is at stake is a shift of value (ordinarily monetary value, or other kinds of 
performances or omissions resulting in one person being enriched at another’s expense), 
and in order for such shift to stand, it ought to be justified. That being the case, the test to 
ascertain such justification is always the same: is there a legally sufficient reason for the 
shift of value? The reason for such a shift must be objective. Such a reason can be a 
contractual (or other) obligation, a voluntary act or a statutory rule. It is to be observed 
that often special rules may apply in analysing a reason based on a statute, for in such 
cases one has to look at the rationale of the relevant statutory rule, i.e., one must enquire 
whether the rule sanctions the shift of value or not.637 In any event, once it is ascertained 
that the rule sanctions the shift, that statutory rule is then perceived as the ‘causa’ for the 
shift. 
 
                                                 
635  M.I. Carvalho e Mendonça, Doutrina e Práctica  Vol. I, p. 488,  note 204. 
636  Baudry-Lacantenerie et Barde, Obligations (3rd ed. (1906) 592. 
637  See for example, art. 165-166 of the Nacional Tax Code (CTN) discussed in chapter 5 below. 
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I have alluded above to the analysis of enrichment claims from the perspective of the 
aggrieved person himself and seeing him either as one who has performed as a 
‘prejudicado voluntário’ or a ‘prejudicado involuntário’. Such analysis entails that the 
aggrieved may be a participant in the underlying reason for the shift of value or not be a 
participant. Where the claimant is a participant in the underlying reason and the shifts of 
value deriving from such action were initially thought of as constituting a legal obligation 
(e.g., payments under a void contract), such shifts are considered as made without legal 
ground if there turns out to be no obligation to be discharged. Voluntary participatory 
shifts of value, which are made with no sense of obligation, lack a legal basis when the 
intended outcome is not achieved. Non-participatory (i.e. over which the claimant has no 
control) shifts of value (e.g., the acquisition of fruits by a bona fide possessor)638 may 
constitute a legal basis.  
 
But the Brazilian legislature has clearly opted for a different view. What is required is 
simply that if there was no error leading the payer to voluntarily effect a payment of what 
was not due, an undue payment action will not be entertained. In addition, Brazilian law 
considers error widely. It does not matter whether the error was of law639 or of fact; 
neither does it matter whether it was excusable or not.640 As long as there was error in 
performing an undue payment, restoration of the undue payment must follow. 
 
 
4.2.2.3. Enrichment Sine Causa (arts. 884-886). 
 
4.2.2.3(A).  The Pathway from the Old to the New Code and Some Contentious Issues. 
 
                                                 
638 For a modern treatment of the theme of possession and the acquisition of fruits from a bona fide 
possessor see (Professor Schulz - Conference CAHS, papers delivered at UFPR on 15/08/2007 and his 
interesting interpretation of Pontes De Miranda’s treatises on the issue).    
639 Note however an exception made under art. 849 of CC 2002 (parágrafo único) about error of law, where 
the issues giving rise to the error were controversies between the parties.  
640  On error of fact or of law see for example the judgments referred to in RT 302/661 in which the courts 
held that ‘não só o erro de fato, mas igualmente o de direito, pode ser invocado como fundamento da 
condictio indebiti’. 
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The third pillar of the Brazilian enrichment liability is indeed enrichment sine causa. 
Technically speaking this is the enrichment law proper and it is in this area that the new 
Code differs noticeably from the 1916 Code. While the old Code omitted a general 
principle of liability prohibiting an enrichment sine causa, the new Code has clearly 
stated this principle. I have alluded elsewhere to the deficiencies of the earlier Brazilian 
enrichment law under the old Civil Code, based solely on undue payment, which entailed 
that objectively the Code aligned the whole field as if it were all dependent upon a 
payment, instead of a more general principle. The new Code partly overcomes that 
shortcoming and now art. 884 of the new Code provides that ‘whoever has been enriched 
at another’s expense without just cause shall restore what he has unduly acquired, after 
updating (adjusting) the monetary values’.641 A caveat is however added to the provision, 
namely that ‘if the object of the enrichment claim consists in a specific thing, he who has 
received it is under a duty to restore it, and, if the thing does no longer subsist, its 
restitution shall be effected by its value at the time it was demanded’.642 The provision 
and its caveat do not give much detail, but it seems almost unquestionable that by 
negative inference the formulation adopted subtly envisages making a distinction 
between an enrichment that comes about through a fungible and one that comes about 
through a non-fungible.643 These notions seem to be built-in and reflected in the language 
                                                 
641  Art 884 Civil Code 2002 (Título VIII - Direito das Obrigações – Dos Atos Unilaterais, Capitulo VI ‘Do 
Enriquecimento Sem Causa’. The article reads in Portuguese ‘Aquele que, sem justa causa, se enriquecer à 
custa de outrem, será obrigado a restituir o indevidamente auferido, feita a atualização dos valores monetários’. The 
Code is in effect from 1 January 2003 although some parts are still to enter into effect. Note however that 
differently from art. 473 of the Portuguese Civil Code 1967 which speaks of ‘sem causa justificativa’ 
(without a justified cause or better ‘unjustified cause’) [Full text: ‘Aquele que, sem causa justificativa, 
enriquecer à custa de outrem, é obrigado a restituir aquilo com que injustamente se locupletou’], the 
Brazilian provision speaks of ‘sem justa causa’ (without a just cause).  Note also the different wording of 
art. 2041 of the Italian Civil Code of 1942 that simply mentions ‘without cause’. [full text: ‘A person who 
has enriched himself without cause at the expense of another shall, to the extent of the enrichment, 
indemnify the other for his correlative financial loss’]. 
642 For the implication of the expression ‘its value at the time of the demand’, see discussion below at 4.3.2. 
643 Note however that Sílvio Rodrigues discussing the condictio indebiti under art. 876 and 877 remarked 
that ‘as regard to the condictio indebiti there is basically no difference whether the object that has been 
transferred is a movable or an immovable one, and whether it is fungible or non-fungible. The dispositions 
of art. 876 and 877 apply to all of them alike. The solvens that has transferred an immovable to an 
accipiens on an undue payment can have it restored to him if he proves that he paid by mistake. The parties 
are returned to the position they had been in prior to the undue payment’. S. Rodrigues, Dos Contratos e 
Atos Unilaterais (2003). This is not in contradiction to what we are saying above, as our emphasis is on the 
defence to a claim under art. 884 and the measure of the returnable enrichment under such provisions, 
through a cross-reference to the provisions in arts. 876 and 877 might create a contrary impression. Where 
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used. The same may be true for enrichment by services rendered, which does not seems 
to be recognised under any provision.  Indeed one must ask what is meant by a specific 
thing.  Is money, under such a formulation, a specific thing? Are shares specific things? 
Where does enrichment resulting from a performance of services fit into this caveat? Can 
one interpret the first part of the general enrichment action as solely related to monetary 
claims because of the expression ‘updating the monetary values’ attached to it, while the 
caveat (parágrafo único) as related to no- monetary claims? I shall return later to some of 
these questions. 
 
This provision (art. 884) as a whole is followed by two other articles (arts. 885-886) 
which form the whole new addition. However, the addition of these three new provisions 
to the enrichment law does not mean that under the old Civil C de one could not have 
recourse to provisions of the Civil Code to protect or defend his interest if the case 
resembled a claim now sanctioned under the general enrichment sine causa. The notion 
was partially covered under art. 964 of the 1916 Civil Code which provided that 
‘whoever has received something not due to him, is obliged to restore it’. This provision 
was followed by an elucidation that ‘the same obligation is incumbent upon someone 
who has conditionally received money before the condition is fulfilled’.  
 
The main difference however is that the old Code systematically treated the undue 
payment (pagamento indevido) feature of the enrichment law and a litigant could 
immediately and objectively refer to a clear provision in the law if aggrieved, while he 
could not do so if his claim were characterised under the so-called ‘actio de in rem 
verso’. The only way a litigant could protect his interest, or the court could help an 
aggrieved person in the absence of a general principle, was to refer to the general 
principles of the law (in some instances by analogy) – a technique which is allowed under 
Brazilian law. Obviously, absent a general principle prohibiting enrichment sine causa, 
the Brazilian legislature still addressed various situations that today would fall under the 
                                                                                                                                                 
a thing is lost or no longer in existence, there is no way of escaping from the fungibility and non-fungibility 
analysis to establish its value for the purpose of restitution. 
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heading enrichment sine causa through the generic idea. But such cases had to be very 
specific.  
 
The main provisions relating to unjustified enrichment under the old Code were art. 964 
and 965,644 and the rest of the provisions went all the way up to art. 971. In addition, the 
1916 Code had numerous other provisions scattered throughout its body that could be 
used in specific instances, either by analogy or because they addressed a specific matter. 
That was for example the case in respect art. 513 of the old Code which provided the 
possessor, even in bad faith, with the right to receive the expenses of maintenance and 
related expenditures, because were it otherwise, the owner would have been enriched 
without proper legal ground;645 the same provision also allowed the good faith improver 
under the rules of specificatio to acquire the ‘raw-material’ that he had modified, but the 
law under art. 613 imposed upon him the duty to indemnify the owner, because if the 
solution were otherwise, either of the parties could have exacted an undue benefit: the 
improver by having acquired gratuitously the raw-material; or the owner by having 
unduly appropriated to himself the services of the improver without paying for them. An 
enrichment action could also follow under the provisions of art. 157 of the 1916 Code 
where someone was entrusted with the administration of the affairs of another and he 
turned out to be absolutely or relatively incompetent in doing so.646  In short, it was 
possible under the 1916 Code to address most of the issues that the new provisions will 
address through the exercise of skillful cross-referencing of the provisions of the Code.647  
                                                 
644  Article 965 held that ‘He who has voluntarily paid what was not due bears the onus of proving that he 
has done so by error’ (Ao que voluntariamente pagou o indevido cumbe a prova de havê-lo feito por erro).  
This provision is repeated verbatim in the new Code 2002 in Art. 877. 
645  See for this A. Alvim (1957)  Revista Forense  49. 
646  See Pontes de Miranda Tratato de Direito Privado, 2nd Ed. Volume 43, (1963) 195 (§ 4.706) 
647  The cross-referencing under the new Civil Code can already be seen in the application of art. 884 by the 
courts. For example, this art. (884) is cross-referenced with art. 1832 of the new Code dealing with 
collation. Current Brazilian jurisprudence has for example held that ‘in order to avoid an enrichment sine 
causa, collation – in the law of succession - shall be done based on the value of the bequest at the time of 
the donation, in terms of the caveat of the Civil Code 2004 (reference to art. 884, caveat which is 
commented further below in this work), exclusively in the hypothesis that the thing donated is no longer 
part of the donor’s assets.  However, if the thing is still part of his assets, collation shall be calculated based 
on the value of the thing at the time the succession takes effect,   in terms of CPC 1014, in order to preserve 
the quantity that will effectively integrate the legitimate deceased assets when these are amalgamated., i.e;, 
at the time of death’ (See Colação, Valor. in  Jornada I STJ 119). The whole law of enrichment is also 
cross-referenced to art. 206(3)(iv) of the new Code dealing with the prescription period of an action for 
enrichment sine causa which is three years.  
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In spite of all the efforts by the courts to address the issue through general principles and 
analogy, the doctrine (academic writings) deemed this solution to be inadequate and went 
on the offensive, demanding that a catch-all provision be recognised, because it found 
that there was still a possibility that some genuine claims could not be solved under the 
existing techniques.  Amongst the problems that the old Code created was the difficulty 
to fathom whether the legislator, although it omitted a general principle prohibiting an 
enrichment sine causa in the 1916 Code, nevertheless wanted to proscribe generally all 
enrichment sine causa, or whether such proscription could only be admitted in the 
specific cases mentioned in the text of the law, such as those cited earlier.648
 
Obviously, under these circumstances there were two currents of thought, the one trying 
to defeat the other. The first approach was based on the negative position mostly captured 
under the maxim ‘inclusio unius, exclusio alterius’ while the second assumed a positive 
attitude and is subsumed under the adage ‘ubi eadem ratio, idem jus’.  The negative 
approach, mostly espoused by Clovis Bevilaqua649 and vehemently defended afterwards 
by the theorist Jorge Americano,650 held that given that the Brazilian legislator was aware 
of similar rules in other jurisdictions and consciously omitted it, this meant that apart 
from undue payment and the specific cases mentioned in the Code or other legislative 
instruments,651 enrichment sine causa was tolerated under the then Brazilian law. For  
Jorge Americano, again, enrichment sine causa was nothing more than an informative 
principle and could not be elevated to the heights of an institute or normative principle. 
Further arguments advanced to deny the existence of a general enrichment action at that 
stage were that the number of cases that could fall under such a general action would be 
very small indeed as most of the imaginable cases were already covered by the existing 
law in the various provisions scattered throughout the Code or other legislative 
                                                 
648 See A. Alvim, ‘Do Enriquecimento Sem Causa’ RT, 259/3 São Paulo (1957); A. Alvim,  ‘Do 
Enriquecimento Sem Causa’ Revista Forense  47ss; S.  Rodrigues (2003) 422.  
649  See C. Boviláqua,  Código Civil, Observações ao Artigo 964 (Code of 1916).   
650  J. Americano ‘Essaios... (Ensaios Sobre o Enriquecimento Sem Causa’) p.122 No. 59. 
651 See for example decree no. 24.150, of 20 April 1934 (Lei de Luvas) which expressly mentions 
unjustified enrichment that such enactment intends to outlaw.  
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instruments.652 The negative position drew additional impetus from art. 4 of the Law that 
had introduced the 1916 Code which held that ‘should there be omission in the law, the 
judge has to decide the case having recourse to analogy, customs (costumes) and the 
general principles of law’. The positive view, defended among others by Agostinho 
Alvim, sustained the idea that the omission under the 1916 Civil Code was a legislative 
oversight and this lacuna was being addressed by the judiciary through the use of 
analogy, and if analogy could not work, the issue was dealt with by reference to the 
general principle of the law, as stated earlier. Carvalho Santos, commenting on the 1916 
Civil Code, objected to Clovis Bevilaqua’s view that the omission of the general principle 
forbidding an enrichment sine causa was not only intentional by also justifiable due to the 
fact that the various species in which enrichment was present could not be made 
subordinate to a single unifying principle.653 Santos thought that the omission, even if not 
an oversight, was being addressed either by the application of art. 4 and 7 of the law 
Introducing to the Civil Code, just cited above, i.e.; (whenever there is omission in the 
law), or it was indeed the actio de in rem verso that was being ingeniously applied in 
practice, despite the difficulty of defining its scope and limits.654  
 
 
4.2.2.3(B).   The Solution under the New Code’ (CC 2002):  An Analytical 
Consideration. 
 
The new Code, as has been mentioned, enacted the general principle into law by means 
of art. 884, which provides that ‘he who is enriched at another’s expense without just 
cause, is obliged to restore what was unduly obtained, after ‘updating (or adjusting) the 
monetary values’. 
  
This new provision emphasises four main aspects: (i) enrichment (ii) without just cause; 
(iii) at another’s expense (iv) ‘after updating (adjusting) the monetary values’.655 I will in 
                                                 
652  J. Americano (supra) p.122-26. 
653  See C. Boviláqua, Código Civil, Observações ao Artigo 964 (Code of 1916).   
654  J.M. Carvalho-Santos, Código Civil Brasileiro Interpretado 13th ed (1988) 378-79. 
655  The expression ‘updating monetary values’ is sometimes referred to as ‘correcção monetária.  
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due course address each of these aspects separately and reveal some of the nuances that 
might be encapsulated in the formulation. 
 
For the time being, let me consider the addition of the principle to the Code as a whole. 
Reading the new enrichment provisions as a whole (art. 884-886) it transpires once again 
that this principle banning unjustified enrichment is in turn based on the principle of 
higher equity that does not allow one person to gain to the detriment of another without a 
cause that justifies such a gain.656 Following in the footsteps of the development of 
French law, the general enrichment principle encapsulated in the Brazilian law developed 
through the actio de in rem verso and thus far it is only allowed if there is no other 
judicial remedy available through which an aggrieved person can have a redress, as 
provided for under art. 886 of the new Civil Code which reads that ‘no restitutionary 
action for enrichment shall be entertained if the law grants to the aggrieved party other 
means to redress the loss suffered’.657 This is the subsidiarity requirement. Brief 
discussion of subsidiarity and its various meanings was done elsewhere in this thesis.658 
It suffices here to note that there have also always been some voices among Brazilian 
academics or writers questioning the desirability of such requisite in the Brazilian 
enrichment law, alongside the mirror-image ‘gain-loss’ or ‘enrichment-impoverishment’ 
requirement.659 Recently it was held, for example, that the ‘expression enrichment at 
                                                 
656 There exist several other views as also A. Alvim recognised when he held that ‘grande número de 
autores fundam na equidade a condenação do enriquecimento injustificado; outros há que se reportam à 
ideia de causa; outros aproximam o instituto do enriquecimento do instituto da reparação do dano; outros 
prendem-se à ideia de equilíbrio de patrimónios; ainda há outros pontos de vista’ [A considerable number 
of authors base the foundation of the condemnation of unjustified enrichment in equity; others do so based 
on the idea of causa; others approximate the institute of enrichment to that of reparation of damage (i.e. 
delict or tort law); others are attached to the idea of equilibrium of assets; and exist many other views) 
(1957 A. Alvim, ‘Do Enriquecimento Sem Causa’ (1957) Revista Forense 51). For a wider treatment of the 
various foundations of unjust enrichment law, see my conclusion to chapter 2 of this thesis, and further 
literature there provided (pages 101-105 above).  
657  (Art. 886 – ‘Não caberá à restituição por enriquecimento, se a lei conferir ao lesado outros meios de se 
ressarcir do prejuízo sofrido’).  
658  See notes 5 and 558 above and note 915 below in the conclusion chapter for issues on subsidiarity. For 
an in depth treatment of the theme, see my separate publication dealing specifically with such a notion in 
the law of unjustified enrichment. (Note: The publication mentioned here is to appear in spring 2010 in 
Columbia Law Review – New York, at which time full reference will be available. For the time being the 
manuscript is obtainable from the writer). 
659 Back in 1954 Pontes de Miranda writing about the action of ‘distrate’ or ‘distrato’ as he sometimes calls 
it, said the following: ‘Is the restitutionary action the same as that of unjustified enrichment, or that of 
distrate itself,  or both, with a subsidiary character of  the latter?  If the efficacy of ‘distrate’ achieves the 
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another’s expense of the new Civil Code art. 884 does not necessarily mean that there 
must be impoverishment’.660 In the same vein, Claúdio Michelon661 confirms the general 
opposition to an unqualified subsidiarity requirement when he refers to the decision of 
the Commission on the Law of Obligations,662 which a few months after the enactment of 
the Code recommended the following: 
   
‘Article 884 that deals with the subsidiarity of the right to restitution based on the enrichment sine 
causa does not exclude the right to restitution of the enrichment either in the cases in which the 
alternative means given to the aggrieved to make up his losses encounter an obstacle of fact which 
hinders the elimination of the enrichment, or in the cases in which the alternative means offered to 
the aggrieved appear not to suffice to undo the totality of the enrichment’.  
 
Existing Brazilian legal literature, though scanty on this issue, seems to have quietly 
accepted it that the new addition is indeed the actio de in rem verso. There are still some 
small variations among writers, but the dominant view is that a claim based on such a 
action entails the following requirements: (i) an enrichment of the defendant; (ii) an 
impoverishment of the claimant; (iii) the existence a causal link between the enrichment 
and the impoverishment; (iv) an absence of cause that justifies the transactions and (v) 
the absence of any other action for the claimant to gain redress. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
factual support (o suporte fáctico), or the cause, the action is that of restitution ob causam finitam. The 
same does not happen if the ‘distrate’ only remains in the sphere of efficacy, - the cause was not achieved; 
the action here is that of ‘distrate’. But there is a third solution: The ‘distrate’ goes against the effects and 
achieves the cause: here the creditor would have a choice. The question is linked to the operation that 
happens with the ‘distrate’ in the sphere of efficacy, that is, the ‘distrate’ dissolves (undoes), but it does not 
resolve, nor does it solve; it does not turn ‘E=Zero’, it only enunciates that ‘E-E’, in which moment ‘M’ 
corresponds with the action of contract, and post-propositionally leads to ‘Zero’, and at the same time ‘M’ 
corresponds to an enrichment action. If the contracting party that has performed asks his performance, 
alleging ‘E-E’, then he exercises the action of ‘distrate’; if he asks his performance alleging that ‘E=Zero’, 
he left moment ‘M’ behind him, and anything he demands, it can only be according to art. 964-971 (the 
enrichment provisions under the 1916 Civil Code), principles which do not always coincide with those that 
direct a contractual action (there, ‘distractual’ – according to the author himself) on restitution. There it can 
be seen how false is the theory of subsidiarity of the ‘justified enrichment action’, which only accepts it if 
there is no other action’ (Miranda, Tratado das Obrigações: Parte Geral, Vol. 3 (1954) 229). I think in this 
quotation he meant ‘unjustified enrichment action’ and not ‘justified enrichment action’, as the text puts it.  
660 See Primeira Jornada de Direito Civil (Brasilia 2002) No. 35; See also N.N. Junior & R.M.A. Nery 
Código Civil Comentado (4th ed) (2006) 592 (revised and updated edition). M.C. Kroetz, Do 
Enriquecimento Sem Causa (2005) 78ff. 
661  C. Michelon, Direito Restitutório (2007) 264. 
662 Primeiras Jornadas de Direito Civil -  Council of Federal Justice – CJF - (Brasília (2002), Enunciados: 
(Direito das Obrigações),  Item 35 (which deals with art. 884 of the new CC) and item 36 (which deals with 
art. 886 of the new CC).  
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The rule that has hitherto been accepted for an action based on improvements namely that 
the enrichment must be actual, i.e. existent at the time of demand (litis contestatio), 
seems to extend now to the whole field. For an action based on improvements, it has been 
held, that where such improvements have been done by a possessor and by the time of the 
litis contestatio such improvements no longer exist or have deteriorated, there is no room 
to speak of enrichment, because there is no increase in the assets of the owner.663 Put 
differently, it has always been implicitly accepted that ‘non-enrichment’ in cases of 
improvements is a ‘defence’ to the claim itself. Though it is not openly acknowledged 
either by the law (legislation) or in the jurisprudence, the non-enrichment as a defence, is 
subtly accepted in a wider sense, as we shall see later, and the doctrine has clearly 
ventilated it in this wider sense, lacking only a systematic consideration of the issue, 
perhaps obscured and hindered by the subsidiarity requirement. Support for my 
contention can be found in what Agostinho Alvim fifty years ago described as being one 
of the essential elements of an enrichment sine causa action in his seminal Article 
published in Revista Forense. The author put it this way:  
 
‘Because [in an action for enrichment] what is at stake is restitution for enrichment, and not 
indemnification for damages, the enrichment must exist at the time of the action. If it existed, but ceased to 
exist, as a rule, there is nothing to restore. Such hypothesis, however, must not be confused with the 
substitution of the thing, because, if it does not exist because it was transferred, this will be a case of sub-
rogation in the price’.664
 
 The author is very clear here. Subrogation in the price applies only if the non-existence 
of the thing is due to a transfer of the original thing; that is to say the replacement of the 
thing by its value. 
 
(i)  ‘Enrichment’.  
 
The element ‘enrichment’ is an essential requirement in order to establish a successful 
claim on enrichment sine causa. The notion of ‘enrichment’ is to be understood in its 
                                                 
663  J.M. Carvalho-Santos, Código Civil Brasileiro Interpretado 13rd Ed. Vol. 12 (1988) 385. 
664   A. Alvim (1954) No. 173 Revista Forense 47-67, at 57. 
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wider sense. The most frequent form of enrichment is the shift of values from one 
person’s patrimony to that of another. But enrichment also occurs in many other forms 
such as where one has avoided losses; or where one has avoided using his own things or 
assets, saving himself expenses. There is also enrichment flowing from the transfer of 
possession (condictio possessionis) or from the remission of a debt or from services 
having been rendered; or from the acquisition of some moral benefit (advantage) which 
also has a pecuniary value. There is even enrichment if one’s assets have enlarged by 
incorporation into them of a material or an immaterial element.  In sum, the wider sense 
of enrichment entails any increase of one’s assets or any avoided decrease of such assets 
(a decrease in one’s liabilities), and even non patrimonial advantages gained provided 
they can be estimated in money.  The example discussed in the section that follows on 
monetary adjustments in cases of judicial deposits in times of steep inflation,665 
represents from one angle of analysis a situation in which no direct values have shifted 
from one patrimony to that of another, because it is not denied that such deposits are to be 
refunded in the very sums received. The contention that ‘unjustified enrichment’ in this 
example arises only because of the perceived difference between the ‘numeric value’ of 
those deposits and the ‘real value’ of the money in the accounts. In other words, the State 
in this example, by devaluing the currency and attempting to pay the very sums received 
in judicial deposits in their original ‘numeric value (or nominal value) after some 
considerable time has elapsed, indirectly decreases its liabilities, and therefore enriches 
itself, while the depositor is impoverished because whatever he can do with that ‘nominal 
value’ is now more expensive, and therefore decreases his acquisitive power. Put 
differently, the State is enriched by decreasing its potential liabilities and by shifting the 
burden to the depositor who is impoverished with having a sum in his hands which has 
less acquisitive power, and therefore extending the time to fulfill any potential 
obligations sounding in money he (the depositor) might have. 
 
As mentioned above, enrichment can also come about through the performance of 
services or through a remission of a debt. Enrichment by performance of services has 
received very scanty treatment under Brazilian law, and examples of recovery under such 
                                                 
665   See below, discussion on effects of Law No. 6.899/81 (Indexation Decree); and REsp. 12.591.0/SP. 
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a heading are very rare. In the scanty instances of this kind of enrichment, one sees the 
enrichment arising therefrom in its end product or in the increase in value that it brought 
about in an existing property where it is associated with improvements (benfeitorias). It 
is, however, to be noted that where mistakenly conferred services do not create an end-
product, or result in the increase of value of an existing property or discharge of a debt, 
the only probable remedy which a plaintiff might pursue is the payment for the 
reasonable value of the services rendered. The reasonable value approach brings the 
matter somewhat closer to a contractual setting, but concrete examples are very rare and 
sometimes ambiguous. In any event, it would appear that in ordinary circumstances, 
requiring the defendant to pay for the reasonable value of services would in most cases 
leave that defendant out of pocket and thus at a disadvantage compared with his pre-
mistaken position. The issue may be of interest for further research.  
 
In short, whether it is stated or not, there is enrichment whenever the right of ‘retention’ 
of a benefit would be unjustified, and the related enrichment liability arises where there 
has been performance in one of the following circumstances for which one expects the 
associated right: (i) where the performance is the undue delivery of a thing, the claimant 
has the right to claim the thing as having been unduly rendered; (ii) where it is payment 
of money, the claimant has the right to claim payment of the same amount; and (iii) 
where other performances have been rendered the claimant has the right to reversal 
thereof.  A swollen wealth resulting from an omission to perform qualifies in any of the 
categories above as enrichment if the facts fit it.  
 
 
(ii). ‘After Updating the Monetary Values’ (Monetary Adjustment). 
 
The expression ‘after updating the monetary values’ (feita a atualização de valores 
monetários) is somewhat confusing in the context in which it is used and what exactly it 
means has not yet been fully tested in the courts. Article 884 was meant to introduce a 
general enrichment action as a catch-all provision; and yet the provision speaks of 
‘updating or adjusting monetary values’ apparently as the fourth requirement of such a 
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general action. The use of this element seems to indicate that the enrichment claim 
provided for under this general action embraces money claims alone and any enrichment 
that does not fit into the monetary mould is not considered. This observation may be 
corroborated by the wording of the caveat to the general claim that follows it and which 
speaks of ‘if an enrichment consisted in a specific thing’ which appears to be there as the 
opposite of money in the preceding clause. I have highlighted in a footnote above the 
differences in the wording of the general actions provided for in the Portuguese and 
Italian Codes which do not use those words.  There is a suggestion in the legal literature 
to the effect that such an expression is related to currency devaluation or inflation in the 
country as a whole, but the context does not seem fully to support such a wide contention. 
Carlos Gonçalves666 who advocates this proposition says that  
 
‘the determination that restitution of that which has been unduly received be effected with ‘adjustment of 
monetary values’ is due to the fact that jurisprudence (court decisions) has for long manifested that the 
corresponding monetary value constitutes a mere reposition of the value of the currency weakened by 
inflation, and its calculation is to be computed from the moment the ‘payment’ (emphasis added) was 
made, in order to avoid the enrichment sine causa of the debtor, rendering irrelevant any delay that might 
have occurred in the institution of the demand’.  
 
The author, however, does not cite any authority supporting this contention, save a single 
reference to one court decision,667 and his discussion of this issue appears in a single 
paragraph of seven lines. Neither does the author tell us what the facts were in that 
decision in which such proposition might have been made and how the judge updated the 
monetary values and the criteria used. Be that as it may, Claúdio Michelon668 has in the 
                                                 
666  C. R. Gonçalves, Direito Civil Brasileiro – De Acordo com o Novo Código, Vol. III (2004)  588-90. 
667  STJ, REsp 31. 791-MG, 4a. Turma; Rel. Min. Barros Monteiro; DJU, 22/04/2002,  p. 212. 
668  C. Michelon, Direito Restitutório (2007) 242. The author says: ‘As regard situation (b) - [at p. 240  – 
situation in which the value received (which is expressed in money) has suffered a decrease due to currency 
devaluation. In this case (second case), one must ask whether the obligation to the enriched person also 
comprises the duty to restore not only the nominal value, but also a reposition of real value, i.e.; a monetary 
correction] -  the provisions of art. 884 seem to make an exception to the general rule in the Civil Code.  
Art. 315 of the CC determine that debts (owed) in money must be paid in their nominal value. The 
automatic monetary correction (not agreed upon) is a consequence that the Code ascribes to the non-
performance of a pecuniary obligation, with the aim of preserving the purchasing value correspondent to 
the nominal value at the time of non-compliance (art. 404). The so-called ‘nominalism principle’ that is 
opposed to the notion that debts have to be paid by the value of the purchase, admits exceptions, such as the 
possibility of correction of pecuniary value due to the disequilibrium between performances arising from 
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meantime also adopted the same view as Carlos Gonçalves while commenting on the 
very art. 884 and cross-referencing it to arts. 315, 317 and 404 of the Code. Furthermore, 
the observations of Judge Sena Rebouças in an Appeal Court decision in São Paulo 
(426.304/1 SP) seem indeed to corroborate Gonçalves and Michelon’s interpretation:669  
 
‘Masking the inflationary process (alleging or pretending that it does not exist, institutionalizing the 
tale of a ‘strong currency’, but which has always been the same weak currency under a different 
name), also results in hiding the profits that inflation brings to the State as debtor. The process that 
once was open is now hidden, but it continues to exist. Inflation is lucrative to the extent that it 
transfers the assets of the creditors to the debtors. Whenever there is inflation and the fact is ignored 
for whatever reason (by the law or by the courts decisions), there is a transfer of assets. The creditor 
is impoverished (decreasing his credit in real value), and the debtor is enriched (decreasing his 
debits), to the extent of the inflation. The profit is exactly what the debtor (in casu, the depositary) 
has ceased to pay for a while, postponing his debt without any duty of adjusting it (because in effect, 
inflation continues), which results in an enrichment sine causa, which cannot and must not pass 
unnoticed by the Judiciary. The institutionalization of a monetary correction [monetary adjustment 
mechanism] in judicio is an instrument of justice through which judges and courts correct the 
distortions that, in the face of inflation, legal and contractual norms bring to the rights of the 
parties’. 
 
‘It is important to correctly establish the concept of monetary correction in judicio (or monetary 
correction as an instrument of justice), peculiar to the law, although it is of economic origins, or 
emanating from an economic concept. Monetary correction in judicio is an inherent mechanism to 
the inflationary process, and for that reason it is only possible to conceive the non-existence of 
monetary correction if there is no inflation. It is not only unacceptable and even contrary to the 
notion of good faith to establish a ‘nominalistic’ principle in time of steep inflation, but also it is 
objectionable to implement any other idea that could hamper and curb the enforcement of monetary 
correction in this time of inflation, for, such fact would impose the transfer of the above mentioned 
assets to the benefit of   the debtors while harming the creditors’. Yet, the worst that comes from this 
same situation is the effect of transforming the Judicial Power in the process to be an instrument of 
windfalls, or, in the best of hypothesis, as an accomplice of what conventionally is called 
                                                                                                                                                 
unforeseen events that have occurred from the time the obligation arose (art. 317). Thus, art. 884 makes an 
exception to the ‘nominalism principle’ because it expressly determines that the value unduly acquired be 
restored after adjusting the monetary values’.  
669  The whole issue of currency devaluation leading to the assertion of ‘adjustment according to inflation’ 
is linked to the economic crisis period and its main features are embodied in Lei No. 6.899/81 which deals 
with Judicial deposits. The law is also known as the law of indexation. 
CHAPTER IV - Unjustified Enrichment in Brazil: Part I - Structure & Nomenclature          
        
             © Jorge Aimite  Cape-Town 15/08/2009    [This is   Page 193 ]
Change of Position Defence
  (Unjustified Enrichment)
193
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 ©
 J
or
ge
 A
m
ite
 ©
enrichment sine causa.  The non-implementation of a monetary correction (adjustment) mechanism 
is a profound shock to the general ethical sentiment, and consequently, the suggestion to return the 
same genuine deposit unchanged represents the idea of returning nothing at all.  It would lead to an 
absurd result, economically indefensible and judicially an aberration, which cannot be sustained. For 
this reason, it must be ensured that the rules on actualization of values on the sums deposited must 
be the same as those that are used to updating judicial calculus (assessments), i.e. the use of IPC 
(CPI – Consumer Price Index), in the periods in which the government plans above cited have 
modified the system of ‘remuneration’ of savings, mandating the implementation of indexes that did 
not reflect the reality of inflation. In these cases, jurisprudence has acquiesced, admitting a real 
correction. The correction, as a ‘ceiling’, is aimed at maintaining the currency at its initial level of 
acquisitive power, and consequently, it is not an ‘income’. The devolution of an amount deposited 
must be corrected (adjusted) from the date of the deposit up to the effective date of receiving such 
deposits’.  
 
Further support for this position can be drawn from the effect that Law No. 6.899/81 
(Indexation Decree) may have in the law as a whole. This law is very complex, but we 
are only interested in those aspects that are relevant to unjustified enrichment. It has been 
held in a case reported at REsp. 12.591.0/SP670 that ‘the systematic monetary adjustment 
of debits arising from judicial decisions – sanctioned by Law No. 6.899/81 – constitutes a 
real legal principle that is applicable to any kind of legal relationships and in all branches 
of the law’.  The court in that decision further held it to be well known that the 
phenomenon of monetary adjustment ‘is exclusively aimed at maintaining over time the 
real value of the debt by means of an alteration in its ‘nominal’ (numeric) expression. It 
does not generate any increase in the value nor does it translate into a punitive sanction. It 
simply derives from the passage of time under the currency devaluation regime’.  
 
Under the rules sanctioned by such a law in a generally indexed economy,671 it is said 
that one must transform any monetary obligations – especially those arising from 
contractual transactions – into ‘debts in values’ (dívidas de valores) in which the currency 
serves as a mere indicator of an amount which changes according to pre-established 
                                                 
670  REsp 12.591-0/SP (1ª Turma STJ)  (18.5.1992) Relator,  Min. Demócrito Reinaldo, in Boletim Adcoas 
No. 138.819] 
671  It is debatable to what extent Brazilian can still be considered as a generally indexed economy; for over 
time many have argued for its des-indexation to some extent. Therefore the ‘adjustment of monetary 
values’ under art. 884 of the New CC should be put in perspective with time, if it is indeed correct. 
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indexes.672  It is to be noted that, as regard to debts arising from judicial decisions, art. 1 
of Law 6.899/81 clearly encompasses all pending payments arising from the unfulfilled 
obligations, and it mandates monetary adjustments of any pecuniary debt even if there 
exists no specific contractual provision. In the case of a liquid debt, monetary adjustment 
is to be undertaken from the time the debtor fell in mora, and in all other cases, from the 
time the judgment was issued. In some instances, obligations undertaken envisaging 
payment in a foreign currency,673 the operation itself is normally not invalidated, but the 
clause that stipulates the foreign currency operation is sometimes considered null and 
void; although the agreed upon sum between the parties in such agreements still has to be 
converted into the national currency. In these cases the problem that often arises is to 
determine the value date for the conversion, whether it is the stipulation date or the 
payment date. In either hypothesis, there arises the possibility of an unjustified 
enrichment. While the Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF)) in such 
issues has decided that the conversion to the national currency is to be considered from 
the date of the stipulation (i.e. of the judgment), because, according to the court (Rel. 
Min. Morreira Alves)674 a conversion based on the date of the payment would result in an 
unjustified enrichment (inaccurately labelled as ‘enriquecimento ilícito’)675 of the 
creditor, who would benefit from the adjustment of the foreign currency during the 
duration of the contract, having as basis an invalid act, which is expressly proscribed by 
Decree No. 23.501/33. Logically, the appealed decision from the TJRJ (Tribunal de 
                                                 
672  G. Tepedino, Temas de Direito Civil’  1st ed. (1999) 102-103; 3rd. Edition, (2004) 110-111.  There 
exist official indexes for the adjustment of monetary values emanating from judicial decision debts.  Law 
No. 6.899/81 itself was the product of the then Brazilian high inflationary economy, under the currency 
known as ‘Cruzeiro’. For further details on these indexes and related matters, specially quotations in 
foreign currencies see A. Wald, Obrigações e Contratos (53);  G. Tepedino, Temas de Direito Civil’   
(1999) 103. 
673  This issue is based on Decree No. 23.501 of 27/11/1933. This decree forbade in all internal contracts 
(contracts within Brazil) stipulations and payments in Gold (it is to be remembered that by 1933 the world 
still operated under the Gold standard) or in other determined kind of currency, other than local currency. 
This precept exactly originated due to the inflation and the cambial imbalances of the time, which forced 
the Provisional Government of the 1930 to issue such legislations following other countries. This 
legislation is still in effect, but over time it has been modified and several exceptions are now made to its 
provisions.  
674 Foreign readers should take notice that under Brazilian ‘legal nomenclature’ the justice (judge) issuing 
the judgment is commonly referred to as ‘Relator’ (in brief: Rel.) and the judges or justices at the ‘Supremo 
Tribunal Federal’ (STF) are referred to as ‘Ministers’ (in brief: Min.).  
675  It is not infrequent that some writers interchangeably use ‘enriquecimento ilícito’ with ‘enriquecimento 
injustificado’ (sine causa). The confusion occasionally appears also insome judgements, such as in the 
judgement referred to here.   
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Justiça do Rio de Janeiro) was equally founded on the principle forbidding an enrichment 
sine causa, but there it was seen from the reverse party. According to the TJRJ  the 
conversion of the sum borrowed in the hypothesis of a loan contracted in a foreign 
currency,  had to be made from the date of payment, in order to avoid an enrichment sine 
causa of the debtor in the face of the devaluation of the national currency while the 
contract was in operation.676 Therefore, in whatever way the issue of ‘monetary 
adjustment’ is seen, it is obvious that it leaves a windfall to one party in the equation, 
which though it might ultimately be justified (i.e. it is cum causa, because of the 
application of the said Law 6.899/81), it might still be unjust. 
 
Inflation ordinarily is not the work of private citizens, but that of the State or 
Government. How can a provision aimed at all private persons at large (as well as public 
bodies) be made dependent upon an act done by the State? While the above interpretation 
would be adequate where one party is a public body (e.g. depository institutions such as a 
bank or the like), stretching that interpretation to cover ordinary private citizens has a 
penal quality, and its universal applicability to any branch of law is questionable.   
 
In order to capture the possible meaning of the words ‘updating the monetary values’, 
one must analyse the provision as a whole. It says that ‘whoever has enriched at another’s 
expense without just cause shall restore what he has unduly acquired, after updating the 
monetary values’. The provision states a general principle and does not refer exclusively 
to money claims; though its final part speaks of ‘monetary values’; it refers to any 
enrichment acquired sine causa, be it a monetary benefit or a money worth benefit, or 
any kind of benefit from which the recipient enriches himself at another’s expense. The 
caveat (parágrafo único) that follows the provision also indicates that if ‘updating 
monetary values’ were to refer to currency inflation, it would be incongruent with an 
enrichment consisting in a specific thing for which the calculation of the value of the 
enrichment, if the thing has been lost or no longer exists, is to be considered from the 
time the demand is made (litis contestatio), and not when the thing was acquired by the 
defendant. This assertion that the enrichment generally is to be considered from the time 
                                                 
676 See generally Jurisprudência Brasileira 70/74-78. 
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of the litis contestatio is well entrenched in Brazilian law for, as Pontes de Miranda once 
put it, ‘what is given in the case of unjustified enrichment is not the value of the thing at 
the time that the enrichment occurred, but the value of the defendant’s enrichment as it 
enriches him at the time the action is brought’.677 The same author elaborated on this 
view by adding the following example in respect of a specific thing: ‘If the thing had 
remained in the hands of the claimant would be valued at ‘a’, but while it remains with 
the defendant its value is now ‘a+x’, then the value to be restored to the claimant is 
‘a+x’, save in the cases provided for under art. 966 of the Civil Code 1916’. Article 966 
which constitutes an exception in Pontes de Miranda’s analysis, provided as follows: ‘To 
the fruits, accessions, improvements and deteriorations that have occurred to the thing 
given in an undue payment, shall apply what is provided for under arts. 510-519 (of the 
1916 Code)’. These provisions have not changed that much under the new Code.678 
Rodrigues Filho Eulámpio679 exemplifies the application of the then art. 966 with 
reference to a São Paulo court decision reported and commented upon at TJSP, RT 
613/96 in which decision it appears that a disputed salary was fixed in a first instance 
court decision. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced the quantum to a lower sum, and 
of course ordered the immediate restitution of the excess. The loser tried to launch an 
appeal for a monetary correction of the quantity returned but the court held the appeal to 
be inadmissible.  
 
The example given by Pontes de Miranda does not detract from the general proposition 
that in an enrichment claim the measure of the enrichment is calculated from the time of 
the institution of the action, save exceptions. In this example he is dealing with an 
existing thing which is still held by the defendant, and while remaining with the 
defendant, its value has changed from x to y. Because it is the thing itself to be restored, 
the proposition does not create any problem. If it is no longer the thing to be restored, but 
its value and the holder had notice at the time it might have lost, then the measure can 
                                                 
677  Pontes de Miranda, Tratado das Obrigações, Vol. 26 (1959) 167. 
678 The new CC, Art. 878 provides the following: ‘Aos frutos, acessões, benfeitorias e deteriorações 
sobrevindas à coisa dada em pagamento indevido, aplica-se o disposto neste Código sobre o possuidor de 
boa-fé ou de má-fé, conforme o caso’. [To the fruits, accessions, improvements and deteriorations that have 
occurred to the thing given in an undue payment, shall apply what is provided for in this Code about the 
good faith or bad faith possessor, as the case might be]. 
679  R. F. Eulámpio,  Código Civil Anotado 3rd Ed. Revista e Ampliada (Porto Alegre, 2001) 838. 
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indeed be (a+x) for in such a case the defendant will be precluded from denying the 
claim because he has knowledge that the thing belonged to another. From this it can 
indeed be seen that in some situations of enrichment liability it matters whether the thing 
received was a fungible or a non-fungible.  
 
In any event, the words ‘after updating the monetary values’ added to the general 
principle seem to me to reflect the old notion of enrichment liability adopted in the 1916 
Civil Code which only considered ‘undue payment’ and made the whole field look as if it 
were dependent upon a payment, as earlier said. Indeed that seems the message that those 
words are conveying; that is to say the general principle of enrichment sine causa is seen, 
as if it could only emanate from a performance through payment of money. If that is 
indeed the meaning to ascribe to the general principle, then, if it is not a limited vision of 
the field as a whole, it might be another oversight in the drafting style. The later 
possibility is probably the correct interpretation since no one today holds the restricted 
view about a general enrichment action that is evident in the first possibility. The Italian 
provision (art. 2041 of the Codice Civile) by which the Brazilian drafters were inspired 
does not mention any balancing of monetary values in such a fashion. The provision there 
reads: 
 
‘General cause of action for unjustified enrichment. A person who has enriched himself without cause680 at 
the expense of another shall, to the extent of the enrichment, indemnify the other for his correlative 
financial loss. If the enrichment consists of a special thing, the person who received it is bound to return it 
in kind if it is still in existence at the time of the demand’.681  
 
In my humble opinion it would have been better not to attach the words ‘updating 
monetary values’ to the general enrichment principle, but to have inserted a separate 
clause dealing with the issue. Each case could have been dealt with according to its 
                                                 
680  Note that similarly to the Brazilian art. 884 of the CC 2002, the Italian art. 2041 says ‘senza giusta 
causa’.   
681 This Italian general principle is then followed by the subsidiarity rule in art. 2042 which provides: 
‘Ancillary character of action: An action for unjustified enrichment cannot be instituted if the person 
injured can exercise another action to obtain compensation for the injury suffered’. For details on the 
subsidiarity rule under Italian law see footnote 625 above on my separate publication on the topic to appear 
shortly elsewhere. 
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merits, but with the benefit of having a clear indication in the Code of a clause 
authorizing such a mechanism, avoiding in this way the danger of an excessive exercise 
of discretionary powers by the courts.  
 
A further problem arising from the fact that those words were attached to the general 
enrichment principle becomes evident from the fact that the structure adopted for the 
enrichment law in the Civil Code clearly separates ‘undue payment’ – the condictio-claim 
– from the ‘general enrichment claim’ (the versio-claim).  Under such a scheme, where a 
‘condictio-claim’ (undue payment) applies’, the ‘versio-claim’ (the general principle) 
does not apply. If that is not the case, why were they separated, and the ‘undue payment’ 
clauses precede the general enrichment clauses? But when one looks at the practical 
application of ‘adjustment of monetary values’ which is  in the general enrichment 
clause, it is being applied to ‘undue payment’ factual scenarios alike, and even beyond. 
The above-cited quotation in REsp. 12.591.0/SP682 illustrates this fact. For this reason, I 
think that it would have been better if the general principle were placed earlier in the 
structure of the Code, rather than after the heading on ‘undue payment’.   
 
For the purpose of the theme of this thesis – loss of enrichment - detailed remarks will be 
made below (Part III of this chapter) showing that the issue of monetary adjustment in 
unjustified enrichment law may indeed constitute a special manifestation of a change-of-
position defence. For the time being, however, it is enough to say that in loss of 
enrichment situations the defendant is saying ‘I don’t have anymore the enrichment that I 
once had’, but, in contrast, in situations of monetary correction the plaintiff, by asking for 
the monetary value to be adjusted, or get it done by the court mero motu, is really saying 
that the defendant has in fact more than he seems to have’. If the defendant has indeed 
more than he seems to have, on what ground is the plaintiff entitled to that ‘extra 
amount’? 
                                                 
682  REsp. 12.591-0/SP (1ª Turma STJ)  (18.5.1992) Relator,  Min. Demócrito Reinaldo, in Boletim Adcoas 
No. 138.819] -  ‘The systematic monetary adjustment of debits arising from judicial decisions – sanctioned 
by Law No. 6.899/81 – constitutes a real legal principle that is applicable to any kind of legal relationships 
and in all branches of the law’ (emphasis added). 
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(iii). ‘Without Just Cause’. 
 
The heading of the general enrichment action (arts 884-886) speaks of an enrichment sine 
causa (enriquecimento sem causa). However the provision itself says that such 
enrichment must be ‘without just cause’. This creates some ambiguity or uncertainty as 
what the claim really entails. To speak of enrichment sine causa using the language of 
‘without just cause’ can only be understood in a very technical sense. The words ‘without 
just cause’ manifest the underlying principle of equity guiding the general enrichment 
action, and this ‘equitable principle’ is not strictly compatible with an evaluation of the 
misplacement of wealth in terms of ‘absence of cause’. Mention was made above that this 
provision of the Brazilian Civil Code is inspired in the Italian C dice Civile, arts 2041-
2042, as well as several other aspects of the law of obligations in general.683 It is to be 
noted however that the Italian provision after mentioning ‘senza justa causa’, also 
highlights that the object of the claim is an ‘indemnity’. Though this aspect of Italian law 
is also controversial in itself, that is how the legislature put it back in 1942 and it has not 
been modified since then. Indeed, the difference between ‘without just cause’ and 
‘without cause’ is extremely relevant and several cases either directly or indirectly 
underscore this point. The point finds further confirmation in the object of the claim, 
which is an ‘indemnity’ unde  Italian law (art. 2041 of the Italian CC). But in the 
Brazilian art. 884-886 of the new CC inspired on the same Italian provision, the object of 
the claim is not an indemnity. When the object of the claim assumes the features of an 
indemnity, as it is in the Italian case, the claimable value will lie between the 
impoverishment of the claimant and the enrichment of the defendant so far as the 
enrichment still exists. That is really the same to say that loss of enrichment is indeed a 
defence to the claim. In fact, this would be incompatible with a purely condictio-based 
enrichment claim, which, ordinarily, ignores any subsequent change-of-position of the 
defendant. In spite of Italian law not directly recognizing the general availability of a 
                                                 
683  See Proceedings of 5th CAHS Conference on Pontes de Miranda – UFPR , (Curitiba 12-17 August 
2007). 
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change-of-position defence684 under the condictio-version (undue payment) of the 
enrichment claim, art. 2037(3) of the Italian CC nonetheless makes an exception, because 
it bars a claim based on undue payment in cases of the good faith receipt of a chattel 
which has been destroyed. In such a case, the defendant is liable only in terms of the 
general enrichment claim under art. 2041 of the Italian CC. Article 2038 of the Codice 
Civile also deals with a curious situation, which could be mirrored in the German BGB § 
816(1),685 namely a triangular situation in which a claimant can claim the thing from the 
third party who obtained it gratuitously. There the defendant in good faith can raise his 
own change-of-position (loss of enrichment) as a defence to the claim. As the contract of 
gift is valid according to art.769 of the Italian CC (gift is a contract in Italian law, as it is 
also under Brazilian law, art. 538686 of the new CC 2002), the defendant is not enriched 
without a cause when he receives a valid gift. His enrichment is justified, but unjust; so 
the Italian Code grants an action which is different from that for undue payment. I have 
mentioned earlier that there is virtually unanimity among the Brazilian writers that the 
general enrichment action recognised under art. 884 emanates from the Roman actio de 
in rem verso though they differ as to the scope to be given to such action.  In the history 
of the actio de in rem verso it is understood that such action originated to allow the 
praetor to give a remedy where the ordinary condictiones did not apply or were to no 
avail to the claimant.687 This action is indeed of an equitable nature and time and time 
again Brazilian writers reiterate this fact.   
 
Due to its equitable nature, the focus is not always on the cause, but it is on justice. The 
measure of restitution awarded by the praetor in the cases of an actio de in rem verso lay 
                                                 
 
685 The provision of the German  BGB § 816(1) reads: ‘If a person without title to an object makes a 
disposition of it which is binding upon the person having title he is bound to hand over to the letter what he 
has obtained by the disposition. If the disposition is made gratuitously the same obligation is imposed upon 
the person who acquires a legal advantage directly through the disposition’ (English translation (1999) RLR 
(1994) 14ff.   
686 Art. 538. ‘Considera-se doação o contrato em que uma pessoa, por liberalidade, transfere do seu 
patrimônio bens ou vantagens para o de outra’ (It is considered donation a contract in which one person 
freely transfers from his own patrimony goods or advantages to the patrimony of another).  
687  See literature in Portuguese on this aspect in the works of Vaz- Serra Enriquecimento Sem Causa 
(1959) No. 3 e 10; and annotations to a case in decided on 31/10/1968 in Revista de Legislação e 
Jurisprudência  (1968) No. 102 pp 366ff. Studies in Italian on the issue can be found among others in the 
works of R. Sacco L’Arrichimento Ottenuto Mediante Fatto Injusto (1959); P. Gallo L’Arrichimento senza 
Causa (1990).   
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between the enrichment of the defendant and the impoverishment of the claimant, 
whereas through a condictio the claimant would aim to obtain the value of the entire 
performance, independently of both the benefit received by the defendant and the actual 
loss suffered by the claimant. Because the versio-claim is an equitable one, it also took 
into consideration the general situation of both parties, and therefore, the defendant could 
not be made liable in a ‘enrichment claim’ under this action beyond the concrete benefit 
which he obtained from the transfer of wealth and was still present in his assets. 
Likewise, such claim, in its historical guise, could not exceed the real impoverishment 
suffered. Finally, this restitutionary action was not triggered by the invalidity of the basis 
of the transfer, as was the case for the condictio.688 As such, even today, the actio de in 
rem verso might be granted despite the existence of a valid cause, because from the legal 
perspective, the lack of ground is not necessarily linked to an unfair, or unjust, transfer of 
wealth. A transfer can be legally sound, but unjust, or even legally unsound, but just. In 
addition, the versio-claim does not require any performance by the claimant, nor need the 
transfer of wealth occur on the basis of an invalid causa. This action is activated by the 
violation of general legal principles – rather than legal norms – which is redressed 
through an evaluation of the consequences of the transfer on both parties. Owing to the 
fashion in which the object of the claim is assessed, it is unusual for the claimant to 
recover through the versio-claim to the full extent of the benefit received by the 
defendant. Even rarer will be the restoration of the claimant’s assets to the condition in 
which they were before the claim yielding event took place. The claimant is more likely 
to receive only that part of the defendant’s benefit which at the time of the claim can be 
                                                 
688  Modern enrichment law in the Civilian tradition in the aspect of a general principle is inspired by the 
French  case Boudier  (Cassation Civil, 15 June 1892) and subsequent decisions. The head-note in the 
Boudier case states the following: ‘As an actio de in rem verso’ has not been codified and derives from a 
principle of equity (emphasis added), which forbids enrichment at the expense of a third person, it follows 
that its application is not subject to any specific requisites, and that it suffices that the claimant proves the 
existence of a benefit which he has procured to the defendant through a forfeiture or personal act’.  See 
further details on the origins of the actio de in rem verso and the French Boudier case references in A. 
Varela Das Obrigações em Geral 10th edition, Vol. I (2000) 497-507;   For an indirect patrimonial 
attribution similar to the one dealt with in the Boudier case above, see also the analogous application of the 
provision of art. 289 (2) of the Portuguese Civil Code 1967 and the annotation of Vaz-Serra to a case in the 
Portuguese S.T.J. (Supremo Tribunal de Justiça) of 23 July 1974 commented upon in Revista de Legislação 
de Jurisprudência (R.L.J.) No. 110, p 45ff.  See equally A.  Alvim (1954) Revista Forense 47-67 (Sept-
Oct). A brief treatment of some of the aspects of de in rem verso claim in English law in recent years are 
dealt with by F. Giglio (2003) 23 Oxford JLS   455-482 and R. Gratham & C. Rickett (2001) 117 LQR 273-
299. 
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still qualified as existing enrichment. The enrichment which triggers the claim does not 
have to be unjustified; but it must be unjust.   
 
From the above analysis it is clear that the idea of groundless receipt of a benefit and the 
idea of injustice do not necessarily overlap. In the case of the versio-claim, as now 
recognised under art. 884 of the new CC 2002, no one will doubt that the injustice of the 
transfer of wealth is a requirement of the cause of action. And the legal principle lying 
behind this versio-claim is the well known statement expressed by Pomponius in 
Justinian Digest 50.17.206 as said earlier and everyone else recognises.  
 
 
(iv)  Enrichment ‘at the Expense of’ Another. 
 
The requirement ‘at the expense of another’ does not ordinarily create many problems, 
though there are a few important issues to be addressed in respect of the so-called 
‘corresponding impoverishment’ approach. Almost all legal systems have moved from 
the language of a defendant’s enrichment ‘by the claimant’s property’ (as it is found in 
older codes) to the language ‘at the expense of another’ (as it is found almost in all 
modern codes).689 Brazil is not an exception in this regard. Where two people claim from 
each other, normally the law requires evidence of a correlation between the patrimonial 
advantage acquired by anyone of them which must translate in the corresponding 
economic sacrifice or a disadvantage suffered by the other. I have earlier referred to this 
situation as the ‘mirror-image gain-loss’ requirement. For example, in the case of 
specificatio, it is understandable that the law will consider the owner of the transformed 
thing to be the person who has done the work transforming it. In such a situation the 
enrichment (the gain) acquired by the owner will correspond to the impoverishment (the 
loss) suffered by the owner of the raw-material. An analogous situation occurs where, for 
example, a payment has been made to one who has made a cession, after the cession took 
place but before the payer is notified of the cession, or a situation where a debtor has paid 
to a creditor after a guarantor has fulfilled the obligation, but without notifying the 
                                                 
689   See for example the Italian CC, art. 2041; Portuguese CC art. 473; Quebec CC art. 1493-1496. 
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debtor. In these cases the advantage obtained by the ceding party with the new 
performance corresponds with the creditor’s loss of right over the cessionary, or in the 
other scenario, the advantage obtained by the creditor with the second payment has the 
effect of a corresponding loss of right of credit that the guarantor would acquire by sub-
rogation over the debtor.  The value that enters into the assets of the enriched party in any 
of these scenarios is the same as the value that left the assets of the impoverished party. 
But there are situations in which the correspondence between the enrichment received 
and the loss suffered is not a requirement to recognise an enrichment liability and there 
need not be any correlation between the two measures to found an enrichment claim. In 
this category fall examples such as where someone has transferred a third party’s assets, 
or where someone has generally made use of a third party’s thing without authorization. 
If A uses B’s car without authorization while B was on a week long holiday and in B’s 
absence he carried his own workers to a distant building site in that car and at the same 
time took C’s cargos on the way and delivered it to D for a fee during that same week and 
returned the car to its parking lot without a scratch, certainly A has been enriched at B’s 
expense, because he has both saved himself the costs of paying for the fare of his workers 
and gained the fee paid by C at B’s expense, but it cannot be said that B has 
correspondingly lost those benefits, as he would never have made them, nor did A’s 
benefits directly come from B’s pockets. In this scenario B has his car back in place 
undamaged. The best he can say to have lost is the tear and wear of his car for a week, if 
he can prove it, but not the fees A received from D, nor what A saved himself carrying 
his workers on his car. However, it is not unusual for a legal system in such 
circumstances to order that A’s enrichment be given up to B. This example reflect the 
frailty of the ‘mirror-image ‘gain-loss’’ that most Brazilian authors still insist must exist 
to found an enrichment claim. But this position is increasingly being questioned and it is 
almost obvious that the corresponding loss approach is now defunct. 
 
 
 
 
PART  II -  DEFENCES. 
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4.3. General Considerations.  
 
With the exceptions of arts 880690 (exemption from relinquishing one’s guarantees), 
882691 (prescription bar), and 883 (illegality bar), all of which appear under the heading 
of ‘undue payment’, there are no other defences to be found in the title of enrichment law 
itself. The title on ‘enrichment sine causa’ does not provide any defences either, except 
perhaps the limitation of the institution of the claim itself through the subsidiarity rule. 
There is also hardly any systematic treatment of the defences to unjustified enrichment 
claims in the doctrine (the work academic writers). Because neither the Civil Code nor 
the doctrine makes clear mention of the defences to such claims, one is bound to ask 
why? Certainly defences to such claims, apart from those just cited, do exist. What are 
they and how to find them? There is no definitive answer, but the following analysis 
gives a glimpse into the issue. Either one makes a logical analysis of any provision a 
contrario sensu of what it says or does not say and from there infer the defence, or one 
makes a structural analysis of the Code as a whole. The discussion that follows analyses 
very briefly the issue of the various defences by means of both techniques, starting first 
with the inference approach and secondly, to a structural analysis.    
 
4.3.1. Miscellaneous Defences to Enrichment Claims. 
 
Does the existence of another claim constitute a defence? Because in most cases one must 
arrive at the conclusion by deduction or inference, that is indeed the case. For example by 
formulating the general principle against enrichment sine causa as subsidiary, the logical 
inference is that the existence of another claim enabling the aggrieved to redress his loss 
is to be considered as a defence to the claim itself. To illustrate this: where a claimant 
alleges that the property in the hands of the defendant belongs to him, he can institute a 
                                                 
690  Article 880 new CC 2002 ‘Is exempt from restitution of an undue payment whoever that, after receiving 
it as part of a true debt, has invalidated the title, has allowed the claim to prescribe or has relinquished the 
guaranties that had secured his right; but he who has paid has the right to a regressive action against the 
true debtor and his guarantor’.  
691  Old Code Art. 969- 970 and 971. Under the new Code extra articles have been added and the 
reformulation of some provisions.  The wording ‘obrigação natural (natural obligation)’ has been changed 
to ‘obrigação judicial inexigível’ (judicial obligations not ‘demandable’).  
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proprietary claim in the form of a reivindicatio, and no enrichment claim will be 
sustained. That is so because in the case of reivindicatio it is presumed that the ownership 
of the thing claimed is not part of the assets of the defendant, while an enrichment claim 
presumes that the ownership of such property has passed and the thing is now part of the 
general assets of the defendant. In other words, if someone institutes a claim in the form 
of a reivindicatio he is seeking what is still his; but someone who institutes an enrichment 
claim is asking what is not his. If the enrichment claim is in the form of condictio 
indebiti, it also supposes error where the performance giving rise to such a claim was 
voluntary; but an error is never a requirement for any reivindicatio claim.  In this 
example, the possibility to institute the other claim constitutes by inference a defence to 
the enrichment claim.  
In some cases, however, the defence is clearly envisaged, though not obviously, stated; in 
other cases it is stated. A defence which is clearly envisaged by the legislator, but not 
stated is the case, for example, where there is a need to demonstrate that performance was 
done by error, which means by negative inference that if the other party can establish that 
there was no such a mistake, the lack thereof constitutes a defence to the claim itself..692  
Some legal systems would simply call this reality as a defence of knowledge.693 Another 
example is the fact that it is almost universally envisaged in an action for unjustified 
enrichment that the defendant can interpose the illegality or immorality of the act 
effecting the transfer/transaction as a defence to the claim itself. The new Civil Code 
under art. 883 clearly precludes a successful claim for undue payment in cases of 
illegality. The provision states that ‘whoever has given something in order to obtain an 
unlawful or immoral aim, or a finality forbidden by law, shall have no right to 
restitution’. This article provides further that ‘in the case of this article, what was given 
shall revert in favour of a local charity, as the judge will deem fit’. It is therefore 
                                                 
692  Under current art. 877 CC 2002 it is said ‘Àquele que voluntariamente pagou o indevido incumbe a 
prova de tê-lo feito por erro’ [Whoever has voluntarily made an undue payment has the onus to prove that 
he has done so by mistake]. 
693  For example that is how it is implicitly also called in South African law where if the claim if founded 
on the condictio indebiti or in some instances on the condictio sine causa, and the benefit being claimed is 
alleged to have been conferred in the knowledge that it was undue, both claims can be defeated by proving 
such a knowledge. (See FirstRand Bank Ltd v ABSA Bank Ltd (2001) 1 All SA 92 (W) 103 E-F). For more 
details, see chapter two of this thesis – under the heading ‘Loss of Enrichment and Other Defences in South 
Africa Law’). 
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doubtless that illegality is always a defence to such claim, and remembering that undue 
payment is but a species of the general enrichment action, ipso facto illegality is also a 
defence to the general claim. The illegality defence as such will be dealt with in more 
detail later in the thesis. For present purposes it is enough to highlight that the issue of 
illegality is sometimes linked to the condictio ob causam finitam, in which case the cause 
either initially existed or was believed to have existed, and on that supposition or belief 
performances might have been rendered. Thus, as a general rule, if the person who 
performed did not know, that with that act or performance he would offend the law, or 
public policy, he can claim restitution of his performance. It is said that in such 
circumstances the performer is afforded the condictio ob causam finitam.694 However, if 
the performer knew the illegality or immorality, or a rule against public policy, or if he 
performed with the motive of disregarding the law, then, he cannot claim restitution of 
his performance, because in such a case there is no room for a condictio ob causam 
finitam, as he knew everything from the outset.  
 
Prescription as already referred to elsewhere in this chapter, and in chapter two for other 
jurisdictions being considered in this thesis, is also a defence to a claim under enrichment 
sine causa. The period provided for under the new Civil Code is three years (art. 
206(3)(iv) new CC) for an enrichment action695 (five under the old code). The rationale 
for this defence is that the lapse of a certain period of time must put an end to a juridical 
relationship whose right was not exercised in order to secure social order and peace in the 
community. Because the law demands that a debtor or whoever is in such a position to 
                                                 
694  Pontes de Miranda, Tratado das Obrigações, Vol. 26  (1959) 145. 
695  See however C. Michelon (Direito Restitutório (2007) 129) who argues that because under art. 
206(§3)(iv) the prescription period is 3 years (‘the claim to redress an enrichment sine causa’ [pretensão de 
ressarcimento do enriquecimento sem causa] and under the provision of  art. 205 the prescription period is 
10 years (‘prescription starts to run in 10 years if the law did not fix a lesser period’ [a prescrição ocorre em 
dez anos quando a lei não lhe haja fixado prazo menor] (which the author ascribes to cases of undue 
payment), it must be inferred from there that the legislator did not envisage undue payment to be a mere 
species of enrichment sine causa. One must however note that though the words ‘ressarcimento de 
enriquecimento sem causa’ are used in art. 206(3)(iv), Brazilian jurisprudence and the doctrine uses 
‘enriquecimento sem causa’ interchangeably when dealing with undue payment cases (the condictiones) as 
well as cases falling under the actio de in rem verso  and even enrichment resulting from ‘negotiorum 
gestio’. Another term used interchangeably with ‘enriquecimento sem causa’ is ‘enriquecimento ilícito’ 
(see for example the cases discussed under the term ‘monetary adjustment’ below). Therefore, the 
interpretation that ‘enriquecimento sem causa’ in art. 206(3)(iv) encompasses only the claims under art. 
884 CC in exclusion of undue payment,  cannot lightly be accepted, as there is nothing said in the Code that 
excludes the contrary interpretation. 
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fulfill his obligation towards a creditor and allows the creditor to make use of the 
necessary means to receive what is due to him, if such a creditor were to remain inert for 
a long period of time, and such inertia were now to establish a juridical situation contrary 
to his right, such right will be extinct. To perpetuate a right in such circumstances would 
generate uncertainty in social relationships and disturb public order.696 However, not all 
rights are subject to prescription for special reasons, but this is not of much interest for 
our purposes. Furthermore, there has always been a controversy under Brazilian law 
whether prescription extinguishes the action or more properly and directly the right itself. 
This controversy, too, will also not be dealt with here, save to say that normally it is the 
right to institute the action that is extinguished and not the right itself. Prescription acts 
against the inertia to institute the action. The right can indeed survive the action. The 
right is, however, affected by prescription, because, once the action is no longer 
exercisable, the right ipso facto becomes inoperative. The fact that the law in certain 
circumstances admits the payment of a prescrib d debt, precluding a restitutionary 
action,697 illustrates the correctness of this interpretation. Another example appears from 
arts. 61 and 62 of the so called ‘Lei de Cheque’ (Lei No. 7.357 of 2 September 1985) in 
which a right survives an action. Under these provisions, if the titles of credit that have 
prescribed do not authorise an ‘executive’ action, such titles survive prescription, for they 
can be demanded by an ordinary action of enrichment sine causa. 
 
Likewise, res judicata is also a defence under Brazilian enrichment law, as it is 
recognised that ‘no enrichment claim shall lie where a positive judgment affirmed the 
cause of the enrichment’. It is however to be noted that similarly to the Canadian res 
judicata defence discussed in chapter two of this thesis,698 there is a qualification in the 
application of this defence. The general approach is that, if the effectiveness of the 
judgment is not concerned with the alleged fact, such issue may be dealt with, and a 
                                                 
696  For a detailed account of prescription and decadence under the new Civil Code see S. de Salvo-Venosa, 
Direito Civil: Parte Geral Vol. 1 (2003) 611-645. 
697  Article 882 new CC 2002  (art 970 old CC 1916)  ‘Não se pode repetir o que se pagou para solver 
dívida prescrita, ou cumprir obrigação judicial inexigível’. (There is no restitution for what was paid to 
solve a debt that has prescribed, or to fulfill a judicial obligation not ‘demandable!’ [inexigível].  Note that 
this formulation of ‘judicial obligation not ‘demandable’ controversially replaced the notion of ‘natural 
obligation’ that was in similar article under the Code of 1916.  
698  See chapter 2 above (Canadial law) at item 2.4.4. 
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request for the return of the enrichment may be made – such an application (request) may 
or may not be deferred, in conformity with the presence of the cause or the lack thereof 
(e.g. an ulterior resolution, a decree of nullity or voidness, after a declaratory 
judgment).699  
 
While one is able to infer several defences through what the provisions say or do not say 
themselves, the result may not be so encompassing as to explain the absence of  some 
defences  in some titles or chapters of the Code. 
 
A careful observation, however, seems to indicate that the general absence of defences 
under the law of enrichment itself as codified may be a deliberate choice of a legislative 
approach. It would appear that one of the reasons is the general organization of the Code 
itself that is structured into a general part and special parts’700 or, as others would call 
them, general principles and special principles. With this legislative approach it is 
                                                 
699  For a concrete application of the defence of res judicata and additional problems it has recently 
aroused, in relation to the effects on an incidental declaration of unconstitutionality over a ‘acto jurídico 
perfeito’ (= ‘res judicata’ in this context) in tax matters and judicial deposits, see the effects of Decretos-
Lei No. 2.445/88 and 2.449/88 found unconstitutional by the STF (Supremo Tribunal Federal) and the 
consequent enactment of Resolution 49 of 9/10/1995 by the Senate (Senado Federal) suspending the 
execution of such Decree-laws and the subsequent enactment of Provisory Measure No. 1.209 of 
28/11/1995, which has since been successively re-enacted. Such measure determines in art. 17(1) that 
‘instruments of fiscal execution of debts arising from norms considered unconstitutional ‘shall be dealt with 
under a Court order, with notice to the ‘Procurador National da Fazenda’ (National ‘Director’ of Finance), 
save the existence of residual values related to debits legally demandable’. (See more details in the 
discussion of this laws in G. Tepedino, Temas de Direito Civil (1999) 449-457 and corresponding section 
in the 2004 edition). 
700  Professor Miguel Reale as Supervisor of the ‘Revising and Drafting Committee of the Civil Code’ in 
the Speech presenting the new Civil Code said: ‘I received in 1970 from the collaborators the proposals 
corresponding to each area to them entrusted, according to a structure previously agreed upon which 
comprises a General Part, as conceived by the genius of Teixeira de Freitas, and five Special Parts, 
referring to the Law of Obligations, the Law of Enterprises, the Law of Things, Family Law and Law of 
Succession. I am pleased to see that the structure adopted from the start resisted all criticisms to the Draft 
(o Anteprojecto do Código Civil), save the aspect related to the Law of  ‘Sociedades Anónimas’ [Business 
Entities] -  basically Company Law -, to which we kindly assented, to be separated from the Civil Code and 
be treaded in a Special Law, that is more apt to deal with such a matter due to the continuous dynamism of 
stock markets’ (‘Sanção da Lei que instituiu o Novo Código Civil’ in Ives-Ganda et al, O Novo Código 
Civil: Estudos em Homenagem ao Professor Miguel Reale (2003) 18.  Note that Teixeira de Freitas 
mentioned in this quotation was the First Drafter of a Brazilian  Civil Code in 1800s that was never adopted 
in Brazil, but inspired the Civil Codes of Argentina and other South American countries. The speaker 
mentions amongst the collaborators in the Drafting Committee the name of A. Alvim, whose reference I 
made earlier in the contention between the negative and positive approaches to the omission of a general 
enrichment action in the previous Code. Thus, the views of this member are heavily reflected in the area of 
enrichment law in the new Code.  
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believed that what is treated in the general part indirectly or by inference covers any 
claim that may arise in the special parts, unless it is specifically excluded. Therefore, in 
the study of the defences in the whole Brazilian law one must be alert to this fact and 
look in the general part to discover what applies to the claims in the special part and what 
does not apply, and what is specifically excluded. This legislative approach was also 
followed under the 1916 Civil Code. For example, extinctive prescription in the old Civil 
Code was treated under arts. 161-179, located in the general part, while acquisitive 
prescription – generally termed as ‘usucapião’ – was treated in the special part under the 
law of things. These defences are now treated under arts. 205ff (general part) for 
extinctive prescription and arts. 1.230 - 1.244 for acquisitive prescription (special part). 
In this example extinctive prescription is of a general application throughout the Code 
and unless a provision of law specifically excludes it, it applies to any claim or action.  
Acquisitive prescription, however, applies only to the specific cases to which it is 
provided for, i.e.; to the law of property.  With this legislative approach it is further 
understood that any new legal rule, even if it only concerns a claim which is in the special 
law, it is included in the general part of the Civil Code, if such a claim belongs to the 
private law. In short, the structure requires a skilful cross-referencing. 
  
4.3.2. Loss of Enrichment (Change-of-Position) Defence. 
 
Loss of enrichment (or change-of-position) per se as a defence to enrichment claims is 
not mentioned under Brazilian law. Neither the Code, nor the jurisprudence and the 
doctrine speak of this mechanism to resist such claims. But a more detailed analysis leads 
me to conclude that its omission might be mostly per incuriam, perhaps due to the deeply 
entrenched, but dubious notion of subsidiarity, rather than a very conscious decision to 
leave it aside.701 Traces of it subtly appear in the formulations used in drafting some 
articles of the Civil Code dealing with unjustified enrichment. It must be remembered 
that the drafters felt the need to remain faithful to the Roman tradition, and structured the 
whole law of unjustified enriched using the dual structure condictio and actio de in rem 
                                                 
701  A caveat on this assertion is made in the note that follows explaining the reasons advanced by 
Michelon. 
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verso. The lack of a general enrichment principle in the previous Civil Code, along with 
the direct omission of a general defence to enrichment claims there, indirectly influenced 
the doctrine not to pay adequate attention to such defence in a wider context,702 and it 
appears the doctrine confined most of the cases that resemble this defence to the 
treatment of ‘immovable’.703 For example when the doctrine freely accepts and the courts 
sanction it that ‘in this institute (enrichment sine causa) the role of fault is very limited, 
serving only to guarantee that he who has been enriched in good faith does not restore 
more than the subsisting patrimonial enrichment’,704 what else could be meant by 
‘enriquecimento patrimonial subsistente’ other than that the loss of an enrichment in 
good faith where the enriched person had all along assumed that the enrichment was his 
to keep, is a good defence to the claim?  
 
                                                 
702  I am aware that C. Michelon (Direito Restitutório (2007) 239-240) mentions that all the instances 
addressed under BGB § 818(III) are dealt with in the Brazilian law by the provisions of the Civil Code 
provided for in art. 238-242, which read:  
Art.238—If the obligation to restore a certain thing, and this thing, without the debtor’s fault, is lost before 
the transfer (traditio), the creditor shall ‘suffer’ the loss, and the obligation will be terminated, save his 
rights up to the date of the loss.  
Art.239—If the thing is lost due to the fault of the debtor, the debtor shall answer for its equivalent, plus 
the losses and damages.  
Art.240—If the thing that must be restored deteriorates without the debtor’s fault, the creditor must receive 
it, as it is, without any right to be indemnified; the provisions of art. 239 shall be applicable if it deteriorates 
due to the debtor’s fault.  
Art. 241— In the case of art. 238, should there be any improvement or addition to the thing, without any 
labour or expense of the debtor, the creditor shall take the benefit, without any obligation to indemnify. 
Art. 242—If in order to effect the improvement or the addition, the debtor has done some work, the case 
shall be regulated by the norms of this Code that deal with improvements done by a good faith or bad faith 
possessor. Parágrafo único: As regard the fruits received, the provision of this Code on good faith and bad 
faith possessors shall apply. (Emphasis added). 
The difficulty however in accepting fully that explanation is that such provisions deal with obligations to 
give an exact thing which does not seem to derive from a context of enrichment sine causa. The author also 
appears to equate ‘loss of enrichment’ under BGB § 813(III) with ‘impossibility to restore in natura’ alone. 
Finally, once again the author does not refer to any other Brazilian writers supporting such position or a 
case in which that interpretation was applied. In almost all the few pages (pages 239-249) devoted to the 
‘quantification of the value when the restitution is impossible in natura’ and collateral issues, the author 
hardly mentions any reference or if there appears any, they all seem from foreign textbooks and foreign 
writers. For these reasons, though the author might have a valid point, it cannot be said without more that 
the justification he offers is the prevailing position under Brazilian law. 
703  I will exemplify further below in a footone this subtle and aparent application of change of position 
defence to ‘immovable’. 
704  See (infra) the full sentence (of M.C. Kroetz, Do Enriquecimento Sem Causa (2005) 77) in which this 
expression appears.  
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The caveat to art. 884 above transcribed705 also lends support to the idea that loss of 
enrichment can indeed constitute a defence to the claim, because by saying that ‘if the 
thing does no longer subsist, it shall be restored by its value at the time of the demand’,706 
it must be inferred from that proposition that if the value of the thing at the time of the 
‘acquisition’ differs from its value at the time of the demand, the negative difference 
between the first value and the second value is not restorable, therefore it is to be seen as 
a ‘lost enrichment’. Here become obvious the German idea that if the defendant were also 
be required to ‘restore’ that value he would indeed have to dig into his own assets to 
make up that difference. If that were to be allowed, the claimant would be enriched at the 
defendant’s expense, or the defendant would have to be considered as if he were the 
claimant’s insurer. This conclusion is, however, an inference made from the hypothesis 
that the legislature envisaged the negative difference in such cases, which is more logical 
and more probable than the opposite. But because the provision does not expressly say 
so, one must also consider the positive difference b tween the first value and the second 
value, i.e. where at the time the demand is made the thing being claimed is more valuable 
than it would have been at the time it was ‘lost’ and acquired by the defendant. Here the 
analysis is more intricate, for if the thing still subsists one can directly restore it to the 
‘owner’ as it is707 and no need to inquire into its market value, provided it has not been 
intentionally or negligently damaged or altered. But because the thing is no longer 
subsistent, one must inquire into its market value to determine its real value at the time of 
the demand. How does one determine such market value? Is it the market value of the 
thing when it ceased to exist or the market value of the thing when it is demanded? The 
language of the provision suggests that it is the latter and not the former; but this 
interpretation may raise certain problems where the market value of the thing at the time 
it is demanded is higher than at the time it ceased to exist. 
 
                                                 
705  For the sake of easy referencing, I transcribe again the text of the full caveat here: “Art. 884—
Parágrafo único: ‘If the object of the enrichment claim consists in a specific thing, he who has received it 
is under a duty to restore it, and, if the thing does no longer subsist, its restitution shall be effected by its 
value at the time it was demanded’. 
706   ‘(...) se a coisa não mais subsistir, a restituição se fará pelo valor do bem na época em que foi exigido’. 
707 See art. 240 of the new CC. [Art. 240—If the thing that must be restored deteriorates without the 
debtor’s fault, the creditor must receive it, as it is, without any right to be indemnified; the provisions of art. 
239 shall be applicable if it deteriorates due to the debtor’s fault]. 
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Mention was made in the introduction to this chapter that some writers, such as Pontes de 
Miranda and Agostinho Alvim, in the early days implicitly touched upon the issue, when 
they  held that ‘what is given in the case of unjustified enrichment is not the value of the 
thing at the time that the enrichment occurred, but the value of the defendant’s 
enrichment as it enriches him at the time the action is brought’708 and that ‘because what 
is at stake in an enrichment claim is restitution for enrichment, and not indemnification 
for damages, the enrichment must exist at the time of the action’.709 These observations 
clearly suggest not only that the measure of restitution is the remaining enrichment and 
not the received enrichment, save exceptions, but also that where such enrichment no 
longer exists and the defendant in good faith and in reliance on the receipt has parted with 
the benefit, the non-existence of the thing qualifies as a defence.  
 
Certainly the erstwhile treatment of the field as exclusively based upon undue payment 
compared to those of other jurisdictions that spoke of unjustified enrichment might have 
led to additional difficulties in recognizing the defence. As the Beviláqua Code 
exclusively placed emphasis on undue payment, the outcome was that the legal system 
looked also solely at the ‘pending assets’, failing to see what could have happened to the 
assets of the receiver. If due regard is also paid to the assets of the receiver, ‘the thinking 
that all cases of restitution (repetition) are linked to a payment is avoided.’ For example, 
asserts Pontes de Miranda, ‘restitution (repetição) of what was given as a donation, or the 
restitution due to the extinction of a credit sine causa is not a restitution of a payment; the 
reason for such restitution is that “there would be no causa solvendi”’. From there the 
author concluded that the cases provided for in the then arts 964-971 of the 1916 Code 
represented but only one form of the condictio.710 The principles envisaged applied 
mutatis mutandi to other species as well, according to this author. Today we can safely 
say that ‘these other species’ represent all cases of enrichment sine causa, as recognised 
by the new Code. 
 
                                                 
708  Pontes de Miranda, Tratado das Obrigações, Vol. 26 (1959) 167. 
709  A. Alvim, ‘do Emriquecimento Sem causa’ (1954) No. 173 Revista Forense 47-67 at 57. 
710  Pontes de Miranda, Tratado das Obrigações, Vol. 26 (1959) 167. 
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Thus, if on the construction of a coherent doctrine of unjustified enrichment, due regard 
is also had to what is happening in the assets of the receiver, and if such a receiver was in 
good faith or other legally recognised reasons are present that might justify a different 
outcome, it is just one step from recognizing that one cannot ignore the possibility of an 
‘unjust depletion’ of the defendant’s assets in the calculation of the measure of 
enrichment. This is the same as to say that change-of-position (or loss of enrichment) is a 
possible defence to a claim in unjustified enrichment in the Brazilian law now that both 
sides of an enrichment claim are sanctioned – the condictio approach represented by the 
chapter on ‘undue payment (arts. 887-883) and the actio de in rem verso, represented by 
the provisions on ‘enrichment sine causa’ (arts. 884-886).   
 
Despite that clear and penetrating reflection on the issue in its legal literature, the 
Brazilian legislature did not directly consider it nor mentioned it in the new Code. As said 
elsewhere, the reason for the omission is nowhere to be found in the legislative history; 
one is left therefore forced to speculate. The Brazilian legal literature (doctrine) clearly 
recognises that, in order to succeed in an enrichment claim, the enrichment must exist at 
the time of the petition. Hence, Alvim and others write that ‘the enrichment must be 
actual, that is to say, existent at the time the claim is made’.711 A recent doctoral thesis by 
Maria Kroetz on unjustified enrichment at some stage tried to draw a distinction between 
enrichment sine causa and responsabilidade civil (law of delict or torts), especially in 
relation to the role of fault in the field.  She remarked that ‘in the institute of unjustified 
enrichment the role of fault is very limited, and when it does play any function it only 
serves to guarantee that he who has been enriched in good faith is not obliged to restore 
more than the subsisting patrimonial enrichment’.712 Though the writer cites no clear 
authority, nor makes reference to any of the provisions, whether in the chapter on undue 
payment or that of ‘enrichment sine causa’ or the ‘negotiorum gestio’ section, there is no 
doubt that, regardless of the categorization of the claim, all three sections require that the 
                                                 
711  ‘O enriquecimento deve ser actual, isto é, existente ao tempo da demanda’. 
712   ‘No enriquecimento sem causa a conduta do enriquecido não tem tanta relevância, já que a obrigação 
de restituir o enrquecimento pode derivar até de um ato jurídico que não seja consequência da conduta 
humana. Neste instituto o papel da culpabilidade é bem mais restrito, servindo apenas para garantir que o 
enriquecido de boa-fe não tenha de restituir mais do que o enriquecimento patrimonial subsistente’ (M.C. 
Kroetz, Do Enriquecimento Sem Causa  (2005) 77)’.  
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enrichment indeed be in existence at the time the claim is instituted.  It is true that where 
the enrichment was in the nature of a thing transferred and such thing can no longer be 
restored because it has been consumed or is ‘apparently lost’, the enrichment must be 
restored by its monetary equivalent (art. 884 CC 2002). This formulation should not 
detract as it does not alter the requirement that the enrichment must be in existence. The 
very thing transferred may no longer be in existence, but it may survive in a different 
form, and in such a case its monetary value is the measure of the enrichment. But where 
it ‘does not survive’ in any different form, entitling the claimant any legal right to it, the 
loss of enrichment (change-of-position) defence is the right answer.  
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.2.1. Can Article 238 of the New CC Be Fully Equ ted with § 818(3) of the BGB? 
 
Reference was made above that at least one Brazilian author (Michelon) thinks that an 
explicit statement of loss of enrichment (as stated under BGB § 818(3) was not needed 
under Brazilian law because art. 238-242 deal with the problems envisaged by § 818(3) 
of the BGB. Article 238, in particular, according to the writer, is the provision that solves 
those problems. That is so because on the reading of the wording of art. 238 the need for 
the enrichment to be in existence is part of the factual support (suporte fático) of the 
obligation to restore an enrichment sine causa itself, says Michelon. The question that 
arises is this: Does the said article really encompass and capture the core of loss of 
enrichment defence as claimed?  
 
In my view it does not. That is so because it can hardly be said that those provisions 
account for most situations where enrichment is acquired at the expense of another in the 
absence of any justification. If they do sometimes account for such a liability, which is 
probably true on the wording of art. 238, it seems that they would nevertheless only cover 
enrichment liability in which the gain alleged (the ‘certain thing’ as the provision puts it) 
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is a non-fungible. And if such were the case, the very provisions of art. 884 of the new 
CC would be contradicted (as we will see below). Furthermore, the explanation of the 
writer is apparently based on a particular understanding of ‘loss of enrichment’. He seems 
to equate the German provision to those of art. 238-240 of the Brazilian new CC and to 
assume that the German provision applies only in cases arising from an ‘impossibility’ to 
fulfil the obligation regardless of what that obligation is and how the obligation arose.    
That interpretation neither fits the German understanding of the provision in § 818(3) 
BGB713 nor of any other legal systems that recognises loss of enrichment as a defence to 
an enrichment claim. By apparently equating all possible cases giving rise to loss of 
enrichment defence with supervening impossibility, regardless of the nature of the 
obligation, the author does not address the problem whether such provisions (art. 238-
240) deal with generic obligations or specific obligations. It appears to me that where an 
object is destroyed or is irretrievably lost, a distinction should first be made as to whether 
the obligation in issue involved a genus or a species. It is generally understood that a 
‘generic obligation’ cannot become impossible of fulfillment, since the genus is regarded 
as indestructible, while on the contrary, an alternative obligation, that is to say, an 
                                                 
713  The German provision BGB § 818(III) reads as follows: ‘The obligation to return [that which was 
received] or replace its value falls away insofar as the recipient is no longer enriched’ {Die Verpflichtung 
zur Herausgabe oder zum Ersatze des Wertes ist ausgeschlossen, soweil der Empfänger nicht mehr 
bereichert ist}. It is preceded by § 818(II) which reads: ‘If the return of that which was received is no 
longer possible due to its condition, or if the recipient is on other ground not able to return it, he has to 
replace its value’ {Ist die Herausgabe wegen der Beschaffenteit des Erlangten nicht möglich oder ist der 
Empfänger aus einem anderen Grunde zur Herausgabe ausserstande, so hat er den Wert zu ersetzen}. In 
contrast the Brazilian provisions being equated to this provisions read, once again, as  follows:  
Art. 238—If the obligation to restore a certain thing, and this thing, without the debtor’s fault, is lost before 
the transfer (traditio), the creditor shall ‘suffer’ the loss, and the obligation will be terminated, save his 
rights up to the date of the loss.  
Art. 239—If the thing is lost due to the fault of the debtor, the debtor shall answer for its equivalent, plus 
the losses and damages.  
Art. 240—If the thing that must be restored deteriorates without the debtor’s fault, the creditor must 
receive it, as it is, without any right to be indemnified; the provisions of art. 239 shall be applicable if it 
deteriorates due to the debtor’s fault.  
Art. 241— In the case of art. 238, should there be any improvement or addition to the thing, without any 
labour or expense of the debtor, the creditor shall take the benefit, without any obligation to indemnify. 
Art. 242—If in order to effect the improvement or the addition, the debtor has done some work, the case 
shall be regulated by the norms of this Code that deal with improvements done by a good faith or bad faith 
possessor. Parágrafo único: As regard the fruits received, the provision of this Code on good faith and bad 
faith possessors shall apply. (Portuguese wording is above and also at the end of this thesis in Appendixes 
I, II and III). 
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obligation involving a ‘species’, will be extinguished if all the alternatives become 
impossible.714  
 
Hence, if one were to accept Michelon’s contention that all cases dealt with under § 
818(3) BGB are covered by the CC provisions of arts.  238-240 dealing with 
‘impossibility’ to restore the thing in Brazilian law, one would also be bound to ask 
whether Brazilian law regards any obligations giving rise to the unjustified enrichment 
doctrine as limited to dealing with ‘species’ alone, so that all such obligations are ipso 
facto extinguished if all alternatives become impossible. If the answer were in the 
affirmative, the institute of enrichment sine causa would be unduly restrictive. Certainly, 
art. 238 does encompass some aspects of loss of enrichment defence in so far as it relates 
to a non-fungible object, but it does not seem to me to be fully comprehensive to deal 
both with fungibles and non-fungibles. 
 
An additional difficulty in accepting Michelon’s interpretation is that he does not agree in 
his book that undue payment is a sub-species of enrichment sine causa as other Brazilian 
writers do. But when it comes to assessing the application of art. 238, he seems to 
contradict himself as that provision is in the general part, while enrichment sine causa is 
in the special part. If art. 238 were to apply to art. 884, as his interpretation seems to 
suggest, then the caveat of art. 884 would either be contradicted or made redundant, for 
such art. 884 already provides for a situation where the thing no longer subsists, and 
objectively excludes any defence such as that which the writer is invoking, because if the 
thing is lost, it shall be replaced by its value.715 To be consistent with his interpretation 
Michelon would have to say that art. 238 applies only where the obligation to restore a 
lost thing is extinguished if the thing came into the hands of the debtor as a result of an 
undue payment, because only the provisions on undue payment (art. 876-883) are 
                                                 
714 See for example the discussion on impossibility by D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 480. It 
does not however appear to me that Brazilian writers have explored the impossibility doctrine under such 
angle. I have discussed further nuances of the doctrine of impossibility of performance in failed bilateral 
agreements in chapter 3 above, and a brief mention of the Brazilian impossibility doctrine appears futher 
below in this chapter at 4.5.3. 
715  Art. 884—Parágrafo único: ‘If the object of the enrichment claim consists in a specific thing, he who 
has received it is under a duty to restore it, and, if the thing does no longer subsist, its restitution shall be 
effected by its value at the time it was demanded’.  Art. 885 is even clearer in this regard.  
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apparently silent when the thing is lost. Aggravating the above difficulties in accepting 
the writer’s contention is the fact that he does not tell us anything at all as to what the 
situation is under Brazilian law if the obligation under which the object was to be given 
up was a contract: Is that contract discharged wholly or partially by the supervening 
impossibility? Furthermore, he does not indicate whether the obligation is extinguished 
prospectively (ex nunc) or retrospectively (ex tunc). The non-existence of the object can 
come about due to differing factors, such as theft, or the object might have been 
destroyed by a natural disaster or any circumstance beyond the ‘holder’s’ control, or it 
might have been alienated irretrievably with his knowledge but before he was put in 
notice of his lack of ‘capacity’ to do so, and even though the object still exists in a 
restorable manner, its restoration might be legally undesirable.  
 
Finally, Michelon’s interpretation would also need to justify why a defence to an 
‘unilateral act’ is to be sought in the ‘bilateral acts’, as the drafters clearly situated an 
enrichment sine causa within the unilateral acts, though that is controversial anyway as 
we have seen earlier. This dichotomy ‘unilateral’ acts and ‘bilateral acts’ would imply 
that the provisions the writer mentions may not be applicable if the thing alleged to be 
destroyed ended up in the hands of the recipient under a bilateral act.  
 
 
4.3.2.2. Further Traits of Loss of Enrichment Defence under the Provisions of the 
Code and the Doctrine.  
 
While dealing with the notion of ‘without just cause’ above under art. 884, I referred to 
the Italian notion of ‘arricchimento senza giusta causa’ provided for under the Italian CC 
art. 2041. The reading of arts. 2037 and 2038(1) of that Code revealed that Italian law, in 
trying to be faithful to the Roman tradition in structuring its law of enrichment, 
recognised a contained notion of the change-of-position defence in the case of a 
gratuitous transfer (a gift, which is a valid contract) in good faith where the asset or 
benefit received has been lost, because under such circumstances it would be inequitable 
to ask an innocent and good faith receiver to restore such benefit at his expense. Were 
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this to happen, the innocent receiver would be treated as if he were the claimant’s insurer. 
Under the Italian art. 2037, the claimant who is hit by the defence of change of position 
has to shift the resolution of the issue to the general principle provide for under arts 2041 
and 2042 of the Codice Civile.  
 
In arts. 877 and 879 of the new Brazilian CC 2002 we are presented with an analogous 
scenario, under the condictio-version of the enrichment claim (undue payment).  We deal 
with an undue payment scenario that has as its object an immovable. These articles focus 
on good faith and what may actually happen in different kinds of scenarios. Let us 
consider a range of possible scenarios through a hypothetical example and explore the 
different possibilities in the application of the law.   
 
‘B’, a 70 year old settler in Brazil, inherited a house from ‘A’, his great uncle, as a 
bequest under a will. All along ‘B’ and everyone around him believed in good faith that 
the house was his and lived there openly. Because of his old age and beset with infirmity, 
a year later “B” sold the house to ‘C’ to raise money to cover his medical bills and 
moved to a smaller apartment. ‘C’ paid a total sum of $R∗500 000 for the house and 
registered it in his own name. Before the purchase ‘C’ had lived in a smaller house and 
poorer neighbourhood, but had worked hard and saved over the years to provide 
comfortable conditions to himself at an older age. He used up his savings of $R250 000 
to pay for the new house. The balance of $R250 000 was covered as follows: $R125 000 
by selling several antiques and memorabilia items, and $R125 000 from a bank loan for 
which he paid an interest of 20 per cent p/a and pledged his small house as security. To 
avoid long term indebtedness he took up a vacation job in England as consultant and 
worked 12 hours a day to boost his earnings and pay off the bank loan quickly. 18 months 
after having bought his house and having returned to Brazil, it is discovered that ‘A’, the 
bequest grantor, had skillfully forged both the will and the immovable property 
documents pertaining to the house. The house in fact belonged to ‘Z’ who had gone for 
military service to a distant country and was not heard of for 15 years. The house is 
currently fully registered in the name of ‘C’ and no one had discovered before the forgery 
                                                 
∗ $R = Brazilian Real. 
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at the registration office, nor was the will ever put into question. Obviously ‘A’ is dead, 
and ‘B’ is now terminally ill and almost impecunious. ‘Z’ has since returned from his 
military service and wants his house back to him. It is plain that the original bequest from 
‘A’ to ‘B’ was null and void, as it was based on a void document. Is ‘C’ protected under 
current Brazilian enrichment law? And, if so, what can ‘Z’ do? What will legally happen 
to ‘B’? 
 
From this example, B’s enrichment resulted from a donation (a gift as explained 
elsewhere in this chapter is recognised as a valid ‘contract’). It is however an ‘undue 
payment’ (understood in its wider sense, i.e.; as lacking legal ground) because the ground 
of the donation (a proper ownership) did not exist. ‘B’ however acquired the immovable 
openly and in good faith and duly transferred it to ‘C’ for value. ‘C’ holds that 
immovable as a bona fide purchaser for value.   
 
Scenario 1 – An ‘undue payment’ to “B”, resulting from a donation of “A” of an immovable 
belonging to “Z” which is subsequently conveyed to “C” for value, by the recipient (accipiens) 
(“B”), in which scenario, all parties (“B”, “C” and “Z” act in good faith.  
 
Scenario 2 – Gratuitous transfer to “C”, but in good faith, by the recipient (accipiens) (“B”) of an 
immovable unduly received from “A”.   
 
Scenario 3 – Transfer for value by the recipient (accipiens) “B” to a third party “C” in bad faith 
of an immovable unduly acquired from “A”. 
 
Scenario 4 – Bad faith of the recipient (“B”) who had notice of the facts resulting in the 
immovable being donated to him by “A”, in which case the immovable belonged to “Z” and is 
subsequently conveyed to “C” for value.  
 
Before starting the analysis of each factual scenario presented above, some general 
remarks need to be made.  
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First, I start from the premise that in law if the enriched party holds the enriching object 
for value, and another person acquires such an enrichment (object) in good faith, the new 
acquirer,  having had nothing to do with the lack of causa by the first acquirer, he is not 
normally liable. However a third party who acted in bad faith, is liable for the 
enrichment.716
 
Secondly, as the new Code structured enrichment law following a dual-pillar approach – 
condictio-claim (undue payment) and a versio-claim (enrichment sine causa) – I work 
from the questionable proposition (though I do not endorse it) that as regard to the 
condictio indebiti there is basically no difference whether the object that has been 
conveyed is a movable or an immovable one, and whether it is fungible or non-
fungible.717 Therefore, the provisions of arts. 876 and 877 apply to all of them alike. In 
this analysis, the premise is that a solvens that has transferred an immovable to an 
accipiens on an undue payment can have it restored to him if he proves that he paid by 
mistake. The parties are returned to the position they had been in prior to the undue 
payment.  
 
Thirdly, no major questions are raised in regard to the settled law on the good faith 
possessor. It is prima facie accepted that if the accipiens acted without bad faith and 
received the payment believing it as due, he is treated as a good faith possessor. From this 
proposition, normally arise four important consequences: (i) the accipiens has the right to 
the fruits derived thereof;718 (ii) he is not liable for the loss or deterioration of the thing, 
to which he did not give a cause (value);719 (iii) he is entitled to be compensated for 
necessary and useful improvements, and can remove any luxurious improvements;720 (iv) 
he has the right of retention for the value of any necessary and useful improvements.721 
                                                 
716  Pontes De Miranda,  Tratado de Direito Privado, Parte especial, Vol. 26. (1959) 190,  [§ 3.147]. 
717  S. Rodrigues, Dos Contratos e Das Declarações Unilaterais da Vontade (2003) 416.  
718 Article 878 of the new CC. 
719 Article 1.217 of the new CC. 
720  Article 1.219 of the new CC. 
721  Idem.  
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If, however, the accipiens acted in bad faith, he is then liable to respond as a possessor in 
bad faith.722
 
Fourthly, the working of the unjustified enrichment principle in the Brazilian Civil Code 
such as in the civil codes of many countries, entails a skillful exercise of cross-
referencing with principles found in other areas of law, such as property law, contract and 
civil responsibility (known as ‘tort law’ or ‘law of delict’ in English-speaking 
jurisdictions), and sometimes various aspects of public law, such as fiscal legislation, etc. 
We have seen earlier that in the title dealing with enrichment law proper in the new Civil  
Code of 2002 there are no defences to be found, except, perhaps two or three, but that 
such defences are to be sought in the General Part of the Code. The reflection below is 
typically a cross-referencing to the principles mostly found under property law, but a 
strict and blind application of those principles may result in an undue enrichment or 
unjustified impoverishment of one of the parties to the transaction or to a third party.     
 
Let us now consider the various hypotheses above as it may happen that having received 
an immovable as ‘payment’, the accipiens has transferred it, for value or gratuitously to a 
third person in good faith or in bad faith. What is the law’s solution? This problem, as we 
just mentioned above, can be split in various hypotheses, starting with the transfer where 
all parties have acted in good faith. 
 
 
Scenario 1 – An ‘undue payment’723 to “B” as a result of a donation from “A” of an immovable 
belonging to “Z” which is subsequently conveyed to “C” for value by the recipient (accipiens) 
(“B”), in which scenario, all parties (“B”, “C” and “Z”) act  in good faith.  
 
In these circumstances the legal system is confronted from the outset with two colliding 
interests, both protected by respectable principles of law.   
 
                                                 
722  Article 878 read with art. 1.218 of the new CC. 
723 ‘undue payment’ here is used in wider sense, as it is indeed understood in the new civil code, i.e. ‘a 
performance which lack a legal ground’. In casu, the donation is invalid because the transferor (the dnor)  
did not have proper title (ownership) to bequest the asset.  
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On the one hand the interest of the solvens who, having mistakenly724 transferred the 
ownership of a certain thing, seeks now to reintegrate it within his assets from which it 
should never have been separated. In this scenario, if the transfer is considered 
ineffective, due to the fact of resulting from an undue payment, the accipiens should not 
be able to effectively pass ownership of the immovable, because he was never the owner 
of it and he should never have been deemed to be as such.  That being the case, the 
transfer he made to a bona-fide third party should have no legal effect because the 
transferor was not a dominus. If one applies the rule that only owners or their 
representatives are able to transfer ownership, the law should allow the solvens who has 
‘badly’ paid, to reivindicate the immovable from whomever it has been transferred under 
such a payment.  
 
On the other hand, there is the interest of the bona-fide third party who, having acquired 
the immovable from someone who was apparently its owner, has acted as any reasonable 
person would have acted in such circumstances.  
 
Put differently, there is a competition between the interest of the solvens who has made 
an undue payment due to his own error, and the interest of a third party, who having 
acted in good faith and in the reliance of the unbeknown ‘mistaken transfer’, was induced 
to enter into a transaction for which he is now under the risk of suffering a loss.  In the 
circumstances, which of the two interests shall merit the protection of the law?  It would 
appear that under current Brazilian law in such a case the interest of the bona-fide third 
party is also the one to be preferred. That is so because having he done nothing to blame 
him, neither having he indirectly collaborated to bring about such a situation, if the law 
indeed held otherwise, he would find himself in the imminence of suffering an entirely 
unjustifiable a loss. Certainly, neither art. 876 nor art. 877 as currently formulated would 
sanction such a loss.  So, if the articles of the Code just mentioned prefer not to sanction 
the third party’s loss in such case, what else is that rather than saying that ‘non-
                                                 
724  In the example given above “B” transferred to “C” on a mistaken belief that he was the owner, or better 
ignoring that he was not the true owner. Therefore “B” was not a domino; he was just an apparent domino. 
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enrichment’725 is a defence? Or if the notion of ‘no-enrichment’ is not really sustainable 
in these circumstances, one can also say that the law does not sanction restorability in this 
case for policy considerations; i.e.; the need to protect innocent and bona-fide receivers 
coupled with the ideal of security of receipt.  
 
Furthermore having regard to the structure of the Code as a whole and the ideal that 
inspired its revision and the vision embodied in it that the interest of society be 
protected,726 the legislator by helping the third party, is deemed not only to have 
legislated to protect the interest of such a third party, but also the interest of the society at 
large, because the solution of the law must be directed to reinforce confidence in the 
security of legal transactions, which any member of the society expects that they be firm 
and stable. 
 
One would still argue in this example that the perceived deficiencies are in the efficacy of 
the public registries which are expect to detect any anomalies. If they cannot detect the 
anomaly in such transactions, why should the ‘the buyer’ suffer the loss, as he is also 
expected to act with due diligence?  However, to this argument one can simply counter 
that, if there were any elements of doubt in the efficacy of public registries, as the 
example demonstrates applying a contrary position, to the extent of imperilling a buyer 
who has taken all precautionary measures to suffer losses, such an element of doubt in the 
law would represent an unsettling aspect of the whole legal order. Should that be the 
case, the legislator would be called upon to immediately redress it.  
 
In the event that an undue payment happened on the transfer of an immovable, which was 
subsequently transferred by the recipient to a bona-fide third party for value, the law does 
                                                 
725 ‘No-enrichment’ in this aspect is considered in a very abstract and technical form, for the assets still 
exist. It is ‘no-enrichment’ in the sense that the recipient acquired such asset for value and in good faith, 
and as such it is more related to the element ‘causa’ (an acquisition as if cum-causa’), and for that reason it 
should stand. Here there is also a nuanced interface with the notion of acquisition without ‘fault’; but it is 
well known that fault is not a requirement under enrichment law and normally should not enter such realm.  
726 See similar remarks on contractual obligations by R. P. Nalin (Do Contrato: Conceito Pós-Moderno 
(2001) 79-80 which under the new Civil Code are expected to fulfill a social function and the role of good 
faith in contractual settings. At the time the author wrote he made reference to the contract in the then 
‘Projecto de Código Civil’ (General Dispositions: Project CC art. 420, 421, 423) and to the Consumer Code 
(Código Do Consumidor) hereinafter  ‘CDC’, art. 51.  
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not defer the solvens the right to reinvidicate the thing (art. 879) CC 2002).  On the 
contrary, the law will allow the solvens to sustain the loss. But his prerogative of a 
regressive action against the recipient will remain.  This solution, as Sílvio Rodrigues 
puts it, is an indirect conclusion from the provisions of art. 879 (the principle), and of an 
interpretation, (a contrario sensu), of the sole paragraph of this provision.727
  
The text of the article, inter alia, indicates that if the recipient has in good faith 
transferred an immovable received under undue payment, he is only liable for the value 
received. The sole paragraph by deferring to the solvens a revindicatory action against a 
bad faith receiver, or a receiver who has gratuitously obtained the immovable, exonerates 
from it, a contrario sensu, whoever has in good faith acquired an immovable for value. 
This is akin to the American and English doctrine of good faith purchase for value 
without notice, which constitutes a defence under those laws, whether it is for a movable 
or an immovable, as discussed in chapter two of this thesis.  That doctrine says that an 
‘innocent purchaser’ is one who had no reasonable basis to suspect the seller did not have 
good title. The most significant impact of the bfp [bona fide purchaser] doctrine, as a 
defence to an enrichment claim, (as said in chapter two (of this thesis) above) arises when 
one is seeking to assert a right of ‘equitable’ origins against a third party who has 
acquired legal title. To establish the defence of ‘bona-fide purchaser’ it must be shown 
that the defendant has given value, in good faith, for the subject matter which the plaintiff 
claims; and, ordinarily, that he was without knowledge, actual or constructive, of such a 
claim at the time he acquired title.728  
 
For our purpose the analogy and the relationship with change-of-position is that once a 
bona-fide purchaser for value is accorded the right to hold title, he is secure in what he 
has, and the plaintiff cannot lay claim on him. Put differently, what is at issue here is 
competing ‘equities’ if not interests. Both the claimant and the defendant have ‘title’ so to 
say, to the subject matter; but in such cases the best title is on the defendant, and 
                                                 
727 S. Rodrigues, Dos Contratos e das Declarações Unilaterias da Vontade (2003) 416.  
728 See Chapter three above and authorities cited there, among which,  Lake City Corp v Michigan Avenue 
National Bank of Chicago 337 NE 2d 251 (1975); 76 American Jurisprudence 2d, Trusts, § 269 et seq;  G. 
Douthwaite, Attorneys’ Guide to Restitution (1977) 389.  
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therefore he must prevail in any claim for restitution. The apparent windfall he acquires is 
fully justified because he ‘paid’ for it.  
 
Scenario 2 - Gratuitous and good faith transfer of Title by the ‘accipiens’ of an immovable 
unduly received. 
 
In this case, the conflict between the interest of the third party who has acquired such a 
property and that of the solvens are put in different terms. That is so because on the one 
side is the solvens who is seeking to avoid suffering a loss (certat de damno vitando), and 
on the other side, the third party is seeking to make a profit, i.e, he wants to increase his 
assets (certat de lucro captando). In this respect, under Brazilian law Sílvio Rodrigues is 
of the view that frequently when the Brazilian legislator is put under the dilemma to 
decide between the interest of ‘qui certat de lucro captando’ and that of ‘qui certat de 
damno vitando’, the legislator has shown preference for the latter.729 But not everyone 
would certainly agree with this proposition. In any event I also agree with that position, 
as the most rational one and leave the matter there.  
 
 
Scenario 3 - Transfer for value by the accipiens to a third person in bad faith, of an 
immovable unduly received.  
 
In this situation, a similar solution to the one allowing a reivindicatio of an immovable 
property is in sight when a third party acted in bad faith. If the third party acquired the 
immovable knowing that it was the subject of an ‘undue payment’, there is no reason why 
the law should protect his interest, because of acting in bad faith. In this case the 
protection given by the good faith principle does no longer apply, hence giving way to 
the principle that protects the right to property. Therefore, the solutions in the case of an 
acquisition of property without value, or the acquisition of property by a third party in 
bad faith, are the same, and are provided for in art. 879 (parágrafo único) which reads:  ‘if 
the immovable was transferred without value, or, if, transferred for value, the third party 
                                                 
729  S. Rodrigues (supra) (2003 ) 417. 
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who acquired it acted in bad faith, whoever has paid by error has the right to a 
reivindicatory action’.  
 
Scenario 4 -- Bad faith of the recipient, in the same hypothesis as above.  
 
If the recipient acted in bad faith, there is a possibility of a double solution, in conformity 
as to whether there is or there isn’t a third party acting in good faith. In the last 
hypothesis the solution was already given above. Given that the bad faith of the acquirer 
in such a circumstance does not deserve protection, the solvens can institute a 
reivindicatory action for the return of the immovable. 
 
However, if the accipiens was in bad faith and the third party acquiring such a property 
was in good faith, the need to protect the position of the latter (the good faith acquirer) 
requires the ‘transaction’ to stand. However, in this case, the law, having precluded the 
undue payer in these circumstance to institute a reivindicatory action, it nonetheless 
grants him the right to claim from the mala-fide receiver not only the price received for 
the sale of the immovable but also the right to recoup his losses and claim damages.730 
This is what is provided for under art. 879 of the CC 2002 (caput). 
 
In this last scenario, we see the possibility of two different outcomes, depending on 
whether there is or there isn’t a third party. However, whether there is one or not, the 
matter ordinarily remains solved within the property law principles and, only in 
secondary level other principles of law could kick in.  
 
 
4.3.2.3. Concluding Remarks.  
 
As stated at the start of this analysis, there is a limited recognition of the change-of-
position doctrine in this scenario, especially where the transaction resembles a gift (under 
the first scenario). The need of a legal system to protect the interest of innocent bona-fide 
                                                 
730  Ibid. 418-419.  
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receivers and the security of transactions may entail for a transaction which could prima-
facie be reversible to stand, and for that reason it is susceptible of leaving ‘a windfall 
onto the defendant.  Also in scenario no. 4, the law protects the third party who acquires 
the property in good faith but where the transferor was in bad faith. Though the law 
grants the undue payer the right to claim from the mala fide receiver not only the price 
received for the sale of the immovable, but also the right to recoup his losses and claim 
damages, there remain the possibility that such receiver might have absconded or gone 
bankrupt, or the proceeds of the sale were deposited in a bank that went insolvent.  In 
these hypotheses what will the claimant recover? How will the law deal with the 
situation? If the banking institution went insolvent and there is no way the defendant can 
pay, can he not plead change-of-position (loss of enrichment) as a defence?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4. Other Situations that May Generate Windfalls.  
 
4.4.1. Non- Recoverability of debts arising from wagering games and betting. 
 
Articles 814-817 of the new CC 2002731 deal with debts arising from wagering games 
and betting (jogo e aposta).  Article 814 provides that ‘a gambling debt or betting, are not 
enforceable; but a sum voluntarily paid under such activity is not recoverable, save if it 
was gained fraudulently (por dolo), or the loser is a minor or an interdicted person’. 
However, art. 817 specifies that a ‘draw conducted to solve a question or to divide 
common assets is considered as a sharing mechanism or a transaction process, as the case 
may be’. Apart from this exception, the whole issue of debts arising from wagering and 
betting activities has strong relationship with enrichment liability themes as such debts 
                                                 
731  Civil Code of 1916: art. 1.477 Civil Code 1916. 
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bring to fore questions of validity or invalidity of the cause underlying the transfer and 
the concomitant consequences. Sometimes it is thought that due to the peculiarity of such 
transactions, the creditor’s right is mutilated because the underlying cause is tainted with 
illegality; or that the inquiry can be put at different levels depending on the facts in issue. 
 
Thus, from this holding the following questions have often been asked under Brazilian 
law, depending o the angle from which the question of validity or invalidity is addressed: 
(a) does any credit result from such transactions, given that the right of the creditor is 
mutilated; or (b) do such transactions not give rise to any obligations, given that they are 
invalid?; or (c) alternatively, because such acts are not legally valid and therefore 
unenforceable, can they, as consequence, be considered or equated to ‘no-acts’ (i.e.; 
legally non-existent) and that for that reason, no obligation arises from them? 
 
These are questions that almost date back to Roman times and the answers given to them 
in the various systems inspired by Roman law or others have varied over time. Though 
gambling contracts are often considered irrational and harmful for exploiting the mental 
frailty and other weaknesses of the people they target by causing economic advantages to 
be promised to them in exchange for the gambler’s performance, the advantages to the 
gambling organisers generally exceed the value of the performance to such an extent that 
there is always a striking disproportion between them. When such contracts are 
permissible or ‘tolerated’; restitution of what was voluntarily performed is normally or 
often prohibited because it would be in itself indecorous and inappropriate to do 
otherwise. But there is no single solution to all situations. In modern times, several 
jurisdictions have devised a set of rules which are generally more flexible than in times 
gone by. In line with this modern trend, Brazilian law has developed its own solution, 
too. Though such solution has some remnants of the Roman times,732  it has nonetheless 
                                                 
732  Pontes de Miranda summarised the Roman position as follows; ‘In Roman law there was no concept of 
nullity corresponding to the modern concept: nec ullus, nullus, era o que nada era; ‘a void obligation was 
considered as non-existent, i.e.; a no-obligation. The Roman natural obligation existed in the so-called a 
natural sphere or natural plan, as if an under-world in legal sense; in a sphere that has not attained the 
‘world of laws’. The contract of gambling known as ‘aposta’ (the species of the gambling contract known 
in Portuguese as ‘aposta’) was considered as ‘licit’ (permissible); but that species known in Portuguese as 
‘jogo’ was illicit, save if it was entered into with the aim of exercises or entertainment, or if its aim was that 
of fulfilling an object of immediate consumption. Under these circumstances, for Romans, the solution was 
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been updated to accommodate modern thinking. The law, as it currently stands, 
distinguishes between prohibited games; tolerated games and authorised games. The 
solution adopted for each type of game is a bit different, though in some respects they 
overlap. In the cases of a debt arising from a game in general, the sum voluntarily paid is 
not recoverable.733 A prohibited game does not produce any obligations. In a tolerated 
game, the debt does not oblige one to pay it, but the debtor cannot recover a sum 
voluntarily paid. In an authorised game, the debt can be demanded by the winning 
player.734 The non-recoverability is premised on two foundations: nullity and illegality.  
 
Two exceptions are provided for which thwart the non-recoverability rule: (i) the case of 
fraud (or dolo) and (ii) the cases of a minor or of an interdicted person. The word dolo 
corresponds to fraud in a wider sense, including mischievous behaviour, trickery and 
dishonesty or scam as to the winner.  In other words, the winnings are achieved by 
trickery or scam, for example by modifying for one’s benefit or favour, the course of 
luck, or inducing the other party into an error, such as hiding the capabilities and abilities 
of one of the players, in which the loser has put his bet. If the loser is a minor or an 
interdicted person, the sum voluntarily paid is susceptible to be reclaimed. The reason for 
such recoverability is the presumption that the winning party took advantage of the 
insecurity of the minor, or of the inexperience and mental frailty of the interdicted 
person.735 In such matter, it is understood that the benefit acquired by the winner was 
won dishonestly, and as a consequence there is no moral justification – and legal 
justification – to pay it. Put differently, there is no recognised legal cause for the minor or 
the interdicted person to pay. In the analysis we have been doing thus far, it simply means 
the benefit was acquired unjustifiably because the object of the ‘contract’ was illegal and 
                                                                                                                                                 
that provided for under alternative (c) in the three hypotheses above. In modern law there are two 
conceptions a) and b), in addition to c). It is to be noted however, that under hypothesis a) above, there 
have been and there are still bifurcated disagreements among scholars on what is excluded and when it is to 
be excluded. The situation can graphically be represented as {a1 or a2} in which case sub-category a1 is the 
situation in which the hypothesis a) would encompass or attract the denial of the claim only (a pretenção); 
and in sub-category a2  the [denial of enforceability] would encompass the action (a acção), a fact that 
would explain the non- repetition (non restoration)..’ (Pontes de Miranda, Tratado do Direito Privado    
Vol. 6 (1955) 47-49). 
733  Revista dos Tribunais, no. 467/ p.217. 
734  Revista de Jurisprudência do Tribunal de Justiça de São Paulo, No. 6 p.107. 
735  Arnaldo Rizzardo, Contratos (2002) 797. 
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as such it falls under art. 883 of the new Código Civil by analogy. Therefore that 
provision applies by cross-reference.  
 
4.4.2. Illegality. 
 
The illegality defence is another candidate that may generate windfall, but such a defence 
will be the subject of a separate treatment at later stage as already mentioned elsewhere in 
this study. Therefore no further discussion of the issue is to be undertaken here, except to 
reiterate that there is however some connection with the supposed illegality discussed 
under the previous section. The whole issue of illegality, seen generally, has strong 
relationship with enrichment liability because it brings to fore questions of validity or 
invalidity of the cause underlying the transfer and the concomitant consequences. 
Sometimes it is thought that whenever one has entered into an illegal transaction, his 
right is mutilated because the underlying cause is tainted with such illegality. But in other 
occasions the inquiry can be put at different levels depending on the facts in issue. 
Where, however, illegality is raised and falls within the provision of art. 883 of the new 
Código Civil, the legislature has provided a clear indication how the judge should 
proceed: ‘whoever has given something with the finality of obtaining an unlawful, an 
immoral aim, or an end forbidden by law, he is not entitled to restitution’. And the caveat 
to this provision adds: ‘in the case of this article, whatever was given shall revert in 
favour of a local charity [designated] at the judge’s criteria’.  
 
4.4.3. Prescription. 
 
Prescription was briefly discussed above and need not be repeated again. What is also 
said in chapter two of this thesis on prescription in other jurisdictions is mostly valid here 
as well. Any windfall a defendant may acquire through the operation of prescription is 
legally justified, though it might seem unjust. It might be important to remember, 
however, here that if someone has paid a debt that has prescribed, but such debt was 
nonetheless due, the payment is not recoverable according to art. 880 of the new CC 2002 
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(old Code 970) mentioned above.  For some writers such rule seems to stem from a more 
technical conception of the foundations of prescription. It has been held that the real 
foundations of prescription is to protect one who is not a debtor and who may no longer 
have proof of the existence of the debt; but it is not to protect one who was a debtor and 
believed in the inexistence of the debt. This contention may no longer be correct today, 
but it was defended at various stages of the development of the Brazilian law, including 
by Pontes de Miranda,736 and many others, but it seems to me the position he (Pontes de 
Miranda) rejected is the correct one, at least in part. That view says that a claimant’s 
action will be held to have prescribed if, due to his own negligence, he failed to demand 
his thing or a debt for a long period of time.737   
  
4.4.4. Enrichment and Public Law. 
 
This aspect is dealt with in the next chapter on passing on defence. It is well established 
under current Brazilian law that if one is dealing with performance in the public law, (e.g. 
payment of taxes, that a court decision has found unconstitutional), an enrichment action 
against the Ministry of Finance (Fazenda Pública) will be entertained, and if there exist a 
clause dealing with special prescription, such action (unjustified enrichment) shall be 
subject to that prescription rule.738
 
 
4.5. Ineffectiveness of Contracts in Brazilian Law 
 
4.5.1. Introductory Remarks. 
 
                                                 
736  Pontes de Miranda Tratado de Direito Privado, Vol. 6 (1955) 100-101.  
737  The foundation of this last view under Brazilian law comes inter alia from the Imperial Decrees known 
as Ordenações.  Thus Ordenações Filipinas, Livro 4, Titulo 79; Ordenações Manuelinas Livro IV Titulo 80 
are some of the direct references for such position.  
738  Related issues have been mentioned above when dealing with res judicata and the authorities cited 
there apply mutatis mutandi here. See Generally G. Tepedino Temas de Direito Civil (1999) 449-457 and 
corresponding text in the 2004 edition. See also historically how the issue was addressed in Pontes de 
Miranda Tratado de Direito Privado Vol. 26 (1959) 122. For current position see chapter 5 below when 
dealing with unjustified enrichment under the Código Nacional Tributário.  
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On the issue of ineffectiveness of contracts Brazilian law resembles closely with other 
civil law systems, but from time to time it encounters difficulties in defining the effects of 
termination of a contractual relationship for breach in which some theorists think the 
termination should have effect ex tunc and not ex nunc. The somewhat continuous scuffle 
in defining the precise meanings and scopes of concepts such as ‘resilição, rescisão, 
anulação, resolução’,739 testifies to the difficulties, though their magnitude is somewhat 
limited.  
 
4.5.2. Ineffectiveness of Contracts due to Breach. 
 
 
It is recognised under current Brazilian law that breach of contract may also generate the 
possibility of a windfall to one of the litigants. The remedies and effects of breach are 
generally discussions for contract law. However, the question whether on breach the 
relationship is terminated ex tunc or ex nunc has occupied the attention of some Brazilian 
writers like in other jurisdictions. If the effects of the breach are considered ex tunc and 
not ex nunc, the result could indeed be to create an interface between enrichment law and 
contract law. But these problems, though they might have received some insightful 
debate under current Brazilian law, time and resource constraints hinder any detailed 
consideration of the issue in this jurisdiction for the time being. It is, however, evident 
that one of the major controversies which have surrounded rescission ex tunc under 
Brazilian law is indeed to define whether in addition to restitution for breach to which the 
aggrieved party is entitled, he is also entitled to recover any form of damages 
(indenização). The difficulty is thought to be a logical one which arises out of the 
retrospective effect of rescission ex tunc. If rescission requires the parties to be restored 
to the position they would have been in had the contract not been entered into, how can 
damages (indenização) for breach be awarded? The two remedies are said to be 
inconsistent in that damages (indenização) is a compensatory remedy which aims at 
placing the aggrieved party in the economic position he would have stood in had the 
                                                 
739 ‘Resilição, rescisão, anulação e resolução’ would roughly translate respectively as ‘cancellation, rescission, 
annulment and discharge’. 
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contract been properly performed. The operation of the subsidiary rule also limits the 
dynamic of this kind of cases under Brazilian law, though from time to time they do 
surface. This is one of the areas where some Brazilian private law scholars at the 
‘Primeira Jornada de Direito Civil’740 gathered in Brasília put into question the 
unqualified subsidiarity rule under the new Code. 
 
All indications are, however, that it can be said that Brazilian law does not consider the 
possibility of its ‘faint’ change-of-position doctrine enshrined under the impossibility of 
performance approach (art. 238 new CC) in cases of breach of contract. The remedy is 
wholly contractual and no issues of enrichment liability are generally considered. The 
situation however might be different if the obligation ceases due to impossibility of 
performance.  
 
4.5.3. Brazilian Impossibility of Performance Doctrine. 
 
 
Article 238 of the new CC741 offers a clear glimpse on the Brazilian impossibility of 
performance doctrine, though it mostly relates to the destruction of the object that must 
be restored. Brazil, like most civilian law countries, sustains generally the rule that 
impossibility of performance leads to ‘nullity’ of the obligation.742 The underlying idea in 
such a proposition is that the court cannot compel a person to do what is impossible. The 
refusal to compel specific performance, however, does not preclude the award of 
damages. If the impossibility extends to the entire obligation, Brazilian law considers the 
entire obligation as void. Because the general rule under Brazilian law is that 
enforcement of the obligation is assumed to be the primary remedy, (see the emphasis on 
the concept of good faith), it becomes as a matter of logical conclusion that it would also 
be inappropriate to demand specific performance, when the performance in question is, or 
                                                 
740  Enunciado No. 36 – I Jornada de Direito Civil – Conselho de Justiça Federal (11 a 13 de Sept. 2002). 
741  Brazilian Civil Code of 2002 art. 238. 
742 This position is based on the idea expressed in the Justinian Digest that impossibillium nulla obligatio (D. 
50.17.185). Thus art. 166(ii) of the new CC clearly states that ‘it is considered null and void an obligation whose object 
is illicit, impossible or indeterminate’ (emphasis added). Article 104 of the new CC expresses the same idea in the 
positive when it declares that ‘the validity of an obligation requires that its object (ii) be licit, possible, determinate or 
determinable’.  
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has become, impossible. This is the effect of the following provisions of the new Código 
Civil: art. 607 of the new Código Civil dealing with contracts for the provision of 
services;743 art. 399 dealing with a debtor in mora;744 and art. 106 dealing with a 
‘temporary’ impossibility,745 which, a contrario senso, indicates that a permanent 
impossibility discharges the obligation; and arts. 123-124 sanctioning the invalidity of an 
obligation where it was subject to a condition which is impossible, illicit or unintelligible. 
However, if one of the parties had promised to do the impossible, he may nevertheless be 
liable in damages, e.g. because he was at fault in assuming the obligation when he knew 
or should have known of the impossibility. But, sometimes such liability is restricted to 
compensation of the other party’s reliance loss, – perhaps because the terms of the 
contract are considered to include a guarantee that performance was (or would be) 
possible; or because one of the parties was responsible for the impossibility. The disposal 
of the subject matter of the contract, though it prima facie seems as a case of breach, is 
ordinarily considered as a case of impossibility.  
 
Judging again from the position argued by Claúdio Michelon described earlier in this 
chapter that the cases dealt with under the German BGB § 818(3) are resolved under 
Brazilian law by applying the provisos of art. 238 of the new Código Civil which 
provides that ‘if the obligation to restore a certain thing, and this thing, without the 
debtor’s fault, is lost before the transfer (tradictio), the creditor shall ‘suffer’ the loss, and 
the obligation will be terminated,  save his rights up to the date of the loss’. It would 
seem that, if this provision applies alike to synallagmatic failed contracts, then the main 
contention defended under the proposition is that the creditor always bears the risk. Put 
differently, the ‘res perit domino’ seems the predominant approach under Brazilian law. 
However, as I said earlier, it is not clear whether the provision of art. 238 indeed applies 
in synallagmatic situations as well as in unilateral acts, because the provisions of art. 884 
under the Brazilian new CC clearly reiterate that if the thing is lost, it must be replaced by 
                                                 
743  In terms of this article a contract for the provision of services is discharged, inter alia, with the death of any of the 
parties (…) as well as for impossibility of performance by either party due to force-majeure.  
744  This article provides that a debtor in mora is answerable for the impossibility to perform, even if such impossibility 
arose from a fortuitous event or a force-majeure, if such events occurred during the delay, save where he can prove that 
he was not at fault, or that the ‘loss’ (or damage) would have happened anyway had the obligation been performed in 
time.   
745  The provision states that an ‘initial impossibility of the object does not invalidate the obligation if the impossibility 
is relative, or if it ceases before the realization of the condition to which it was attached’.  
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its value, and that provision appears in the title on unilateral acts. It does not seem to 
sanction loss of enrichment as a general defence under current Brazilian law, and the 
inference that art. 238 applies to such cases should be seen with reservation without 
further authority.  
Notwithstanding the above said, it appears however clear that the performance of an 
obligation to pay money is virtually never considered to be impossible, so that the action 
for an agreed sum (which is conceptually a kind of specific enforcement) cannot be 
resisted on the ground of impossibility.  
 
 
4.6. General Conclusion. 
 
My investigation found no conclusive reason why the Brazilian legislator opted for a 
general enrichment claim and at the same time omitted to make reference to the general 
defence. Obviously, the function of a general defence as provided elsewhere in this study 
is to curb the very wide general enrichment principle, and the legislator has clearly 
mentioned the subsidiarity rule which to some extent serves such function. However the 
legislative history and the travaux préparatoires do not reveal that due consideration was 
given to the effectiveness, desirability or undesirability of the general defence compared 
to the subsidiarity rule and that the subsidiarity rule was chosen to the detriment of the 
general defence.746 Indeed, recent doctoral studies in the country by Maria Kröetz747 and 
Giovanni Ettore Nanni748 on unjustified enrichment in general under the new Code as 
well as other theorists who have recently discussed the topic did not find that there has 
been a substantial and sustained discussion on the desirability of the subsidiarity 
approach. An earlier consideration of the issue in the 1950s by Agostinho Alvim749 did 
however note that the subsidiarity requirement did not always have a universal adherence 
in the Brazilian academic literature (known in the country as ‘doctrine’).  There were 
                                                 
746 I have mentioned elsewhere that few months after the enactment of the new CC the ‘unqualified’ 
subsidiarity rule came under attack by Brazilian experts meeting in Brasília and they recommended 
limitations to it straight away.  
747 M.C. Kroetz, Do Enriquecimento Sem Causa (Curitiba, 2005). 
748  G. E. Nanni, Enriquecimento Sem Causa  (São Paulo, 2004). 
749  A. Alvim (1954) No. 173 Revista Forense 47-67 (Sep/Oct). 
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some theorists, according to the author, who were of the view that the action of 
enrichment sine causa was not necessarily subsidiary, because it could concurrently 
function with other actions of the ‘ordinary law’ or in its place when the said action 
becomes impossible due to an obstacle not contrary to law.750 Some attributed to it a 
minor importance while others thought the law of enrichment could do as just well 
without it.751   
  
Under these circumstances, it appears safe to say that the lack of a clear mention of the 
loss of enrichment (change-of-position) defence in the new Brazilian Código Civil may 
be a legislative oversight. That is so because there is no clear indication to be found 
anywhere in legislative history why the legislature chose to omit it. Several Brazilian 
academics writing on the new code in comparison with the old one also found that arts. 
884-886 did not pass through a sustained ‘scrutiny’ between the Draft Project of the 
1970s and the time the Code was finally adopted in 2002. For example, Carlos Camillo752 
and others commenting on the New Civil Code and comparing the new provisions with 
those in the old Code simply state that ‘these provisions were adopted as they came in the 
Ante-Project’.753 They acknowledge that they have no antecedent in the previous Code, 
but no discussion of them in the Senate is referred to. 
 
Hence, I am of the view that the lack of a general defence might be a lacuna in the 
legislation, in the same way that the previous Code of 1916 embodied a lacuna in 
omitting the general enrichment principle against unjustified enrichment and led the 
jurisprudence to resort to analogy and general principles of the Code to solve any 
emerging problems under the de in rem verso features. Michelon’s explanation can 
positively be viewed as another indirect attempt resorting to such analogy to solve 
problems he might have already identified. The only difference is that he is now applying 
the analogy on the defence side while before the recognition of the general principle of 
                                                 
750  Ibid, at 65. 
751  E. Espínola ‘Garantia e Extinção das Obligações’ pp 101ss. 
752  C.E  Nicolletti-Camilo et al, Comentários ao  Código Civil de Acordo com a Lei 121.280/2006 (São 
Paulo 2006). 
753  For a general criticism of the whole Civil Code see among others G. Tepedino ‘O Velho Projeto de um 
Revelho Código Civil’ (1997) No. 1 Revista Jurídica Del Rey 17 (Dezembro 1997); Also Reprinted in the  
1999 and 2004 editions of his Temas de Direito Civil  437  and 460 respectively. 
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enrichment sine causa the analogy had to be applied on the liability side. We have seen 
that that technique had its limitations and the doctrine demanded a catch-all provision to 
solve the issues that could not be solved under that technique.  In sum, given that an actio 
de in rem verso now sanctioned under art. 884 is of ‘an equitable’ nature,754 and demands 
that no one should unjustly and unjustifiably benefit at the expense of another, it should 
also provide that no one should unjustly and unjustifiably be prejudiced in restoring an 
enrichment. Loss of enrichment should have been directly sanctioned as a defence under 
the New Code. The subsidiarity rule is somewhat too restrictive to encompass an 
adequate protection to the parties’ interests.  
 
 
 
PART III.  REFLECTIONS ON BRAZILIAN ENRICHMENT LAW FROM ABROAD. 
 
 
4.7.1. Introductory Remarks.  
 
This section considers briefly and critically some significant issues raised by the 
formulation of the general principle against unjustified enrichment in the new Brazilian 
Código Civil. Special focus is placed on the words ‘after updating monetary value’ and 
the consequences emanating from that ‘expression’, namely: the conundrum of ‘interest 
in money’ and to what extent a claim is amenable to be adjusted.  
 
 
4.7.2. What does the Brazilian Approach and Experience Tell Us?  
 
The general manifestation of the unjustified enrichment doctrine under current Brazilian 
law is to some extent similar or analogous to many other civil-law jurisdictions, 
especially those following the ‘Pothier School’, varying only in some nuances. But there 
are at least two important aspects in which Brazilian law is very peculiar and such aspects 
relay noteworthy messages to other jurisdictions. The first message that can be extracted 
from the Brazilian formulation of the unjustified enrichment doctrine is that in whatever 
                                                 
754  I have made reference earlier that some writers such a C. Michelon do not subscribe to this labelling of 
art. 884, but the practical application of the institute so attests.  
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way a legal system tries to ward off loss of enrichment as an objective defence in its 
enrichment law, the system will still need to address the issue. If it cannot do so directly, 
it will do so indirectly (mostly by analogy). If a system gives way to a general enrichment 
action, it is bound to establish not only mechanisms to protect vulnerable receivers, but 
also to specify to what extent its enrichment law will delimit the right of recovery in 
‘borderline’ cases. Omitting a general enrichment defence and relying on an indirect 
reasoning is however problematic. That is because the approach may lead to the 
conception of an enrichment doctrine which is too restrictive and that leaves aside many 
deserving cases in the attempt to protect the integrity of the principle as enshrined in the 
code.  
 
The need of a change-of-position defence becomes even stronger if that system also 
places emphasis on the concept of good faith throughout its private law. That is exactly 
what happens under current Brazilian enrichment law because the notion of good faith755 
permeates the civil code at large. Being that the case, and because of the implicit desire of 
the legal system to keep in line with the rest of the Romanistic tradition, it becomes 
inevitable that subtle manifestations of the loss-of-enrichment defence in the Brazilian 
enrichment law would appear now and then. That is, for example, noticeable in art. 878 
where the system seeks to protect a good-faith receiver of an undue payment when he is 
in a position analogous to that of a possessor in good faith as regards fruits are 
concerned.756 The proviso in art. 238 discussed above is to the same effect, albeit only 
partially so. Many other provisions scattered in the Code would require such protection if 
the need and the circumstances arise.  
 
                                                 
755 On the notion of good faith in contractual obligations and related issues see also R. P. Nalin (Do 
Contrato: Conceito Pós-Moderno (2001) 79-81 refering to arts. 420, 421, 423 considers, among other 
things, that the new Civil Code is expected to fulfill a social function. The role of good faith, especially in 
contractual settings, becomes then prominent. (Please note that at the time P.R. Nalin wrote, he made 
reference to the contract in the then ‘Projecto de Código Civil’ (General Dispositions: Project CC art. 420, 
421, 423) and to the Consumer Code (Código Do Consumidor) art. 51. For this reason the reference 
numbers differ from the final version of the Civil Code). 
756 Article 1.214 reads: A good faith possessor is entitled to the fruits while the posse in good faith lasts. 
And art. 1.217 provides that ‘a good faith possessor is not liable for the loss or deterioration of a thing for 
which he ‘gave’ no causa’ – emphasis added - [Probably the drafters meant ‘he acquired without a 
cause’].In Portuguese: O possuidor de boa-fé não responde pela perda ou deterioração da coisa, a que não 
der causa. 
          
        
CHAPTER IV: Unjustified Enrichment in Brazil: Part III - Reflections on Monetary Correction & Interest in Money
             © Jorge Aimite  Cape-Town 15/08/2009    [This is   Page 239 ]
Change of Position Defence
  (Unjustified Enrichment)
239
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 ©
 J
or
ge
 A
m
ite
 ©
The second important message emanating from Brazilian enrichment law is the need to 
establish the real place and the consequences of inflation within enrichment liability. 
Generally speaking, under private law most legal systems adhere to the ‘nominal value 
principle’, and this principle prima facie constitutes an ‘obstacle’ to adapt say, a contract, 
on the basis of regular inflation unless the parties have agreed to do so. While on the one 
hand, the creditor normally ought to bear the risk of depreciation, an appreciation of the 
value of the currency would seem to be empathetic to the debtor.757 The situation, 
however, might be different where such inflation is no longer ordinary in so far as 
contract law in general is concerned. Here we encounter two trends of thought, (in some 
legal systems), one adhering strictly to the ‘nominal value principle’ while the other 
advocating adjustment rules. Each of them advances different reasons to sustain their 
contention. Those adhering to the general application of the nominal principle usually 
contend that it would be contrary to the ‘criterion’ of reasonableness and equity, if, for 
example, the judge were to adapt a contract in random occurrences, where many other 
people in the society at large will equally be affected by the same ‘exceptional inflation’. 
However, where regular inflation affects a long term contract, there is a tendency to 
consider exceptional cases and allow some judicial intervention to adjust the contract. 
The underlying idea for such adjustment is that it would be unreasonable if a 
disproportionately inflationary advantage simply fell into the laps of one of the 
contracting parties. To avoid that ‘unjust’ outcome, some theorists think that the 
‘disturbed contractual equilibrium should always be restored’.758 These considerations, 
however, fall mostly within contract law, though their ambit can have ramifications 
                                                 
757 See for example art. 6:111 of the Principles of European Contract Law. To the same effect is art. 6:258 
of Burgerlijk Wetboek, BW- (new Dutch Civil Code) and to some extent also art. 6: 260, BW.  In the Dutch 
legal doctrine, for instance, A. S. Hartkamp (Asser’s Handleiding tot de beoefening van het nederlands 
Burgerlijk Recht, Verbinstenissenrecht, Algemene leer der overeenkomsten  (2005) n. 338 (as cited by 
Mirella Pelletier “Common Core of European Private Law – Change of Circumstances – Dutch Report” 
(Research Offices, Supreme Court of The Netherlands) at http://www.unexpected-
circumstances.org/Dutch%20report%20nov.%2006.doc (last accessed 19 April 2009)) remarks that in 
reverse cases in respect of the influence of appreciation of immovable property on marriage settlements, the 
Dutch Supreme Court (The Hoge Raad) disregarded the nominal value principle on the basis of unforeseen 
circumstances. In other words, it adjusted the value taking into account appreciation or depreciation of the 
currency. Hartkamp refers here to cases reported at HR 10 January 1992, NJ 1992, 651; HR 15 September 
1995, NJ 1996, 616; HR 12 June 1987, NJ 1988, 150. (HR=Hoge Raad) 
758  Few example of case law going in this direction in Dutch law can be found in HR 12 June 1987, NJ 
1988, 150; HR 30 January 1991, NJ 1992, 191; HR 15 September 1995, NJ 1996, 616. (all Dutch cases 
cited here are taken from Mirella Peletier (supra) footnotes 21-23). 
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beyond that field. What exactly is the position under unjustified enrichment law in which 
the parties to the claim may not necessarily be linked by an underlying contract denoting 
voluntary assumption of risks? Can monetary inflation qualify as a form of change of 
position/circumstances? If so, how would it operate? What difficulties are there proving or 
disqualifying this potential head of the defence? 
 
These questions arise incidentally in this thesis because the new Brazilian Código Civil 
appended ‘monetary adjustment’ to the general principle against unjustified 
enrichment,759 which indicates that the issue transcends the ambit of contractual 
obligations. Earlier in this chapter I took the view that such appendage to the general 
principle was unfortunate, as it throws the general principle into confusion. But my 
disapproval of the appendage does not mean the issue should not feature within the 
enrichment doctrine. I then highlighted that the drafters of the Civil Code should have 
done so in a separate provision. What does really inflation tell us in such contexts?  
 
The general process of inflation can give rise to a multitude of different problems, and for 
our purposes the most salient of which would be two distinct issues, namely, that of 
revalorization and that of discharge. Once again we see here that there is a need in 
enrichment context to know how the enrichment came about. While revalorization (of a 
currency) in our context presupposes a debt that must be paid or re-paid in certain 
monetary units and thereby the possibility of adjustment; discharge of the obligation, on 
the other hand, tells us that the claim arises from a contract and there are underlying cost 
variations. When inflation is seen from the perspective of possibly discharging the 
contract, the concept presupposes a voluntary agreement between the parties, and 
inflation might be seen as one of the risks voluntarily assumed; when it is seen from the 
notion of revalorization, the concept does not necessarily presuppose a contract between 
the parties; it may also entail a unilateral act. 
 
The issue straddles several areas: third party claims, risk assumption, termination or 
variation of contracts, etc. Apparently in the cases of devaluation there is ordinarily no 
                                                 
759 Brazilian new Civil Code art. 884. 
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problem of impossibility to restore the benefit received, nor is there any issue of bad 
faith. The receiver is ready to restore the benefit received, with the only problem that the 
‘purchasing power’ of the money has diminished. Restoring the ‘money’ in the same 
units as received corresponds ‘numerically’ with restoring the ‘value received’, but value-
wise, it actually corresponds to the ‘value remaining’. On what basis can then the plaintiff 
claim the restoration of the ‘actual value’ (adjusted value), without leaving the defendant 
worse of, as a result of having received an undue/unjust gain?  Why the loss should in 
these cases be shifted from an innocent and ‘mistaken or unmistaken’ party to an 
innocent party who neither made a mistake nor brought about the event that led to the 
decline of the value? 
 
The message that can be distilled from the Brazilian enrichment law (the new enrichment 
sine causa under art 884 of the new CC as discussed above) is that a situation of hyper-
inflation can result in involuntary enrichment of one party at the expense of another. The 
issue, however, is complicated to be addressed within the enrichment doctrine, because 
the act enriching one party and correspondingly impoverishing the other is ordinarily not 
done by the parties themselves, but by a third party who mostly happens to be the public 
authority (the government), or outside events, such as market turmoil in times of global 
recessions or conflicts. From the perspective of the parties such an incident (currency 
devaluation) is more akin to a supervening event outside their control. Both parties would 
seemingly be in the position of two innocents. Can then the rule which says that ‘as 
between two equally ‘innocent’ parties, the position of the defendant is the better’, apply 
to such cases?  What would be the implications of such application?  
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Thus far it is a moot point in South African law as well as in English760 and American761 
laws whether monetary inflation can qualify as a relevant change of position for 
enrichment law. Such a situation would be more common where there is steep currency 
fluctuation or devaluation, or a total collapse of the currency such as it was in Brazil in 
the 1980s-1990s or the current upper-inflation of Zimbabwe. In the assessment whether 
inflation should be considered as a potential head of change of position, a distinction 
must then be made between different degrees of inflation: a slight inflation, a severe or 
acute inflation and a total collapse of the currency. Although the last two aspects might 
be considered speculative in some economies, we have a living example – Zimbabwe - 
where it cannot be said that that inflation is acute or severe, but simply as a total collapse 
of the currency. It is not unimaginable that the judiciary might be called upon to decide 
enrichment cases in these circumstances. Where the claim arises from a ‘functioning’ 
contract, the contract itself might provide for payment to be ‘index-linked’, but this only 
works if the inflation is somewhat predictable and manageable, and the remedy is to be 
founded in contract. Where the inflation is so extreme to amount to total collapse of the 
currency, an ‘index-linked’ approach by the parties themselves may not work, the 
contract is simply ‘defunct’ and performance should simply amount to near-impossibility, 
and therefore discharge might be the logical outcome. It is more likely that in cases of 
extreme inflation or total collapse of the currency, such effects on contracts and other 
private law matters would be dealt with by legislation and the questions raised here 
would not need to be resolved by the courts applying the common-law principles.762 But 
should such legislation be wanting, there would still be room for judicial pronouncement 
and, in my view, the change-of-position defence would be available in the circumstances. 
                                                 
760  Note however for English law that a dictum by Lord Roskill in National Carriers Ltd v Panalpina 
(Northern) Ltd [1981] 1 AC 675, 712 refers to ‘inflation’ as one of the ‘circumstances in which the doctrine 
of frustration has been invoked, sometimes with success, sometimes without’. So it is not very clear 
whether inflation falls within the former or within the letter groups of circumstances.  
761  Note equally some nuanced references to discharge of contract for inflation in Corbin, Contracts, § 
1360 who says that the ‘difference in value between the gold and paper currencies could have been taken 
into account in action for damages’ and thereby suggesting the possibility of discharging the contract.  
(References to gold and paper currencies are in relation to the Gold Standard, for which see more details in 
the Brazilian discussion of ‘actualização de valores’ [updating monetary value] in chapter four above; or as 
commonly known as the Bretton Woods system). For related issues on the Gold Standard and possible 
unjust enrichment in currency devaluation in USA, see Perry v US 294 U.S. 300. 
762 G.H. Treitel, Frustration and Force Majeure (1994) 277 (§§ 6-041 to 6-042). See also once again the 
Brazilian discussion above and the adoption of the ‘indexed-system’ in the years 1980s-1990s. 
          
        
CHAPTER IV: Unjustified Enrichment in Brazil: Part III - Reflections on Monetary Correction & Interest in Money
             © Jorge Aimite  Cape-Town 15/08/2009    [This is   Page 243 ]
Change of Position Defence
  (Unjustified Enrichment)
243
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 ©
 J
or
ge
 A
m
ite
 ©
The same rationale presented in the question as to whether change-of-position should be 
available to public authority in the ‘disaster version’, as discussed further down in chapter 
five, would  mutatis mutandi apply in these cases.   
 
 
4.7.2. ‘Updating Monetary Value’ and Interest on Money. 
 
Corollary to ‘adjustment of monetary values’ in the unjustified enrichment doctrine is 
another important incidental question: that of interest on money. This question, though 
incidental only, is of great significance because it may influence the whole conception of 
the enrichment law. Is interest on money recoverable under current Brazilian enrichment 
doctrine? If it is not, that is the end of the matter. On the contrary, if it is, then the 
following ramifications arise: If interest is due on a sum of money that must be restored, 
it is obvious that such interest is more likely regarded as a fruit763 of the principal sum. 
That being the case, it must also be assumed that such interest is to be earned from the 
time of the receipt of the money,764 or at least from the time of litis contestatio. Then, for 
example, if it is assumed that in an undue payment claim the restoration of interest is no 
less due than the restoration of the principal, the further question that need to be asked is 
whether there are two different regimes for the recoverability of interest in enrichment 
claims under Brazilian law. Or to frame the question in its underlying components one 
would ask the following subsequent questions: (i) Is interest recoverable on a claim based 
on undue payment – the condictio version – or not? If it is, from what sum and from what 
moment it starts to run? (ii) Is interest recoverable in a claim based on enrichment sine 
causa or not? And; (iii) if the answer to (ii) is in the affirmative, from what moment it 
starts to run and what consequences does the recoverability of interest have on the 
calculation of the measure of enrichment under art. 884? 
 
                                                 
763 For example art. 878 of the Brazilian Civil Code may implicitly be said to consider interest as a fruit, for 
the article provides that ‘to the fruits, accessions, improvements and deteriorations accrued to the thing 
given in undue payment apply the provisions of this code dealing with a good faith or a bad faith possessor, 
as the case may be.’ (Emphasis added). 
764 Other provisions of the Code making reference to interest are art. 591referered to in the note 
immediately bellow; arts. 297, 389, 395, 404, 405, 406, 407, 552, 677, 833, etc.  
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If one considers that in many cases falling within the undue payment (- the condictio-
version of the enrichment claim) there is no special agreement between the parties 
regarding recovery, it should also be assumed that there might be no recovery of interest. 
That is so because the sum ‘owing’ on undue payment is not a commercial loan. Even if 
it were considered analogously as a loan (‘a mutuum’), the proviso dealing with ‘o 
mútuo’, arts. 586-592, do not attract interest except where the mutuum falls within the 
provisions of art. 591765 in terms of which a ‘mútuo’ given for economic finality attracts 
interest.766
 
In this view of the non-recoverability of interest on undue payment the assumption that I 
am making is that if the party received the money in good faith believing it as his own, 
then, he must also be free to deal with his money as he deems fit. Were it otherwise there 
would be a peril that the defendant who has not been earning interest on the money that 
he received will be subject to an obligation to restore beyond the extent of his 
enrichment. This would be equivalent to imposing liability on the back of the people.   
Put differently, if I had no agreement with you for the receipt of your money, I cannot be 
bound to pay you interest on that sum, because I am not your investor. Therefore, in cases 
of money paid by mistake and kept by the defendant there is no guarantee that the 
defendant has been earning interest. A probable exception to this assertion, if the receiver 
is in good faith, is where the money was directly deposited in an interest bearing account.  
 
If we consider again an earlier assertion made above that in unjustified enrichment the 
thing unduly transferred is part of the transferee’s assets and the transferee is then to be 
                                                 
765  Article 591 reads: “If a loan (mutuum) is given for economic aims, interest is presumed, and such 
interest may not exceed the rate referred to in art. 406 (of the Code) on annual capitalization, otherwise it 
will be subject to reduction” [Destinando-se o mútuo a fins económicos, presumem-se devidos juros, os 
quais, sob pena de redução, não poderá exceeder a taxa a que se refere o art. 406, permitida a capitalização 
anual].” [If a loan (mutuum) is given for economic aims, interest is presumed, and such interest may not 
exceed the rate referred to in art. 406 (of the Code), sanctioning an annual capitalization’, otherwise it will 
be subject to reduction].  
766 The Brazilian Civil Code drafters manifest here an authentic fidelity to Roman law, because interest was 
not payable on mutuum in Roman law as it was considered a gratuitous loan normally between friends. In 
fact the drafters clearly distinguish two types of loans: the ‘comodato’ (arts. 579-585) and ‘mútuo’ (arts. 
586-592). ‘Comodato’, according to the Code (art.579) is the loan of non-fungible objects, while ‘mútuo’ is 
conceived as the loan of fungible objects (art. 586). The borrower in the case of ‘mútuo’ is ‘obliged to 
restore  to the lender what he receivd from him in an object of the same nature, quality and quantity’. 
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considered as its ‘owner’ until such time as it is claimed by the plaintiff that such ‘thing’ 
cannot remain within the defendant’s assets because of the lack of causa retinendi;  and 
considering further that under art. 237 of the Civil Code, in the cases of obligations to 
give a certa res [obrigação de dar coisa certa] ‘the thing with its improvements and 
additions belongs to the debtor until it is transferred’, and that while it is ‘the debtor’s 
property the fruits earned from it belong to the debtor, but those pending belong to the 
creditor’, then it might also be inferred from there that if interest is considered as a fruit 
and it is earned while the thing (the principal sum) is the property of the debtor (because 
it has not yet been transferred), then that fruit belongs to the debtor. By implication the 
principal amount cannot be considered as a loan. Therefore, interest can only be claimed 
on a different ground. Probably policy ground is the only candidate that might be 
persuasive.  
 
Meanwhile if the word ‘fruits’ in art. 878 of the Code is understood to also encompass 
‘interest’, as it indeed would appears to do (unless ‘thing given in undue payment’ 
excludes money, which does not make sense), then the defendant equated to mala fide 
possessor can (or will) be liable to the extent he was enriched by the ‘fruits’, even if they 
might have been consumed. Should, however, a defendant under a claim falling within 
such provision be equated to (or assumed to be) a bona fide possessor, he might not be 
liable even to the extent that he was enriched by the ‘fruits’ which he gathered and 
consumed in good faith. I reiterate once again that the provision clearly says that “to the 
fruits, (…) accrued to the thing given in undue payment apply the provisions of this Code 
dealing with a good faith or a bad faith possessor, as the case may be”.767 Here we clearly 
see that the Brazilian legislature by framing art. 878 (in so far as the consequences of the 
accrued fruits to ‘a thing received in undue payment’ are concerned) to analogously 
differentiate a defendant who is a bona fide possessor from a mala fide possessor, it 
directly indicates that the maxim ‘bona fide possessor facit fructose perceptos et 
                                                 
767 The main provisions of the Code on good faith possessors that are relevant to our purpose are given in 
translation in annexure B at the end of the thesis. Articles 1.201, 1.214 and 1.217 are the most directly 
related to the issue. Art. 1.214 says that ‘a good faith possessor is entitled to the fruits received while the 
possession in good faith lasts; and art. 1.217 says that ‘a good faith possessor is not liable for the loss or 
deterioration of a thing to which he ‘gave no cause’ (emphasis added). 
          
        
CHAPTER IV: Unjustified Enrichment in Brazil: Part III - Reflections on Monetary Correction & Interest in Money
             © Jorge Aimite  Cape-Town 15/08/2009    [This is   Page 246 ]
Change of Position Defence
  (Unjustified Enrichment)
246
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 ©
 J
or
ge
 A
m
ite
 ©
consumptos suos’768 would indeed apply to such cases. This, in turn, implies by inference 
that a defendant who is equated to a bona fide possessor under art. 878 of the Brazilian 
Civil Code has the defence of change of position (or loss of enrichment) as far as fruits 
are concerned. That would also imply that the same defence applicable to the ‘fruits’ is 
open to the ‘principal thing’ received itself. But let us remain for the time being with the 
question of interest in the enrichment law as a whole.  
 
What about a case falling within the actio de in rem versio aspect of the claim? Does it 
attract interest and, if so, why? The circumstances giving rise to such a claim may vary 
from case to case, and there appear to be no unanimity about the contours of the claim. 
Nonetheless, the provisions of the Brazilian Civil Code (arts. 884-886) are silent. For this 
reason any conclusion to the effect that an interest is claimable must be drawn either by 
inference or by cross-referencing to other provisions of the Code. Nonetheless, based on 
the general principle of law, ‘prima facie’ interest seems to be claimable in unjustified 
enrichment law besides the principal sum.769 But this is a mere general inference alone. 
According to art. 404 of the Code, ‘losses and damages’ in obligations payable in money 
are to be paid adjusting their monetary values in accordance with official indexes 
regularly established. The payment encompasses ‘interest, expenses and lawyer’s 
emoluments, without prejudice for the ‘conventional sentence’ [da pena convencional]’. 
And according to article 405 of the Code ‘interest on mora runs from the ‘initial citation’ 
i.e. from the moment of the issue of judgment770 (in some cases, I think, it is probably 
from the moment of first notification). These two provisions, however, cannot be said to 
apply to an enrichment sine causa, because art. 404 speak of ‘losses and damages’, which 
clearly indicates it is not applicable to enrichment claims because an unjustified 
                                                 
768 Translated the maxim means ‘The bona fide possessor makes fruits gathered and consumed his own’. 
769  For comparative insight see the new Article VII. -5:104 of the European Union DCFR (Draft Common 
Frame of Reference) a project of Study Group of the European Civil Code Project presented to the 
European Commission on 18 December 2008. Art.VII. -5:105 there reads: ‘Reversal of the enrichment 
extends to the fruits and use of the enrichment if the enriched person is in bad faith at the time that the 
fruits or use are obtained’. 
770 I am of the view that ‘initial citation’ is used in a wider sense. In some contexts it would appear that 
‘initial citation’ is strictly equated with ‘court judgment’ as ‘citation’ seems to refer to a judge 
pronouncement. However, if to be put in mora were to be understood in that sense alone it would either be 
too restrictive or even contradictory in some cases. A defendant who has been notified as owing a sum of 
money is certainly put in mora from that moment if he knows that money is not his to keep and the court 
decides so only at a future date. 
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enrichment claim is about ‘gains obtained at another expenses without valid ground’ and 
not about ‘losses or damages’ suffered. ‘Losses and damages’ presuppose contractual or 
delictual (tort, or civil responsibility) claims. Article 405 also cannot be said to apply 
because a defendant in an unjustified enrichment claim is not presumed to be in mora for 
the payment of money until such time he has notice to the contrary. Until then, the 
defendant must be able to rely on the money that he received as absolutely his. By 
inference, however, art. 405 cast some light on the issue. If interest on mora runs from 
the initial citation,771 that implies that from the time the defendant has notice, interest 
starts to run, which by implication can be extended to an enrichment claim, because if 
under the enrichment sine causa doctrine the measure of enrichment is calculated from 
the time of ‘litis contestatio’ (or litis pendente), that also means that from that moment 
the defendant has notice of the claim and any money ‘being retained sine causa’ is now 
due as if it were a debt, unless the defendant has a recognised defence.772 It can 
analogously be said that from the moment of ‘litis contestatio’ the defendant is put in 
mora, and therefore interest would equally start to run, and the sum ‘owed’ from that 
moment is the base value (the principal sum) for calculating interest.  
 
Article 884 provides, however, that the amount to be restored is ‘known’ only ‘after 
adjusting monetary values’. Then, if the principal sum to be restored is not known until 
‘monetary values have been adjusted’, can it really be said that the defendant has been 
put in mora for that ‘unknown value’ of the ‘debt’?  Put differently, if monetary 
adjustment is to be undertaken, from what date interest starts to accrue and based on what 
principal sum? Is it the ‘pre-adjusted-value’ or the ‘adjusted value’ that is the principal 
amount for calculating interest on the sum due?  
 
In any event, before I elaborate further on these questions, it is worth remarking the idea 
that a sum held sine causa is susceptible to be adjusted according to the level of inflation 
implicitly embodies a nuanced conception of that sum being analogously considered as a 
commercial loan (a mutuum). On this assumption, one might say that interest would 
                                                 
771 I use ‘initial citation’ in its wider sense I just described above. 
772 Obviously if ‘initial notice’ is equated to court judgment, whatever defence the defendant might have 
had is of no consequence after judgment. 
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accrue as of right, unless the parties ‘agreed’ otherwise. If it does not accrue as of right, 
then it might be dependent on other factors. 
 
If the measure of enrichment is considered as the ‘value received’ and such value is only 
‘known’ with certainty after the value of the money has been adjusted according to the 
rate of inflation at a given period,  there is no ‘exact amount’ on which to calculate 
interest until such adjusted sum is determined. In such cases there arises incongruence 
between the ‘sum claimed’ as the amount by which the defendant has been enriched as 
‘principal value’, and the sum on which the interest is to be calculated. For example, if 
‘B’ is enriched sine causa at the expense of “A” for the sum of $R 50 000 on the 29th 
January 2008 and by 31st January 2009 there is a 50 per cent inflation of the currency 
with the result that the real value of the owed sum of $R 50 000 has now shifted to $R 75 
000 by the time judgment is passed, a simple interest of 20 per cent on the principal 
amount owing as due from 29 January 2008 to 31 January 2009 would amount to $R 10 
000, but if the principal sum for the calculation of interest is now considered $R 75 000, a 
20 per cent interest on that sum is $R15 000, if calculated per annum. Interest may also 
not be due before the date of the determination of the value (the day the judgment is 
issued), because there is no principal amount to serve as the basis for the calculation of 
the interest. If the rate of 20 per cent interest is charged on the $R 75 000 now owing, it 
may not be applicable retrospectively to the date of litis contestatio (the date the claim 
arose), because no such amount was owing on the 29 January 2008. The defendant was 
never put in mora on that date as owing the sum of $R 75 000. It is plain in law that 
interest is ordinarily due either ex lege, ex contractu or ex mora. If none of these aspects 
apply, in principle it becomes difficult to levy interest on a sum of money to be paid. One 
must then find ways to justify why interest should be due on that sum of money to be 
paid.  
In essence, if we accept that the ‘final’ proof of the extent of enrichment is only 
established after ‘adjusting the monetary values’, we are effectively saying that any sum 
to be awarded for interest will be assessed as a ‘pre-judgment’ interest if it started to run 
from the time of receipt of the money. At the level of principle we encounter a dilemma: 
because, on one side, we are saying that ‘whenever a defendant receives money and 
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keeps it for a reasonable time, there is a presumption that he is earning ‘fruits’ with that 
money and therefore he is being enriched sine causa with our money; but, on the other 
side, it is also plain that we are not certain that the defendant is actually earning any 
interest and therefore being enriched. Consequently, in the face of uncertainty to allow 
relief in any case where actual enrichment is not yet proved is inconsistent with the 
fundamental principle of unjustified enrichment.  
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CHAPTER V. 
 
PASSING ON A TAX BURDEN AS THE REVERSE FACE OF CHANGE OF POSITION 
  
The Story of the Hazard Federal Republic. 
Three years ago the Government of the HAZARD Republic (population: 50 million) enacted ten Statutes and three Special 
Regulations. All Statutes passed in ZARAS Parliament and still stand. Article 7  of the first Special Regulation issued 
under Statute 3 establishes what is known as ‘extra taxes’ and the government has imposed for the past three years an 
extra  tax of 25 cents of a Rand (Rand 0.25)  for every 350 ml of a bottled or canned beer sold in the country whose 
market is 50 million people. Twenty Percent of the population drinks at least one 350 ml tin of beer every week. The 
beer industry is the monopoly of two big firms. They decided to pass the burden of the tax to consumers by increasing 
the price of a 350 ml tin by 25 cents of a Rand.  
 In this simple scenario, the result in numbers came to this: Each person consumed 1.4 litters of a beer per month or 
18.20 litters per year. At the end of each year the firms had shifted the financial burden of R 13.00 (thirteen Rand) to the 
consumer. The 10 million consumers each year paid R 130 million in extra tax to the government through the two beer 
producers. In three years this amounted to R 390 million. After three years the extra tax on beer was declared 
unconstitutional. Incidentally it is also discovered that the same 25 Cents of a Rand was also imposed on all soft drinks 
produced by these firms and three other firms. The entire population drinks at least one 350 ml tin of soft drink 
produced by these companies each week and all five firms passed on that R 0.25 to the consumer as well.  The amount 
collected from the soft drinks alone in three years was R 1, 950 Billion.773 Now that it has been found that the extra 
taxes were unconstitutional, the two firms go to court asking the ZARAS Republic to pay back to them both the R390 
Million and the R 1.950 Billion in unjust or unjustified enrichment of ZARAS at their expense.  
 
5.1. Introductory Remarks. 
 
‘Passing on’ essentially entails that the plaintiff has shifted on to a third party the 
‘financial’ burden that is consequent upon the defendant’s unjust enrichment. In the most 
common scenario, a business apparently liable for tax makes payment to the government, 
but it also attempts to recoup its losses by raising the prices that it charges to its 
customers. When the tax is subsequently determined to be improper or inapplicable, the 
business seeks repayment as a relief. The government resists such a claim arguing that its 
enrichment came not at the plaintiff’s expense, but rather at the expense of the plaintiff’s 
                                                 
773  This sum is roughly equivalent to £ 140 Million, US $ or C$ 280 Million and R$ 600 Million (Brazilian Reais).   
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customers. Is it then vital to the unjustified enrichment doctrine sanctioning such a 
defence? If so when, why or why not? What does such recognition imply in regard to 
change-of-position defence?  
 
Some theorists, attempting to systematise the defences that can be raised against an 
enrichment liability, view passing on, if recognised in the legal system, as a form of 
changed circumstances defence on the plaintiff’s side774 that thwart in full or in part its 
prima facie right to recover a benefit unjustifiably transferred onto the defendant’s hands. 
An underlying idea to this conception of passing on is the reasoning that a plaintiff is 
only entitled to recover that which it can prove it has lost to the defendant who is now 
better off, while the claimant has been made worse of. If this quadration cannot be 
established, then the law should favour the defendant.  
 
It is noteworthy to remind ourselves that it is essential to the law of unjust or unjustified 
enrichment that if someone obtained something at another’s expense, whether it is a 
payment or other kind of benefit, to which he was not entitled, he has been unjustifiably 
enriched. If that someone is a taxing authority, and the something alleged to have been 
gained by him is a payment of money and the money came to him in the form of a tax or 
a ‘levy’ that was not due, because of, say, the unlawfulness of the legislation or 
regulation under which it was exacted, or for any other reason, the principle still applies: 
no one shall enrich himself (or retain a benefit acquired) at another’s expense without 
‘plausible justification’. Therefore, the benefit must be restored to whoever has the right 
to it. The giving-up of that benefit can however be challenged by a recognised defence. 
Passing on (or disimpoverishment775 as some scholars suggest it should be called) is one 
of such possible defences. In some quarters the defence is also termed ‘unjust enrichment 
of the payer or the claimant’.776 This idea, in part, embodies the notion of ‘dis-
                                                 
774 G. Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (2006) 715-716; D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment 
(2008) 748.  
775  M. Rush, The Defence of Passing on (2006) 1; 9-12 and 17 prefers to call such defence 
‘disimpoverishment’. This notion captures the nuance of a claimant who has first been ‘impoverished’, but 
as a result of subsequent events he has since ceased to be impoverished.  
776 See the European Court of Justice case Just I/S v Danish Ministry for Fiscal Affairs (case 68/79 [1980] 
ECR 501, para 26 ) that refers to the defence in such language: [Community law]  ‘does not require an 
order for the recovery of charges improperly made to be granted in conditions which involve the unjust 
CHAPTER V - Passing on as Reverse-Face of Change of Position          
        
             © Jorge Aimite  Cape-Town 15/08/2009    [This is   Page 252 ]
Change of Position Defence
  (Unjustified Enrichment)
252
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 ©
 J
or
ge
 A
m
ite
 ©
impoverishment’ but adds an extra dimension to it, in that the claimant becomes himself 
the victim of his own claim. If passing on is seen from a different angle and by analogy to 
the mitigation rule in the law of obligations, it can be said that the plaintiff by so shifting 
his financial burden onto the third party, has effectively ‘minimised’ his own losses. If 
that ‘mitigation’ was in ‘full’ to the extent of eliminating the entire loss (recouping the 
entire loss), then he has rendered his claim ‘nugatory’. Should he insists on such a claim, 
he is likely to become the ‘victim’ of his own claim, for, as will be seen later, on one 
approach enrichment law is said not to be designed to confer windfalls onto plaintiffs 
who may have suffered no loss.777
 
Previous chapters highlighted that the conception of the enrichment doctrine prevalent in 
a legal system will also influence what defences that system has and how those defences 
are perceived. Once again, this notion is of some importance in the evaluation of the 
passing-on defence. There is sometimes ‘tension’ in the various legal systems under 
analysis as to when and how the enrichment claim is to be calculated. Some hold that an 
enrichment claim should be capped by the extent of the claimant’s loss. The reason 
presented for such capping is that if it were otherwise, either the plaintiff would in turn 
enrich himself if he were to recover more than he lost, or an enrichment claim would 
mirror punishment if the defendant were to disgorge more than the claimant’s loss.778 
Even when there is general agreement on the basic reason, the opinions may still diverge 
over whether the claimant’s loss should be ‘calculated’ at the moment the defendant is 
‘unjustifiably’ enriched (the claimant’s initial loss), or later, when the claimant 
commences his enrichment action (the claimant’s ultimate loss). While some writers 
believe that consideration should be given to the value of the claimant’s initial loss, 
                                                                                                                                                 
enrichment of those entitled’.  See also the description given to the fourth specific defence by the English 
Law Commission (Law Com. No. 227 (1994)  - Restitution: Mistake of Law and Ultra Vires Public 
Authority Receipt and Payments – paras. 10.5 -10.8) which is discussed further below for the purposes of 
the specific defences to the general right of recovery under English law.   
777  See Kingstreet Investments case below discussed under Canadian law and the Brazilian approach in 
Acordão 14.810/02 (2a Turma), Impugnação 40.01011540 – 43 (MG). 
778 M. Rush (The Defence of Passing on (2006) 109) thinks, however, that the reason for such capping is 
analogous to the notion of ‘nemo dat quod no habet’. I am not persuaded with this reasoning. Perhaps Rush 
understands the adage in the reverse: if you have not given it because you did not have it, then you cannot 
claim it as yours. But that is not the ordinary meaning ascribed to this adage.  
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others hold that it is the claimant’s ultimate loss that provides the appropriate limit to the 
award in an enrichment claim.779  
 
This difference of opinion has one major consequence for the understanding of the 
passing-on defence. If a system holds that only the claimant’s initial loss should be used 
to assess the extent of an enrichment liability, it should also, as a matter of logical 
necessity, reject the defence of passing on. That is so, because whatever steps a claimant 
may take to avoid his loss, after the initial transfer, are irrelevant to his enrichment 
claim.780 To reiterate, it is the measure of the transfer that is the measure of the claim. By 
contrast, if a system considers that the claimant’s ultimate loss provides the upper limit to 
any claim, it could be expected to endorse the defence of passing on. 
 
It will be seen later in the discussion that where the passing-on-defence is ‘recognised’, 
when it is advanced by a defendant, depending on the facts of the case and various other 
factors, the extent of the defendant’s liability may also be reduced or extinguished 
altogether. Thus, because the defence of change of position, just like the defence of 
passing on, is concerned with the defendant bringing to account for dealings which, while 
are causally connected to his enrichment, reduce or extinguish his enrichment liability, it 
is also thought that for reasons of symmetry the defences should co-exist in the law of 
unjustified enrichment.781 The desire of symmetry in the law is based on a belief that 
consistency is important and should be maintained in the unjustified enrichment doctrine. 
Not everyone, however, agrees with this desire for symmetry in regard to the defences, 
because of the fundamental principle underpinning enrichment law itself. Though under 
these circumstances like cases should be decided alike, this is only desirable if the 
fundamental principle underpinning enrichment law is convincingly defensible in both 
cases, says the contrary argument.782 Consequently, given the possibility that when the 
defence of passing on is recognised in a legal system, it may also theoretically be of 
general application, it is undesirable that it should be available to public authorities. This 
                                                 
779  R. Grantham & C. Rickett (2003) 62 CLJ 159, 166. 
780  M. Rush, The Defence of Passing on (2006) 109. 
781  Ibid 179-180. 
782 Ibid 180. M. McInnes (1997) 19 Sydney LR 179. 
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is because they will inevitably be backed by the inherent power of the State which will 
act upon the citizen with some sort of duress or ‘coercion’ in improperly demanded tax 
situations. For these reasons, the second view is to the effect that between allowing 
government retention of a benefit obtained through ‘extortion’ and allowing restitution to 
a claimant who merely suffered an immediate expense, policy considerations point to the 
latter.783 This is so because it is overwhelmingly observed that the temptation for 
misconduct is constant in the case of a government defendant, and as a natural conclusion 
it has to follow that enrichment law must favour deterrence over philosophical 
consistency.  
 
In the light of the above observations, this chapter discusses the passing-on defence by 
first presenting the theoretical foundations of such a notion, and seeks to scrutinise its 
sustainability in the private law of enrichment. Thereafter, it proceeds to present the 
contention that a distinction should be made between recovery under the ordinary 
‘private-law of enrichment’ and a ‘public law of enrichment’ by public-authorities, 
especially if taxation is at issue. I attempt to present the pros and cons of such 
approaches. After presenting these theoretical analyses, I proceed to survey the defence 
as applied or discussed in the various jurisdictions under consideration and I critically 
address in loco some nuances whenever deemed necessary. The order followed is the 
same as in chapter three above. A discussion on the situation in Brazil is included in this 
chapter because it apparently has a passing on defence in its enrichment law. Finally, in 
the light of the general theme of the thesis, before drawing the conclusion to the chapter, I 
discuss the interface between the change-of-position and passing on defences.   
 
 
 
 
5.2. Theoretical Analysis of the Passing-on Defence. 
 
 
                                                 
783  See for example  M. McInnes (1997) 19 Sydney LR 179 at 197; Kingstreet Investments Ltd v New 
Brunswick (2007) 1 SCR 3 discussed below under Canadian Law.  
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We have just seen above that the passing-on defence arises where a plaintiff has shifted 
to others the burden that is consequent upon the defendant’s unjustified enrichment. At 
one level passing on is ‘related’ to the illegality defence – and can present the features of 
the in pari delicto rule or simply as a one sided illegality allegation. At another level it 
raises problems of good faith in connection (if taken together) with the knowledge 
requirement. If the claimant knew (or suspected) that the tax or levy being demanded was 
unlawful or ‘illegal’, but did not protest its unlawfulness and consciously passed the tax 
or levy on to the customers in the knowledge that he will recoup more profits, his 
intention (action) of passing it on can be said to be tainted with ‘sharing’ in the unlawful 
act (in pari delicto), albeit indirectly. He cannot now be heard to say that he did not know 
of it and ask the court to assist. If the defendant is said to be a wrongdoer, then no 
enquiry should be made whether the defendant’s gain is commensurate with any loss he 
suffered or might suffer, and he cannot successfully defend himself by saying that the 
plaintiff has passed on the taxes which he paid. The situation is different where the 
unlawfulness of the statute/regulation was on both ends revealed later, say by a court 
decision, and all along none of the parties knew or suspected its unlawfulness. Where 
there was no protest from the claimant one could also add that the lack of such protest 
brings the claim into the realm of voluntarily made payments. Here the absence of 
coercion from a public authority as a defendant would also entitle it the defence of 
change of position. If it can be shown that the public authority simply acted under the 
statutory provisions which imposed ‘penal’ sanctions but had not threatened the taxpayer, 
it is entirely understandable that the court would allow such a public authority to plead 
change of position. This is because a public authority which mistakenly thought that it 
had the power to levy the tax can be said to have acted in good faith. As it is with the 
claimant, here the same analogy applies to the defendant, that is to say, a public authority 
which made the demand knowing that it was illegal to do so must surely be deemed to 
have exerted illegitimate pressure784 and cannot have the benefit of the defence. The 
problem however with the good faith aspect in the passing-on defence is how to 
categorise a public authority as a wrongdoer when it has acted under a ‘genuinely’ passed 
legislation, which only later transpires to be either ultra vires or invalid.  Though it is 
                                                 
784  G. Jones, Restitution in Public and Private Law (1991) 38-39. 
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theoretically possible to ascribe wrongdoing to a public entity, in practice, the 
circumstances leading to the imposing of ‘unlawful’, ‘inappropriate’ or ‘ultra vires’ taxes 
or levies onto the claimant can hardly fit the description of ‘intentional’ wrongdoing.  
 
The defence of passing on, as far as it is related to unlawful tax collection, also raises the 
fundamental problem of standing to sue. Who is the real party to claim the lost benefit or 
assets? Some hold the opinion that in the operation of such a defence the real claimant 
was established by the legislature, for in the operation of the transactions, the business-
plaintiff passed-on such loss to third parties – usually customers – thereby offsetting his 
losses. In this view of the defence, the state by collecting the tax from the hands of the 
claimant, is said to be collecting its dues from the consumers through this business-
person.785 In fact, the claimant here is to be seen as a mere ‘conduit-pipe’; an ‘agent’ or 
mere intermediary of the state or government in the collection process of what is due to 
the state from the customers or consumers. Because he is a mere intermediary, he should 
have no ‘standing’. He has no ‘standing’ because as a ‘plaintiff-conduit’ he acquired no 
interest in the tax money, and therefore, he has no right to get it back.  Viewed in this 
manner the claim sustains the idea that to permit the intermediary to recover the money 
from the taxing-authority or the government, would award to the plaintiff its customers’ 
money. If such is what the result would entail, then the unjust enrichment of the plaintiff 
would result not from overcompensation (the windfall argument, or that the law of 
unjustified enrichment is not designed to confer windfall to the claimants), but from 
acquiring property from the government that belongs to someone else. This argument 
however seems flawed on several grounds and it is usually resisted in practice. First, to 
advance this contention in the context of unjustified enrichment, the very notion of the 
unjustified enrichment doctrine must be distorted to encompass only a physical transfer 
approach to the whole field.786 Secondly, it must also be accepted that the title to the tax-
money paid by the customers to the business-person when the consumers ‘purchased’ 
their products or rendered the ‘services’, remained in the customers. The intermediary 
never acquired ‘ownership’ of such money, but such an intermediary is only to be seen as 
                                                 
785  W. Woodward (1985) 39 U Miami LR 873. 
786  Ibid 873. 
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a ‘constructive trustee’ for the claimant’s money that the tax-collector unlawfully 
demanded from the customers. The correctness of such an analysis seems equally 
unsustainable because when the business-plaintiff claims the illegal tax-money he is 
seeking it for himself and for this very reason he has a sufficient stake in the controversy 
to make the controversy justiciable.787 He is therefore the real party in interest, because 
he is asserting his own claim and is seeking the money for himself.788 As the question of 
standing involves an inquiry into whether the plaintiff has a sufficient stake in an 
otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy, the 
plaintiff in these circumstances usually has standing when he alleges that the defendant’s 
action has caused the plaintiff economic or other injury. The taxpayer-intermediary, in 
these cases, probably has suffered some financial injury as a result of the illegal tax even 
where he has recouped the entire amount of the tax from the customers.789   
  
There is no doubt that in such circumstances what was paid to the government as a tax 
came both from the business-person (or ‘intermediary’) and the customers. One of them 
is viewed as the immediate payer and the other – the customer – as the ultimate payer. 
Though it might be disputed, it sounds defensible that the requirement ‘at the expense of’ 
in the law of unjustified enrichment merely requires that the defendant’s enrichment be at 
the plaintiff’s immediate expense, but it does not necessarily require further that the 
defendant’s enrichment to be at the plaintiff’s ultimate expense.790 In this perspective the 
relevant enquiry to sustain an enrichment claim is to ask where the burden consequent 
upon the defendant’s enrichment (the government in casu) initially arose, and not where 
it eventually came to rest. In other words, the passing-on of the burden of the payments 
                                                 
787 It was for example observed above, in the discussion of the Brazilian law in chapter 4, that normally a 
claim in property entails title has not passed, and for that reason the plaintiff will be revindicating what is 
his and never formed part of the defendant’s assets; but an enrichment claim presupposes that title has 
passed and the claimant will be asking what ‘is not his’, but asserts that it cannot continue as part of 
defendant’s asset due to lack of ‘causa retinendi’. 
788 W. Woodward,  (1985) 39 U Miami  LR 873, 890. 
789 Ibid., at p. 897, footnotes 109-110. See also the economic analysis of the application of the defence in 
antitrust (competition) law given below. 
790 See for example the analysis of Brennan J in Commissioner of State Revenue (Vic) v Royal Insurance 
Australia Ltd [1994] 182 CLR 51 arguing in this line of thinking. 
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does not affect the situation that as between the government (public authority) and the 
payer, the former was enriched at the expense of the latter.791   
 
The proper conception of the passing-on defence in taxation matters also depends on the 
nature of the tax levied on the plaintiff as well as the legislative scheme that imposed that 
tax, because not all taxes necessarily have equal characteristics, nor obey equal legislative 
schemes.792 In the ordinary course of events, various sales taxes, for example, may obey 
an entirely different plan in the legislative scheme where the legislature from the outset 
contemplates wholesalers and retailers. The legislative scheme may impose the tax prior 
to the goods entering the retail market, either upon the antecedent sale by wholesale or 
upon the immediately antecedent wholesale value which the goods possess.793 In these 
cases, because the tax is often levied upon the value of goods, the sales tax794 is generally 
regarded as a duty of excise. A central feature informing this character of sales taxes is 
that the economic burden of the impost is generally not intended to be borne by the 
person liable to remit it; it is to be passed on.795 In contrast, income taxes, for example, 
which are charged in such situations as income conventionally defined as well as all 
capital gains, and even gifts, inheritances and lottery winnings, cannot be said to be 
                                                 
791  (1994) 182 CLR 51 at  90-91;  M. McInnes (1997) 19 Sydney LR 179, 181. 
792 It is incontestable that the primary object of taxation is, and has always been, to raise money for 
government expenditure. However, taxes may also be imposed not for revenue purposes but to discourage 
the activities taxed, such as the duties levied on tobacco and alcohol aimed at discouraging smoking and 
heavy drinking, though the law makes no express indication that these are to be abandoned as it does when 
it ‘makes them criminal’. See C. Whitehouse, Revenue Law – Principles and Practice (2002) 6-7. 
793  Avon Products Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2006] HCA 29 (14 June 2006), Para. 8. 
794  See for example the description of sales tax versus the ‘business and occupation’ tax  (B&O) by of 
Justice Richard B Sanders in Herbert Nelson v Appleway Chevrolet Inc (case No. 77985-6- April 2007 WA 
App (Supreme Court of the State of Washington), clearly indicating that sales tax was expected to be 
passed on, but not the ‘business and occupation’ (B&O) tax on the same product. 
795  See for example in this regard the recent case in the Australian High Court  Avon Products Pty Ltd v 
Commissioner of Taxation [2006] HCA 29 (14 June 2006), especially paras. 7-10 referring to such schemes 
both in the Constitutional context and other legislative instruments.  John Tiley et al in Revenue Law 5th Ed. 
(2005) 18 explaining the difference between Direct and Indirect Taxes have this to say: ‘A direct tax is one 
which is demanded from the very persons who, it is intended or desired, should pay it. Indirect taxes are 
those which are demanded from one person in the expectation and intention that he shall indemnify himself 
at the expense of the other: such as the excise and customs. The producer or importer of a commodity is 
called upon to pay a tax on it, not with the intention to levy a peculiar contribution upon him, but to tax 
through him the consumers of the commodity, from whom it is supposed that he will recover the amount by 
means of an advance in price’. Further, the authors explain that ‘(…) there is thus a fundamental distinction 
between the economic ‘recoupment’ of a direct tax and the simple passing on (often in the form of straight 
percentage of the price) which is the hallmark of indirect tax, i.e.; between the recovery of a direct tax by a 
more-or-less circuitous operation of economic forces and the passing-on of a tax in a recognizable form’.  
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designed to be passed on. This view of sales tax is based on the consideration that the 
imposition of the tax in respect of some dealing with goods by way of sale or distribution 
in the expectation, or with the intention, that the taxpayer will not bear the incidence of 
the tax but will indemnify himself/herself by passing it on to a purchaser or consumer. 
This characteristic of the tax enables one to say of it that its fundamental concern is with 
goods rather than with the person from whom it is exacted.  
 
One must equally consider the nature of the economy (or even a sector of the economy) 
in which the tax is imposed, whether it is an economy geared towards making profit or 
otherwise.796 It is no novelty that, in the cases of sales tax in an economy geared towards 
profit-making, such tax will be expected to be passed on, as the profit-making motive of 
business will generally require that outcome. That is the case because, with the exception 
of few cases in which sales tax is separately identified and added on top of the invoice 
price after sale,797 sales tax can only be pass d on indirectly through the price 
mechanism. In a profit-making structure, businesses will set prices so as to ensure at least 
that all foreseeable costs are recovered, anything above being conceptualised as a margin 
of profit. Because sales tax in the wholesaler-retailer situation is levied upon the vendor 
prior to the ultimate sale by retail as explained above, it forms part of the cost structure of 
doing business. Therefore, there is nothing really extraordinary in the proposition that in 
the usual course of things sales tax, in these cases and in myriad others, will be passed on.   
 
Because of the normality of the situation that the tax in such circumstances is expected to 
be passed-on, it is also incumbent upon the taxpayer who is asserting a claim in 
unjustified enrichment in these cases to establish that a circumstance out of the ordinary, 
                                                 
796 For example The European Court of Justice in Les Fils de Jules BiancoSA  v Directeur Géneral des 
Douanes [1988] ECR 1099 at 1119-20 discussing the defence of passing on, and evaluating whether a 
charge had been incorporated into a business price noted, inter alia, that ‘it may be relatively easy in a 
regulated economy (in which a government both imposes an invalid tax and sets the price at which a 
product or service is sold) to determine whether or not a charge has been included in a price’. Though 
cautiously the court refused to assume passing on even in such circumstances, it still highlighted that ‘it is 
quite probable, depending upon the nature of the market, that the charge has been passed-on. However, the 
numerous factors which determine commercial strategy vary from case to another so that it is virtually 
impossible to determine how they affect the passing-on of the charge’.    
797  See discussion below on the ‘specifically charged’ tax in American cases versus that which is not 
specifically charged.  
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i.e.; that the amount of the overpayment of sales tax has not been passed on. Where the 
whole or a part of the economic burden of the sales tax may have been passed on 
indirectly through prices, the enquiry in this regard is likely to be complex.798 The 
complexity arises because prices may be set with reference to a wide range of factors 
(including considerations of cost of production, competitive advantage, operational cash 
flow and consumer goodwill). Be that as it may, the starting point must always be the 
seller’s pricing policy and practice.799 In the context of European law, for example, 
Rudden and Bishop,800 analysed, among others, the economic dynamics involved in the 
passing-on defence in regard to tax incidence both on the price of a product or 
commodity, the demand and supply features of the market for that product as well as the 
effect of such tax in the long-run should the business-person decide either to modify his 
supply behaviour according to the nature of competition for that product in the market. 
Leaving aside the economic technicalities of the analysis, a bare denial of the defence of 
passing on, say the authors, would assume that in real world there is a ‘perfectly 
competitive market’ for a given product, in which, staying in the extremes, (1) on the 
demand side, where (i) if there is a ‘perfectly inelastic demand’,801 there would be a 
complete passing on, for a buyer would take the same quantity of a product whatever the 
price, and (ii) where there is a ‘perfectly elastic demand’,802 there is no passing on, 
                                                 
798 Avon Products v Com for Taxation [2006] HCA 29 (14/06/2006), (2006) 227 ALR 398, para. 9.; 
Benjamin Alarie (below ); W. Woodward (1985) 39 U Miami LR  873, 885-6. 
799  See further below the discussion on mark-up pricing for additional details on pricing policies. 
800  B. Rudden & W. Bishop ‘Gritz and Quellmehl: Pass It On’ (1981) European LR 243, 246-252. 
801 There is a ‘perfectly inelastic demand’ where buyers do not respond to price increase. In such a 
situation, the competitive price of the victim’s output (the firm’s output) will rise by the full amount of the 
inappropriate tax (or another overcharge). The firm/business continues to produce the original output 
without losing any profit.  Put differently, there is in effect no injury, as the damage sustained equals zero. 
In this situation, in the same way that in an antitrust (competition) law an overcharge would clearly 
overstate the lost profits because there were no such lost profits, and compensating the victim who 
continued to earn a competitive return on his investment would overcompensate him, (see for examples 
(1999) 68 George Washington LR 1, 35); in an unjustified enrichment scenario, disallowing a passing on 
defence to the Government would grant a windfall to the complainant with an almost ‘double recovery’. 
802 The effect in this scenario is the opposite of that outlined in the previous note: A ‘demand is perfectly 
elastic’ if any effort to raise price is futile, i.e.; buyers respond to price increase. The affected firm finds it 
optimal to reduce output. As a consequence, not only will this firm be paying more for the inputs, but as its 
output decreases, it will likely be producing the output in an inefficient manner. Said more technically, the 
cost increase is compounded by the unexploited economies of scale that result in the short run. As a 
consequence, the lost profits will exceed the ‘tax inappropriately’ charged (or any other overcharge). In this 
scenario, in an antitrust case, an overcharge under-compensates the victim. In an unjustified enrichment 
scenario, not refunding all of or at least part of the inappropriately charged tax to the claimant would result 
in loss to the claimant.  
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because the buyer would adjust the quantity bought in response to the price increase; and 
(2) on the supply side, (i) if there is a ‘perfectly inelastic supply’,803 there would be no 
passing on, because a supply is ‘perfectly inelastic’ when the quantity offered for sale in 
the market is fixed and will not rise or fall at all, regardless of the price change; and (ii) if  
there is a ‘perfectly elastic supply’ of the product, there would be a passing on, because 
when supply is ‘perfectly elastic’ the seller will provide as much or as little as his 
customers wish to buy and will experience no change in his marginal costs of production.  
   
Given that in real life such a perfect market rarely exists, what we ordinarily observe is 
the relative elasticity of both supply and demand, the extent of passing on, observe the 
authors, will also inevitably be ‘dependent on the ratio of the two variables: the elasticity 
of demand to that of supply’. Hence, the price rise, from which the plaintiff is said to 
have recouped his losses, will only have risen according to what is supplied; but because 
demand also varies with price, the buyers may also have bought less. As a sequel, the 
mere imposition of the tax does not explain the amount of loss that the claimant may have 
recouped by the price increase. Adding to the difficulties above in evaluating the exact 
amount passed-on, are the further possibilities of the so-called ‘passing-back’ or 
‘backward-shifting’ on input prices, the possibility of a ‘monopoly-power’ in the market 
and the ‘long-run effects’ of any decision the claimant might have taken on the price 
increase. When all of these factors are taken together it becomes clear that the 
complexities involved in determining the amount of the passing-on become enormous, 
and the viability of the defence becomes cost ineffective should the claimant allege that 
what the authorities deem to be the amount passed-on is not what exactly was passed on 
considering all other variables of the market and ‘production’.  
 
From this economic analysis, Rudden and Bishop concluded that ‘there are arguments 
both for and against the pure principle of ‘reducing compensation’804 by the amount 
                                                 
803  What is said in the previous two notes is applicable mutatis mutandi in the cases of supply being 
‘perfectly inelastic’ and ‘perfectly elastic’, respectively.  
804 The authors use ‘compensation’ here because of the context in which the analysis was undertaken. In 
Gritz and Quellmehl cases (Cases No. 117/76 & 16/77, [1977] E.C.R. 1753 and [1979] 2 C.M.L.R 445; 
Cases 103 and 145/77, [1978] E.C.R] 2037; [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. 675), the European Court of Justice did not 
have jurisdiction on the issue of private law - ‘droit commun’.  The claimant could not reclaim their ‘levies’ 
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passed-on. Both have merits and demerits.805 Ultimately, the decision might be one of 
policy, instead of principle.  
 
The analysis above shows the intricacies of advancing a passing on defence, as well as 
the pitfalls that are encountered if it is not allowed. Every legal system under discussion 
at one point or another of its development has faced the dilemma between favouring the 
government or the private citizen. Before discussing the application of the defence in the 
various jurisdictions, it is worth first highlighting some interfaces of the defence between 
public law and private law and note why some people think that the whole issue of 
recoverability of ‘unlawfully’ demanded imposts and the like should be the preserve of 
public law alone and private law should be ousted from this field altogether. 
 
 
5.3. The Interface Public Law-Private Law in th  Analysis of Passing on. 
 
The defence of passing on also creates a problem of interface between public law and 
private law. Some authors defend the idea that the right to recover money paid under 
unlawfully imposed taxes should not be squeezed into the private law mould of 
unjustified enrichment, but that it should remain confined to the public law sphere806 and 
                                                                                                                                                 
under ‘droit commun’ (condictio indebiti) or an (unjust enrichment) as they would be in the national courts; 
so the claim was instituted for ‘compensation’ under art. 215, paragraph 2 of the EC Treaty, i.e.; ‘in 
accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States’.  
805  Here is how the authors on pages 253-254 verbatim put their conclusion:  ‘If, on the theorems advanced 
above, there is no possibility of passing on, cadit quaestio: compensation equals refund; if however, the 
relevant model shows the possibility of passing on the burden, the following arguments suggest that 
compensation should be cut: (1) the purpose of the compensation is simply to make good a loss; (2) if 
compensation equals refund then (a) the applicants gets a windfall; and (b) this benefit will not be passed 
on in lower prices; (3) since, ex-hypothesis, downstream buyers have suffered loss, their claim is not 
stopped in limine by a large award to the initial producer’.  ‘But there are also arguments against the 
principle: (1) Permitting full recovery provides some incentive to producers to go to law. Where Member 
States infringe the Treaty, one of the reasons for holding its provisions directly applicable is that ‘the 
vigilance of individuals interested in protecting their rights creates an effective supervision’. Why should 
not the Community’s breach of the Treaty be subject to similar control? (2) Permitting full recovery saves 
the costs involved in establishing the extent of passing on. (3) Permitting full recovery is a reason for 
denying any action to those to whom part of the burden has been passed, whether backward if they are 
landlords or employees, or forward if they are downstream buyers’ (253-254). 
806  J. Adler (2002) 22 Legal Studies 165, argues that the Woolwich principle should be regarded as a ‘free 
standing public law principle enforceable in the Administrative court, broadly analogous to a legitimate 
expectation’. Similarly the judge in the Canadian case discussed below Kingstreet Investments expressed an 
equivalent view in rejecting the passing-on defence (paras. 13, 20, 40-45). 
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its recoverability, and ancillary issues, should be dealt with under administrative law 
principles. Where special courts are established for administrative issues, these are the 
appropriate venues for the resolution of the matter.807 Other authors however see it as 
inherently a private-law matter because the acquisition of any ‘benefit’ not sustained by a 
justifiable ground is subject to the same principle.808 Analyzing the grounds generally 
advanced to stop the public authority retaining the tax-money unlawfully ‘received’, 
public law defenders think that none of the reasons require a strong private-law right to 
restitution. This is so because all the reasons are primarily concerned to limiting 
government power, or ‘preventing an abuse of power’ and for that ‘reason’/fact it can be 
concluded that all justifications point more to a ‘prima facie’ obligation to disgorge the 
unlawful gain, but do not require the gain to be paid to any particular person as of 
right.809 This being the case, the appropriate avenue under which the claim should be 
dealt with is public law and not private law. However, save exceptions and atypical cases, 
the great bulk of unlawfully demanded tax cases would fall under the ‘conditional 
payment’ facet of the unjustified enrichment doctrine. If the ‘validity’ of a basis (or 
consideration as the English sometimes put it) in the context of unjustified enrichment 
includes ‘conditional payment’, and the state of affairs contemplated as the basis or 
reason for the payment failed to materialise or, if it materialised or did exist, has failed to 
sustain itself or ceased to exist (e.g. a legislation found to be unconstitutional is void), it 
is also clear that the claim arising from such factual scenario embodies all the elements of 
a private-law claim compatible with the unjustified enrichment principles. For that 
reason, several authors argue in favour of dealing with the matter under private law, and 
                                                 
807  R. Willins (2005) 16 KCLJ 199, for example, thinks that the existence of a public law action should 
exclude a private law one. 
808  Under this facet of the argument would be among others, for example, A. Burrows (2005) 121 LQR 
540, 542-543 and J. Edelman (2005) 68 MLR 849, 851 who argue that there is no reason in principle why 
one unjust factor should exclude the other. This notion ‘of one unjust factor excluding the other’ is another 
manifestation of the instability of the those basing the search for reason why there should be restitution on 
identifying an ‘unjust factor’ instead of simply asserting that ‘there was no basis’ for the transfer, and that 
is the reason why the ‘enrichment’ should be reversed.   
809  J. Adler (2002) 22 Legal Studies 165, 170.  This view technically amounts to saying that in such cases 
the courts should exercise discretion whether to sanction the case or not, depending on the circumstances 
and various other factors. 
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many cases810 have indeed been decided under the private-law aspect of enrichment 
liability. 
 
The following are, however, among the most important reasons advanced for the 
suitability of such matter under public law: 
 
(i) It is seldom encountered, and where it has been recognised it is some 
sort of a novelty, that a private-law right to recovery can be generated 
by a ‘Bill or a Charter of Rights’.811 Recovery of, say, an unlawful tax 
payment is almost invariably defended under the ‘duress’ or ‘coercion’ 
heading. Even if it is not clearly stated, this is still the idea underlying 
most of the claims;  
(ii) (ii) The costs generated by public action should be born by the public 
as a whole, or put differently, the public should bear the costs of actions 
of its representatives.812 This contention is based on the argument of 
‘fiscal disruption’ and the notion of ‘burdening future generations’. The 
argument draws force from the supposed ‘resulting unfairness’ of 
burdening a new generation of taxpayers with the consequence of the 
acts of past governments. The rationale behind the argument is that if 
recovery is to be allowed in such circumstances, the government, 
having already spent the funds on projects, must now raise the amount 
to be recovered from the taxpayers in successive fiscal years to 
‘compensate’ the claimant. Thus, the government can only raise such 
money by raising the tax burden of future generations, or finding 
                                                 
810  See Air Canada v British Columbia (1989) 59 DLR (4th) 161 SCC discussed under Canadian law below 
and now partly overruled by Kingstreet Investments case also discussed below. 
811  For the novelty of the argument in the South African Bill of Rights context see Carmichelle v Minister 
of Safety and Security (2001) 4 SA 938 (CC), where the interface constitutional law and private law was 
considered, albeit not in the context of enrichment law. 
812   See the views expressed by Wilson J, a dissenting judge in Air Canada v British Columbia (1989) 1 
SCR 1161, at 1215 and referred to with approval in Kingstreet Investment v New Brunswick (2007) 3 SCR 
3, at par. 28. The argument suggests that the loss should be distributed fairly across the public. The contrary 
argument however sees it as burdening the same taxpayer twice, and enriching the undeserved ‘business-
person’ (claimant) at the expense of innocent taxpayers.  
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alternative means to do so, such as sacrificing actual and viable 
projects.  
 
(iii)  (iii) The right to repayment of such taxes arises because the citizen has 
a prima facie duty to obey a demand that appears to be valid, thereby 
generating a reciprocal obligation of repayment. This facet of the 
argument may raise the issue of competition between different aspects 
of the rule of law if the citizen, who performed, did so under protest or 
made it known he suspected the unlawfulness of a demand. The first 
aspect is that there is a strong presumption of validity in favour of 
government orders though its scope may not necessarily always be 
clear. Thus, because an order of ‘government’ is presumed to be a 
lawful one unless and until a court declares it invalid, when it can be 
treated as void ab initio, the citiz n is under a duty to obey it. On the 
other hand, however, a strong presumption of validity which requires a 
person to obey an order and then challenge it in the courts, if he does 
so, affronts another aspect of the rule of law, namely the principle that 
an official who acts without proper legal power has no special standing 
and is not entitled to obedience.813 This can be regarded as a buttress of 
a free society militating against deference to ‘authority’. However, if a 
citizen suspected that the order was unlawful and nevertheless obeyed 
it, then this person can be seen as betraying the rule of law itself, 
because such a person is acknowledging an usurper and therefore 
undermining one of the main justifications for the existence of law, that 
of facilitating and coordinating the achievement of a common-goal;814 
 
(iv) (iv) The need to maintain an elementary value of justice to the citizen. 
This argument however, generates problems relating to the effective 
                                                 
813 But contrast this with the view of J.E. Du Plessis (Compulsion and Restitution (2004) at 138) who 
argues that such tax claims ‘are to certain extent accompanied by compulsion in the form of implied threat 
of penalties, litigation and even bad publicity – all considerations which may induce submission to the 
demand in the short term’. In this analysis such performance is regarded as involuntary.  
814  J. Adler (2002) 22 Legal Studies 165, 171. 
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conduct of government business and costs imposed on the community, 
for example, in the event of fiscal shortfalls815 if the citizen has an 
absolute right to recover; 
 
(v) (v) The need to ensure that public authorities comply with the highest 
standard of conduct and probity. This aspect however seems to suggest 
no more than that the authority should have the discretion to repay 
since ethical behaviour presupposes an act of choice by an autonomous 
agent. Therefore the idea of probity seems redundant in the face of an 
automatic duty to repay;   
 
(vi) (vi) As a supplementary reason the fact that normally money paid out 
by the state/government can be recovered, it would also sound 
incongruent with legal norms and standard principles and therefore 
offensive if the citizen were not to enjoy a corresponding right; 
 
(vii)  (vii) Finally, in the current constitutional and Human Rights 
instruments, which are becoming standard throughout the world, it is a 
requirement that an effective remedy be given for a violation of a 
substantive right.816 If the unlawful exaction of tax-money infringes a 
citizen’s fundamental right, an effective remedy must ipso facto be 
given, and a state or government that retains an unlawfully exacted 
                                                 
815  See for example the Brazilian case Usina Açucareira Passos discussed below under 5.7 (Passing on in 
Brazilian law) and the line of the reasoning taken by the majority decision in defence of public finances. 
816  For Example under European Union several cases are increasingly being discussed under Art. 43 of the 
ECHR as the note below exemplifies. In the various domestic laws, the Constitutions themselves with 
strong provisions on people’s rights or entrenched Bills of Rights do also provide a platform for such view. 
See also what the United States Supreme Court said in this regard in McKesson v Division of Alcoholic 
Beverages 496 US 18, 31110 L.Ed. 2d 17, 32 (1990): ‘If a State places a taxpayer under duress promptly to 
pay a tax when due and relegates him to a post-payment refund action in which he can challenge the tax’s 
legality, the Due process of the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the State to provide meaningful 
backward-looking relief to rectify any unconstitutional deprivation’.                                                                                                    
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benefit from its citizens cannot be seen to still be complying with the 
Constitutional or Human Right standards.817 
  
But it is also plain that the ultra vires doctrine fits into a private-law framework. It 
ordinarily reflects the ‘liberal’ version of the rule of law, which holds that governments 
as such have no power to alter legal relationships other than those conferred under 
positive law. And if one wants to maintain consistency in the legal system, there seem to 
be no plausible reason why the private law of enrichment should not be able to deal with 
such matters, if all the elements of a claim are satisfied. 
 
Let us now consider the practical application of the defence or its direct or indirect 
invocation in the various jurisdictions under consideration. 
 
 
 
5.4. Passing on In English Law. 
 
 
In English law, still hampered with the ‘burden’ of the unjust-factor approach despite its 
bold recognition of a general principle of enrichment liability, there are still at least three 
main theories advanced to decide whether a person who made a payment demanded by a 
public authority, ultra vires, may succeed by claiming restitution. The first is, in essence, 
that the basis of recovery should be limited to cases where the plaintiff paid money under 
duress or mistake. It is essential to note here that ‘duress’ and ‘mistake’ are among the 
clearest unjust factors entitling the plaintiff to recovery under English law. Under this 
                                                 
817  For recent application of this aspect under the European Community law, specifically in the context of 
non-discrimination of citizen of EC citizens (or companies) due to their residence (art. 43 EC Treaty - the 
provision of right of freedom of establishment within the EC) see the facts and case of Metellgesellschaft 
Ltd v IRC [2001] Ch. 620 (cited under other EC publications as case C-397/98 & C-410/98).  More recent 
claims made in the wake of this case are Sempra Metals Ltd v IRC [2004] EWHC 2387 (CH) affirmed in 
[2005] EWCA Civ. 389 and further appeal at [2007] UKHL 34; Pirelli Cable Holdings Ltd v IRC NV 
[2003] EWCA Civ. 1849; Deutsche Morgan Greenfell Group Plc [2003] EWCA 1779 (Ch), reversed 
[2005]  EWCA Civ. 78, and again appealed to the House of Lords (2006) UKHL 49, in which the appeal 
was allowed. See also comments by M. Chowdry & C. Mitchell (2005) RLR 1 at 15-16 for some of the 
issues raised in the cases.   See equally the application of Art. 1 Protocol 1 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights in Stretch v UK [2004] 38 E.H.R.R. 12 and Rowland v Environmental Agency [2003] 
EWCA Civ. 1885 which inter alia clearly provide that the ‘doctrine of ultra vires …provides an important 
safeguard against abuse of power’. For a useful comment of these last cases see M. Elliott (2004) 63 CLJ 
261.  
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first approach, recoverability is founded on the fact that mistake of law is no longer a bar 
to recovery.818 Because mistake of law has been abolished, the once claimed exception 
employed in Kiriri Cotton Co Ltd v Dewari,819 is now the normal rule if a claim 
encompassing mistake of law appears in court. There, Lord Denning, giving the judgment 
of the Privy Council said:   
 
The true position is that money paid under mistake of law, by itself and without more, cannot be 
recovered back…If there is something more in addition to the mistake of law – if there is something in 
the defendant’s conduct which shows that, of the two of them, he is the one primarily responsible for 
the mistake – then it may be recovered back. Thus, if as between the two of them the duty of observing 
the law is placed on the shoulders of the one rather than the other – it being imposed on him especially 
for the protection of the other – then they are not in pari delicto and the money can be recovered back.  
 
The second approach advanced is equally founded on an implicit notion of duress or 
coercion.820 Duress in this context is to be seen as some sort of a modified private law 
where a special standard should apply for government officials. It could be viewed as a 
unique enrichment category; i.e. the combination of breach of duty and the inherent 
coercion in a public authority’s demand would render the payment involuntary and 
provide the basis for recovery. The third theory which is now mainstream in English law 
is based on the ‘general enrichment principle’ as defended earlier by Professor Birks,821 
though later Birks changed his stances slightly.822 This theory sustains the position that 
                                                 
818  Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349 at 375. As explained in chapter three 
above, this case abolished mistake of law in English law, when the judge held that ‘I would therefore 
conclude on issue No. 1 that a mistake of law rule should no longer be maintained as part of English law 
and that English law should now recognise that there is a general right to recover money paid under a 
mistake, whether of fact or law, subject to the defences available in the law of restitution’. 
819  (1960) AC 192 (PC) at 204). In this case, the defendant required the plaintiff to pay an illegal premium 
for a tenancy. The plaintiff was allowed to recover the premium and retain the tenancy because it was 
decided that the policy underlying the illegality in such circumstances is the protection of those in need of 
rental accommodation from the risk of exploitation.  
820 For example Lord Keith in his dissenting judgment in the Woolwich case, after reviewing the English 
authorities had this to say: ‘The mere fact a payment has been made in response to a demand by a public 
authority does not emerge in any of the cases as constituting or forming part of the ratio decidendi. Many 
of the cases appear to turn upon considerations of whether the payment was voluntary or involuntary. In my 
opinion, it simply involves that the payment was voluntary if no improper pressure was brought to bear, 
and involuntary if it was.’  Obviously, this proposition was contrasted in the case by the majority judgment 
by Lord Goff, whose view is mentioned below.  
821  (1981) Current Legal Problems 291. 
822 P. B. H. Birks ‘Restitution From the Executive’ in PD Finn (ed) Essays in Restitution (1990), Ch. 6; and 
finally in P. B. H. Birks [1991] LMCLQ 473, 497ff. 
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‘money paid by a citizen to a public authority pursuant to an ultra vires demand is prima 
facie recoverable by the citizen as of right, and that right to recover should require neither 
mistake nor compulsion’.823 This principle, widely referred to as ‘the Woolwich 
principle’,  recognises a new policy reason for restitution in order to give substance to the 
constitutional principle enshrined in the Bill of Rights 1689 art. 4, that the Crown and its 
ministers must not levy taxes without parliament’s sanction,824 or more broadly, to give 
substance to the public law principle of legality, that the bodies invested with powers by 
the State must respect the rule of law and must adhere to the limits of the jurisdictions 
conferred upon them.825  
 
These three approaches to ultra vires tax issues reveal the tension still existing in English 
law about the foundation of enrichment law itself. This is captured in two different 
models of unjust enrichment law, one enshrined in the need to prove in all cases an unjust 
factor while the other model leans towards the absence of basis. Under the model based 
on the ‘unjust factor’ approach in all and any enrichment claims, the claimant must show 
three things to make out an entitlement to restitution on an unjust enrichment ground. 
First, he must show that the defendant was enriched. Secondly, that the enrichment was 
gained at the expense of the claimant and thirdly that the defendant’s enrichment is 
unjust. This third requirement (which for this argument’s sake is the most important), 
does not mean that the court has a discretionary power to order repayment whenever it 
seems just and equitable to do so in the circumstance of the particular case.826 The 
claimant must bring him/herself within a recognised ground for restitution. This model of 
law is currently supported by a significant body of judicial opinion.827 The other model, 
however, holds that a claimant seeking restitution on the ground of unjust enrichment 
must show that a defendant has been enriched at his expense, and that there is no legal 
ground for the defendant’s enrichment. In his last book, Peter Birks argued that English 
                                                 
823  Woolwich Equitable Building Society v IRC [1993] AC 70 (HL)  101 (p173 (per Lord Golf). 
824  (1993) AC 70, 172 (per Lord Goff).  
825  (1993) AC 70, 198 (per Lord Browne-Wilkinson).  
826  Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Birmingham CC [1997] QB 380 (CA) (per Evans LJ). 
827  Just few citation of cases that hold this view: Banque Financière de la Cité v Parc (Batersea) Ltd 
[1999] 1 AC 221, 227 (Lord Steyn); and 234 (Lord Hoffmann); McDonald v Coys of Kensington  [2004] 
EWCA Civ 47; Niru Battery Manufacturer Co v Milestone Trading Ltd (No.2) [2004] EWCA Civ. 487; 
[2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 319, Par. 28 and 41 (per Clarke LJ). 
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law was committed to this model by certain cases concerned with the recovery of 
payments under void but fully executed interest rate swap contracts.828  And Birks was 
not alone in this assertion.  Various judicial pronouncements have already taken this 
approach, at least in special areas.  
 
The tension between the two approaches is further heightened by a recent decision of the 
Court of Appeals in ICR v Deutsche Morgan Grenfell829 in which that Court recognised 
that claims for restitution of something paid by mistake can only arise by reference to 
particular statutory provisions830 or at common law by virtue of the Woolwich principle. 
In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeal drew distinction between public and 
private restitutionary claims and recognised that, for the recovery of overpaid taxes at 
least, restitution occurs by virtue of a specific public law regime which is distinct from 
the private law regime which governs the bulk of the law of unjust enrichment. Apart 
from establishing a dichotomy between public law and private law regimes, a division 
that several English authors doubt whether it is necessary or desirable,831 the case also 
points to the issue of mistake of law in the claimant’s attempted escape from the time-bar 
to bring the case within the provisions of the Limitation Act 1980, S 32(1) (c) for which 
                                                 
828  P. B. H. Birks, Unjust Enrichment, 2nd Ed. (2005) ch. 5. See criticisms of P. B. H. Birks’ approach inter 
alia by R. Stevens and T. Krebs [2004] RLR 270-276. The ‘absence of basis’ approach has already made 
deep inroad in English case law. For example Criterion Property Ltd v Stratford Property UK Ltd [2004] 
UKHL 28; [2004] 1 WLR 1846, par. 4 (Per Lord Nicholls); Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Sanwell BC [1994] 4 
All ER 890; Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln CC [1999] 2 AC 349 (Per Lord Hope). 
829  [2005] EWCA Civ. 78 (2005), (2005) STC 329). 
830  These tax provisions are essentially embodied in the following Acts: (i) Tax Management Act 1970 
section 33 (which provides for the recovery of overpaid income tax, corporation tax, capital gains tax and 
petroleum revenue tax); (ii) Inheritance Tax Act, section 241 (which provides for the repayment of 
overpaid Inheritance tax); (iii) Finance Act, section 29 (which provides for the repayment of overpaid 
excise duty and car tax); (iv) Value Added Tax Act 1994, section 80  (which makes provision for the 
recovery of overpaid VAT). This last Act must now be read as Amended by the Finance Act 1997 sections 
46-47 and by the further amendment by section 3 of the Finances (No. 2) Act of 2005. This extends the 
operation of the unjust enrichment defence to claims for credit of overpaid VAT rather than confining it to 
cases where the tax has been overpaid.  For further details on these tax enactments  see G. Virgo, The 
Principles of The  Law of Restitution 2nd Ed. (2006)  412; M. Chawdry & M. Mitchell (2005) 13 RLR 1, 1-
17. 
831 See for example G. Virgo, The Principle of the Law of Restitution 2nd Ed. (2006) 412-414. Both, A. 
Burrows (2005) 121 LQR 540, 542-3 and J. Edelman (2005) 68 MLR 849, 851 argue that there is no reason 
why one unjust factor should exclude the other, and therefore the fact that the claim exists in public law, 
does not mean private law in this field should be excluded. 
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time only starts to run when the mistake is or could have been reasonably discovered.832 
One must remember here that mistake of law is no longer a bar to recovery under English 
law,833 and the Woolwich principle itself does not depend on the ground of mistake.  
 
 
Given the complexities and the potential impact of a general right to recover affirmed by 
the Woolwich principle, the English Law Commission felt the need to protect public 
finances and recognised such need as a legitimate policy aim834 which is justified because 
in certain cases the amount of tax or charge which might be repaid could amount to 
millions of pounds. A blunt restitutionary right could prove to be disastrous to the public 
authority and the relevant projects which it finances. Consequently, although the Law 
Commission rejected a general defence of serious disruption to public finances835 on the 
ground that such a defence would be too uncertain in operation, it nevertheless 
recommended the creation of four specific defences to protect public authorities against 
serious fiscal disruption.836 The four specific defences recommended by the UK Law 
Commission in this regards are: (i) failure to exhaust statutory remedies, (ii) change in 
the settled view of the law,837 (iii) compromise,838 and (iv) unjust enrichment.839
                                                 
832  In brief, the facts in ICR v Deutsche Morgan Grenfell were that the claimant sought a restitutionary 
remedy in the form of interest in respect of taxes which it had paid too early. Some of these taxes had been 
paid more than six years before the claim was brought. Therefore the claim was time-barred unless the 
claimant could found the claim on a mistake of law for which time would not begin to run until the mistake 
could reasonably have been discovered.  
833  Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349 (HL) 349, 382. 
834  Law  Commission, Restitution: Mistake of law and Ultra Vires Public Authority Receipt and Payments 
Law Com. Report No. 227 (1994) paras 10.5 -10-8). 
835  See the Canadian case Air Canada v British Columbia Ontario (1989) 1 SCR 1161, (1989) 59 DLR 
(4th) 161 that recognised such issue as fundamental to the acceptance of the defence of passing on. The case 
is now overruled by Kingstreet Investments v New Brunswick (2007) 1 SCR 3 as discussed below.  Contrast 
this, however, with the view being adopted or retained in the American New Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, section 19, Tentative Draft No. 1 (2001), which provides that a tax 
payment is retrievable unless repayment would threaten the stability of the public finances. 
836  G. Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution 2nd Ed. (2006) 421. 
837  It was recommended that the claim be denied on this ground if restitution is founded on a mistake of 
law where the payment was made in accordance with a settled view of the law that the money was due and 
that view was subsequently changed by a decision of a court or tribunal. See equally for support for such a 
view the judgment of Lord Goff in Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln CC [1999] 2 AC 349, 382.  For 
criticisms of the validity of this ground of defence see G. Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution 
2nd Ed. (2006) 421. 
838  Restitution is to be denied on this ground (compromise) where the restitutionary claim has either been 
contractually compromised or where the payment was made in response to litigation which had been 
commenced by the public authority, but not where the litigation was merely threatened. Such a defence of 
compromise is consistent with the general bars to restitutionary claims at common law founded on the 
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In sum, English law objectively does not recognise the defence of passing on in its 
private law in order to maintain consistency within its unjust enrichment doctrine. 
However, despite its affirmed willingness to uphold the rule of law and respect for its 
constitutional principles, it can still be queried whether that will hold for long, as the 
‘disguised’ assertion that such matters be dealt with under public law alone, will 
ultimately sanction a passing on defence by statute, if it has not happened already. 
 
 
5.5. Passing on In Canadian Law. 
 
5.5.1. Introductory Remark. 
 
In the study of the Canadian defence of passing on and its enrichment law in general one 
is now bound to take notice of two different evolutionary ‘ages’:  Pre-2007 and Post-2007  
that for convenience’ sake I shall call Pre-Kingstreet and Post-Kingstreet, as its 
jurisprudence finally put to rest the symmetry requirement of gain-loss in enrichment 
arena. 
 
 
5.5.2. Passing on prior to 2007 - The Air Canada v British Columbia Approach. 
 
We have seen from the outset that for a plaintiff to succeed in the Canadian enrichment 
law he must successfully prove four requisites in his claim: (i) an enrichment to the 
defendant; (ii) a corresponding deprivation to the plaintiff, (iii) an absence of juristic 
                                                                                                                                                 
claimant’s voluntary submission to an honest claim. This recommendation is based on the settled position 
in English law that ‘where the claimant settles or compromises’ (Ward and Co v Wallis [1900] 1 QB 675; 
see also Andrews (1989) LMCLQ 431, 432-435) the plaintiff’s claim for payment will be barred from 
obtaining restitution from the defendant because of the policy of the law to uphold the settlement of the 
claim. Thus, a settlement constitutes a bargain between the parties and should only be invalidated in 
extreme circumstances, namely where the contractual test for mistake can be regarded as satisfied, in other 
words, where there is a shared fundamental mistake, or where the defendant induced the settlement by 
fraud, undue influence or absence of good faith (for he notion of ‘duress’ see  J. Beatson (1974) CLJ 97, 
103 and for ‘fundamental mistake’ see  Brenam v Bolt Burdon [2004] EWCA Civ. 1017, [2005] QB 303.  
839 Unjust enrichment in this context is exactly another way of saying that the state will not tolerate a 
situation whereby a plaintiff gains a windfall without justification. It certainly includes the aspect of 
passing on. 
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reason for the defendant’s enrichment, and (iv) there must be no defence to such a 
claim.840 If the plaintiff proves each of the first three elements, he is presumptively 
entitled to relief. His claim however may be ultimately defeated to the extent that the 
defendant is able to invoke a defence, as indicated, at the fourth stage of the enquiry. 
When one analyses all the relevant defences in unjust enrichment, as was done in chapter 
two above, one will quickly realise that almost all of them operate by demonstrating that, 
notwithstanding initial appearances, either the defendant was not truly enriched or the 
plaintiff  did not ‘truly suffer a corresponding deprivation’. The passing-on defence in 
Canadian context is ordinarily to be seen as an example of a case where the plaintiff ‘did 
not truly suffer a corresponding deprivation’, for allegedly having recouped his loss by 
shifting it to the customers.  
 
Though unjust enrichment claims against public authorities in Canadian law did and 
perhaps still do sometimes succeed where none of the established grounds of restitution 
appear to be or to have been applicable, the real success of these claims is thought to be 
or to have been justified by reference to an independent ground of restitution which is 
peculiar to enrichment claims against public authorities.841 Other cases however, 
generally rejected a general right of restitution founded on the receipt of ultra vires 
payment, primarily because of the fear that allowing restitution for this reason would 
unsettle public finances842 and until very recently the leading cases in Canadian law 
rejecting such a general right to recovery and consequently affirming the passing-on 
defence were still Air Canada v British Columbia843 and Air Canada v Ontario (Liquor 
Control Board).844 These cases are now to a certain extent superseded by Kingstreet 
Investments v New Brunswick.845 But they haven’t been superseded in all respects, hence 
the importance of looking at Air Canada v British Columbia and Air Canada v Ontario 
                                                 
840  See generally M. McInnes (2002) Univ. Toronto LJ 163, 164-168 and other references discussed under 
the Canadian change of position defence in chapter 3 above. 
841  Old examples cited in this regard are Steel v Williams 155 ER 1502; South of Scotland Electricity Board 
v British Oxygen Co Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 587; In Re GST (Good and Services Tax) (Can) (1992) 2 SCR 445. 
842  See G. Virgo, The Principles of The Law of Restitution 2nd Ed.  (2006) 408 for some earlier cases. 
843  [1989] 1 SCR1161; (1989) 59 DLR (4th) 161 SCC. 
844  [1997] 2 SCR 581. 
845  [2007] 1 SCR 3 (2007)  SCC 1. 
845  See G. Virgo, The Principles of The Law of Restitution (2006).   
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first. Notwithstanding the fact that the approval of the defence by the Canadian Supreme 
Court appeared only in a non-binding comment from La Forest J, with whom two other 
members of the Court concurred, namely Lamer and L’Heureux-Dube JJ, La Forest’s 
assertion in Air Canada v British Columbia became the cornerstone of that defence in 
Canadian law.  That assertion reads as follows:  
 
‘The law of restitution is not intended to provide windfalls to plaintiffs who have suffered no loss.  Its 
function is to ensure that where a plaintiff has been deprived of wealth that is either in his possession or 
would have accrued for his benefit, it is restored to him. The measure of restitutionary recovery is the 
gain the Province made at the Airlines’ expense. If the Airlines have not shown that they bore the 
burden of the tax, then they have not made out their claim. What the Province received is relevant only 
insofar as it was received at the Airlines’ expense’.  
 
The majority of the Court rejected the claimant taxpayers’ claim to recover ultra vires 
payments for three main reasons: (i) if the enrichment claim was allowed to succeed the 
State would need to recover the money from a new generation of taxpayers who had not 
been benefited from the provision of State services funded by the tax; (ii) arranging for 
the repayment to the original taxpayers and issuing new tax demands would be 
economically inefficient; (iii) a further consequence of repaying tax to the original 
taxpayer would be to disrupt public finances.  
 
Notwithstanding the clarity and force of these arguments, one member of that Court 
(Wilson J) still dissented, and held that these reasons should not prevent the acceptance 
of a general right of recovery. In the dissenting judge’s view (a view also defended now 
by many other authors846) the general dangers above mentioned should be dealt with by 
                                                 
846  Other authors then defending the same principle were W. Cornish (1987) JMCL 41; P. B. H. Birks, 
‘Restitution from the Executive: A Tercentenary Footnote to the Bill of Rights’ in Finn (ed) Essays in 
Restitution, chapter 6. More recently G. Virgo, The Principles of The Law of Restitution 2nd Ed. (2006) 409-
410; B. Alarie ‘Kingstreet Investments: Taking a Pass on the Defence of Passing on’ (October 2007) 
(University of Toronto). The Paper is available online in pdf format at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cmf?abstract_ID1023789.  Alarie agrees that in principle there should 
be a general right to recover and the defence of passing on is in principle defensible, but for policy and 
economic reasons it should not be applied. He analyses passing on from an economic perspective.         
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developing specific defences for the protection of public authorities where the greater 
public good requires such protection.847  
 
In 1997 the Supreme Court of Canada considered similar case in Air Canada v Ontario 
(Liquor Board) 848  for the possible recovery of unconstitutional taxes through the 
doctrine of unjust enrichment. In brief, the facts of this new case were that in 1984, an 
Airline drew to Ontario’s (Provincial Authority) attention the probable 
unconstitutionality of a statute requiring the airline to pay alcohol-related fees to the 
Province. Ontario agreed to stop collecting the fees from that airline on the condition that 
the airline did not disclose to other airlines that this was occurring. When the 
arrangement was eventually discovered, other airlines successfully challenged the 
constitutionality of the legislation. The court below held that the airlines were entitled to 
restitution of some of the fees, as the airlines had proven they did not pass the costs to the 
passengers. However the Court of Appeal only ordered restitution of the fees collected 
after 1984 on the basis that prior to that date the airlines and the Province were in pari 
delicto. The SCC unanimously ordered restitution of all the fees collected.  
 
The basis of the Supreme Court’s decision in this second case was that there was no rule 
in Canadian law that only fees collected by a government agency who knew that a law 
was unconstitutional could be recovered. The court reasoned that the ‘responsibility of 
ensuring the constitutional applicability of a law lies with the governmental agency in 
charge of administering the law, not the tax payer’.849
 
                                                 
847  Air Canada v British Columbia [1989]  SCR 1161 at 1214-19. Among other things, Wilson J also held 
as follows:  ‘Why should the individual taxpayer, as opposed to taxpayers as a whole, bear the burden of 
government’s mistake?  I would respectfully suggest that it is grossly unfair that X, who may not be (as 
in this case) a large corporate enterprise, should absorb the cost of government’s unconstitutional act. If 
it is appropriate for the courts to adopt some kind of policy in order to protect government against itself 
(and I cannot say that  the  idea  particularly  appeals  to  me)  it  should  be  one  which distributes the 
loss fairly across the public.  The loss should not fall on the totally innocent taxpayer whose only fault 
is that it paid what the legislature improperly said was due’[at p. 1215].  
848  (1997) 2 SCR 581. 
849  For detailed analysis of this case and the Canadian law to that point see the comments out of the bench 
by Beverley McLachlin, a member of the Supreme Court of Canada in B. McLachlin, ‘Restitution and the 
Legislature in Canada’ in W. Cornish et al (eds) Restitution, Past, Present and Future (1998) 288.  
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It is to be remembered that Canadian enrichment law requires a correlation between loss 
and gain. It would also appear that because of that correlation, Canadian law demands 
that not just an initial financial deprivation to the claimant, but a financial deprivation 
which is persistent. If the claimant later makes good his losses, restitution will be denied. 
However, it is still to be seen whether this position will survive the recent Kinsgtreet 
Investments case which is immediately discussed below. 
 
5.5.2. Passing on after 2007 -- The Kingstreet Investments’ Approach. 
 
As currently understood, Canadian law has firmly rejected the defence of passing on in 
the context of ultra vires taxes. The reasons for such rejection, according to the Supreme 
Court in Kingstreet Investments850 are mainly three: (i) the defence is inconsistent with 
the basic premise of ‘restitution law’ (unjust enrichment); (ii) the defence is economically 
misconceived;851 and (iii) it creates serious difficulties of proof as there are inherent 
difficulties in a commercial marketplace of proving that the loss was not passed on to 
consumers.852 Before the court arrived at this conclusion which all the nine Supreme 
                                                 
850  (2007) 1 SCR 3, paras. 44-45. In the Kingstreet Investments litigation the specific levy (tax) at issue in 
the appeal was a user charge, ranging over the years from 5 per cent to 11 per cent, imposed by the New 
Brunswick Liquor Corporation on sales of alcoholic beverages to licencees through the Corporation’s 
outlets. The plaintiff, Kingstreet Investments and 501638 MB Ltd had operated night clubs in the areas of 
Fredericon and Mocton, New Brunswick since 1988.  Over the years, they paid more than $ 1 million in 
user charges, which with interest amounted to a sum close to twice the principal amount. At trial the 
plaintiff challenged the constitutional validity of the charge arguing that it was ultra vires the Province (the 
Provincial Authority) on the basis that it was an indirect tax. The Canadian Constitution permits Provinces 
to impose only direct taxes.  In defence, the Province argued that if the user charge was an indirect tax, then 
although the tax was ultra vires, the plaintiff should have no remedy since the incidence of the tax fell on 
the nightclub and bar patrons. In other words, the Province argued that the plaintiff had passed-on the user 
charge and had therefore experienced no compensable loss. On appeal, the Province did not contest the 
conclusion that the user charges were indirect taxes, and therefore ultra vires. Having conceded the 
illegality of the charge as an indirect tax, the nightclub’s appeal focused only on the appropriate remedy in 
the light of the unconstitutional nature of the levy. The Court of Appeal accepted that the passing-on 
defence should preclude recovery for the user charge paid prior to the commencement of legal proceedings, 
but allowed recovery of the user charge paid under protest and compulsion. On further appeal, the Supreme 
Court by unanimity of a 9-0 decision, rejected the passing-on defence. 
851 For detailed discussion of the ‘economically misconceived’ reason see B. Alarie, ‘Kingstreet 
Investments: Taking A Pass on the Defence of Passing On’ (October 2007) available at  the University of 
Toronto ‘Social Science Research Network Center (SSNR) – Electronic Paper Collection  at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1023789. 
852  Kingstreet Investments Ltd  v New Brunswick (2007) 1 SCR 3, paras. 42, 44, 47-48. 
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Court judges unanimously agreed with, it considered the previous view in Air Canada v 
British Columbia that held that the ‘law of restitution is not designed to confer windfalls 
to plaintiffs who suffered no loss’ and replaced it with a new version that ‘the law of 
restitution is not concerned by the possibility of the plaintiff obtaining a windfall because 
it is not founded on the concept of compensation for loss’.  
 
While this assertion is sound to defeat a defence of passing on, its implication in the 
context of unjust enrichment in general is that one must now start questioning the 
correlation gain-loss that is entrenched in Canadian law and therefore the measure of 
recovery itself. As was explained earlier in this chapter, the defence of passing on would 
seem to encounter a more fertile ground in a legal system that requires a correlation gain-
loss than one that does not require such correlation. Canadian law in the past few decades 
seemed to defend such correlation, but when faced with its applicability in the context of 
the passing-on defence, it subtly departed from it. 
 
The three reasons advanced by the judge seem to be more concerned with policy rather 
than principle. As a decision firmly grounded on policy, it may actually embody some 
other contradictions in principle.  The decision recognises that all the elements of an 
unjust enrichment claim are present in the cases of ultra vires taxes and for that reason 
the judge ordinarily has no discretion but to grant the relief prayed; however, the Court 
also concludes that ‘the ordinary principles of unjust enrichment should not be applied 
to claims for the recovery of monies paid pursuant to a statute held to be 
unconstitutional’.853 In support of that contention the judge continues that ‘restitution for 
ultra vires taxes does not fit squarely within either of the established categories of 
restitution. The better view is that it comprises a third category distinct from unjust 
enrichment’.854
                                                 
853  Kingstreet Investments Ltd v New Brunswick  (2007) 1 SCR 3,  para. 39. 
854 Kingstreet Investments Ltd v New Brunswick (2007) 1SCR 3, para. 40. With some historical remarks the 
Court also found that ‘[a]ctions for recovery of taxes collected without legal authority and actions of unjust 
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In sum, Canadian law has now rejected both the passing-on defence and its mirror-image 
requirement gain and loss, because an ultra vires law can never constitute a ‘juristic 
reason’ for the State.   
 
 
 
5.6. Passing On In American Law. 
 
5.6.1. Introductory Remark.  
 
Like change of circumstances defence, the passing-on defence is the United States of 
America has been discussed for a long time. Its desirability or otherwise is examined in at 
least two areas, namely the private law of restitution itself and in antitrust (competition) 
law. The brief presentation below follows the same approach.  
 
5.6.2.. Passing on in Unjust Enrichment Law. 
 
The law of the United States of America, unlike that of Canada, does not endorse the 
view that restitution needs necessarily be restricted by the net financial loss suffered by 
the claimant. Therefore, some of the considerations encountered in Canadian enrichment 
law do not find fertile ground in American law. However, it has long been acknowledged 
that the policy considerations behind the law of unjust enrichment imply denying a 
plaintiff relief if that relief creates ‘unjust enrichment’ for the plaintiff.855 Because the 
                                                                                                                                                 
enrichment both address concerns of restitutionary justice, but these remedies developed in our legal 
system along separate paths for distinct purposes. The action for recovery of taxes is firmly grounded, as a 
public law remedy in a constitutional principle stemming from democracy’s earliest attempts to 
circumscribe government powers within the rule of law. Unjust enrichment, on the other hand, originally 
evolved from the common-law action of indebitatus assumpsit as a means of granting plaintiff relief for 
quasi-contract damages’. Additional authorities for this proposition are cited in the case itself. 
855 Cf. Restatement (Second) of Restitution, Topic 3, Introductory Note at 157 (Tentative Draft No. 1 
(1983). There might be some changes operated here in the New Restatement (Third) of Restitution, which is 
still under discussion. Thus far section 19 of Tentative Draft No.1 (2001) as already cited above, is devoted 
to the recovery of disputed tax payments, and it generally provides that a tax payment is retrievable unless 
repayment would threaten the stability of the public finances or ‘public fisc’, as M.P. Gergen puts it (see 
M.P. Gergen (2005) 13 RLR 225 at 229 notes 28 and 29).  
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central policy underlying the law of unjust enrichment is precisely to avoid or to prevent 
unjust enrichment, a court judgment in this branch of law that ‘unjustly enriches’ a 
plaintiff would be self-defeating.  
 
Given the possibility of conflicting principles, some commentators advance a cautious 
clarification note to the assertion above. Hence, Woodward thought that such doctrinal 
explanation of the defendant’s victory should not be confused with an explanation that 
sanctions the defendant’s enrichment through an illegal purpose. He explains that this 
notion ‘is conceptually very different from one that justified a defendant’s victory on the 
basis that the illegal tax does not unjustly enrich the defendant’. That is so because ‘a 
defendant successfully deploying the ‘unjust enrichment of the plaintiff’s defence’ will 
not win because the defendant was not unjustly enriched; he will win because the cure – 
an award of restitution to this plaintiff – would be no better than the disease.’856 Hence, 
denying recovery on the grounds of unjust enrichment of the plaintiff’ seems most 
accurately to reflect the dynamics of these tax cases themselves. 
 
Despite the apparent clarity of the explanations above, in practice, however, the 
American position on passing on is somewhat ambivalent and at the same time very 
diverse. Commenting on an enrichment arising from ‘improperly’ charged taxes, George 
Palmer, two decades ago, succinctly put the matter this way: 
  
There is no doubt that if the tax authority retains a payment to which it was not entitled it has been 
unjustly enriched. It has not been enriched at the taxpayer’s expense, however, if he has shifted the 
economic burden of the tax to others.857  
 
Under what circumstances can it be said that the plaintiff did not shift the economic 
burden of the tax to others? The answer may be very complex and the enquiry to 
                                                 
856  W. Woodward (1985) 39 U Miami LR 873,  911. See the similarity of this reasoning with the Brazilian 
argument discussed below, at 5.7 which is essentially premised in finding a dilemma in the factual scenario.  
857 G. E. Palmer, The Law of Restitution, revised supplement (Boston 1986) 255.  Palmer is essentially 
echoing here a Federal statutory approach that technically had overridden the common-law approach. In 
this regard Statute 26 USC § 6416(1)(A) (1984) required a taxpayer seeking refund had to demonstrate that 
it ‘had not collected the amount of the tax from its customers’. This mechanical approach is said to 
establish that the intermediary has suffered ‘no loss’. 
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understand all such circumstances may be futile but one thing is clear: in order for a 
defendant successfully to advance passing on, he must allege that the plaintiff did not 
bear the burden of such taxation and the onus is on the plaintiff to prove that he did. 
Whether one wants it or not, this exercise seems to be premised on finding whether one 
has suffered a loss or not.858  
  
Meanwhile, unlike other jurisdictions that may not have a long tradition on passing on 
defence, American law has a longstanding jurisprudence on the issue dating back at least 
from 1916 in the case of William C van Antwerp v State of New York.859 The same 
jurisprudence was adopted indirectly two decades later by the US Supreme Court in an 
obiter dictum in United States v Jefferson Electrical Manufacturing Co.860 But in 
between these two cases the US Congress slightly changed direction through legislation 
in the Revenue Act (US) 1928 section 424(a).861 This Act denied recovery to any 
claimant who did not bear the burden of the unlawful tax. In the Act the Congress 
required claimants seeking refunds, for example, of Automobile Accessories Tax, to 
establish affirmatively that they had ‘borne the burden’ of the tax.  Ever since, this 
federal legislation has had a profound influence on subsequent decisions of State courts. 
In circumstances where state governments were slow to introduce a statutory defence of 
passing on, state courts filled the gap. The defence thereby became part of the landscape 
of the common-law of the United States. But pockets of resistance to the common-law 
introduction of the defence of passing on did, however, remain862 and today it is still 
possible to encounter some ambivalence in the application of the defence in some States. 
There are instances in which the defence is rejected outright. A second string of cases 
presents more ambivalence by either rejecting the defence on technical grounds or 
                                                 
858  This is what W. Woodward calls the mechanical approach, which is aimed to establish that the 
intermediary has suffered no loss. 
859  218 NT 422 (NYCA, 1916). See also Wayne County Produce Co. v Duffy-Mott 244 N.Y. 351, 155 N.E. 
669 (1927).  
860  291 US 386 (1934) 401-403. In this case the US Supreme Court referring to the 1928 Tax Act said that 
‘statutes providing for refund and for suits on claims proceed on the same equitable principle that underlies 
an action in assumpsit for money had and received’.  
861  Revenue Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 886 (1928).  
862  See generally M. Rush, The Defence of Passing on (2006) 53. 
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accepting it with qualification. The third approach is represented by those cases in which 
it is directly accepted with no qualification.863  
 
One often contentious issue in the application of the passing-on defence in American law 
is the concept of ‘specifically charged restriction’ against a ‘lump-sum’ charge. For some 
judges864 and commentators865 where the claimant has ‘specifically charged the tax’, i.e. 
it is clearly said that the price is X plus tax, in principle, the defence of passing on would 
be available, and where a lump-sum price was charged, the defence would be defeated. 
The corollary of these analytical issues is also the problem as to whether the customers to 
whom the burden was passed are readily identifiable or it is impossible to identify them. 
And even if they are readily identifiable or unidentifiable, the other question that must be 
asked in such circumstances is whether the plaintiff is seeking recovery in his own right 
or on behalf of his customers. If one asserts that the plaintiff is just an intermediary 
seeking recovery on its customers’ behalf, one gains the impression that at issue is the 
image of an intermediary simply passing on the recovery and deriving no benefit from it. 
However, the reality of life is certainly different from this imagination. The scenario is 
even murkier because the customers, as ultimate taxpayers, are usually barred from 
claiming directly from the government as of right that which they paid in overcharge to 
the plaintiff. So, if the plaintiff is said to be claiming on his customers’ behalf, the 
likelihood is that such customers, in the event they are identifiable, will have pledged to 
pay something to the claimant to act on their behalf, (such something can be money, firm 
future business, higher future prices, good-will, etc, which might ultimately amount to as 
much as the value of the illegal tax paid) in exchange for getting the proceeds of the 
recovery.866  This reflection shows that the defence of passing on denies restitution to the 
                                                 
863  See again M. Rush, The Defence of Passing on (2006) for details of these three positions. For an in 
depth discussion of older Tax cases see Bondurant (1939) 37 Michigan LR 357; Johnson (1937) 37 
Columbia LR 910; Field (1932) 45 Harvard LR 501; W. Woodward (1985) 39 U Miami LR 873 at 885-907  
(part III of his article) offers a thorough analysis of various facets of passing on in various American cases.  
864  See Judge Hand’s dissenting judgment in 123 East Fifty-Fourth Street 157 F.2d (2d. Cir. 1946) for 
more details on this view. Herbert Nelson v Appleway Chevrolet Inc. Case No. 77985-6 (April 26, 2007) 
(Supreme Court of Washington State) and Sprint Spectrum v City of Seattle 113 Wn. App 339, 127 P. 3d 
755 (2006) . 
865  M. Rush, The Defence of Passing on (2006) 217; B. Sweeney (2006)  Melbourne U LR 26. 
866  See the example given by W. Woodward (1985) 39 U Miami LR 873, 903 footnote 139 as well as the 
inefficient outcome of the class action in M. Rush (supra) 217-218. See equally the economic analysis of B. 
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plaintiff because of the existence of third-parties’ rights that the courts perceive to be 
stronger than the right of the plaintiff.867 Briefly stated one can say that because what is 
really at stake in the recovery of unlawfully charged taxes is the dilemma to prevent both 
the government to enrich itself by infringing the very law it is expected to protect and 
thwart plaintiff’s undeserved windfall that he would gain at the expense of the innocent 
ultimate taxpayers without having borne any financial burden (or any loss). The dilemma 
is often resolved on policy grounds that may resemble the adage ‘as between ‘two 
innocents’, the position of the defendant is to be preferred’.  
 
Similar to the Brazilian approach discussed below, American courts sometimes deny 
recovery and apply the defence of passing on because events extraneous to the 
transaction between the intermediary and the government (i.e., the plaintiff passing on the 
tax) have divested that plaintiff of the rights he otherwise might have had. Consequently, 
by framing the question as whether the recovery sought would result in the claimant’s 
unjust enrichment, it properly redirects our attention from the defendant and the manner 
in which the defendant acquired the enrichment to the plaintiff and to the results that 
might follow a judgment in favour of the plaintiff.868   So in these cases, an appropriate 
plaintiff which met other requirements for recovery and did not pass on the tax would be 
entitled to recover the illegal tax. Where the plaintiff has passed on the tax, the 
government, it is said, has not strengthened its own case for retention of the illegal tax-
money. Instead, the original balance of equity favouring the intermediary has shifted 
because of the intermediary’s unilateral action in charging his customers the tax. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Alarie (supra) in the Canadian context and the complexities of tax incidence on passing on defence at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cmf?abstract_ID1023789. But see a recent Washington State Appellate 
Court’s application of the analysis in Herbert Nelson and Other v Appleway Chevrolet Inc and others case 
No. 77985-6 (April 26, 2007)   as well as Sprint Spectrum v City of Seattle 113 Wn App. 339, 127 P.3d 755 
(2006) as a potentially contrary view. In Herbert Nelson v Appleway the court clearly states that ‘the First 
Amendment however will not insulate Appleway’s practice of making customers bear Appleway’s tax 
burden’ which implies that passing on will be considered as a defence if the immediate taxpayer passed that 
burden on to the customers. 
867  W. Woodward (1985) 39 U Miami LR 873, 899. 
868 W. Woodward (1985) 39 U Miami LR 873, 911-912. See the position of the English Law Commission 
above that has adopted this reason. Among the four defences that can be advanced in cases of ‘improperly’ 
collected tax, the strongest is the defence of ‘unjust enrichment of the plaintiff’ (Law Com, No. 227 (1994) 
paras. 10.5-10.8. 
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Following collection of the illegal tax, the government has not ‘gained equity’, rather the 
plaintiff has lost it. 
 
5.6.3. Passing on in Antitrust (Competition) Law. 
 
Because of the layered market structure in which products, commodities and services are 
traded, which the government usually targets with taxes, the passing-on defence must 
also be understood in that environment. When a government imposes a tax on those 
products or services, regardless of whether such tax is lawful or unlawful, the corollary is 
that it will be reflected in the various layers of the market. That is so because the tax or 
any other levy always has a reflex in the price of the product or services traded. Similarly, 
in antitrust (competition) law, when a business-person or a corporate or a conglomerate 
of corporations decide to ‘fix’ a price for a particular product or service, the effect of that 
price-fixing will be felt on the various layers of the market, though its impact will vary 
from one layer to another or be dependent on other externalities such as supply and 
demand.869
 
Observing the marketplace we realise that, on the one hand, many producers do not sell 
directly to their ultimate consumers. The producer of a consumer good, for example, sells 
it to a wholesaler who in turn will sell it to a retailer who in turn will resell it to the 
ultimate consumer. Even if there is no wholesale stage of distribution, the ultimate 
consumer will ordinarily be the direct purchaser from a retailer and only an ‘indirect 
purchaser’ from the producer.870 On the other hand, it is also true that in some cases the 
product in question may be used as an input into a final consumer-good, for example, 
flour sold to a baker who makes it into bread that is sold to the consumer. It is also 
                                                 
869  For example, in 1975 Elmer Schaefer used the concepts of supply and demand to analyse passing on 
questions (see E.J. Schaefer (1975) 16 William & Mary Law Review 883).  An evaluation and reaction to 
his analysis and similar studies are offered by subsequent authors such as M.W. Landes  & R. Posner 
(1979)  46 U Chicago LR 602, at 619; B Sweeney  (2006) Melbourne ULR 26; MP Schinkel & J Tuinstra, 
‘Illinois Walls in Alternative Market Structures’ CeNDEF Working Papers Series 05/11/2005 (Amsterdam 
University), and J. Tuinstra et al, ‘Illinois Walls: How Barring Indirect Purchasers Suits facilitate 
Collusion’ Paper No TI 2005-049/1 at www.tinbergen.nl/discussionpapers/05049.pdf (last accessed 
19/02/2008). Ari Lehman (2005) 27 Cardozo LR 343. 
870  See generally W.M. Landes & R.A. Posner (1979) 46 U Chicago LR 602. 
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entirely possible that the product may not even appear physically in the final good, for 
example the oven used by the baker in making the bread. In all these the ultimate 
consumer is only an indirect purchaser of the flour or oven, the cost of which will be 
reflected in the price of the bread. 
  
It is against this type of background that the iconic decisions of Hanover Shoe Co v 
United Shoe Manufacturing Corp871 and Illinois Bricks Co v Illinois872 were decided and 
must be understood in that context. These decisions are not only the pillars of the 
acceptance or rejection of the passing-on defence in American Antitrust law, but they 
also have ramifications in the private law of unjust enrichment. 
 
In Illinois Brick Co the Supreme Court held that indirect purchasers do not have standing 
to sue for violations of the antitrust laws under section 4 of the Clayton Act,873 which 
authorises private damages (known as treble-damages) suits by individuals or firms 
injured in their business or property by violation of those laws. 
 
The Illinois Brick case is considered as a mirror-image of the Hanover Shoe case, decided 
almost a decade earlier. The case of Hanover Shoe was a suit by a shoe manufacturer   
against a manufacturer of shoe machinery who had earlier been found to have 
monopolised the shoe machinery industry in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.874 
The defendant argued that it should be allowed to show that the claiming customer had 
not in fact been injured by the antitrust (competition) law violation because such 
customer had passed on the cost of the violation to its customers, the purchasers of shoes. 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, by holding that there is no ‘passing on’ 
defence to a suit by a direct purchaser. The direct purchaser is entitled to get the 
overcharge back [trebled], whether or not he was really injured to that extent.875 The 
                                                 
871   392 U.S. 481 (1986). 
872   431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
873   15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) 
874  15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976).  
875 See parallelism here with the recent Canadian case Kingstreet Investments discussed under Canadian 
passing on defence, in which the court as said there held that the law of enrichment is not concerned by the 
possibility of the plaintiff gaining a windfall, as it is not about compensatory damages, but it is about gains 
acquired at plaintiff’s expense where there is no juristic raison to keep them.  
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Illinois Brick case is considered a mirror-image of Hanover Shoe because in that case, the 
plaintiffs, represented by the State of Illinois suing on his own behalf and also on behalf 
of some 700 local governmental entities in the Chicago area, claimed overcharges in 
connection with various construction projects. The defendants, manufacturers and 
distributors of concrete blocks who were alleged to be in collusion, had sold the blocks to 
masonry contractors who submitted bids to general contractors who in turn submitted 
bids to customers such as the plaintiffs.876 The Illinois Brick’s plaintiffs were therefore 
indirect purchasers of concrete blocks, and standing in the same relation to the defendants 
as the buyers of shoes at retail stood to United Shoe Machinery Corporation in the 
Hanover Shoe case. A similar situation occurs to customers in a passing on defence in 
ultra vires tax, considered above as the ‘ultimate payers’. Therefore, the predicate of the 
Illinois Bricks suit was the passing-on of all or part of the overcharge by the direct 
purchaser. Without passing on, there could be no injury to indirect purchasers.877  
 
So, in the United States, it has long been argued that unless the system is willing to 
countenance multiple liability, the Courts cannot allow suits by indirect purchasers 
without also permitting the defendant to assert a ‘passing on’ defence against direct 
purchasers’ plaintiffs.  In Illinois Bricks itself, the Supreme Court recognised that there 
were only two ways of avoiding unacceptable multiple liabilities: (i) allow indirect 
purchasers to sue but overrule the Hanover Shoe case, or (ii) retain the Hanover Shoe 
case and preclude indirect purchasers from suing.878  
 
The difficulties raised by the Illinois Brick case, have led to various reactions to it.879  
Several States simply enacted the so-called ‘Illinois Brick Repealers’, which in many 
ways may be inconsistent with each other and make it difficult for litigators with 
                                                 
876  Illinois Bricks v Illinois 431 U.S.  720 (1977) at 726. 
877 See generally H. Hovenkamp (1990) 103 Harvard LR 1717. 
878  Illinois Bricks v Illinois 431 U.S.  720 (1977) at 736. 
879  For further reactions and detailed accounts of linked issues raised by Illinois Brick and the contention 
on the passing-on specially in antitrust law see the following literature: R. Cooter (1981) 129 U 
Pennsylvania LR 1523; SB Farmer (1999) 68 Fordham LR 361; E. Rollo (1992) 94 Western Virginia LR 
1105; R. Harris & L. Sullivan (1979) 128 U Pennsylvania LR 269; B. Sweeney (2006)  Melbourne ULR 26; 
N.R. Stoll & S. Goldfein (2006) 235 New York Law Journal – (17 January 2006) (online edition at 
www.nylj.com).; W.M. Landes & R.A. Posner (1980) 128 U Pennsylvania LR 1274; R. Collins (1984) 26 
McGill LJ 407; Note: ‘Illinois Bricks’ (1978) 39 Ohio State LJ 545. 
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plaintiffs in different States. Such a situation usually ends in multiple liability resulting in 
inefficiency in the administration of justice. The very possibility of multiple liability was 
already rejected earlier by the Supreme Court,880 but mechanisms remained in place to 
circumvent that decision due to separation of power and State autonomy in private law 
matters. From the above, it can safely be said that there is not any definitive and uniform 
position in American law in the resolution of these matters. 
 
5.6.4. Concluding Remarks. 
 
In sum, the denial of passing on defence, be it in antitrust (competition) law or in other 
private law areas, such as unjust enrichment, may allow someone who may not be injured 
(or only slightly injured) – the direct purchaser in case of antitrust, and the ‘direct payer’ 
in the general case of ultra vires tax demand – to recover damages or ‘acquire’ a gain, 
while denying the right to recover any damages to other people (indirect purchasers) in 
antitrust, or (‘ultimate payers’ – consumers/customers) in ultra vires tax demand)) who 
may have in fact been injured or suffered a loss. Succinctly stated, by denying the 
indirect purchaser the right to sue (in antitrust), and by denying the government the right 
to plead passing on in cases of ultra vires tax demands, the plaintiff (direct purchasers in 
antitrust, and ‘immediate taxpayers’ in ultra vires tax demand) receives what I have 
called a ‘judicial windfall’.  
 
In the same way that the Brazilian dilemma discussed immediately below in such 
circumstances is decided in favour of the government which is categorised as ‘bounty-
spreader’, American courts also often prefer the government to hold the ‘windfall’ in 
such cases because of the perceived government’s function of spending its income – legal 
                                                 
880  Hawaii v Standard Oil Co. 405 U.S. 251 (1972); several States enacted the so-called Illinois Bricks 
repealer Statutes. In the wake of such State Acts, the US Congress has now enacted Class Action Fairness 
Act (CAFA) 28 USC § 1711 (2005) which amends 28 USC § 1332(d). In the views of many commentators, 
CAFA has now indirectly overruled Illinois Brick. See particularly NR Stoll & S Goldfein (2006) 235 New 
York Law Journal (17 January 2006).  A direct, albeit implicit overrule of Illinois Bricks is also found now 
in California v ARC America Corp. 109 S. Ct 1661 (1989) a case in which the US Supreme Court held that 
state antitrust statutes may constitutionally grant damages to indirect purchasers –provided that the statutes 
do not deny direct purchasers their full treble damages remedy under Federal law. In essence, if the federal 
statute is viewed together with the state statutes, the logic is that passing-on has been established, albeit at 
state level only.  
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and illegal – for the public welfare. This benefactor’s view of the government gives it the 
edge over a plaintiff who will not spread his unlawful gains as broadly. This decision to 
prefer the government is ultimately based on policy considerations infused with some 
nuanced principles in the broader legal system. 
 
 
5.7. Passing on In Brazilian Law. 
 
The recovery of taxes demanded ‘ultra vires’ or through any other impropriety in the 
demand for payment by a public authority will ordinarily fall within the purview of the 
provisions on undue payments, including the more recent provisions on the general 
principle of enrichment sine causa. Where the facts of the case so justify, the provisions 
on negotiorum gestio would also be applicable.881 However, given that Brazilian law has 
a well structured codified system, and taxation is seen as a matter of public law, the 
legislature has clearly avoided some possible ambiguities arising from cross referencing 
between the general law provided for in the Civil Code and the special laws on taxation. 
Thus, the recovery of ‘improperly demanded’ taxes or any other payments demanded by 
the Revenue Services are specifically provided for in the Código Tributário Nacional882 
(Brazilian Nacional Taxation and Revenue Code of 1966).883 Thus, art.165884 of Lei 
5.172 of 1966, as amended by the aforesaid law, provides as follows:  
 
                                                 
881  See discussion of this in chapter 4 above. 
882  The description ‘Código Tributário Nacional’ (National Taxation Code)   instead of ‘Código Tributário 
Brasileiro’ (Brazilian Taxation Code ) was adopted by art. 7 of the Complementary Act 36 of 13 March 
1967.  
883  Lei (Law nº 5. 172, of 25 de October 1966, as now amended by the Complementary Law No. 118 of 9 
February 2005).  
884  The original text in Portuguese reads as follows: SECÇÃO III – Pagamento Indevido: 
Article. 165. O sujeito passivo tem direito, independentemente de prévio protesto, à restituição total ou 
parcial do tributo, seja qual for a modalidade do seu pagamento, ressalvado o disposto no § 4º do artigo 
162, nos seguintes casos: 
 I - cobrança ou pagamento espontâneo de tributo indevido ou maior que o devido em face da legislação 
tributária aplicável, ou da natureza ou circunstâncias materiais do fato gerador efetivamente ocorrido; 
 II - erro na edificação do sujeito passivo, na determinação da alíquota aplicável, no cálculo do montante do 
débito ou na elaboração ou conferência de qualquer documento relativo ao pagamento; 
 III - reforma, anulação, revogação ou rescisão de decisão condenatória. 
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Art. 165 – Save the disposition of paragraph 4 of Art. 162, the passive subject885 has the right to total or 
partial restitution of a tax in the following cases, regardless of any previous protestation and whatever 
might have been the modality of its payment:  
(i) –- the spontaneous charging or the payment of an undue tax or a levy which is higher (greater) than 
that which is due in the face of the applicable tax legislation or of the nature or material circumstances 
of the fact that effectively gave rise to what happened; 
(ii) – a mistake in the establishment ‘(edification)’ of the passive subject, in the determination of the 
applicable ‘flat tax’ [alíquota], in the calculation of the amount of the debit, or in the conferral of any 
document regarding the payment;  
(iii) – reform, annulations, revocation or rescission of a ‘condemnatory’ (penal) decision. 
The exception provided for under paragraph 4 of art. 162 above reads as follows: 
[T]he loss or destruction of the ‘revenue stamp’ [estampilha], or a mistake in the payment in this 
modality, shall not give right to restitution, save in the cases expressly envisaged in the tax legislation, 
or in cases in which the error is attributable to the administrative authority’. 
Article 166 of the National Tax Law provides further that 
‘[R]estitution of taxes that, by their nature, entail transfer of th  said financial burden shall only be 
effected to someone that proves to have undertaken the said burden, or, in the case he has transferred it 
to a third party, the transferee must expressly have authorised him to receive it.886     
 
The reading of the above provisions certainly indicates that a Public Authority (be it the 
Union itself – the Brazilian Federation - or any State or other public body, described as 
‘active subjects’ under art. 119 of the Código Tributário Nacional), cannot enrich 
themselves by improperly collected taxes, without at the same time infringing upon the 
principles of legality and probity enshrined in the law.  However, the law as set out does 
not objectively mention the situation of a taxation norm that has been declared 
unconstitutional by the Federal Supreme Court (STF). Thus one is required to make some 
inferences from the provisions themselves and interpret the text in a consistent manner 
that will maintain a logical harmony in the normative system. In this context, reading the 
                                                 
885  ‘Active subject’ and ‘Passive subject’ are defined in the law itself respectively in art. 119-120 and 121-
123. According to art. 119 ‘active subject of the obligation’ is ‘the juridical person of public law, (public 
authority) entrusted with the competency to demand its implementation’; and the ‘passive subject of the 
obligation’, according to art. 121 is defined as ‘the person obliged to pay the tax (or levy) or a pecuniary 
penalty’.  
886  The Original Portuguese text reads as follows: ‘Art. 166.  A restituição de tributos que comportem, por 
sua natureza, transferência do respective encargo financeiro somente será feita a quem prove haver 
assumido o referido encargo, ou, no caso de tê-lo transferido a terceiro, estar por este expressamente 
authorizado a recebê-la’. 
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provision of art. 168(2) which establishes a right to restitution of a payment effected due 
to a ‘unlawful decision’ which has since been reformed, annulled, revoked or rescinded, 
would seem to establish that the restitution of an ultra vires tax is of right and cannot 
ordinarily be denied.  However, one must still remember that under the Brazilian law of 
enrichment there is the requirement that the plaintiff must have suffered a loss in order to 
recover in unjust enrichment and recovery is capped with the amount lost.887 Hence, in an 
Appellate Taxation decision reported at 14.810/02/2 (the parties are described as Usina 
Açucareira Passos S/A v Evandro De Sousa/ Outros888) the court was faced with the fact 
that the applicant had effected payments of an AIR (Additional do Imposto de Renda = 
Additional Income Tax) in the period between April 1990 and April 1993, in accordance 
with a State Legislation,889 which the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court found 
unconstitutional in November 1993.890 At issue in the litigation was a claim for the undue 
payment (repetição do indébito) of the AIR made between April 1990 and April 1993. 
The claimant argued that the Federal Supreme Court decision No. 619/93 mentioned 
above was effective for all Minas Gerais taxpayers, and alleged that in the case in 
question the provisions of art. 166 of the National Tax Code were not applicable, as it had 
been found by the State’s Supreme Court of Justice (the STJ)891 because it was an 
indirect tax, therefore null and void. Because prescription was a hurdle, depending on 
how the claim was framed, the claimant argued that a prescription period of ten years, 
calculated from the date of the collection of the undue payment, applied to the facts.  It is 
to be noted that the claimant presented its restitutionary claim (AIR) to the Minas Gerais 
Taxation Authority at Passos (Administração Fazendária de Passos) on 13/07/2000, more 
than seven years later, while under art. 168 of CTN the prescription period is five years 
calculated from the date of the extinction of the tax credit (i.e.; ‘payment’). 
 
Notwithstanding the court having found that the claimant was not entitled to restitution of 
the claimed tax payment due to prescription according to art. 166 of the CTN and the 
                                                 
887  See Chapter 4 above. 
888 Acordão: 14.810/02/ (Segunda Turma); Impugnação No. 40.010101540-43 (Inscrição Estadual: 
479.089074.0018 AF/Passos State of Minas Gerais). 
889  Law 9.751/88 of the State of Minas Gerais.  
890  Decision ADIn No. 619/93 (Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF). 
891  Note for no-Brazilians:  Brazil is a Federation of States. Each State has its own Supreme Court of 
Justice (the STJ) which is different from the ‘Supremo Tribunal Federal’ (the STF).  
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Revenue Services having solely and exclusively framed their defence based on 
prescription, given the facts of the case, the court mero motu thought it necessary to 
analyse in broader sense the implications of the issues, because, as stated earlier, the 
provisions did not directly mention the effect of a Supreme Court finding a tax legislation 
to be unconstitutional.  Because art. 166 of the CTN provided that ‘[r]estitution of taxes 
that, by their nature, entail transfer of the said financial burden shall only be effected to 
someone that proves to have undertaken the said burden, or, in the case he has transferred 
it to a third party, the transferee must expressly have authorised him to receive it’,892  this 
raised the need to establish who had actually borne the burden of the said tax. In a rare 
occasion a civil law court citing both an academic and ‘precedents’ to back-up its 
reasoning, the court referred to Professor Aliomar Andrade Boleeiro893 positions on the 
theme as well as two court decisions to support its conclusion, perhaps for being aware 
that it was departing from clear provisions in the Civil and Taxation Codes. Thus the 
court894 verbatim said (my translation):  
 
On the theme, Professor Aliomar Boleeiro, cited by many other authors, says that the repercussion is 
conditioned by different variables, of which the most important are related to the tenets of offer and 
demand and to the conjectural economic circumstances so that as regards the same ‘tax’, the passing-
on of the burden may or may not happen, because it is a changing phenomenon in which the ‘de iure 
taxpayer’ (‘contribuinte de direito’)  transfers the burden to the ‘de facto taxpayer’ (‘contribuinte de 
facto’) who will ultimately support the burden of the tax’.   
 
Should the enterprise be industrial or commercial, the taxpayer (the de jure taxpayer), in the process 
of formulating its pricing policy will take into consideration the costs of the goods and the charges of 
the ‘contributors’ (the de facto taxpayers’ charges) that will be re-passed to the State’s coffers. In this 
manner, when it establishes the profit margins of its mix of products, the trader will ‘include’ in its 
                                                 
892  The Original Portuguese text reads as follows: ‘Art. 166.  A restituição de tributos que comportem, por 
sua natureza, transferência do respective encargo financeiro somente será feita a quem prove haver 
assumido o referido encargo, ou, no caso de tê-lo transferido a terceiro, estar por este expressamente 
authorizado a recebê-la’. 
893  Aliomar de Andrade Boleeiro was a Tax Law Professor who later became a member of the Brazilian 
Parliament and finally a Judge of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (STF) and its Chief Justice 
(Presidente do Supremo Tribunal) in 1971/1973. But in the judgment below he is cited more as an 
academic than as a judge, renowned books Direito Tributário Brasileiro. 10th ed.; Forense (1996) and 
Limitações Constitutionais ao Direito de Tributar 2nd ed. (1960), than as judge.  
894  Decided by a majority decision with one member (Luiz Castro Trópia) dissenting. For the majority 
were the following judges (‘Conselheiros’): Roberto Nogueira Lima (Relator), Lúcia Maria Bizzotto 
Randazzo, Luciana Mundin M Paixão, President & Revisor). 
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costs all expenses including those that will be borne in the future, because if it does not do so, it will 
leave Revenue Services [described as ‘o Caixa’] without financial support to fulfill its commercial, 
fiscal and social obligations. In this manner, and in the final analysis, it is the consumer who supports 
the entire burden (charges), and as such it is the de facto taxpayer. So, for a trader to put forward a 
restitution claim of that which he unduly paid, it will not suffice for him to prove only the ‘unlawful 
enrichment of the Revenue Services (o Fisco), but also that that fact impoverished him, or that he was 
expressly authorised to do so by the de facto taxpayer to whom he passed-on the burden.  
 
In this instance, it was not proved that the commercial practice of the applicant had exonerated its 
client from the tax burden, even if it could pay after the expiry of the accounting period.  
 
In this case it was not proved that the applicant had taken over the onus to pay AIR (Additional Tax 
Income), and the decision of the Chief Fiscal Administrative Officer of Passos (Minas Gerais) is 
upheld. In a similar factual scenario, the TJSP (Tribunal de Justiça de São Paulo) RT 638/102, TJSP 
held: ‘Denying the (passing on) but not proving it with his accounting and taxation books, the 
taxpayer establishes a positive premise – that his patrimony was affected by the tax burden – the onus 
is upon him to prove the constitutive fact of his right (art. 333 of CPC, C/C o art. 166 of CTN895). If 
he abstains from proving it, he has not made out his restitutionary action’.  
 
If any doubt subsists as to where AIR fits regarding its classification and financial support of ‘tax’ [do 
tributo] by the consumer-taxpayer it is w rth transcribing the vote (decision) of the Eminent 
‘Desembargador’ (Judge of Appeal) Rubens Xavier Ferreira in the Appeal No. 44.233/5, of TJMG 
(Tribunal de Justiça de Minas Gerais): 
 
Faced with a dilemma between enriching sine causa the Revenue Services (Treasury) by denying 
restitution of a tax which was unduly charged, and enriching the taxpayer sine causa, who did not 
suffer any decrease in his patrimony because of the illegitimate taxation, it is always preferable to opt 
for the enrichment of the Treasury, given that the business of the State has as its finality the 
satisfaction of the interest of the collectivity and constitutes, on balance, the lesser evil. It would be 
doing a lesser justice awarding him (the plaintiff) a super-profit sine causa for his own personal 
benefit rather than leave such value with the State, which presumably has already utilised it in the 
maintenance of public services and in the satisfaction of various other burdens that fall on the 
Treasury for the benefit of the collectivity.  
 
                                                 
895  Article 333 of the Código Processual Civil [Civil Procedure Code] read with Art. 166 of the Código 
Tributário Nacional  (CTN).  
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If the dilemma is to sanction the enrichment sine causa, either in favour of the State, by rejecting that 
a claim in such a case is made out or simply disallowing it, or in favour of the taxpayer, if the petition 
is allowed, there must be no hesitation that the first alternative is the one that must prevail, because 
the State represents, by definition, the collective interest, for the protection of which the sum of the 
Revenue is destined, a sum that a private individual now claims for his own personal benefit.   
 
The extract above clearly indicates the foundation and ‘logical consistency’ of the 
Brazilian enrichment law, that it requires a mirror-image loss-gain and as such it will not 
ordinarily uphold a claim for plaintiffs who suffered no loss. A passing on defence by the 
Public Authority is what is at work in this case.896 However, it is less convincing that 
such an approach fully upholds the rule of law as claimed in the same judgment. Be it as 
it may, resource and time constraints limit me to further  investigate how widespread is 
the position above and to what extent the passing-on defence is fully entrenched in the 
Brazilian legal system and what ramification it has.  
 
 
5.8. Passing on In South African Law. 
 
The defence of passing on as such is unknown in South African law.897 However, the 
principles upon which it has been advanced in other jurisdictions are not strange to the 
South African legal system. As we have seen above, the concept of passing on mainly 
arises in the tax context and to some extent in antitrust (competition) law. The ideals 
governing these bodies of law are similar to some extent to those of other jurisdictions, 
such as the rule of law or the principle of legality enshrined in the South African 
                                                 
896  In the Brazilian case above one can also see the notion sometimes prevalent in some American 
judgments that hold the idea of the ‘government as a bounty-spreader’. This idea reinforces the approach 
that the plaintiff may not recover on a ‘quid-pro-quo’ argument which holds that ‘the illegal revenues are 
(or were) actually returned to the claimant in the form of other benefits, and, therefore, the claimant has no 
reason to complain. See for example Universal Film Exchange v Board of Finance and Revenue 185 A. 2d 
542 (1962) at 548.  
897  In his recent book on the law of Unjustified Enrichment (2008) Professor D. P. Visser deals briefly with 
such notion of passing on, and questions whether South African law should consider recognizing such a 
defence (pp. 748-752). After a brief overview of other legal systems that seemed to him had such a defence, 
and considering the arguments in favour and against the defence, Visser came to the conclusion that South 
Africa should not venture into this area, even if on principle he could have sanctioned it, as the intricacies 
(or near impossibilities) of proving such defence seemed to him insurmountable. 
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Constitution (ss 1-2); the right to security of one’s property (s 25);898 the rule of law that 
entrenches the Constitution as the supreme law of the land; the rule that a right enshrined 
in the Bill of Right can only be overridden  by a law of general application (s 35); the 
duty entrusted to the courts to develop the common-law in line with Constitutional 
principles, just to cite a few examples.  In general an improperly demanded tax, either 
due to some sort of ‘indirect pressure’ exerted upon the taxpayer constrained to pay the 
tax due to some business or personal vicissitudes, or simply a tax that has been found not 
to be owing due to the illegality of the instrument upon which it was exacted, will simply 
fall under the general idea of ‘undue payment’, and in principle the condictiones are able 
to deal with such a matter, as payments made under void or non-existent agreements, 
therefore, sine causa. 
 
However, due to the specificity of the context in which they arise, it is not strange that the 
applicability of the common-law is often directly or indirectly ousted by Statutes. It is to 
be expected then that various statutes dealing with tax issues will provide a provision for 
the recovery of the money paid as tax which is not owed; and this very tendency situates 
the majority of the cases in statutory law context and ultimately it may be an issue of 
public law. For this reason, in practice, the number of claims to recover money paid as a 
tax which is not due where any principle of private-law would need to be relied upon is 
likely to be small. So too will be the number of cases in which claimants will be allowed 
to rely on their private-law right in preference to those conferred by Statute, for example, 
because they wish to take advantage of a more flexible system of rights in preference to 
those conferred by statute—such as prescription period899 or right to interest. 
Nonetheless, cases arise where ‘common law’ principles are in play. I will deal with 
some of these cases briefly. For example, similar issues mentioned above in the English 
Woolwich case arose in Eskom v Thabo Mofutanyana Districksraad900 where Eskom 
claimed back R 130 000 paid in terms of a services levy imposed by the Thabo 
                                                 
898  S 25(1) reads ‘No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and 
no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property’. 
899  See for example the approach adopted by the appellant Eskom v Bojanala Platinum District 
Municipality (2005) 4 SA 31 (SCA).  
900  Eskom v Thabo Mofutsanyana Districksraad (case no. 4184/2001) –(18 Mar 2004) – unreported case, 
but noted by  D. P. Visser in South Africa Annual Survey (2004) 280 and also noted in (2005) 13 RLR 205. 
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Mofutsanyana Districksraad (District Council). Similarly to the Woolwich factual 
scenario discussed under English law, Eskom also had doubted its liability to pay the levy 
and sought legal advice from two Senior Advocates, who unfortunately gave conflicting 
opinions. At first Eskom refused to pay and the dispute ended up in Court. While the case 
was in progress it decided to pay the amount of the levy because it would be ‘politically 
incorrect to antagonise the local authority and also to avoid penalties if the payment 
turned out to be due’.  After most of the amount had been paid to the District Council, the 
court ruled that the levy was indeed not due. Eskom meanwhile still paid R16 000 of the 
total amount after the judgment had been given, but then decided to reclaim the full 
amount, which resulted in the present case. The case is fully commented by Daniel Visser 
in (2005) 13 RLR 206 and need not be repeated here, save to acknowledge that, contrary 
to the court’s interpretation, it indeed makes sense that exacting a tax which is not owed 
does squarely fall within the meaning of property in section 25(1) of the South African 
Constitution, for as Visser argues, it would mak  no sense that the same provision 
allowed one’s house not to be expropriated by the State without compensation, but 
allowed one’s bank account to be cleared out by the authorities. There must therefore be 
uniformity on how the provisions of legislations are interpreted. For our purpose, 
however, the further issue that the case raises is indeed the ‘voluntariness of the payment’ 
and to what extent the law can allow ‘indirect coercions’ such as ‘fear of penalties’ and 
‘politically incorrectness’ as sufficient ‘coercion’ to cancel out one’s free will. In my 
view, in the absence of other policy considerations such coercions should not be 
entertained as sufficient enough to cancel the ‘voluntariness’ aspect of the payment. The 
case is of further importance because it brings out the issue as to what extent it can be 
said that South African law recognises a recoverability of ultra vires demanded taxes as 
of right. Is the right to recover a prima facie right only or is it a mandatory right? 
Discussing English law above, we have seen how the three possible approaches that 
could be followed to recover such payments, and one of which, like in South African 
law901 relied upon mistake. But ultimately, due to the constitutionality of the issue and 
the sphere upon which the matter arises, it was found that the best arena to deal with ultra 
vires demanded tax is the public law. So, based on the provision of section 32 of the 
                                                 
901  See for example Bowman, De Wet and Du Plessis NNO v Fidelity Bank Ltd (1997) 2 SA 35 (A). 
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South African Constitution it could indeed be ideal that the guarantee of the just 
administrative action provided for in that section could allow the recoverability of the 
levy which is imposed when it is not sanctioned by law and such violation of the law can 
best be remedied by allowing the citizen to recover as of right without any reference to 
error. 
 
We have also seen discussing Canadian law, that the reasoning in the recent Kinsgstreet 
Investments case led the court to depart from the proposition that ‘the law of enrichment 
is not designed to confer windfalls to plaintiffs who suffered no loss’ to the new 
proposition that the law of enrichment ‘is not concerned by the possibility of the plaintiff 
obtaining a windfall because it is not founded on the concept of compensation for loss’. 
Taking into account that South African law is one of the legal systems that supports the 
mirror image gain-loss, despite its recognizing the defence of loss of enrichment and 
geared towards the acceptance of a general principle, it can still be asked whether the 
insistence upon gain-loss does not place South African law in a better position to 
recognizing the defence of passing on, for that recognition would indeed bring some 
symmetry in the law.  So far, however, no direct case has dealt with passing on in South 
Africa, and therefore, the terrain is still open to explore.  
 
 
 
 
 
5.9. Interface Change-of-Position and Passing-on Defences. 
 
 
Change of position being a general defence to enrichment claims,902 will inevitably have 
some crossing-points with other defences that the law of enrichment recognises. In one 
sense all other defences operate as if in ‘special’ or ‘specific conditions’, while change-
of-position would analogously operate in the ‘general condition’; i.e.; it encompasses all 
sorts of enrichment claims, irrespective of the ‘condictione (or its equivalent in modern 
Codes) that raises them (or of the ‘unjust factor’ that is alleged to disapprove retention of 
                                                 
902  See chapter 3 above for details on this assertion. 
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the benefit by the defendant), being only excluded if a specific defence is available. Some 
defences will operate more in similar situations where change of position operates 
excluding some of its elements or requirements, while others will operate in very 
different and ‘specific’ circumstances.  Under this ‘analysis’ passing on seems to operate 
in ‘specific situations’ as all other defences, save change-of-position. In one sense it can 
be said that passing on is a ‘positive (or ‘affirmative’) defence’, and in another sense it 
also encompasses aspects of a ‘negative defence’. Analytically, passing on fulfills all the 
conditions of a ‘positive defence’, in that the defendant recognises that he has been 
enriched, ‘at the plaintiff’s expense’ (understood as initial expense), and that in ordinary 
circumstances the plaintiff would be entitled to recover the enrichment; but thereafter the 
defendant pleads that under the particular circumstances of the case it would be 
‘inequitable’ to grant the relief sought by the plaintiff on account f such relief infringing 
the very same principle the plaintiff invokes for his own recovery; that is to say, ‘no one 
should enrich himself at another’s expense without ‘plausible justification’’.903 
Therefore, ‘the equities being equal’ (in the sense that neither the plaintiff nor the 
defendant can succeed without infringing the very same principle), then the alleged loss, 
if any indeed exists, should lie where it currently falls. We have seen above that the 
defendant infringed such a principle by demanding the said tax-money ‘unlawfully’ 
(ultra vires) in contradiction with a general principle of law. Now the plaintiff in turn 
would be defeating the very same principle by asking the defendant to refund to him what 
in reality belongs to the customers from whom it was exacted by the plaintiff shifting his 
financial burden to them. The real impoverished party to such a claim is the customer.  
But ‘passing on’ is also a negative defence because it actually denies one of the 
enrichment claim’s essential elements – the aspect ‘at the expense of’. It is so because a 
claim in unjustified enrichment is only made out if the plaintiff can establish that the 
defendant has actually enriched himself at the claimant’s expense. If he cannot ultimately 
                                                 
903 I use the expression ‘plausible justification’ here to encompass both the positive and negative 
approaches to unjust or unjustified enrichment, for whether one speaks of ‘absence of a cause’ as a reason 
for plaintiff’s recovery or the presence of an ‘unjust factor’ depriving the defendant the right to retain the 
claimed enrichment, one is ultimately offering a ‘plausible justification’ for what it is being asked for.  
However, I do not mean that the ‘absence of cause’ or the ‘unjust factor’ requirements should be replaced 
by such expression.  It only has a descriptive function in the context of the issue I am dealing with.  
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prove such a requirement, then it can indeed be said that he hasn’t actually made out his 
claim.  
 
All these arguments apply smoothly in the event that the defendant alleges and proves 
that the claimant has fully recouped its losses, i.e.; the ‘amount’ shifted onto the 
customers corresponds exactly with the amount ‘transferred’ to the defendant. If the 
claimant alleges that it has not entirely recouped its losses and the defendant cannot 
disprove that allegation, then, another limb of the defence can develop: how to assess the 
measure of the ‘claimant’s loss’, and consequently the value of the defendant’s 
enrichment that corresponds to such a loss? One must be aware here that the law of 
enrichment in various jurisdictions is not about ‘losses’ but it is about the defendant’s 
‘gains’ acquired at plaintiff’s expense. In many jurisdictions (unlike South Africa), there 
need not be a mirror-image ‘loss-gain’, save those jurisdictions that so require to make 
out an enrichment claim. In any event, the issu s raised in such contexts and the 
reasoning advanced still have force in that in the operation of business the claimant may 
have increased the price of his products or services as part of his operating costs and not 
necessarily that all the amount that the defendant alleges that has been passed on to the 
customers is indeed what the claimant ‘recouped as his losses’. Though the assessment of 
the values in these scenarios becomes very complex and apparently impractical for the 
administration of justice, the issue may indeed raise the conundrum analogous to the one 
that historically has been raised between restoration where a non-fungible is at issue and 
the one where it is the fungible. That is so because although what was paid is money and 
money is a fungible and can be replaced by its equivalent value, that is only feasible 
when the amount has been ascertained or is readily ascertainable. If it is not, a complex 
exercise must be undertaken, and in this exercise one would have to inquire into the 
economics904 of certain products and services, the nature of the ‘commodities’, 
                                                 
904 Here one would need to know whether the product/service in question is traded in a monopoly, 
oligarchy, or a competitive market. The impact of the tax incidence in each of the three situations just 
mentioned will differ. See for example In Re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation 123 F. 
3d 599 (7th Cir. 1997). This is an antitrust case in which manufacturers and wholesalers had conspired with 
one another to deny retailers discounts available to favoured  customers. The facts illustrate what is known 
in American legal literature as the ‘exceptions to the Illinois Brick’ rule, i.e., cases in which passing on is 
permitted as a defence, because of the monopolistic position of one party, as well as the resulting problem 
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‘products’905 or ‘services’ taxed; the nature of the market906 in which those commodities, 
products or services are traded and the impact of specific taxation in that market on the 
acquisitive power of consumers and the respective loss of market shares to the 
claimant,907 which ultimately might impact on the claimant’s gains.908 In this case, we 
are really no longer in the realm of a specific thing or an ascertained or ascertainable 
value of that which has been ‘lost to the defendant’ (i.e.; gained by the defendant), but we 
enter the realm of an un-ascertained value. Because the ‘real value’ which the claimant 
alleges he has gained in these circumstances and he objectively ‘paid’ it to the defendant 
is a matter of interpretation, there is also the possibility of an interface with some 
elements of ‘loss of enrichment’ or ‘change-of-position’ defence. That is so because with 
                                                                                                                                                 
of successive monopolies, which creates a second layer of market power that in turn results in the 
possibility of differing prices at each layer. 
905  For example, when particular commodities being traded from a wholesaler to a retailer are inputs for 
intermediaries and/or final consumer goods, that can span a wide array of differentiated products; many 
parties in the economy are likely to be injured, each typically to a different extent. Some intermediaries 
may be able to pass-on all of an input price increase imposed on them, while others have to absorb the 
injury. Therefore the extent of the passing-on is determined by the nature of competition and the demand 
elasticity in the various markets in which the products or services that are the subject of the ‘inappropriate’, 
‘ultra vires’ or ‘unlawful’ taxes are traded.  Typically, in these circumstances, the more competitive a layer 
of the production-distribution chain of that product or service is, the larger is the part of the input price 
increase that is passed-on by the firms in that layer.  (See in this regard a detailed study undertaken by EU 
on ‘Damages Actions for Breach of EC Antitrust Rules’, (SEC 2005) 1732 & COM (2005) 672 Final, 
Brussels (19 December 2005). The results of the Green Paper are thoroughly discussed by Jakob 
Rüggeberg and Maarten Pieter Schinkel of the Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam Center for Law 
and Economics (Amsterdam 21 April 2006). Electronic version available at Tinbergen Institute 
www.tinbergen.nl/discussionpapers/05049.pdf  (accessed 19/02/2008). 
906 The incidence of taxation in a ‘perfectly competitive market’ will differ from that in an ‘imperfectly 
competitive market’. Using, for example, the ‘general static-equilibrium model’ (the models are described 
below) some economists have found that where there is a ‘perfectly competitive market’ the trend is for the 
producers to absorb the taxes through ‘backward shifting’ (such as replacing ‘human labor’ by machines, 
reducing workers’ income, etc, or simply put, the burden of taxes tends to fall on factors that are relatively 
immobile), but where there is an ‘imperfectly competitive market’, the trend is ‘forward shifting’, i.e.; the 
taxes are mostly passed on to consumers in higher prices (see M.L. Katz and H. S. Rosen ‘Tax Analysis in 
Oligopoly Model’ (1985) 13 Public Finances Quarterly 3-19). In this case if there is a ‘backward shifting’, 
the claimant might have recouped some of his losses through savings, for example on labour, as he might 
have paid less income to workers, or retrenched some, saving costs, by opting for capital intensive business 
(machines, instead of labour), but he may also have incurred losses affecting the output of the business.  
907  The basic issue here is that taxation induces changes in individuals and businesses’ behaviour. The 
associated changes in commodity prices and factor returns ordinarily imply that the final burden or 
‘economic incidence’ of a tax will be different from its ‘statutory incidence’, that is to say, a tax may be 
partially or fully ‘shifted’ from one set of economic agents to another. In economic circles business taxes, 
for example, are a frequently cited example, as they may be either ‘shifted forward’ as higher consumer 
prices, or ‘shifted backward’ as lower wages or land, smaller buildings, etc. 
908  Further below I offer some simplified economic implications of this issues. 
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the ‘defence of change of position the defendant is no longer required to make restitution 
when his assets are no longer swollen by the benefit received’.909  
 
When the claimant objects that he did not fully pass on the cost of the inappropriate tax 
through price increase, but alleges that its business was affected either through the costs, 
say, of inputs, or that the level of its output had to be adjusted due to the impact of the 
price increase in the market or other factors, then, the practical issue becomes that of 
estimating or calculating the elasticities910 of supply and demand of that product or 
service in the market. Today’s advanced econometrics in conjunction with related 
disciplines can certainly estimate with near mathematical precision the results, though all 
of it may depend, inter alia, on the strength of the economic assumptions made and the 
availability of data or its collection in the relevant market or industry. However, despite 
the help of advanced and sophisticated econometrics modelling, economists still disagree 
on the route to follow in calculating such elasticities. They seem to agree only on the 
difficulties of the task. They usually estimate the different values of elasticities in relation 
to the supply and demand, the price and other variables to determine what exactly was 
passed-on and what was not, and if anything was passed-on at what stage, how and why. 
Hence, if a legal system ventures in accepting the passing-on defence, but in a given case 
the extent of such passing on is disputed, it is almost certain that the success of the 
defence will require gathering such complex evidence and the litigants must face the 
inherent difficulties in the process. Among the various difficulties that are likely to be 
encountered, the following merit some attention and description: (i) Although it is 
                                                 
909  M. Rush, The Defence of Passing on (2006) 180. 
910  Elasticity is understood as the measure of the responsiveness of one variable to changes in another. 
Economists have identified four main types of elasticity: price elasticity, income elasticity, cross-elasticity 
and elasticity of substitution. Price elasticity measures how much the quantity of supply of a good, or 
demand for it, changes if its price changes. If the percentage change in quantity is more than the percentage 
change in price, the good is said to be price elastic; if it is less, the good is said to be price inelastic. Income 
elasticity of demand measures how the quantity demanded changes when income increases. Cross-elasticity 
shows how the demand for one good (for example, coffee) changes when the price of another good (for 
example, tea) changes. If the said goods can substitute each other (such as coffee and tea) the cross-
elasticity will be positive: an increase in the price of tea will increase demand for coffee. If the said goods 
are complementary (example, tea and teapots) the cross elasticity will be negative. If the said goods are 
unrelated (for example tea and oil) the cross-elasticity will be zero.  Elasticity of substitution describes how 
easily one input in the production process, such as labour, can be substituted for another, such as 
machinery. (for explanation of these and other terms, see amongst others, The Economist, whose electronic 
version on the issue is made available at 
 http://www.economist.com/research/Economics/alphabetic.cfm?terms/ (last retrieved 15 June 2008) 
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possible to estimate with fair degree of precision either the demand or supply elasticity 
for a certain product or service, it is exceedingly difficult to estimate both 
simultaneously, say the economists.911 That is so because demand estimation is normally 
facilitated when such demand is relatively constant, but supply is shifting (increasing or 
deceasing), so that the interaction between the different supply patterns and the constant 
demand pattern enables the value of the demand to be established precisely.912 However, 
given that in this instance the supply is also shifting, the estimation of the precise pattern, 
and consequently the precise value of the amount passed-on becomes difficult. 
Conversely, where supply is constant, but demand is shifting, the estimation of the supply 
pattern is facilitated because the intersections between the supply pattern and the different 
demand patterns enable the values along the supply curve to be determined precisely. 
But, again, the estimation of the demand in turn becomes difficult. Consequently, because 
of these difficulties, economists are generally agreed that in these circumstances, trying to 
identify both supply and demand patterns is often a statistical nightmare913 and the 
outcome may be an unwarranted result. (ii) There will be a time lag between the moment 
the inappropriate tax is imposed and the time it is discovered and the claim instituted. 
Because of such lag of time, it is almost certain that there will be variations and 
fluctuations at certain periods in the demand and supply patterns and therefore the 
                                                 
911  W.M. Landes & R.A. Posner (1979) 46 U Chicago LR 602, 618-619. 
912  Ibid. 
913  According to G. R. Zodrow, ‘Tax Incidence’ in Encyclopedia of Taxation and Tax Policy, 1st Ed. 
(1999) 200-202), financial economists have constantly used in the past decades three basic approaches to 
analyzing tax incidence, namely ‘partial equilibrium analysis’, ‘static general-equilibrium analysis’ and 
‘dynamic general equilibrium analysis’. The first and the most widely used analyses the effects of taxes in a 
theoretical model of the economy, but it markedly differs with the other two approaches in various aspects, 
such as the number of markets analysed, the extent to which the factor supplies are assumed to be fixed, the 
method of capital accumulation, and the extent to which transitional issues are addressed. The second 
approach is still a bit closely related to the first because it involves numerical simulations of tax effects in 
models that are basically complex variants of the analytical models. The third approach calculates 
incidence by estimating individual tax burdens directly using large micro-data sets. Analyzing in further 
detail the ‘partial-equilibrium analytical model’, for example, and applying it to a single market (in this 
case the assumption was to ignore any tax induced effects in other markets) the writer observes that the 
results demonstrate that ‘incidence is determined primarily by the extent to which individuals or firms are 
able to change their behavior to avoid the tax. This flexibility is typically measured by price elasticities of 
demand and supply’. By way of example he illustrates that ‘the burden of an excise tax tends to be borne by 
consumers if demand is relatively inelastic - that is, if consumers are unable to substitute away from 
consumption of the taxed good; by comparison, the burden of an excise tax tends to be borne by producers 
if supply is fairly inelastic’. In limited cases, ‘the tax is borne fully by a single group; for example when the 
demand is perfectly inelastic or supply is perfectly elastic (as is the case with constant return to scale in 
production [i.e. mass production], consumers bear the entire burden of the excise tax.’ The article is also 
available online at http://urban.org/uploadedPDF/1000534.pdf (Last accessed 11 July 2008). 
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elasticity values of these variables will also yield different passing on values depending 
on the extent of those changes, because elasticity may depend on the amount of time 
buyers and sellers have in which to adjust to the price change. (iii) When there is only 
one class of product or service traded, only two elasticity estimates are required. Thus, 
statistical problems multiply as the class of products or services lengthens.  
 
Despite these real and apparently insurmountable difficulties, the calculation of the extent 
of passing on is not necessarily murkier in all aspects and the difficulties should not be 
overstated. Many sectors of the economy already use what is known as ‘percentage mark-
up pricing’.914 In cases arising from transactions involving this form of pricing, proof of 
passing on involves simply the computation of the elevation in prices caused by one 
level’s application of the percentage mark-up to increase costs stemming from the 
previous level of overcharge.915 Furthermore, in the same way that in some complex 
cases the apportionment of damages is accomplish d, the same can also be achieved in 
the case of passing on defence in unjustified enrichment. For example, in some American 
antitrust cases this has been achieved.916 Where for instance the only claimants suing are 
businesses, courts there have used the so called ‘yardstick’ technique to determining 
damages suffered. This technique compares the plaintiff’s allegedly reduced profit level 
with those of unaffected but otherwise comparable firms in the same industry.917  There 
is equally another alternative technique that has been applied in cases of passing on 
                                                 
914  Mark-up pricing is one of the several different policies companies use to price their products. They do it 
by calculating the cost per unit of output, to which they add a profit margin, or a ‘price mark-up’ to 
determine the final price of their product. The cost per unit is the variable ‘production’ and marketing cost 
per unit of output plus the average overhead cost. Then, the final price is determined by adding a certain 
percentage margin to the unit cost. (See generally R. E. McAuliffe, The Blackwell Encyclopaedia 
Dictionary of Managerial Economics, 2nd Ed. (2006) 125. See also J. Federkea et al, in South Africa at 
http://www.commerce.uct.ac.za/Economics/staff/jfedderkea/Documents/2006/markup14jae2_v3.pdf. 
The price mark-up is usually expressed as the difference between the final price and the marginal cost of 
production, as a percentage of either the price or the marginal cost. In this situation, the marginal cost 
represents the per unit cost of production. The former method gives the ‘mark-up’ on price, while the latter 
gives the mark-up on costs. Thus, for example, if P represents the final price of the product, and MC its 
marginal cost, then the ‘mark-up’ on price equals P MCP
− P MC
MC
− .  and the ‘mark-up’ on cost is
915  D. Berger & R. Bernstein (1977) 86 Yale LJ 809, 862 note 238. 
916  See for example Lehrman v Gulf Oil Corp.500 F.2d 659, 667 (5th Circ. 1974), cert. denied 420 U.S. 925 
(1975); Pacific Coast Agr. Export v Association v Sunkist Growers, Inc. 526 F.2d 1196, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 
1975), cert. denied 425 U.S. 959 (1976).   
917  See for example Richfield Oil Corp. v Karseal Corp, see 361 US 901(1960). In this case for example, 
the court carried out the determination of volume reduction due to price increase as it was necessary to 
compute the intermediate purchaser’s profit losses. 
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defence, where essentially all businesses in the industry have been affected. It compares 
the ‘pré-violation’ and ‘post violation’ profit levels for each level of business purchasers. 
Both of these techniques reveal how much of an alleged overcharge is absorbed at each 
intermediate level in the chain of distribution, thereby preventing ‘duplicative’ 
recoveries. 
 
If non-business levels, such as ultimate consumers, also sue, the ‘yardstick’ and the ‘pré-
violation and post-violation’ techniques will also remain useful. The damage suffered by 
ultimate consumers is at least the amount of the initial overcharge that is not absorbed by 
intermediate levels in the form of diminished profits (the same techniques, applied to the 
defendant’s prices, can be employed to estimate the initial overcharge).918  With this 
technique, it is thus possible to calculate whether ultimate consumers did suffer 
‘damages’ in excess of the absorbed portion of the initial overcharge if the defendants or 
intermediate purchasers used a ‘percentage mark-up’ system, which magnifies the 
overcharge at subsequent purchaser levels.919  
 
The right to recover tax-money paid under ultra vires demand is also a prima facie right 
only, because it is partly premised on the rationale of good governance. Though by 
holding that such a right is only ‘prima facie’ one is not necessarily saying that the right 
must by its nature be absolute, what however transpires from labelling or treating a right 
as ‘prima facie only’ is its susceptibility to being an interest that can be overridden by 
indeterminate policy considerations.920 And such susceptibility to be overridden by 
policy considerations brings that right within the sphere of those rights that usually 
resemble a legitimate expectation. And if a ‘right’ is treated like a legitimate expectation, 
the weight that the courts will attach to such ‘legitimate expectation’ will vary with the 
context.921 Non-fundamental rights are often specifically designed to be rather vague, 
precisely so that courts can engage in a ‘balancing exercise’ between the individual right 
                                                 
918  D. Berger & R. Bernstein (1977) 86 Yale LJ 809, 862 and 877-878.  
919  Ibid 878.  
920  J. Adler (2002) 22 Legal Studies 165, 168-170. 
921  J. Adler (2002) 22 Legal Studies 165, 168. 
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and the broader public interest.922 This indeed is what is observed in a considerable 
number of American cases that have applied a passing on defence or similar fact 
scenarios where objectively the private law right to restitution is either directly or 
indirectly ousted by a legislative provision in the court’s interpretation and adjudication 
of the facts.923  
 
The defence of change of position however is also distinguishable from the defence of 
passing on (when this is available in a legal system) in at least two further aspects, though 
both defences share one thing in common, that is to say, they are both concerned with 
events causally related to the defendant’s gain.924 The first aspect distinguishing them is 
related to the point of focalization in the claim itself. While change of position focuses on 
the defendant’s enrichment (gains received), passing on focuses on the claimant’s loss 
(detriment or injury suffered). When change of position is established, the defendant is 
not required to restore the enrichment received if his assets are no longer swollen by the 
said benefit. By contrast, the defence of passing on is directed at ensuring that the 
claimant is only awarded restitution when he has suffered a corresponding loss. Thus, 
where the conception of the unjust enrichment doctrine encapsulates a mirror-image loss-
gain requirement, passing on defence has greater chances of recognition and a fertile 
ground for development than in a legal system that does not require such mirror-image 
between gain-loss. 
 
The second aspect differentiating these defences is the fact that change of position is 
mostly concerned with security of receipt, an ideal that ensures that the defendant be able 
to freely deal with what he considers as his own wealth without fears of being put in a 
situation to continuously guard against the danger of unexpected unjust enrichment 
                                                 
922  See for example the analysis of ‘Non-absolute fundamental rights’ in the context of European 
Community Law by C. Hilson (2004) 29 European LR 636, 640. For the author, ‘when a right is classified 
by its nature as fundamental, it can be argued not only for the broad interpretation of the initial or prima 
facie right, but also for a narrow interpretation of the exception to that right’. Thus, explains the writer, that 
ordinarily exceptions to a right must be interpreted restrictively.  
923  See for example what D. P. Visser says of South African law discussed above in (2004) Annual Survey 
of South African Law 280-283;  (2005)  RLR 205. 
924  M. Rush, The Defence of Passing on (2006) 179. 
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claims.925  In the case of passing on, however, there is no such concern. The concern in 
the change-of-position defence to secure the security of receipt is a matter of both 
principle and of wealth maximization. It is a matter of principle, because it prevents the 
defendant from indemnifying himself at the expense of, or to the detriment of, an 
innocent defendant.926 And it is a matter of wealth maximization because if receipts were 
not secure, there would be a need to forsake potential investment opportunities of one’s 
wealth by setting up contingency insurance plans against the continuous risks of unjust 
enrichment suits, thereby sterilising one’s wealth.927  In the case of passing on defence, 
however, such a concern does not really apply, because the claimant receives nothing and 
for that reason, the law does not have anything to protect.928 For this reason, Rush for 
example, thinks that passing on has actually the potential to stifle economic activity and 
promote misallocation of resources. The same reasoning on stifling economic activities 
seems also to be supported by some EU commentators, such as Graig & de Burca929 who 
address the defence of passing on mostly in antitrust (competition) context and in the 
context of analyzing the implications of the Irks-Arkady cases decided under Art. 288 of 
the EC Treaty.  
 
This analysis shows us once again that it is very important to consider in unjustified 
enrichment doctrine, the way the enrichment came about, as advanced by Flume long 
ago.930 The way the enrichment came about, not only may have a say how the enrichment 
liability is calculated and its extent, but also whether there can be a claim at all, and if 
there is one, how can a defendant safeguard his interests in defending himself. 
 
 
5.10. Conclusion. 
 
 
                                                 
925  P. B. H. Birks, Unjust Enrichment 2nd Ed. (2005);  M. Rush, The Defence of Passing on (2006) 170. 
926  W. A. Keener,  A Treatise on the Law of Quasi-Contract (1893); Restatement (First) of Restitution 
(1937) § 142. 
927  M. Rush, The Defence of Passing on (2006) 171. 
928  For more details on this position see again M. Rush, The Defence of Passing on (2006) 180. 
929  Graig & de Burca, European Union Law (2003) 571. The Irks Arkady v Council Commission (case No. 
238/78, 1979 ECR 2955) cases are also known as part of the Quellmehl group of cases cited earlier. 
930  W. Flume ‘Der Wegfall der Bereicherung…’ (1953) 103. 
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It has been noted earlier in this study that the defence of change of position has two 
versions: the ‘reliance version’ and the ‘disaster version’. On the reliance version, as 
explained in chapter 1 and 3, the defendant is absolved in full or in part from liability in 
restoring the benefit received at the expense of another, because on the faith of receipt he 
has disposed of that benefit in the belief that it was his own; on the ‘disaster version’, the 
defendant is absolved from the obligation because the benefit received has been lost in 
circumstances in which he is not to blame,931 regardless whether it was received in good 
faith or in bad faith. In both versions, requiring him to ‘disgorge the benefit received, 
which no longer exists, would be equivalent to seeing him as the insurer of the 
plaintiff’932 and expecting him to ‘deplete his own assets which are no longer, or have not 
been swollen, by the defendant’s wealth, and such fact would be utterly inequitable.  
      
If these considerations are applied to ‘public authorities’ in the context of ‘improperly’ 
charged taxes, for example, the reliance version would prima facie be often easily 
satisfied, because in the ordinary course of events, the defendant (public authority), is 
expected to disburse the tax-money collected in public projects, and by so doing, it can 
analogously be said that it indeed disposed of the assets in good faith in the assumption 
that it were its own assets. The problem, however, is with the other element of the 
change-of-position doctrine, viz, the so called ‘but for requirement’. Change of position 
is only available in the reliance version to a defendant who can establish that ‘but for the 
receipt’ he would not have undertaken the action or activity in which he spent the benefit 
(usually money).  Can the State/Government (or other public authority) prove that but for 
the receipt of the ‘inappropriate tax-money’ it would not have undertaken the said public 
projects? Any citizen expects public authorities to undertake public projects, and for that 
                                                 
931  D. P. Visser (2008) 718 analyzing German law describes also two versions of the defence there. Citing 
Schulze et al, BGB Handkommentar § 818 marginal note 10, he notes that one version of loss of 
enrichment is ‘an enrichment falling away without a substitute’ [‘Bereicherung die ersatzlos wegfallen’], 
while the other ‘loss of enrichment constituted by detrimental side-effects’ entails mostly ‘expenditure in 
respect of that which had been received – such as the fact that the enrichment-debtor paid freight costs, or 
taxes, or storage fees, or the costs of repair of a thing which had been obtained without a legal ground’. 
This second aspect is essentially the reliance version I have been referring to, though there are some 
nuanced differences, and the first may essentially correspond to the ‘disaster version’. The ‘uneconomical 
use of a benefit’ which is a further way an enrichment can be lost (as provided for by T. Krebs (2001) 281, 
is essentially a ‘disaster version’ of the defence on my analysis.  
932 L.D. Smith (2001) 79 Texas LR 2115, 2149. 
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reason taxes are paid. It is a primary duty of public authorities to undertake public 
projects. It can, however, be argued that Governments (public authorities) envisage 
realizing their projects on ‘budgetary projections’ (i.e. according to what they think they 
will be able to ‘collect’ from taxpayers and other ventures) and not necessarily with 
reserve funds already in their pockets. Therefore, if such projections could only be made 
because the government relied on the sources of the funds (including the challenged 
source) then, this could qualify as the ‘but for’ requirement’. If the government had then 
known that the resources it had projected (and collected) in good faith could latter 
become the subject of an unjust enrichment claim, it could not have projected and spent 
the money as it did. Therefore it is entitled to the defence of change of position on this 
ground.  
 
In reply to this contention one could say that because of the attempt to rely on the ‘illegal 
instrument’ (ultra vires legislation), the claim would be automatically invalidated. So, 
too, if the claim could be barred because of the illegality, so too the defence should have 
the same fate. In other words, there is no causa retinendi, and therefore the defence is 
inapplicable. Seen simply from the perspective of the condictiones this is a simple case of 
a condictio ob causam finitam. 
 
On the other hand, if the benefit received has been lost due to a disaster, such as a ‘drastic 
and unexpected and unpredictable economic disaster’, or where the benefit received was 
money and there has been a sudden and uncontrollable inflation of the currency, which 
has wiped out both private and state’s wealth, and such a situation does not depend on the 
local authorities, in principle, the defence could be available to the state. Of cause in 
these circumstances, the state could pre-empt the institution of any such a claim by 
enacting a special statute or simply by declaring a state of emergency, suspending most 
of private rights. But assuming that the state does not reach such a stage, it could still 
successfully argue, in my view, a defence of change of position, which is viable both in 
principle and on policy grounds. 
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Can the government argue that it was undertaking the special project because it expected 
to receive from its ‘budgetary projection’ the specific money from the claimant, or was it 
expecting to receive it from the general pool of taxpayers? 
 
Obviously, if the plaintiff be a very large corporation or a conglomerate of corporations, 
there may be some merits in this argument, for the contributions of a large corporation 
may amount to millions if not billions of Rand (or dollars). For that very fact it is 
reasonable for the government in its general accounting books to expect a substantial 
contribution from that corporation or conglomerate of corporations, and can envisage a 
special project in the expectation of that substantial contribution. To illustrate this point, 
let me consider the ZARAS scenario given at the beginning of the chapter. The simple 
mathematics tells us that it was almost certain that the Government relying on the 25 
cents of a Rand and knowing the normal behaviour and drinking needs of its population, 
would be able to collect both the R 390 millions from the beer industries and the R 1,950 
billion from the soft drink industries. It is not also unreasonable to think that it could set 
up a special account for those amounts. With this example is it then unreasonable to think 
that the authorities could have envisaged spending, and did in fact spend, say, the exact R 
1,950 billion in the construction of a public road in reliance on that fact they money was 
theirs, or expected to be theirs and undertook the project before it was discovered that the 
regulations were invalid?   
 
Though the argument may seem attractive and forceful, the difficult, however, of 
accepting such argument is that when the government collects tax money it first goes to a 
‘pooled fund account’, regardless how many accounts the government opens for 
practicality reasons, and from the ‘pooled account’ the government made (or envisaged) 
its projections based on the total sum in it (or the expected total sum to be in it). So, it is 
incredibly difficult (if not directly impossible) to prove with substantial detachment that a 
specific sum of money expected from one taxpayer is the one that was destined to and 
used in that particular project. Therefore, given such near impossibility of establishing the 
‘but for’ requirement, the defence of change of position should not be available to a 
public body.  
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Having concluded that change-of-position should not be available to public authorities, 
does that mean that in order to maintain symmetry in the system should equally the 
defence of passing on be made automatically unavailable to public authorities as well?  
We saw above that these defences respond to different policy considerations. One is 
concerned with ensuring security of receipt and focus on the gain acquired, while the 
other is intended, when it is accepted, to thwart the possibility of the ‘unjust enrichment’ 
of the plaintiff at its customer’s expense. Though the dictates of one are not necessarily 
the same as those of the other, it may make sense to require such symmetry. But the 
example given at the beginning shows, and many other jurisdictions do attest, that should 
the passing-on defence be denied on principle, the legislature may act quickly to pass a 
statute enacting the defence through legislation. In sum, passing on can be ruled out only 
if there are sound policy considerations to do so. It is defensible in principle, though the 
practicalities might complicate its application. 
 
 
 
5.11. Should South Africa Venture into the Passing-on Forest? 
5.11.1. The Emerging View. 
 
Discussing the South African approach above, it is clear that the country does not yet 
have an ‘official pro ouncement’ as to whether to sanction or reject passing on in its 
unjustified enrichment law. All that can really be said is that looking at how the field is 
conceived the ground could indeed be fertile for such sanctioning. The system requires a 
mirror-image ‘gain-loss’ and that is one of the strongest arguments in passing on issues. 
Mention, however, was already made that Visser in his recent book explored slightly the 
waters, and advanced what I would call a preliminary view,933 which may eventually take 
hold in the country or be refined as other theorists and the courts confront the 
                                                 
933 I opt calling it a preliminary view because if one looks at, and compares the detailed discussions of other 
defences in the book and other writings of the author, and the bird-eye-view devoted to passing on, the 
imbalance indicates that the author did not explore several contours of the defence, but might do so in the 
future and eventually refine the preliminary view. 
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practicalities of the issue. Thus far, that proposition is essentially a ‘no defence’ 
approach, save where it is sanctioned by legislation. 
 
In Visser’s preliminary view, South African law should not venture into a passing on 
defence due to the complexities inherent in proving its extent.934 In the light of the 
detailed discussion above that highlighted such complexities, it is fully reasonable to give 
credit to the ‘no defence’ view in order to spare the courts the nightmare of venturing into 
the thick forest of econometrics and statistical evidence chiefly based on economic 
assumptions and estimates. The ‘no defence’ view would also be supported by the 
following additional arguments: (i) Allowing passing on defence in any fashion would 
directly or indirectly undermine the rule of law (or the principle of legality). It does so 
directly because where ‘illegality’ has been sufficiently proved, the government is 
nonetheless allowed to get away with it.935 It does undermine it indirectly because by 
allowing the government to plead passing on the system is incidentally discouraging 
claimants with genuine cases, or who sufficiently know of the government’s 
‘impropriety’ in imposing taxes or other ‘misconducts’ from bringing actions against the 
government. They are discouraged because by knowing that they might be overwhelmed 
with the evidentiary burden of disproving passing on in their business operations. In this 
sense, the rule of law is undermined as the system takes away or dilutes the right of the 
citizen to challenge government misconduct by imposing on him a burden of proof that 
might be complex and costly. (ii) Passing on should also be rejected for its inherent 
tendency to put excessive strains in the judicial system by trying to reconstruct ‘price and 
output decisions’ in the courtroom.  
 
In spite of the above propositions, almost all proponents of ‘no defence’ argument agree 
that, in principle, the defence is ‘sound’ and logical, discarding it only for policy 
considerations.936 As a result what the conventional wisdom really advocates is letting 
                                                 
934 D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 752. 
935 D. Berger & R. Bergstein (1977) 86 Yale LJ 556 note 222. 
936 D. P. Visser agreeing with McInnes on this point puts this way: ‘the notion that an action based on 
unjustified enrichment should not be used to enrich the plaintiff is one which no-one would oppose in 
principle…but the logistics of giving effect to that idea through the defence of passing on would be just to 
much’ (D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 752); M. McInnes 1997 19 Sydney LR 179 at 199. 
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things be simple and expeditious. Is it then a sound policy for a legal system to 
completely give up a principle it recognises to be defensible merely because of the 
complexities of proof? Are such complexities insurmountable in any and every case that 
may raise a passing on situation? 
 
The main policy being protected with the ‘no defence’ view, however, seems to me to be 
chiefly the administrative convenience of simplicity and expediency, apart from what 
along the discussion was termed as ‘the principle of legality’ or, put in other words, the 
policy of divesting illegal taxes to safeguard the rule of law. I fully agree that this 
approach accords rationality in the decision making process, and ‘if tax-refunds are to be 
restricted to those who ‘bear the burden of the tax’, then perhaps the legislature, rather 
than courts or academics, are the proper source of such rules937 and that the private law of 
unjustified enrichment might be ill-equipped to absorb the complexity necessary for such 
decision making. However, let us not lose sight of one thing: the problem with the ‘no 
defence’ approach is in its very simplicity, especially in tax matters. The ‘no defence’ 
approach seems to overlook or underrate a legitimate view expressed in any fiscal 
legislation that a tax refund should not overcompensate plaintiffs; or in other words, it 
should not enrich them at the expense of innocent taxpayers. Furthermore, the ‘no 
defence’ approach in tax area does not capture the full complexity and subtleties that may 
lie beneath decisions in this area938 as it may lack the flexibility to operate across a range 
of cases in unjustified enrichment in which courts might encounter a passing on defence. 
That being the case, is there any way out that might capture those subtleties and deal with 
the complexity without destroying the rationality, predictability and certainty of the 
decisions that the ‘no defence’ approach safeguards? 
 
5.11.2. An Exploratory Road-Map to a Qualified Passing-on Defence. 
 
                                                 
937  W.J. Woodward (1985) 39 U Miami LR 873, 930; B Alarie, ‘Kingstreet Investments: Taking a Pass on 
the Defence of Passing on’ at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cmf?abstract_ID1023789. 
938  W.J. Woodward (1985) 39 U Miami LR 873, 930. 
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To answer the questions above we may need to draw some lessons from competition 
(antitrust) law, as the situations leading to possible passing on in unjustified enrichment 
are to some extent similar or analogous to those arising under competition law, namely 
the allegations of ‘price-increase’, ‘shifting fully or partially the burden of a price-
increase’, using ‘control-mechanisms’ such as ‘increasing outputs’ or ‘decreasing input-
costs’, ‘using substitutes’, etc. 
 
Though the task of proving passing on is difficult and complex as acknowledged by 
economists, the difficulties should not be overstated. It is plain that in real life not all 
situations in which passing on is at issue present similar fact-patterns. For this reason the 
difficulties can be qualified and in appropriate cases may even be ‘discounted’. That is so 
because in various circumstances in which the claimant will challenge the extent of 
passing on, he will likely do so by alleging that it lost profits as a result of the imposition 
of the inappropriate tax. If that is the case, then, one must consider the claimant’s pricing 
methods939 in the operation of its business, as well as the following other scenarios:  
 
First, one must recognise that in estimating the ‘extent of the lost profits’, the lost profits 
are equal to the difference between the profits actually earned and the profits that would 
have been earned ‘but for’ the imposition of the inappropriate tax.940  
 
Secondly, where the alleged ‘inappropriate’ tax was by its nature supposed to have been 
absorbed by the claimant and not to be passed-on to consumers, but the claimant 
nevertheless overcharged them, such consumers as ultimate taxpayers may have paid in 
excess of the unabsorbed portion of the initial value of the inappropriate tax if the 
claimant used a percentage mark-up pricing system which magnified the said tax to the 
ultimate consumers.941 In such cases, allowing an unqualified tax recovery has the 
potential to render the award duplicative, because the claimant may be seeking to recover 
from an ‘loss’ (or an injury) actually fully borne by another person, that is to say, it might 
                                                 
939  The discussion on pricing methods amenable to passing on was described above. It is the mark-up 
pricing, which various industries routinely use. (See note 877 above and accompanying text). 
940  R. D. Blair & J. L. Harrison (1999) 68 George Washington LR 1, 36-38. 
941  D. Berger & R. Bergstein (1977) 86 Yale LJ 862. 
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have recouped fully its losses either through ‘backward-shifting’ or ‘forward-shifting’, 
and now wants to recover them again from the government by an enrichment action. So, 
disallowing passing on defence to the government, it opens the doors to claimants being 
ingeniously awarded duplicative recoveries.  
 
Thirdly, in most (if not all) cases, in which the claimant might dispute the extent of 
passing on, what will come to the fore is, in effect, a situation akin to apportionment of 
damages. For the claimant to prove its part of ‘losses suffered’ it must produce evidence 
of such loss or ‘injury’ to the business due to the imposition of the tax. Such evidence 
must reasonably be clear or reasonably inferred, even if based on estimates. That is so 
because a reasonable inference differs from mere speculation. Admissible damage 
estimates must be more than a stab in the dark. That onus befalls upon the claimant as it 
is the only party in a position to do so.942 Lost profits (or damage) estimates will be 
deemed insufficient as a matter of law, and therefor  inadmissible, if they are the product 
of mere speculation and guesswork.943 Because judges cannot be asked to speculate, 
insufficient ‘damage/ ‘injury’ evidence cannot be put before the judge.  
 
                                                 
942 See McKesson v Division of Alcoholic Beverages 496 U.S. 18, 31;110 L.Ed 2d 17 (1990) at 43. 
‘Because it is the taxpayer and not the [Revenue] Commissioner, that understands the intricacies of the 
taxpayer’s industry and is in possession of the sales data to establish such a thing as pass through and 
diminished market share’. In the same vein, Judge Neel of the Supreme Court of West Virginia, in State of 
West Virginia (Dept of Tax & Revenue v Exxon Corporation [(1993) case No. 21573 – January 1993 
Term], granting a writ of prohibition in favour of the State in similar situation, had this to say:  ‘West 
Virginia will compensate taxpayers only for the amount of the tax they absorbed and did not pass through 
to consumers and for any loss of market share attributable to the unconstitutional tax. Claimants should be 
prepared to furnish this kind of information in order to show the amount of the unconstitutional tax they 
absorbed and the market share they lost as a result of unconstitutional tax. The amount of tax absorbed is 
determined by a Tax Incidence Analysis. The focus of this analysis is the relationship between the elasticity 
of demand and the elasticity of supply as well as the relationship among input costs, revenues, taxes and 
product prices’. In this case, the State had sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the Circuit Court of 
Kanawha County from entertaining a declaratory judgment action to settle a dispute between Exxon and the 
Tax Department. Exxon asked the Circuit Court to declare ‘Administrative Notice 91-15’, which described 
the procedure that Exxon had to follow to obtain tax-refund, unconstitutional, because the US Supreme 
Court had already held that States in case of tax-refunds had to afford claimant a meaningful relief, which 
entailed paying the unconstitutional tax retroactively. 
943  For example, in a similar fact scenario other American cases such as Home Placements Service Inc v 
Providence Journal Co 819 F. 2d 1199, 1205 (First Cir. 1987) have found that ‘damages awarded 
according to the lost-profit measure’ are inappropriate where the plaintiff ‘has introduced no evidence 
tending to establish comparability between its own business and other companies engaged in similar 
business pursuits’.  
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Fourthly, one should also recognise that the difficulties of estimating lost profits (or other 
variables) are no worse than those associated with estimating overcharge. For the later, 
one must establish the price actually paid, which is usually available from normal 
business records.944 This actual price is compared to the price that would have been paid 
‘but for ‘the ‘imposition of the inappropriate tax’ – the same way that it happens in 
competition law for the ‘price-fixing’ claims.945 The ‘but for’ price is the price that 
unimpeded forces of supply and demand would have produced. One must however admit 
here, as it was explained already elsewhere, that to achieve a satisfactory result, the 
estimation must take into account a variety of economic and ‘demographic’946 factors 
that influence supply and demand. This effort is not apt to be completely successful and 
therefore, some degree of imprecision will infect the estimation of the ‘but for’ price.  
 
Fifthly, to avoid having a ‘damage’/’injury’ estimate characterised as speculative, certain 
steps must be taken. For one thing, a plaintiff claiming lost profits during the alleged 
‘damage period’ should have a history of profitable operations in the past. In estimating 
what the profits would have been ‘but for’ the tax imposition (like in an antitrust 
violation), the plaintiff must consider other factors that would have influenced the profits 
during the ‘damage period’. Some factors – growth, enhanced efficiencies, and reduction 
in competition – may have caused profits to rise, while other factors – such as increased 
costs, increased competition, regulatory changes – may have caused profits to fall.947 
Accounting for every potential influence may not be possible, but the most important 
components should be examined. 
 
These suggestions may seem too technical, adding further complexity and not helping at 
all to simplify the administration of justice in such cases, especially where expediency in 
                                                 
944  For a recent mark-up pricing study in South African industrial context see J. Fedderkea et al (2007) 16 
African Journal of Economics 28-69. A similar publication is also available at this site: 
http://www.commerce.uct.ac.za/Economics/staff/jfedderkea/Documents/2006/markup14jae2_v3.pdf. 
945  R.D. Blair & J.L. Harrison, (1999) 68 George Washington LR 1, 38. 
946 By ‘demographic factors’ here I mean such things as the ‘nature’ of buyers, whether low income, middle 
income or high income earners; the importance of the product or service traded to the buyers such as 
whether it is something the buyers by their nature, culture, tastes, and inclinations, etc, can live with or 
without, thereby influencing the level of its demand and supply. 
947  R. D. Blair & J. L. Harrison, (1999) 68 George Washington LR 1, 37. 
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tax-refunds should be the rule. However, our legal system is procedurally equipped to use 
expert evidence in appropriate cases. This area might be one in which experts may be 
useful to assist the courts in the determination of the extent of passing on where the 
claimant pleads that it did not fully pass-on the tax due to various factors affecting the 
business. The outcome can be much more reasonable than the outright ‘no defence’ 
approach. As the onus of proof in showing that he did not pass-on fully the tax is on the 
plaintiff, it will also be equipped to have such evidence. In short, despite some 
apprehension, I am of the view that we may cautiously admit a qualified form of passing 
on defence in the South African law of unjustified enrichment in cases of ‘inappropriate 
tax’ demands if a full refund would indirectly ‘overcompensate’ or compensate twice the 
plaintiff after recouping its losses. Such result would be inequitable and infringe the very 
purpose of an unjustified enrichment claim. This suggestion is an exploratory road-map 
alone, and its possible implementation is subject to the legal system maintaining its 
current ‘mirror-image gain-loss’ in the unjustified enrichment doctrine as a whole, for if 
that relation is altered, the all suggestion falls away.  
 
In sum, where there has been an inappropriately charged tax due to the 
unconstitutionality or illegality of the imposing legislation or norm, the claimant has a 
prima facie right to recover in full the tax so paid. However such right may be partially or 
entirely curtailed and the claimant denied restitution or the extent of recovery diminished 
if there are militating policy considerations to do so and the evidence clearly points to 
curtailing such prima facie right in the following scenarios: 
 
(i) Where the tax was not meant to be passed-on due to its nature and purpose, 
but had to be borne by the claimant, and the claimant nevertheless passed it on 
direct or indirectly to the consumers as higher price or otherwise, such as 
through ‘back-shifting’, or other mechanisms, the right to recover the said tax 
may be diminished according to the extent of the loss or extinguished 
altogether if losses have been fully recouped. 
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(ii) In the assessment of the extent of the loss, the court must first ascertain the 
nature of the tax at issue, the pricing mechanism used by the claimant, and any 
other relevant factors, as long as it remains objective.  
 
(iii) The claimant bears the onus of proof948 and must supply such evidence when 
alleging that it suffered loss as a result of the imposition of the said tax. 
  
(iv) Miscalculation or error in the computation of the tax either by the Revenue 
Service or by the claimant cannot be invoked for any form of passing on. 
 
Where the case does not lend itself amenable to percentage mark-up pricing, the 
problems of proof may be more difficult. In each case, however, the court should enquire 
into those problems to determine whether proof of passing on is infeasible. Only then 
does the conflict between the positive and countervailing policies become irreconcilable. 
Under such circumstances, it may be appropriate to preclude a passing on defence in 
order to ensure that the principle of legality is not undermined.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
948 Slightly contrary to this proposition would be the European Union which to some extent holds that ‘any 
requirement of proof which has the effect of making it virtually impossible or extremely difficult to secure 
the repayment of charges levied contrary to Community law would be incompatible with Community law’. 
See San Giorgio (Amministrazione delle Finanzedello Stato v SpA San Giorgio) (case 199/82, [1983] ECR 
3595, para 13); See also D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 748 note 248 and Baines v 
Commissioner for her Majesty’s Taxes [2005] EWHC 2300 (ch), para 6. But these observations are only 
relevant if it is extremely difficult to adduce the evidence, which is not the case if ‘mark-up pricing’ was 
indeed used. 
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CHAPTER VI. 
 
GENERAL CONCLUSION. 
 
 
The argument advanced throughout this thesis is that, once a legal system accepts the general 
principle against unjust or unjustified enrichment, it will also have to curb its potential broadness 
either through the defence of change of position/loss of enrichment or by other means. The model 
of unjustified enrichment adopted by a legal system will also determine its defences and their 
scope. Change-of-position is a more robust and all-encompassing defence to overcome potential 
injustices than other enrichment defences which operate only in particular contexts. The 
limitation of the general principle through the subsidiarity rule, which indirectly and implicitly 
amounts to a ‘defence’ to an enrichment claim by curtailing it at the liability stage, is also 
vulnerable to unjust outcomes949 as it may put off well deserving cases. 
 
The discussion demonstrates that enrichment law is now to greater or lesser extent entrenched as 
a separate branch of the law of obligations in all five jurisdictions under consideration, and that 
despite its inevitable link to equity,950 it is a general principle of law at the same level as all other 
                                                 
949  See in this regard the discussion under Brazilian law above in chapter four, part II: ‘Defences’, as well 
as the occasional treatment of the subsidiarity notion throughout the thesis. I deal in detail with the 
subsidiarity concept in unjustified enrichment claims (also in comparative perspective) in a separate 
publication to appear shortly elsewhere. For further references see also the study group for the European 
Civil Code, which has directly obliterated the concept of subsidiarity from the DCFR (March 2009) in 
Book VII of the Draft. The only exception apparently allowed is at art. VII - 6: 104 of the DCFR which 
says that the ‘enrichment book does not apply where the enrichment is obtained as a result of the 
disadvantaged person’s benevolent intervention in the enriched person’s affairs”, or said differently, the 
enrichment claim is disallowed where negotiorum gestio applies. The DCFR also sanctions change of 
position or loss of enrichment as a general defence (see DCFR VII – 5: 101), and obviously the general 
principle appears at the beginning of the book at VII – 1:101 as the basic rule (1) “A person who obtains an 
unjustified enrichment which is attributable to another’s disadvantage is obliged to that other to reverse the 
enrichment”. New insight on subsidiarity can also be gained from the Scottish case Transco Plc v Glasgow 
City Council (2005) SLT 958 and commented upon by N. R. Whitty at (2006) 10 Edinburgh LR 113-132. 
950  See D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) Chapter 12. 
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major categories.951 The major difference between the various systems is more in the scope that is 
ascribed to the principle than its denial, save exceptions. English law (or the common-law in 
general), after a long journey through the vagaries of quasi-contract, implied contract and 
‘restitution’ forests, has now finally arrived at its destination of fully sanctioning the unjustified 
enrichment doctrine as a general principle founded on the concept abhorring the retention of any 
‘benefit’ acquired at the expense of another in the absence of basis.952 The ‘absence of basis’ has 
been ‘introduced’ by Peter Birks in English law and, in my view, this approach is currently taking 
firm hold in England and the trend now seems to me as probably irreversible.953 Such ‘absence of 
basis’ is, however, cast in a special ‘pyramid’ scheme whose ‘lower layers’ are still formed by 
unjust factors954 with the ‘absence of legal basis’ as if the ‘super unjust factor’, by which Birks 
meant ‘a single proposition covers every case: an enrichment at the expense of another is unjust 
when it is received without explanatory basis’.955 In the determination of ‘basis’, the new 
approach uses both an objective and a subjective test.956 The determination is generally objective 
when the claim is related to ‘obligatory enrichment’; and it is subjective in relation to ‘voluntary 
enrichments’.957 In such new approach change of position becomes increasingly important.  
 
For American law, in turn, the ideals driving its current reform or restatement continue in the 
footsteps of Keener & Costigan’s assertion, as modified with time, that ‘the principle which 
forbids the defendant enriching himself at the expense of the plaintiff should also clearly forbid 
the plaintiff indemnifying himself at the expense of an innocent and blameless defendant’.958 The 
new Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment closely adheres to the traditional 
                                                 
951 See chapter one and two above for more details. But see contrary views supported as late as the year 
2001 among others by  Alan Farnsworth in American law (E.A. Farnsworth et al, Contracts: Cases and 
Materials 6th Ed (NY 2001) who still thought that unjust enrichment is an appendage of contract; or J. 
Rogers (2007) 42 Wake Forest LR 55-99, who thinks that ‘the law of restitution’  is an appendage of 
property law; or still as D. Rendleman and D. Laycock who collectively take the view that ‘Restitution’ is 
just a remedy to be bundled together with many other remedies such as injunctions (interdict or other 
mandatory devices), specific performance, declaratory relief, damages calculations, etc. See generally C. 
Saiman (2008) 28 Oxford JLS 99 at 102.   
952  P. B. H. Birks, Unjust Enrichment, 2nd Ed (2005) 116; see also T. A. Baloch (2007) 123 LQR 636; & C. 
Saiman (2008) 28 Oxford JLS 99. 
953  Not everyone however will agree that the trend is almost irreversible, as the unjust factor approach is 
deeply entrenched in case law and the change might be a little unsettling in some cases.  
954  P. B. H. Birks, Unjust Enrichment 2nd Ed. (2005) 11-117. Birks uses ‘unjust factors’ as tools to indicate 
when the basis can fail.  
955  P. B. H. Birks, Unjust Enrichment 2nd Ed. (2005) 116. See also T. A. Baloch (2007) 123 LQR 636, at 
639. 
956  Contrast this position with the German position under § BGB 812(1) which uses an objective approach. 
See generally R. Zimmerman and J.E. Du Plessis (1994)  RLR 14. 
957  T. A.  Baloch (2007) 123 LQR 636, 641. 
958  (1906) 20 Harvard LR 205, 215. 
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American view, the liberal philosophy encapsulated in the general principles abhorring non-
consensual transfers and forced exchanges.959 While traditionally the American law of restitution 
is rooted in the ‘unjust factor’ approach, the current Restatement of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment technically takes no position face to the switching allegiance of English law from the 
‘unjust factor’ to the ‘legal ground’ approach, but the Restatement firmly claims that ‘instances of 
unjustified enrichment are both predictable and objectively determined because the justification 
in question is not moral but legal’.960 For some commentators the Restatement’s silence is due 
neither to intellectual timidity, nor to its inability to decide between the competing theories;961 but 
it is rather that the Restatement’s ‘failure’ to address the issue proceeds from the assumption that 
nothing turns on this debate. For many American scholars and theorists,962 and even a 
considerable body of judicial statements (case law), supports the view that it is ‘irrelevant’ as to 
whether the field is described in terms of ‘unjust’ or ‘unjustified’ enrichment.963 It must however 
be noted that, in addition to Louisiana’s enrichment law, which is inspired by the civil-law, three 
other ‘common law’ jurisdictions (states) include clearly the ‘absence of legal justification’ as an 
element of the prima facie case of unjust enrichment. Thus, claimants in North Dakota, Arizona 
and Delaware, in addition to the other ordinary elements,964 must prove an ‘absence of basis’ to 
succeed in an enrichment claim.  
 
Canada as said in the first chapter has firmly moved to the ‘absence of juristic reason’ approach 
as clarified in Garland’s965 case. In all these jurisdictions change-of-position assumes 
increasingly a vital role as the principal defence to enrichment claims. 
 
When change of position/loss of enrichment is the avenue chosen to curb the wide enrichment 
principle, such limiting mechanism will manifest itself in two different variants, namely the 
                                                 
959  See generally M. P. Gergen (2005) 13 RLR 224, 225; and M.P. Gergen (2002) 71 Fordham LR 709. 
960 Restatement (Third) of Restitution, Discussion Draft at § 1, Comment b. 
961 C. Saiman (2008) 28 Oxford JLS 99, 121, footnote 123. 
962  These academics include the Reporter, A. Kull, who as recently as 13 December 2007,in exchange with 
the Canadian professor J. Neyers at the Restitution Roundtable held at Washington and Lee Law School, 
defended such position. See C. Saiman (2008) 28 Oxford JLS 99, 121 footnote 124. 
963  See Restatement (Third) of Restitution § 1 comment b, and Reporter’s notes; C. Saiman (2008) 28 
Oxford JLS 99, 121, footnote 123-125. See the note immediately below for examples of judicial statements. 
964 The full extent of an enrichment claim in these jurisdictions requires (i) and ‘enrichment’; (ii) an 
impoverishment; (iii) a connection between the enrichment and the impoverishment; (iv) absence of 
justification for the enrichment and the impoverishment; and (v) an absence of a remedy provided by law’. 
See particularly the recent cases McGhee v Mergenthal, 735 NW 2d 867, 872 (ND 2007); Jackson National 
Life Insurance Co  v Kennedy 741 A 2d 377, 393-94 (Del Ch. 1999); Trustmark Ins. Co v Bank One, 
Arizona, NA 48 P 3d 485, 491 (Ariz. App 2002). 
965 Garland v Consumers Gas [2004] SCC 25; [2004] 1 SCR 629; (2004) 237 DLR (4th) 385 (roughly at 
pages 40-46 on the SCC Report). 
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‘reliance version’ and the ‘disaster version’. On the reliance version, as explained in chapter one 
above, the defendant is absolved in full or in part from liability in restoring the benefit received at 
the expense of another, because on the faith of receipt he has disposed of that benefit in the belief 
that it was his own; on the ‘disaster version’, the defendant is absolved from the obligation 
because the benefit received has been lost in circumstances in which he is not to blame,966 
regardless whether it was received in good faith or in bad faith. In both versions, requiring the 
defendant to ‘disgorge the benefit received, which no longer exists, would be equivalent to seeing 
him as the insurer of the plaintiff’967 and expecting him to ‘deplete his own assets which are no 
longer, or have not been swollen, by the defendant’s wealth, and such fact would be utterly 
inequitable.  
 
If a legal system deliberately or otherwise omits loss of enrichment as the general defence, it will 
still find ways to circumscribe the liability under unjustified enrichment doctrine. One such 
approach is the general tendency of cases falling within the ambit of loss of enrichment being 
either denied outright at the liability stage or, if they do go forward, they might be framed and 
defended in part under the norms dealing with impossibility of performance in general. In this last 
version, special reliance is placed on the good faith doctrine. Depending on whether a system is 
codified or un-codified, there is almost a need of a complex cross-referencing between various 
sets of rules and doctrines.  
 
In the categorization of bad faith (as the reverse of the good faith doctrine), which thwarts the 
defence, it is proposed that where the defendant has received money, he cannot generally raise the 
defence of change of position or loss of enrichment, if he spends it in the knowledge that the 
claimant does not or did not mean him to have it, and he (the claimant) is legally entitled to have 
it back. The same applies where such knowledge would have been regarded by the world at large 
as sufficiently clear enough, and would constitute an outcry to the public for the court to side with 
the defendant, if spending the money in the circumstances would be regarded as a dishonest thing 
                                                 
966  D. P. Visser (2008) 718 analyzing German law describes also two versions of the defence there. Citing 
Schulze et al, BGB Handkommentar § 818 marginal note 10, he notes that one version of loss of 
enrichment is ‘an enrichment falling away without a substitute’ [‘Bereicherung die ersatzlos wegfallen’], 
while the other ‘loss of enrichment constituted by detrimental side-effects’ entails mostly ‘expenditure in 
respect of that which had been received – such as the fact that the enrichment-debtor paid freight costs, or 
taxes, or storage fees, or the costs of repair of a thing which had been obtained without a legal ground’. 
This second aspect is essentially the reliance version I have been referring to, though there are some 
nuanced differences, and the first may essentially correspond to the ‘disaster version’. The ‘uneconomical 
use of a benefit’ which is a further way an enrichment can be lost (as provided for by T. Krebs (2001) 281), 
is essentially a ‘disaster version’ of the defence on my analysis.  
967  L.D. Smith  (2001) 79 Texas LR  2115, 2148-49. 
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to do. Dishonesty in this instance represents the ‘bad faith’ aspect proscribing the defence. Bad 
faith here, in turn, is to be viewed as encompassing both a ‘self-conscious’ dishonesty as well as 
‘unself-conscious’ dishonesty.968 That is so, because where the defendant, for example, knows 
that the payment was made by mistake, the position is to be assumed to be quite straightforward: 
he must therefore return the benefit so acquired. It must be noted, however, that there are 
situations in which, despite that knowledge, the recipient’s conscience may be absolutely clear 
and his behaviour absolutely reasonable. In such cases, though the recipient knows that he is not 
entitled to such a benefit, he may have been led to believe that he must apply what he received in 
a particular way.969 In these circumstances his belief in being entitled and bound to pay away the 
money is what counts, not his knowledge that he was not himself entitled to the benefit.970
 
Notwithstanding the above, difficulties might still arise where the defendant does not know for 
sure, but he has ground for believing that the payment has been made by mistake. In such cases, 
there is a possibility of finding that good faith may indicate that an extra inquiry be made to 
ascertain the veracity of the issue.   
 
Be it as it may, the problem of how to measure the enrichment itself will remain in certain 
circumstances, because enrichment claims do not arise in a uniform manner. Some claims arise 
from ‘unilateral’ voluntary performances, others from involuntary performances, and there are 
those that arise from failed reciprocal agreement situations, as discussed in chapter three above, 
or in any other forms. Given the diversity and complexity of situations in which enrichment 
claims arise, it is a perennial problem the question whether to require in all and any enrichment 
claims the return of the ‘value received’ or that of the ‘value remaining’.971 It is contentious 
because once a general principle against unjustified enrichment is sanctioned, the observable 
tendency in several legal systems is to move away from being concerned with the ‘value 
received’ to aiming at securing a disgorgement of the ‘value remaining’972 or at least aspiring to 
getting rid-of the ‘net enrichment’ view and favouring an ‘itemised concept of enrichment’ 
liability, whose inevitable outcome is also the sanctioning of the defence of change of position/ 
                                                 
968  [2002] 2 All ER 705 EWHC (Comm.), [par. 135].  
969  Such was indeed what happened in African Diamond Exporters v  Barclays Bank  1978 (3) SA 699 (A).  
970  P. B. H. Birks, ‘Change of position: Nature of the Defence…’ in M. McInnes (Ed) Restitution & 
Development in Unjust Enrichment (1996) 52. 
971  See chapter 1 above for the evolution of this thinking.  
972   S. Swann, ‘The Structure Of Liability For Unjustified Enrichment: First Proposals of The Study Group 
On An European Civil Code’ in R. Zimmernann (ed) Grundstrukturen eines Europäischen 
Berecherungsrechtsn (2005) 279; D. P. Visser ‘Unjustified Enrichment in Comparative Perspective’ in M. 
Reimann & R. Zimmermannn (ed) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (2006) Chapter 30, p. 991.  
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loss of enrichment. But the application of ‘value remaining’ as the measure of enrichment often 
leads to incongruity in particular cases where the enrichment arose from failed reciprocal 
agreements.973 In such situations it is strongly thought that the ‘value received’ should be the 
appropriate measure974 because it would be inequitable if one of the contracting parties were 
allowed to rely on change of position due to an inability to return what he had received.975 This 
facet of the law is sometimes dealt with under the rubric of restitutio in integrum.976 Hence, 
though the application of the general principle against unjustified enrichment leads generally to 
sanctioning the ‘value remaining’ as the logical measure of enrichment in most instances, a 
caveat for its inapplicability in the cases of claims arising from failed synallagmatic agreements 
must be recognised as an inevitable exception. In other words, change-of-position as a defence 
cannot generally be made available in such circumstances.  The proscription of loss of enrichment 
in synallagmatic contracts is further justified on the understanding that though an enrichment 
remedy within contracts does not necessarily redistribute the risks allocated by the contract, in the 
overwhelming majority of cases an enrichment remedy applied within a ‘functioning’ contract 
has greater possibilities of redistributing such risks. For this reason, a more sensible construction 
of the contract would be required. 
 
The issue of ‘value received’ versus ‘value remaining’ surfaces also in the context of inflation 
and in the attempt to adjust monetary value according to specified indexes as art. 884 of the 
Brazilian Civil Code envisage. The main complications it raises in such context is to establish (i) 
the reason why between two innocent parties on such situations the loss is to be borne by the 
defendant and not by the claimant, and (ii) if ‘adjustment’ is made, and the legal system sanctions 
a claim of interest as a ‘fruit’ accruing to the principal sum, to ascertain on which ‘principal 
amount’ an interest accru ng to an undue payment or an enrichment sine causa expressed in 
money is to be calculated. If it is on the nominal value received, then interest can indeed start to 
run when the claimant received the money or at least on the litis contestatio day; but if interest is 
to be assessed on the ‘adjusted value’, it is not possible to say that interest starts to run before that 
amount is actually established with certainty. Therefore, there seem to be incongruency between 
                                                 
973  The contention of ‘value received’ versus ‘value remaining’ surfaces also in the context of inflation and 
in the attempt to adjust monetary value according to specified indexes as art. 884 of the Brazilian Civil 
Code envisage. Full discussion of this issue appears at Part III in chapter IV of the thesis.  
974  See P. Hellwege (1999) 7 RLR 93.  D. P. Visser (supra) 992. 
975  Ibid.  
976  For a detailed discussion of the restitution in integrum see the recent Article by P. Hellwege (2004) 
Juridical Review 165. 
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the amount claimable as a principal sum for the unjustified enrichment claim itself, and the fruit 
accruing to such principal, that also appears might be claimable.  
 
Another common contentious issue, although it is so only to a degree, is to know whether in the 
application of the change of position defence in the ‘reliance version’ a distinction should be 
required between anticipatory reliance expenditure and subsequent reliance expenditure. There is 
often no unanimous answer to the question, as various approaches are advanced to defend one 
position or the other. In several common law jurisdictions, in particular, there is a conflicting 
message that in some cases which seem to expressly or impliedly assert that anticipatory reliance 
is a sine qua non for the availability and success of a change-of-position defence,977 while in 
others the requisite is either by-passed or offset by other policy considerations. Thus cases such as 
South Tyneside MBC v Svenska International Plc978 and Hinckley and Bosworth BC v Shaw979 
assume diametrically the opposite views embraced in cases such as RBC Dominion Securities v 
Dawson980  and Dextra Bank Trust Co v Bank of Jamaica.981 The position advanced in Svenska 
case that ‘the defendant raising the change-of-position defence could not point to anticipatory 
expenditure incurred in reliance on the supposed validity of a void interest swap transaction’ led 
the court to a controversial distinction that where the defendant ‘has incurred detriment in 
reliance upon the payments he had received rather than upon his belief that the agreement under 
which they were made was valid’,982 or as Birks put it, a ‘strict distinction between relying on the 
receipt and relying on the validity of the underlying transaction’.983 But this distinction has come 
under fire, at least in English law, for the majority of commentators are of the view that the 
defence might become unduly narrow, if ‘all instances of reliance on the validity of the 
underlying transaction had to be excluded’, as it is difficult to construct any rational case for 
excluding reasonably anticipatory reliance from the defence.984 This new position is the one that 
                                                 
977 It is to be remembered that § 142 of the American Restatement of Restitution (1937) as well as section 
(§ 65) expressly limit the defence to changes of circumstances which supervene ‘after the receipt of the 
benefit’. The current version is still being drafted as section 69-71 (Restatement (Third) of Restitution & 
Unjust Enrichment, Tentative Draft 1 (2001) and cross-referenced to illustrations 33-35 as well as §§ 65 
and 67. Thus far it seems to still keep the spirit of § 142 or is somewhat ‘ambiguous’ or at best silent. 
978  [1995] 1 All ER 545. 
979  [2000] LRG 9, 51. 
980  (1994) 111 DLR (4th) 230. 
981  (2002) 1 All ER (comm.) 192. 
982 See full discussion of this distinction in Charles Mitchell (2005) LMCLQ 168, 180. 
983 P. B. H. Birks ‘Change of position and Surviving Enrichment’ in Swadling (Ed), The Limits of 
Restitutionary Claims (1997) Ch. 2. 
984  P. B. H. Birks ‘Change of position and Surviving Enrichment’ in W. Swadling (ed) The Limits of 
Restitutionary Claims (1997) Ch. 2; J. Beatson & E. Schrage (ed) Unjustified Enrichment (2003) 108 (§ 
3.E.3). 
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is becoming entrenched in English law since the pronouncement in Dextra Bank Trust Co v Bank 
of Jamaica.985 For our purposes, though it might currently be considered a moot point in South 
African law, it does not seem plausible to make such fine distinctions, and therefore the approach 
under BGB § 818(3) in such cases is preferable. It does not really matter whether the reliance 
upon which the defendant acted preceded or was subsequent to the transaction, if all other 
elements of the defence are satisfied, the defendant should succeed. 
 
Finally, it must be acknowledged that, despite considerable advances in the understanding of the 
notion of unjust or unjustified enrichment, the concept can still be understood in at least three 
different ways as expelled out in details in chapters one, two and four, namely: (i) as a principle 
of  ‘Aristotelian’ equity, providing correction when normally sound rules produce unjust or 
unjustifiable results in particular cases; (ii) as a ‘legal principle’ incorporating a broad notion of 
justice, from which courts can deduce solutions for particular problems requiring restoration of 
advantages or benefits acquired or derived at the expense of another;986 and (iii) or as simply a 
generic concept expressing a common theme of restitution cases, i.e.; as a descriptive and 
organizational principle, which plays no role in judicial decision-making.987 In the face of these 
diverse positions, the first major task in the determination and consideration of a loss of 
enrichment/change-of-position defence is really to establish under what guiding philosophy the 
defence operates. In other words, there is a correlation between the strength of the principle 
underpinning the claim and the vigour of the defence to the claim. Where the guiding philosophy 
of the enrichment doctrine is the notion of ‘Aristotelian equity’ and the enrichment doctrine 
assumes more the characteristics of corrective justice, the scope of the change-of-position defence 
is more likely to encompass both the ‘reliance version’ as well as the ‘disaster version’, but its 
‘reliance version’ may not be as robust as where the guiding norm is a full-fledged general ‘legal 
principle’ incorporating a broad notion of justice.    
 
From the aforesaid it can be concluded that the successful application of change of position as a 
general defence to enrichment claims, is directly proportional to the willingness of the legal 
                                                 
985  (2002) 1 All ER (comm.) 192. 
986  This notion corresponds mostly with the current Brazilian, South African and also English and 
Canadian positions, though England and Canada could straddle both the first and the second view, and in 
some cases the third one as well. In the broader classification current South African law could equally fit to 
a certain extent the first category, if one considers that it still lacks a general principle. But the 
developments achieved so far, puts it more in the second group than the first one. 
987 This third view is mostly defended by Australian writers and also to some extent by few American and 
English theorists such as C. Saiman (2008) 28 Oxford JLS   99-126; Stephen Hedley, Restitution: Its 
Ordering and Division (2001), etc (see generally chapter 1 & 2 above). 
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system fully to accept that unjustified enrichment is a general principle sui generis which is not 
an offshoot of other branches of law, though it has relations to them, but it is an independent area 
of law founded upon the notion that no person should be allowed to benefit at the expense of 
another without justification.988 As a matter of principle, the doctrine of change of position, once 
sanctioned, will apply as a defence to all claims in unjustified enrichment,989 save those arising 
from synallagmatic failed agreements, as just stated above. In practice, however, given the need 
for the recipient to establish the good faith requirement or as it is variously described that ‘the 
lack of ‘knowledge’ of the facts entitling the other to restitution at the time of his purported 
change-of-position’, the major impact of the doctrine will always be in connection with the 
receipt of money on mistake990 and probably few other instances outside that realm.   
 
Can monetary inflation qualify as a form of change of position/circumstances? If so, how would it 
operate? What difficulties are there proving or disqualifying this potential head of the defence? 
  
These questions may arise incidentally where a legal system is faced with a hyper-inflation and to 
cope with the problem in claims expressed in money it decides to generalise a regime of monetary 
correction based on specific indexes. That was the avenue, for example, chosen by Brazil as seen 
throughout the thesis. The new Brazilian Código Civil of 2002 appended ‘monetary adjustment’ 
to the general principle against unjustified enrichment.991 Though my view expressed in the thesis 
is that such appendage to the general principle was unfortunate, as it throws the general principle 
into confusion, that does not mean that the issue should not feature within the enrichment 
doctrine, rather that the Brazilian drafters should have done so in a separate provision in order to 
ensure that the issue is not left to the discretion of the judges. What does really inflation tell us in 
such contexts? It tells us that the process of inflation can give rise to a multitude of problems, 
amongst which the most salient for our purposes are the issue of revalorization and discharge.  
 
While revalorization (in our context) presupposes a debt that must be paid or re-paid in certain 
monetary units and thereby the possibility of adjustment; discharge, on the other hand, tells us 
that the contentious issue is a contract or arises from a contract and the fulfilment of the 
obligation is subject to underlying cost variations. If inflation is seen from the perspective of 
possibly discharging the contract, the concept presupposes a voluntary agreement between the 
                                                 
988  D. 50.17.206 (Pomponius).  
989 G. H. Fridman  &  J. C. McLeod, Restitution, Restitution (1982) 606. 
990  Ibid. 
991  Brazilian new Civil Code art. 884. 
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parties, and inflation might be seen as one of the risks voluntarily assumed; when it is seen from 
the notion of revalorization, the concept does not necessarily presuppose a contract between the 
parties; it may also entail a unilateral act. In cases of devaluation neither the impossibility to 
restore the benefit received nor bad faith are part of the matter,  because the  receiver is ready to 
restore the benefit received, with the only problem that the ‘purchasing power’ of the money has 
diminished. Restoring nominally the same units as received corresponds ‘numerically’ with 
restoring the ‘value received’, but value-wise, it actually corresponds to the ‘value remaining’. 
Given that both parties might be innocent there is no reason to shift the loss from one innocent 
party to another innocent party who neither made a mistake nor brought about the event that led 
to the decline of the value. As from the perspective of the parties such an incident (currency 
devaluation) is more similar to a supervening event outside their control and where both parties 
are in the position of two innocents the position of the defendant is to be considered the better. 
The corollary of this assertion is that should legislation be lacking in order to address the issue, 
there would still be room for judicial pronouncement and the change-of-position defence would 
be available in the circumstances. In short, the rationale presented for change-of-position in the 
‘disaster version’ of the defence, would  mutatis mutandi apply in these cases. The loss shall lie 
where it currently stands.  
  
But there are borderline cases. Arguing that the defence of change of position should be 
considered in cases of inflation, it would also bring the query whether the same should be 
considered in cases of deflation,992 with the difference being that the ‘beneficiary’ of the claim (in 
cases of deflation) would be the plaintiff. Thus, this situation arguably could bring symmetry to 
the law. Why is that the case?  
 
That would be the case because on the general reading of the justification at the heart of change 
of position where it assumes the ‘aspect’ of a disenrichment defence, is that ‘a claimant may be 
denied a remedy; even though the defendant may have recovered a benefit by consuming the gain 
transferred to him.993  The law in these circumstances has chosen to favour the defendant’s 
security of receipt over the plaintiff’s right to restitution, because it is found to be a sound 
philosophy and good policy that an innocent and honest defendant should never be left worse off 
                                                 
992 While inflation is the phenomenon which occurs when money becomes relatively less valuable than 
goods, deflation is simply the opposite of that phenomenon, in that over time money becomes relatively 
more valuable than the other goods in the economy. Deflation generally occurs when the following four 
elements combine: (i) the supply of money goes down, (ii) the supply of other goods goes up, (iii)  the 
demand for money goes up, (iv) the demand for other goods goes down. 
993  M. Rush, The Defence of Passing on (2006) 170. 
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as a result of being unjust or unjustifiably enriched. If the enrichment came about as the result of 
an innocent mistake there is no reason for shifting the loss from an innocent but mistaken party to 
an innocent defendant who committed no mistake.994 Therefore, in such circumstances the risk of 
being left out of pocket is placed on the claimant and not on the defendant.995 But the main 
problem in cases of inflation is that there is no mistake from either party. It is a ‘fortuitous’ event 
to both of them. Who then should shoulder such a risk? 
 
Based on the assumption that where typically the change-of-position defence assumes the form of 
disenrichment (loss of enrichment) the risk is placed on the claimant and not on the defendant, 
some commentators theorise that it would also be a fair policy (an appropriate reasoning) if the 
claimant would also accrue the benefit of an increased enrichment.996 Thus, Michael Rush, for 
example, argues that where the defendant increases or decreases the value of his unjust gain, 
provided he is compensated for his skills and labour (where such are applicable), the claimant 
should be awarded restitution for the remaining sum. In this way, an innocent defendant is never 
left worse off as a result of being unjustly enriched, and the plaintiff would recover this value of 
any profits made via the use of the wealth. Consequently, if the claimant bears the risk of losing 
his money to an honest and innocent recipient, he should also gain from an increase in value of 
the benefit transferred.997  
 
This argument is however unrealistic and flawed. The issue does not square within the 
enrichment doctrine, in that if deflation appreciates the value of the currency, it cannot be said 
that that accrued/or regained value to the defendant was at the expense of the claimant nor such 
benefit accrued to the defendant without legal ground. The appreciation is a mere casus fortuitous 
not ascribable to the parties, and cannot give rise to any obligation, nor affect the measure of 
enrichment. If the money has now more purchasing power, tough luck to the defendant. He 
cannot reduce the amount due with such argument based on changed circumstances.   
 
Difficult problems also arise in the application of enrichment principles in the public law sphere, 
particularly where taxes have been collected by the public authority, which are subsequently 
declared as ‘inappropriately charged’.  The main issue explored in this regard is the defence of 
passing on, the merits and demerits of such defence, and the contention that it is another face of 
                                                 
994  H. Matter (1982) 92 Yale LJ 14, 42. 
995  M. Rush, The Defence of Passing on  (2006) 170. 
996  Ibid. 170. 
997  Ibid. 171. 
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change of position. The underlying principles are that if the general principle against unjustified 
enrichment requires the plaintiff to have suffered a corresponding loss, which throughout the 
thesis I have termed as the ‘mirror-image gain-loss’, then, where the plaintiff has passed on the 
alleged loss to others, he should not be entitled to recover it from the defendant, because he (the 
plaintiff) is either the wrong party to the claim or else if allowed to recover, he would be 
infringing the same principle he is invoking be applied against the defendant.   
 
Proving passing on however might be a challenging task. Thus, to the argument that passing on 
should not be accepted in South African legal system (the ‘no-defence approach’ as advocated by 
Visser and others998), not because it is in principle infeasible rather than on account of the 
complexities and/or near impossibility of establishing the proof, this thesis contends that such 
complexities may be partially overstated and some subtleties in the nature of the cases may have 
been overlooked. It is therefore submitted that the ‘no defence’ approach should be qualified and 
due consideration given to the availability of the defence if the imposts at issue were not meant to 
be passed-on, but were nevertheless passed-on and in circumstance where the claimant used 
‘mark-up pricing’ in the operation of his business. The claimant bears the onus of proof and must 
supply the required evidence when alleging that he suffered loss as a result of the imposition of 
the tax at issue.  
 
Another contentious issue raised was to know whether change of position as a defence should be 
available to the government/public authorities. There are pros and cons in allowing public 
authorities to make use of the defence, but ultimately the problem goes down once again to the 
two features of change of position – the ‘reliance version’ and the ‘disaster version’. It was shown 
in chapter five above that it is incredibly difficult for the government to prove the reliance version 
of the defence. For example, where it collected the money from taxpayers, it would be nearly 
impossible to prove with substantial detachment that a specific sum of money collected or 
expected from one taxpayer is the one that was destined to and used in a particular activity or 
project.  The government will seldom, if ever, make the case that ‘but for’ the receipt, it would 
not have undertaken certain activities or projects, because it is an ordinary task of public 
authorities to undertake public projects. Therefore, given such near impossibility of establishing 
the ‘but for’ requirement, the defence of change of position should not be available to a public 
body on the ‘reliance version’.  
 
                                                 
998  See chapter five above for details and others writers contending the same. 
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The case is however different on the ‘disaster version’, which, in my view, is viable both in 
principle and on policy grounds. If the benefit received was lost due to a disaster, such as a 
‘drastic and unexpected and unpredictable economic disaster’, or where the benefit received was 
money and there has been a sudden and uncontrollable inflation of the currency, which has wiped 
out both private and state’s wealth, and such a situation does not depend on the local authorities, 
in principle, the defence could be available to the state.  
 
The main discussion also highlighted that it is a contentious issue classifying the winding up the 
consequences of ‘frustrated contracts’ utilizing the unjustified enrichment doctrine, as such 
approach is prone to inevitably bringing with it the availability of the defence of change of 
position to a ‘contracting party’, and thereby subverting bargains. But it was also pointed out that 
not all cases do fall within the ‘subverting bargains’ rationale, and therefore the unjustified 
enrichment doctrine is still the appropriate avenue for winding up such cases. And if the doctrine 
applies, the ‘value remaining’ as the measure of enrichment, comes once again into play. Faced 
with this impasse one is bound to find an exit door to the dil mma. The probable avenues are:  
either (i) declare that the model of winding up the consequences of a failed contract within the 
unjustified enrichment doctrine is not valid at all, for few would contest the correctness of the 
assertion that there can be no claim in unjustified enrichment unless the claimant shows that he 
was not otherwise obliged to confer the benefit in question, or (ii) if the model is valid and in 
appropriate circumstances the ‘value remaining’ cannot represent the measure of liability in 
unjustified enrichment, then a dual measure of liability must be sanctioned, or (iii) alternatively a 
concession must be made that the defence of change of position is not applicable to these cases, 
thereby acknowledging an important exception in the application of the defence. 
 
We have seen that where enrichment liability arises from ineffective bilateral agreements whose 
end came through breach, none of the discussed jurisdictions made use of the changed 
circumstances defence. If the end came through discharge due to impossibility of performance or 
frustration of purpose, it was highlighted that the current South African position is that the 
plaintiff as creditor always bears the risk if the thing goes under, unless the defendant was at 
fault.999 It was also emphasised that although such position is satisfactory is many instances, it 
leaves loopholes in the structure of the law, and it occasionally results in unjust outcomes. 
Consequently, in order to avoid such unjust outcomes, the proposition advocated here is to the 
                                                 
999  D. P. Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) chapters 9 and 12. 
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effect that where the performance became impossible, and no risk allocation was agreed between 
the parties, the risk of loss should be allocated to the party who has/had control at the time of the 
loss and could reasonably insure against the loss, as Visser1000 has recently argued. However, 
before the courts allocate the risk to such a party, due consideration must be had to the nature of 
the risk, whether it was endogenous or exogenous, to clearly establish the superior risk bearer. In 
essence, it is concluded that in bilateral agreements the defence of change of position/loss of 
enrichment is not to be made available to the parties, thereby establishing an important exception 
to the general defence as contended throughout the thesis. The measure of enrichment in such 
cases is therefore the ‘value received’.  
 
Finally, the thesis reiterates that in enrichment claims, in addition to the recognized 
instances of loss of enrichment as a defence, a severe devaluation of a currency is a 
candidate for a defendant to advance a change of position defence because where two 
innocents are affected for an event for which neither is responsible, the position of the 
defendant is to be preferred. The cardinal principle should always be that an ‘innocent 
person should not be made to restore more than the amount by which they have been 
enriched’ and not the other way around. 
 
 
                                                 
1000  Ibid.  
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APPENDIX 1. 
 
 
Brazilian Civil Code/ Código Civil do Brazil . 
 
TÍTULO VII   (TITLE VII). 
DOS ACTOS UNILATERAIS (ON UNILATERAL ACTS) 
CAPÍTULO II   ( CHAPTER II ) 
 
Da Gestão de Negócios  [Negotiorum Gestio] 
Art. 861. Aquele que, sem autorização do interessado, intervém na gestão de negócio alheio, dirigi-lo-á 
segundo o interesse e a vontade presumível de seu dono, ficando responsável a este e às pessoas com 
que tratar. 
 
 
Art. 861. He who intervenes in the administration of another’s affairs without authorization from ‘the domino’, 
must administer such affairs in accordance with the presumed will and interest of the domino, and shall be 
accountable to him and to the people with whom he deals.  
 
 
Art. 862. Se a gestão foi iniciada contra a vontade manifesta ou presumível do interessado, responderá o 
gestor até pelos casos fortuitos, não provando que teriam sobrevindo, ainda quando se houvesse abatido. 
 
 
Art. 862. The gestor shall answer even for fortuitous events if the administration was initiated against the 
manifest or presumed will of the domino, unless he proves that such events would have occurred anyway, 
even if he did not act. 
 
 
Art. 863. No caso do artigo antecedente, se os prejuízos da gestão excederem o seu proveito, poderá o 
dono do negócio exigir que o gestor restitua as coisas ao estado anterior, ou o indenize da diferença. 
 
 
Art. 863.—In the case of the preceding article, if the losses of the administration exceed its benefits, the 
owner of the business may demand that the gestor restore the things to the previous status or that he be 
compensated for the difference.  
 
 
Art. 864. Tanto que se possa, comunicará o gestor ao dono do negócio a gestão que assumiu, 
aguardando-lhe a resposta, se da espera não resultar perigo. 
 
 
Art. 864.—To the extent that it is possible the gestor shall communicate to the owner the administration that 
he has assumed, waiting for an answer if non peril results from waiting.  
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Art. 865. Enquanto o dono não providenciar, velará o gestor pelo negócio, até o levar a cabo, esperando, 
se aquele falecer durante a gestão, as instruções dos herdeiros, sem se descuidar, entretanto, das medidas 
que o caso reclame. 
 
 
Art. 865.—While the owner’s unavailability lasts, the gestor shall take care of the business up to the end.  
Should the owner die, he must wait instructions from the heirs without neglecting any measures that the 
case demands. 
 
 
Art. 866. O gestor envidará toda sua diligência habitual na administração do negócio, ressarcindo ao dono 
o prejuízo resultante de qualquer culpa na gestão. 
 
 
Art. 866.—The gestor shall apply his usual diligence in the administration of the business, compensating the 
owner for losses resulting from his fault in the administration.   
 
 
Art. 867. Se o gestor se fizer substituir por outrem, responderá pelas faltas do substituto, ainda que seja 
pessoa idônea, sem prejuízo da ação que a ele, ou ao dono do negócio, contra ela possa caber. 
Parágrafo único. Havendo mais de um gestor, solidária será a sua responsabilidade. 
 
 
Art. 867. If the gestor replaces himself for another, he shall accountable for the shortcomings of his 
substitute even if he is a competent person, without prejudice of an action imputable to him or to the owner 
of the business 
Paragrafo único:   If there is more than one gestor, the responsibility shall be ‘in solidum’.   
 
 
Art. 868. O gestor responde pelo caso fortuito quando fizer operações arriscadas, ainda que o dono 
costumasse fazê-las, ou quando preterir interesse deste em proveito de interesses seus. 
Parágrafo único. Querendo o dono aproveitar-se da gestão, será obrigado a indenizar o gestor das 
despesas necessárias, que tiver feito, e dos prejuízos, que por motivo da gestão, houver sofrido. 
 
 
Art. 868.—the gestor shall answer for fortuitous events when he engages in risky operations even if the 
owner used to do them, or when the gestor forgoes the owner’s interests to further his own interests. 
Parágrafo único: If the owner wants to take advantage of the administration, he is obliged to indemnify the 
gestor of the necessary expenditures that he made and of the losses he incurred because of such 
administration.  
 
 
Art. 869. Se o negócio for utilmente administrado, cumprirá ao dono as obrigações contraídas em seu 
nome, reembolsando ao gestor as despesas necessárias ou úteis que houver feito, com os juros legais, 
desde o desembolso, respondendo ainda pelos prejuízos que este houver sofrido por causa da gestão. 
§ 1o A utilidade, ou necessidade, da despesa, apreciar-se-á não pelo resultado obtido, mas segundo as 
circunstâncias da ocasião em que se fizerem. 
§ 2o Vigora o disposto neste artigo, ainda quando o gestor, em erro quanto ao dono do negócio, der a outra 
pessoa as contas da gestão. 
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Art. 869.—If the business was finally administered, the obligations incurred in the name of the owner are 
imputed to him (the owner),  and he must refund to the gestor any necessary and useful expenditures that 
he has made with legal interest. The owner must also pay damages that the gestor suffered for 
administering his business.. 
§ (1).—The usefulness or the necessity of the expenses shall be valued not by the result obtained, but 
according to the circumstances of the occasion in which their were incurred.  
§ (2). The provisions of this article apply even when the gestor, in error as to the owner of the business, 
gave the accounts of the administration to another person.   
 
 
 Art. 870. Aplica-se a disposição do artigo antecedente, quando a gestão se proponha a acudir a prejuízos 
iminentes, ou redunde em proveito do dono do negócio ou da coisa; mas a indenização ao gestor não 
excederá, em importância, as vantagens obtidas com a gestão. 
 
 
Art. 870.—The provision of the preceding article apply when the gestor made himself available (acted) to 
avoid imminent losses, or the action benefited the owner of the business or of the thing (the domino). 
However, the compensation to the gestor shall not exceed in value the benefits obtained with the 
administration.  
 
 
Art. 871. Quando alguém, na ausência do indivíduo obrigado a alimentos, por ele os prestar a quem se 
devem, poder-lhes-á reaver do devedor a importância, ainda que este não ratifique o ato. 
 
 
Art. 871.—If someone feeds a person that must be fed in the absence of the one bound to provide food to 
such person,  he [the Samaritan] can recover his costs from the debtor even if the debtor does not ratify the 
act.  
 
 
Art. 872. Nas despesas do enterro, proporcionadas aos usos locais e à condição do falecido, feitas por 
terceiro, podem ser cobradas da pessoa que teria a obrigação de alimentar a que veio a falecer, ainda 
mesmo que esta não tenha deixado bens. 
Parágrafo único. Cessa o disposto neste artigo e no antecedente, em se provando que o gestor fez essas 
despesas com o simples intento de bem-fazer. 
 
 
Art. 872. Funeral expenditures made by third parties (which are proportional to local uses and to the 
condition of the deceased) may be billed (charged) to the person that would have had the duty to feed the 
person that has died (the deceased), even if the deceased left to assets.  
Parágrafo único. What is said in this article and the previous one cease if it is proved that the gestor made 
such expenditures with mere charity intention (with the mere intention to do a good thing). 
 
 
Art. 873. A ratificação pura e simples do dono do negócio retroage ao dia do começo da gestão, e produz 
todos os efeitos do mandato. 
 
 
Art. 873. The mere and simple ratification of the owner of the affairs (the domino) is retroactive to the day 
the administration (gestio) started, and it has all the effects of a mandate.  
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Art. 874. Se o dono do negócio, ou da coisa, desaprovar a gestão, considerando-a contrária aos seus 
interesses, vigorará o disposto nos arts. 862 e 863, salvo o estabelecido nos arts. 869 e 870. 
 
 
Art. 874. – If the owner of the business, or of the thing, disapproves of the administration, considering it as 
contrary to his interests, the provisions of arts. 862 and 863 shall apply, save what is provided for in arts. 
869 and 870.  
 
 
Art. 875. Se os negócios alheios forem conexos ao do gestor, de tal arte que se não possam gerir 
separadamente, haver-se-á o gestor por sócio daquele cujos interesses agenciar de envolta com os seus. 
Parágrafo único. No caso deste artigo, aquele em cujo benefício interveio o gestor só é obrigado na razão 
das vantagens que lograr. 
 
 
Art. 875.  – If the affairs of another are linked to that of the gestor (administrator) in such a way that it is not 
possible to administer them separately, the gestor (administrator) shall be deemed as a partner of the 
person whose interests he administered with his own affairs. 
Parágrafo único: In the case of this article, the person in whose benefit the gestor has intervened is only 
bound for the ratio of the advantages accrued to hi   (the ratio of the extent to which he benefited). 
 
 
 
CAPÍTULO III (CHAPTER III) 
 
Do Pagamento Indevido (On Undue Payment). 
 
 
Art. 876. Todo aquele que recebeu o que lhe não era devido fica obrigado a restituir; obrigação que 
incumbe àquele que recebe dívida condicional antes de cumprida a condição. 
 
Art. 876.—Whoever received what was not due to him is obliged to restore it; the obligation is also 
applicable to whoever receives a conditional debt before the fulfillment of the condition. 
 
Art. 877. Àquele que volu tariamente pagou o indevido incumbe a prova de tê-lo feito por erro. 
 
Art. 877--.He who has paid voluntarily what was not due bears the onus to prove that he did so by mistake.  
 
Art. 878. Aos frutos, acessões, benfeitorias e deteriorações sobrevindas à coisa dada em pagamento 
indevido, aplica-se o disposto neste Código sobre o possuidor de boa-fé ou de má-fé, conforme o caso. 
 
Art. 878. To the fruits, accessions, improvements and deteriorations ‘accrued’ to the thing given in undue 
payment apply the provisions of this Code dealing with a good-faith possessor or a bad faith possessor, as 
the case may be. 
 
Art. 879. Se aquele que indevidamente recebeu um imóvel o tiver alienado em boa-fé, por título oneroso, 
responde somente pela quantia recebida; mas, se agiu de má-fé, além do valor do imóvel, responde por 
perdas e danos. 
Parágrafo único. Se o imóvel foi alienado por título gratuito, ou se, alienado por título oneroso, o terceiro 
adquirente agiu de má-fé, cabe ao que pagou por erro o direito de reivindicação. 
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Art. 879. If the one that has unduly received an immovable transfers it in good faith and for value, the 
respondent is only accountable for the quantity received; but, if he acted in bad faith, he is accountable for 
losses and damages plus the value of the immovable.  
Parágrafo único: ‘If the immovable was transferred without value, or, if, transferred for value, the third party 
who acquired it acted in bad faith, whoever has paid by error has the right to a reivindicatory action’. 
 
Art. 880. Fica isento de restituir pagamento indevido aquele que, recebendo-o como parte de dívida 
verdadeira, inutilizou o título, deixou prescrever a pretensão ou abriu mão das garantias que asseguravam 
seu direito; mas aquele que pagou dispõe de ação regressiva contra o verdadeiro devedor e seu fiador. 
 
 
Art. 880. Is exempt from restitution of an undue payment whoever that, after receiving it as part of a true 
debt, has invalidated the title, has allowed the claim to prescribe or has relinquished the guaranties that had 
secured his right; but he who has paid has the right to a regressive action against the true debtor and his 
guarantor.  
 
 
Art. 881. Se o pagamento indevido tiver consistido no desempenho de obrigação de fazer ou para eximir-
se da obrigação de não fazer, aquele que recebeu a prestação fica na obrigação de indenizar o que a 
cumpriu, na medida do lucro obtido. 
 
 
Art. 881. If the undue payment consists in the exercise of an obligation to do or to ‘prevent’ an obligation not 
to do, he who has received the performance is obliged to indemnify the one who fulfilled the obligation to the 
extent of the profits made.  
 
 
Art. 882. Não se pode repetir o que se pagou para solver dívida prescrita, ou cumprir obrigação 
judicialmente inexigível. 
 
 
Art. 882. - There is no restitution for what was paid to solve a debt that has prescribed, or to fulfill a judicial 
obligation non demandable [inexigível]. 
 
 
Art. 883. Não terá direito à repetição aquele que deu alguma coisa para obter fim ilícito, imoral, ou proibido 
por lei. 
Parágrafo único. No caso deste artigo, o que se deu reverterá em favor de estabelecimento local de 
beneficência, a critério do juiz. 
 
 
Art. 883. He who has given something to obtain an illicit, immoral or a aim prohibited by law has no right to 
restitution. 
Parágrafo único:  In the case of this article, what was given shall revert in favour of local charity as the judge 
directs.  
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CAPÍTULO IV (CHAPTER IV). 
Do Enriquecimento Sem Causa (On Enrichment Sine Causa). 
 
 
Art. 884. Aquele que, sem justa causa, se enriquecer à custa de outrem, será obrigado a restituir o 
indevidamente auferido, feita a atualização dos valores monetários. 
Parágrafo único. Se o enriquecimento tiver por objeto coisa determinada, quem a recebeu é obrigado a 
restituí-la, e, se a coisa não mais subsistir, a restituição se fará pelo valor do bem na época em que foi 
exigido. 
 
Art. 884. He who, without just cause, is enriched at another’s expense, is obliged to restore what was unduly 
obtained, after ‘updating (or adjusting) the monetary values. 
Parágrafo único: If the object of the enrichment claim consists in a specific thing, he who has received it is 
under a duty to restore it, and, if the thing does no longer subsist, its restitution shall be effected by its value 
at the time it was demanded. 
 
Art. 885. A restituição é devida, não só quando não tenha havido causa que justifique o enriquecimento, 
mas também se esta deixou de existir. 
 
Art. 885. Restitution is due not only when there has been no causa that justifies the enrichment, but also 
when such a causa ceased to exist. 
  
Art. 886. Não caberá a restituição por enriquecimento, se a lei conferir ao lesado outros meios para se 
ressarcir do prejuízo sofrido. 
 
Art. 886. No restitutionary action for enrichment shall be entertained if the law grants to the aggrieved party 
other means to redress the loss suffered.  
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APPENDIX  2. 
 
Brazilian Civil Code / Código Civil do Brazil 
DAS OBRIGAÇÕES DE DAR 
 
Seção I 
 
Das Obrigações de Dar Coisa Certa (On Obligations to Give Certa Res). 
(My own Translation). 
Art. 233. A obrigação de dar coisa certa abrange os acessórios dela embora não 
mencionados, salvo se o contrário resultar do título ou das circunstâncias do caso. 
Art. 233. The obligation to give a certain thing [certa res] encompasses its accessories even if 
not mentioned, save if the contrary results from a title or the circumstances of the case 
provide otherwise.  
Art. 234. Se, no caso do artigo antecedente, a coisa se perder, sem culpa do devedor, antes 
da tradição, ou pendente a condição suspensiva, fica resolvida a obrigação para ambas as 
partes; se a perda resultar de culpa do devedor, responderá este pelo equivalente e mais 
perdas e danos. 
Art. 234. In the case of the preceding article if the thing is lost without the debtor’s fault before 
the transfer or while a suspensive condition is pending, both parties are absolved from the 
obligation; if the loss is the result of the debtor’s fault, he (the debtor) is liable for its equivalent 
plus losses and damages.  
Art. 235. Deteriorada a coisa, não sendo o devedor culpado, poderá o credor resolver a 
obrigação, ou aceitar a coisa, abatido de seu preço o valor que perdeu. 
Art. 235. If the thing deteriorates in circumstances where the debtor is not to blame, the 
creditor can terminate the obligation, or accept the thing after reducing from its price the value 
that it has lost.  
Art. 236. Sendo culpado o devedor, poderá o credor exigir o equivalente, ou aceitar a coisa 
no estado em que se acha, com direito a reclamar, em um ou em outro caso, indenização 
das perdas e danos. 
Art. 236. If the debtor is to blame, the creditor can demand its equivalent, or accept the thing 
as it is. In both cases he has the right to claim he be indemnified for losses and damages.  
Art. 237. Até a tradição pertence ao devedor a coisa, com os seus melhoramentos e 
acrescidos, pelos quais poderá exigir aumento no preço; se o credor não anuir, poderá o 
devedor resolver a obrigação. 
Parágrafo único. Os frutos percebidos são do devedor, cabendo ao credor os pendentes. 
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Art. 237. The thing with its improvements and additions belongs to the debtor until it is 
transferred. The debtor can demand increase in price for the thing for its improvements and 
additions; if the creditor does not agree, the debtor can terminate the obligation.  
Parágrafo único: The fruits received belong to the debtor; those pending belong to the 
creditor.  
Art. 238. Se a obrigação for de restituir coisa certa, e esta, sem culpa do devedor, se perder 
antes da tradição, sofrerá o credor a perda, e a obrigação se resolverá, ressalvados os seus 
direitos até o dia da perda. 
Art. 238—If the obligation is to restore a certain thing, and this thing, without the debtor’s 
fault, is lost before the transfer (tradictio), the creditor shall ‘suffer’ the loss, and the obligation 
will be terminated, save his rights up to the date of the loss.  
Art. 239. Se a coisa se perder por culpa do devedor, responderá este pelo equivalente, mais 
perdas e danos. 
Art.239—If the thing is lost due to the fault of the debtor, the debtor shall answer for its 
equivalent, plus the losses and damages.  
Art. 240. Se a coisa restituível se deteriorar sem culpa do devedor, recebê-la-á o credor, tal 
qual se ache, sem direito a indenização; se por culpa do devedor, observar-se-á o disposto 
no art. 239. 
Art.240.—If the thing that must be restored deteriorates without the debtor’s fault, the creditor 
must receive it, as it is, without any right to be indemnified; the provisions of article 239 shall 
be applicable if it deteriorates due to the debtor’s fault.  
Art. 241. Se, no caso do art. 238, sobrevier melhoramento ou acréscimo à coisa, sem 
despesa ou trabalho do devedor, lucrará o credor, desobrigado de indenização. 
Art. 241— In the case of art. 238, should there be any improvement or addition to the thing, 
without any labour or expense of the debtor, the creditor shall take the benefit, without any 
obligation to indemnify.  
Art. 242. Se para o melhoramento, ou aumento, empregou o devedor trabalho ou dispêndio, 
o caso se regulará pelas normas deste Código atinentes às benfeitorias realizadas pelo 
possuidor de boa-fé ou de má-fé. 
Parágrafo único. Quanto aos frutos percebidos, observar-se-á, do mesmo modo, o disposto 
neste Código, acerca do possuidor de boa-fé ou de má-fé. 
Art. 242—If in order to effect the improvement or the addition, the debtor has done some 
work, the case shall be regulated by the norms of this Code that deal with improvements done 
by a good-faith or bad-faith possessor.  
 
Parágrafo único: As regard the fruits received, the provision of this Code on good-faith and 
bad-faith possessors shall apply. 
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Seção II 
Das Obrigações de Dar Coisa Incerta 
(On Obligation to Give an uncertain thing). 
Art. 243. A coisa incerta será indicada, ao menos, pelo gênero e pela quantidade. 
Art. 243__An uncertain thing shall be indicated at least by its genus or by its quantity. 
Art. 244. Nas coisas determinadas pelo gênero e pela quantidade, a escolha pertence ao 
devedor, se o contrário não resultar do título da obrigação; mas não poderá dar a coisa pior, 
nem será obrigado a prestar a melhor. 
Art. 244__Where the things are determined by genus and by quantity, the choice is that of the 
debtor, if the contrary does not result from the title of the obligation; but he (the debtor) shall 
not give a worse thing, nor shall he be obliged to give the better thing.  
Art. 245. Cientificado da escolha o credor, vigorará o disposto na Seção antecedente. 
Art. 245__The dispositions of the preceding Section apply as soon as the creditor becomes 
aware of the choice.  
Art. 246. Antes da escolha, não poderá o devedor alegar perda ou deterioração da coisa, 
ainda que por força maior ou caso fortuito. 
Art. 246_Before the choice the debtor may not allege loss or deterioration of the thing, even 
for force majeure or a fortuitous event.  
 
CAPÍTULO II 
Das Obrigações de Fazer (On the Obligation to Do). 
 
Art. 247. Incorre na obrigação de indenizar perdas e danos o devedor que recusar a 
prestação a ele só imposta, ou só por ele exeqüível. 
Art. 247__A debtor who refuses an obligation that is only imposed on him incurs the 
obligation to indemnify for losses and damages.   
Art. 248. Se a prestação do fato tornar-se impossível sem culpa do devedor, resolver-se-á a 
obrigação; se por culpa dele, responderá por perdas e danos. 
Art. 248__If the performance of the matter becomes impossible without the debtor’s fault, the 
obligation is extinguished; if the impossibility is due to the debtor fault, he shall respond for 
losses and damages.  
Art. 249. Se o fato puder ser executado por terceiro, será livre ao credor mandá-lo executar 
à custa do devedor, havendo recusa ou mora deste, sem prejuízo da indenização cabível. 
Parágrafo único. Em caso de urgência, pode o credor, independentemente de autorização 
judicial, executar ou mandar executar o fato, sendo depois ressarcido. 
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Art. 249__If performance may be executed by a third party and the debtor refuses or falls in 
mora, the creditor shall be free to order it to be executed at the debtor’s expense without 
prejudice to the indemnification deriving from the action.  
Parágrafo único: In cases of emergency, the creditor may, independently of a judicial 
authorization, execute or have the matter executed and be compensated latter.  
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APPENDIX 3. 
 
Selected Provisions of the  
 
Código Tributário National (Brasil). 
(Brazilian National Tax Code). 
 
SECÇÃO III – Pagamento Indevido 
(Sction III – Undue Payment). 
 
Article. 165.  
 
O sujeito passivo tem direito, independentemente de prévio protesto, à restituição                    
total ou parcial do tributo, seja qual for a modalidade do seu pagamento, ressalvado o disposto 
no § 4º do artigo 162, nos seguintes casos: 
 
 I - cobrança ou pagamento espontâneo de tributo indevido ou maior que o devido em face da 
legislação tributária aplicável, ou da natureza ou circunstâncias materiais do fato gerador 
efetivamente ocorrido; 
 II - erro na edificação do sujeito passivo, na determinação da alíquota aplicável, no cálculo do 
montante do débito ou na elaboração ou conferência de qualquer documento relativo ao 
pagamento; 
 III - reforma, anulação, revogação ou rescisão de decisão condenatória. 
 
 
Art. 165 – Save the disposition of paragraph 4 of Art. 162, the passive subject has the right to 
total or partial restitution of a tax in the following cases, regardless of any previous protestation 
and whatever might have been the modality of its payment:  
(i) –- the spontaneous charging or he payment of an undue tax or a levy which is higher 
(greater) than that which is due in the face of the applicable tax legislation, or of the nature or 
material circumstances of the fact that effectively gave rise to what happened;  
(ii) – a mistake in the establishment ‘(edification)’ of the passive subject, in the determination 
of the applicable ‘flat tax’ [alíquota], in the calculation of the amount of the debit, or in the 
conferral of any document regarding the payment;  
(iii) – reform, annulations, revocation or rescission of a ‘condemnatory’ (penal) decision. 
 
Art. 166.  A restituição de tributos que comportem, por sua natureza, tranferência do respectivo 
encargo financeiro somente será feita a quem prove haver assumido o referido encargo, ou, no 
caso de tê-lo transferido a terceiro, estar por este expressamente authorizado a recebê-la. 
 
Art. 166 ‘Restitution of taxes that, by their nature, entail transfer of the said financial burden shall 
only be effected to someone that proves to have undertaken the said burden, or, in the case he 
has transferred it to a third party, the transferee must expressly have authorised him to receive it.     
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Código do Consumidor (Brazil) . 
(Brazilian Consumer Code) . 
 
 
Art. 42. - da cobrança  de dívidas.   “Na combrança de débitos, o consumidor inadimplente não será 
exposto a ridículo, nem será submetido a qualquer tipo de constrangimento ou ameaça. 
 
  
Parágrafo único – ‘O consumidor cobrado em quantia indevida tem direito à repetição do indébito, por valor 
igual ao dobro do que pagou em excesso, acrescido de correcção monetária e juros legais, salvo hipótese 
de engano justificável” . 
 
 
Art. 42  On Demand of Debts. 
 
When demanding debts, a consumer who has not performed shall not be exposed to 
ridicule, nor shall he be subject to any kind of constraints or threat.   
 
Paragráfo único. 
A Consumer that has been billed for an amount not due has the right to a claim for 
restitution (repetitio of the undue amount) assessed as twice as the amount that he has 
paid in excess, to which value it shall be added the monetary correction (monetary 
adjustment) and legal interest, except in the hypothesis of a justifiable error.   
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  APPENDIX IV. 
 
Selected Provisions of the German BGB mentioned often in this thesis. 
 (English translation as it appears in (1999) Restitution Law Review (1994) 14ff). 
 
BGB §  812. [Grundsatz]. 
 
(1)--Wer durch die Leistung eines anderen oder in sonstiger Weise auf dessen Kosten etwas ohne 
rechtlichen Grund erlangt, ist ihm zur Herausgabe verpflichtet. Diese Verpflichung besteht auchen 
dann, wenn der rechtliche Grund spatter wegfällt oder der mit einer Leistung nach dem Inhalte des 
Rechtsgeschäfts bezweckte Erfolg nicht eintritt. 
 
(2)--Als Leistung gilt auchen die durch Vertrag erfolgte Anerkennung des Bestehens oder des 
Nichtbestehens eines Schldverhältnisses.  
 
 
BGB § 812 [Principle]. 
 
(1)-- A person who, through an act performed by another, or in any other manner, acquires 
something at the expense of the latter without any legal ground, is bound to return it to him. This 
obligation subsists even if the legal ground subsequently disappears or the result intended to be 
produced by an act to be performed pursuant to the legal transaction is not produced. 
 
(2)-- Recognition of the existence or non-existence of a debt, if made under a contract, is also 
deemed to be an act of performance. 
 
 
BGB §  816. [Verfügung eines Nichberechtigten]. 
 
(1) – Trift ein Nichtberechtigter über einen Gegenstand eine Verfügung, die dem Berechtigten 
gegenüber wirksam ist, so ist er dem Berechtigten zur Herausgabe des durch die Verfügung 
Erlangten verpflichtet. Erfolgt die Verfügung unentgeltlich, so trifft die gleiche Verpflichtung 
denjenigen, welcher auf Grund der Verfügung unmittelbar einen rechtlichen Vorteil erlangt.  
 
(2)— Wird an einen Nichtberechtigten eine leistung bewirk, die dem Berechtigten gegenüber 
wirsam ist, so ist der Nichtberechtigte dem Berechtigten zur Herausgabe des Geleisteten.  
 
BGB § 816  [Disposition by a person without Title]. 
 
(1) --If a person without title to an object makes a disposition of it which is binding upon the person 
having title, he is bound to hand over to the latter what he has obtained by the disposition. If the 
disposition is made gratuitously the same obligation is imposed upon the person who acquires a 
legal advantage directly through the disposition.  
 
(2)—If an act of performance is done for the benefit of a person not entitled thereto, which is 
effective against the person entitled, the former is bound to hand over to the latter the value of such 
performance. 
 
 a
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BGB §  818.  [Umfang des Bereicherungsanspruchs]. 
 
(1) – Die Verpflichtung zur Herausgabe erstreckt sich auf die gezogenen Nutzungen sowie auf dasjenige, 
was der Empfänger auf Grund eines erlangten Rechtes oder als Ersatz für die Zerstörung, Beschädigung 
oder Entziehung des erlangten Gegenstandes erwirbt.  
 
(2) -- Ist die Herausgabe wegen der Beschaffenteit des Erlangten nicht möglich oder ist der Empfänger aus 
einem anderen Grunde zur Herausgabe ausserstande, so hat er den Wert zu ersetzen. 
(3) - Die Verpflichtung zur Herausgabe oder zum Ersatze des Wertes ist ausgeschlossen, soweil der 
Empfänger nicht mehr bereichert ist. 
 
 
BGB § 818 – [Extent of Enrichment Claim]. 
 
(1) - The obligation to return extends to emoluments derived, and to whatever  the recipient 
acquires either by virtue of a right obtained by him, or as a compensation for the destruction, 
damage or deprivation of the object detained.  
 
(2) - If the return of that which was received is no longer possible due to its condition, or if the 
recipient is on other ground not able to return it, he has to replace its value. 
 
(3) --The obligation to return [that which was received] or replace its value falls away insofar as the 
recipient is no longer enriched. 
 
  
 
 b
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